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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

SPECIAL EDITION

CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . Vice Admiral R. L. Conolly, USN

RUSSIA 1
Prof. Hans Kohn

GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA 21
Dr. John A. Morrison

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM 57
Dr. James Burnham

RISE OF SOVIET POWER 81
Dr. Merle Fainsod

SPIRIT OF TITOISM 105
Dr. Bertram Wolfe

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES . . 133
Dr. Demitri B. Shimkin

BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

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INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the same benefits as the resident students of the Naval War College. Distribution is authorized to officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—both regular and reserve—of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and above. It will be kept in the possession of officers only and destroyed by burning when no longer required.

As a reader of the articles herein, most of which are transcriptions of lectures delivered before the Naval War College, you share the same privilege as the resident students in receiving the speakers' frank remarks and personal opinions. As a reader, you also share the same responsibility of respecting the privacy of the speakers' expressions. This is true irrespective of the security classification.

The Naval War College Lecture Program has always been of great benefit and interest to officers because the speakers have been willing to talk frankly, thus contributing their most objective thinking to meet the needs of the students without having to consider the possible viewpoints and reactions of an unknown audience.

INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

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平時出汗愈多
戰時流血愈少

"The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war."

—An old Chinese Proverb

FOREWORD

The purpose of this Special Edition of INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS is to pass along some of the excellent lectures relating to Russia, the Soviets, and Communism to the officers of the naval service. The resident students of the Naval War College have found such lectures as these tend to stimulate a desire for additional knowledge of this great land mass with its two hundred million souls; moreover, they inspire further study of the factors which have enabled the Politburo to gain some control over eight hundred million humans.

I consider the naval officer of today must have a thorough understanding of the factors involved in the development of a national strategy which will effectively support our national interests. In war or in time of uneasy peace one should know his adversary. These lectures deal with an important aspect of the world situation which must be considered. It is hoped that they will serve to stimulate the interest of the reader in this subject. Enclosed herein is a brief bibliography which may be of benefit to the officer who desires to expand his knowledge.

The Naval War College is deeply indebted to the lecturers who have generously devoted the time and effort to edit their lectures, and who have cheerfully given permission to publish them here for the benefit of the officers throughout the service in all parts of the world.

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
President
U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

RUSSIA

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 7 September 1951 by
Prof. Hans Kohn

Gentlemen:

In trying to discuss briefly the background and understanding of Russia today, I shall first say a few words about the geographic situation of Russia and the changes which have occurred in it throughout the ages. We can divide Russian history in four epochs according to the capital in which Russia and Russian power was concentrated at that time. As you probably all know, what we call today Russia began in the Ninth Century about 1000 years ago with a settlement in what we call today Western Russia; that means a settlement of traders which went from the Baltic Sea through Novgorod and Kiev, down to the Black Sea. It was around this western river line that Russia originated.

At that time this Russia, from Novgorod to Kiev, was in close touch with Europe. At that time Russia was the eastern frontier of Europe and during that time there were two important events which determined Russian history: *First*, the acceptance of Christianity—not from Rome, as the Germanic peoples did, but in its Eastern Greek form from Constantinople, through influences which expanded north from the Black Sea up the Dnepr to Kiev. Russia was never a part of that European community formed by the influence of Roman law and classical civilization.

Professor Hans Kohn is a distinguished lecturer, author and historian. He was born in Czechoslovakia and lived in Russia during the period of the Bolshevik Revolution. He came to this country in 1931 and is now Professor of History at City College, New York.

Secondly, these early Russians formed along these rivers a protective bastion of Europe, defending Europe against the Asiatic horsemen tribes who poured through the gate south of the Ural Mountains. The Slav settlements found the necessary cohesion only by calling in Scandinavian Vikings as rulers and organizers. The descendants of this house of Rurik ruled Russia for seven centuries.

In the Thirteenth Century the Russians succumbed to the last great wave of these Asiatic horsemen, the Mongols or Tatars under Genghis Khan. And other great leaders who spread into Europe were thrown back from Europe proper from Silesia in Germany or today in Poland, but conquered the whole of Russia. For about 300 years Russia was under Tatar domination; Kiev was destroyed; Western Russia broken, and from this moment on a new Russia grew up—no longer the Dnepr, no longer along the river which flows into the Black Sea with its gateway to the Mediterranean—but this time, as you know, around Moscow, a city founded about 800 years ago in primeval forests where then Finnish tribes lived. The Russian peasants, who from Kiev spread to the northeast to settle around Moscow, intermingled there with this Finnish and later Mongol or Tatar population. It was through the strength and ruthlessness of the Russian Princes of Moscow, from Rurik's family, that Moscow became the centre of the second Russia.

Now if you will look at the situation of Moscow, you will see that Moscow is no longer on a river which connects through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and which leads up to the Baltic Sea, but it spreads along a river called Moskva which flows into the Oka; and the Oka flows near a city called today Gorki (but called Nizhni Novgorod until recently) into the Volga; and the Volga, as you know, into the Caspian Sea. That means that from Moscow

no river, no road leads to Europe, even not to Byzantium or Constantinople; all the roads lead to Asia. And Moscow, in its whole character, in everything it has done in its social and intellectual life, was much more under Asiatic than under European influence. In fact we can say that this *second* Russia—the Russia of Moscow—was no longer the eastern border of Europe, but the western border of Asia; no longer the bulwark of Europe against horsemen from Asia, but a bulwark of Asia against European influences.

This *second* Russia—the Russia of Moscow—was replaced at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, under Peter the Great in 1703, by a *third* Russia—a Russia of which Peter the Great was the founder and the greatest ruler—which he established in St. Petersburg, a city newly founded by him in marshland which never had been Russian. He had only recently conquered the land from Sweden. Determinedly, he built then a European city, but he built it by methods inherited from Moscow. It was the Moscow autocracy of Ivan the Terrible, though modernized by Western technology and administrative bureaucracy.

When Peter the Great came on the throne, Moscow and Russia were separated from Europe by three empires. One empire was the Swedish Empire, to which at that time Finland belonged. The Baltic Sea was then the Swedish Sea. The other empires were the Polish Empire and, south of it, the Turkish Empire. At that time what we call Southern Russia today (the approaches to the Black Sea) was part of the Turkish Empire.

These three empires—the Swedish Empire, the Polish Empire, the Turkish Empire—cut off Russia from Europe and even from the Black Sea; from the Mediterranean, from Constantinople, from Germany, from the whole of Europe. And from Peter the Great on, the effort of all Russian rulers has been to break down

this barrier which separated Russia from Europe, and to expand at the expense of these three intermediary empires—the Swedish one, the Polish one, the Turkish one. You know that Peter the Great achieved the first part of this assignment. Peter the Great destroyed the Swedish Empire and with this destruction he annexed the Baltic Provinces to Russia.

Poland, as you know, was destroyed by one of his great successors, Catherine II, and from that moment on the whole effort of Russia was directed to destroying the Turkish Empire. Catherine II began by conquering Southern Russia.

And now when Peter the Great destroyed the Swedish Empire, he founded an entirely new centre wishing to change Russia fundamentally, turning her away from Asia and turning her resolutely towards the west. St. Petersburg was a port at the mouth of the Finnish Gulf, of the Baltic Sea, and here from St. Petersburg Russia did no longer look eastward but tried to look westward.

From Peter the Great on we may say that Russia tried to shift her frontier more and more westward and more and more southwestward—towards Berlin, towards Vienna, towards Constantinople. But now I wish to make one point which I think is very important to stress today. Though the Russian effort to move this frontier more and more westward had been steady, there have been very long intervals in which the frontier was not moved at all. And the most famous interval in that period was that from 1815-1914.

As you remember, in 1815 at the time of the Congress of Vienna which settled the European affairs after the Napoleonic Wars, Russia was the most powerful nation in Europe. You see

there a strange parallel between 1815 and let's say 1945—a parallel which, however, like all parallels in history does not go too far. In any case at this time the then Russian Tsar, Alexander I, played a role somewhat similar to that of the Russians today. He owned the largest army in Europe (and it meant at that time in the world) and the Russian Army had defeated Napoleon in the same way as the Russian Army of our own time defeated Hitler. And we may say for the very same reason.

Again, I wish to recall to you that during the war we were told again and again that it was only thanks to Stalin's leadership, thanks to the industrialization of Russia by the Bolshevik regime, that Russia was able to defeat Hitler and to drive the Hitlerites back out of Russia. Now that may be or may not be the case, but one thing is certain: that the very same thing was accomplished by the Russians without Stalin and without the benefits of the Bolshevik regime in 1812-1813.

Don't forget that in 1812 the Russians did the very same thing which they did in 1942-1943; they were invaded by the army of Napoleon (at that time "la grande armee"), as large an army, as modern an army, as proud an army as Hitler's army was for its own time in 1941. Napoleon's army was as much disliked in Russia as Hitler's army was, and more so, we may say. If we ask ourselves, "Who was the greater general, the greater strategist —Napoleon or Hitler?"—undoubtedly most people would answer, "Napoleon was." And the Russian people, by their patriotism and stamina, with the help of the Russian space and Russian winter, without the benefit of Stalin or the benefit of Bolshevism, crippled the French Army as well as they crippled later the German Army.

In any case, in 1814-1815 the position of Russia was a position inspiring awe throughout Europe. And at that time there was

general widespread fear that Russia would not be satisfied with her frontiers of 1815, but would try to push on towards the west. And now I think it is important to note that this did not happen. Russia's western frontier from 1815 was *not* expanded until 1945 and that later thing only on the ground of Hitler's war against the Russians. The Russians did not expand their western frontier for 130 years in spite of the fact that they made minor attempts to change it.

These minor attempts were made in four wars against Turkey. The effort was made to change the frontier in the southwestern direction and all this effort did not lead very far—and did not lead very far thanks to the resistance of Europe. Think of the Crimean War—The Crimean War was nothing else but the resistance of united Europe—Britain, France, Sardinia, and Austria against the attempt of the Russians to expand in the Balkans. The important thing to keep in mind is that for 150 years Russia did not expand in spite of minor efforts of trying to do it, and did not do it thanks (I would say) to the superior diplomacy and political strategy of the West—especially the British.

At that time the British had the leadership of what we might call "the resistance to Russian expansion"; something very similar to our situation today. And the British succeeded, at the expense of one war (the Crimean War); a very localized and minor war, as you know, to keep Russia in Europe within bounds. I wish to draw your attention to the most important event (which you all know, of course) when the British succeeded by superior diplomacy, exquisite polite firmness, and readiness for war, *without war*, to stop the Russians. And that was at the time of the great Balkan War, the Russian-Turkish War of 1877. You remember that in this war the Russians succeeded for the first time to break across the Balkan Mountains—after the famous long siege of Plevna and the

famous Turkish defense of the Shipka Pass—to break through and to approach Constantinople proper, and to impose upon Turkey the Peace Treaty of San Stefano in February, 1878—a Peace Treaty which would have destroyed Turkey in Europe practically to a situation as it is today—Constantinople left, everything else to be greater Bulgaria, which the Russians then expected to be what we call today "a Russian satellite."

Now as you know at that moment the (then) Prime Minister of Britain, Disraeli (the Earl of Beaconsfield) did something similar to what I think we are trying to do today in a certain way: by diplomatic strength and by readiness for a show of force, without having too much force in reality, to force the Russians into negotiations. You know that at that time Disraeli sent the British fleet into the Sea of Marmara and for the first time Indian troops were ordered to Europe to the Island of Malta. Disraeli made a show of force in spite of opposition in Britain itself by the Liberal Party under Gladstone. Most people were afraid that the British-Russian War was imminent. It was assumed that nothing could prevent it.

Then Disraeli, with the help of Bismarck, called the Berlin Congress in the summer of 1878. As a result of this Congress, *without war* Britain achieved a tremendous victory; the Peace of San Stefano was abandoned; Greater Bulgaria was *not* created; Turkey remained strong; and, as you know, Disraeli returned from there (from Berlin) with the Turkish Isle of Cyprus under British administration to England. That means Disraeli came back bringing as it was then said, "peace with honour." It was really "peace with honour" because the clash between Britain and Russia (which was believed could not be averted at all) did not happen then, nor since.

Since 1878 until today, Britain has not been at war with Russia. Disraeli achieved it by firmness and an intelligent diplomacy; I still believe diplomacy the most important weapon existing in the international field and to which military means should remain subordinate. He brought back real "peace with honour" and the Russian advance into the Balkans was stopped, until the Hitlerite military aggression gave Russia the opportunity which British diplomacy had successfully prevented.

To return to the main line of my subject, Peter the Great created a *third* Russia—a third Russia which was regarded as a part of Europe. Russia had not been a part of Europe between the Thirteenth and the Eighteenth Centuries. Neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation, neither the commercial nor the scientific revolution of the Seventeenth Century reached Russia. But Russia was not a part of Asia, either. It is important to emphasize this because today sometimes Russian propaganda wishes to point out Russia as an Asiatic people—especially, as you know, in Asia amongst the Indians and other Asiatic people the Russians try to pose as Asians. They are not Asians; they are not either Europeans. The Russians are something of their own kind, *sui generis,* something between Europe and Asia—not Europeans, certainly not Asiatics, either.

And now this period—this period of Russia's growing contact with Europe—which lasted from Peter the Great until 1918, came to an end when Lenin in 1918 shifted the capital back from St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) to Moscow, and today we are in the *fourth* chapter of Russian history. *First,* Russia of Kiev; *second,* Russia of Moscow; *third,* Russia of Saint Petersburg; and now, again, Russia of Moscow. And this Russia of Moscow, like the old Russia of Moscow, is directed against Europe.

As I have heard, Dr. Burnham spoke here yesterday about "The Philosophy of Communism." As you know, the government of Lenin which transplanted Russia back from Petrograd to Moscow was a Communist government. And now you know very well that Communism had its origin *not* in Russia, but in Western Europe—in Brussels, in London, in the Rhineland, wherever you wish to say. It might appear as if the Marxisation of Russia would be an instrument of its Europeanization; it is not the case. I don't know the conclusion which Dr. Burnham arrived at yesterday, but I wish to point out that the Russians have an immense power to assimilate ideas and movements which come from outside and to Russianize them.

Now it happened that in Russia there is a Greek Orthodox Church which, as you know, came from Byzantium to Kiev. What happened is this: the Greek Orthodox Church in Russia is not today a Greek Orthodox Church, but a Russian Church. The character of the Russian people, its aspirations, assimilated, molded, transformed the Church. The very same thing happened with Marxism; though the texts remained more or less the same, the Hegelian tradition remained the same, the spirit was changed—Russified, completely transformed into something which is no longer Marxism but some kind of a new phase which is an amalgamation of certain Marxist elements with a Russian tradition which was born out of 500 to 900 years of history. Again, however, one thing is important: this Russia of Moscow is hostile to Europe and regards itself as it did in its previous period—as a bulwark of mankind against Europe.

And now I wish to point out that Marxist Communism in Russia today has become very largely a Russian faith. Marx wrote in the middle of the last century, and little of what he

wrote can be truly applied to the middle of the 20th Century without serious distortion. One should perforce speak of Leninism or of Stalinism today rather than of Marxism proper in Russia.

It is very difficult to evaluate Stalin correctly because we know very little about what Stalin really thinks. And that knowing little about Stalin is one element of strength on his side. He doesn't speak very much; he speaks very rarely, different from either Hitler or Mussolini (his co-dictators) and by speaking very little (and if he speaks, saying very little, too) you really don't know the man so well. We knew Hitler very well. You had only to listen to his speeches and the whole man was revealed in the way in which he spoke, in the way of his style, in every turn of his speeches. Stalin is a man who does not speak, secluded in the Kremlin—secluded like the old Moscow Princes of the Sixteenth Century without any touch even with the Russian people.

Don't forget one thing—Hitler, Mussolini loved to show themselves to their people. Mussolini went around; Hitler made speeches, traveled, kissed little children, asked wives how their husbands were—the things which politicians are doing. He behaved, from time to time, like any Ward Leader in Tammany Hall does; he really took interest in the people, showed himself, showed a certain warmth, a certain contact. Hitler or Mussolini were still human, "rottenly human," if you like, but still human. Stalin has nothing of this common humanity; he is never being seen except on two or three great public occasions. Very distant. He never mingles. You never see him. He is unapproachable like the old Russian Princes who were High Priests—Oriental High Priests in the Kremlin between whom and the people there was nothing in common whatsoever. A kind of deity or daemon is Stalin, today.

And therein he is very different from Lenin, too. I was in Russia in 1918-1919, when Lenin was in power, and you found nothing of that with Lenin. He was a normal human being, like Mussolini, mixing with the people, making speeches, going out. Stalin is a mystery, an oriental mystery, hidden behind the Kremlin walls; an icon, a picture for veneration—nothing more. That is not Marxism; it has nothing to do with Marx. It is an old Russian tradition before St. Petersburg, before Peter the Great; it is a return to the Old Moscow, a Tatar, Asian way of life—don't forget that.

And take one point more, and a very important point; namely, that what Stalin introduced and what did not exist with Lenin (in Communism) is the deification of the leader. The leader is no longer a human being, even not a human being like Mussolini, like Hitler, like Lenin. He is like a Byzantium emperor and an infallible High Priest, unapproachable yet ever-present; the fountain head of all justice, goodness, wisdom; omniscient in every field; a holy, but unattainable example for men. Today you cannot speak of Stalin in Russia as you could speak of Lenin. It is an entirely different approach, a return to the days of the greatest Moscow Prince.

If we wish to understand Stalin, I think we must think not only of Marx but of Ivan the Terrible, the great Prince of Moscow who ruled in the Sixteenth Century and who (as you know) was a man who created the strength of Moscow, the strength of Russia, but did it in *one* way—by eradicating, by wiping out all the remnants of liberty and individual rights in Russia, giving Russia a complete equality of all Russians who were equally nobody before the Tsar.

You must understand that there is in Russia since Ivan the Terrible an old tradition of "equality without liberty." That is

something not understandable to the West, because we accepted liberty—diversified liberty—privileges and rights of individuals, castes and orders before we had equality. Today we or the British have still much more individual liberty than we have full equality. Because liberty and equality are *not* synonymous; on the contrary, they may be conflicting. In Russia the conflict was started not by Stalin, but by Ivan the Terrible in that way that there was complete equality in Russia without any liberty whatsoever. Free was one alone—the Tsar; all others, whether they were aristocrats or peasants, millionaires or beggars, were equally nobody without any rights before the Tsar and his arbitrary will. This lawless autocracy had been replaced since Catherine II and Alexander II by a growing liberty under law, thanks to the growing contacts with Europe and the heroic struggle of the enlightened class of Russians.

Now this autocracy of "equality without liberty" Stalin introduced again. Mind, if you look at the trials of famous Bolsheviks in 1935-36-37-38 and recently in Hungary and so on, that would have been impossible under Lenin because being a Bolshevik under Lenin gave a higher degree, gave you more rights—that doesn't exist any more today. Today, everybody (the oldest Bolshevik and the oldest Capitalist) are equally without rights before Stalin. It is the old same form of equality without the slightest liberty or gradation for anybody. This oriental, primitive Moscow tyranny of Ivan the Terrible has been introduced in Russia and this, of course, was not there under Lenin. It is something that Stalin did—the old Moscow spirit. Yet, it should not be forgotten that not Stalin but Lenin was the first man to establish a totalitarian regime.

World War I was an immense tragedy because it destroyed the old Europe; an immense tragedy, also, because without World War I Lenin and the rise of Bolshevism would have been impossible

and Russia might have developed into a free, civilized land. A step further—Hitler, Mussolini would have been impossible without World War I and without the example of Lenin. Lenin begot Mussolini; Mussolini begot Hitler; and Hitler begot Stalin.

I think that it is very important to understand that Stalin is not only the disciple of Lenin; he is, in my opinion, also a disciple of Hitler. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Stalin became fascinated by Hitler, by Hitler's theory and Hitler's way, and Stalin learned very much from Hitler. When Lenin came to power in Russia he was *not* a Russian Nationalist. The Lenin Revolution did not wish to make the Russians strong, or stronger. Lenin was a true Internationalist, one of the few who ever ruled a great country. You know that he transfomed Russia (the Russian Empire) into a Soviet Union, into a union of equal peoples. His idea was not Russia leading the world, but the international proletariat; his idea was that from Russia the word of the Revolution would spread very quickly to Germany. And he was convinced that in 1918-1919 *Germany* would be leading the revolution, *not* Russia. He was a faithful Marxist though he, too, had been influenced by the anti-democratic, non-Western tactics of the Russian revolutionary movement—a movement of conspiracy, of secret methods, of ruthlessness.

He was a Marxist in that sense that he still believed that the leaders of the world revolution should be the most advanced proletariat and there was no doubt (with Lenin) that the Germans were the most advanced proletariat. Marx, Engels had been Germans, not Russians, and when Lenin was alive there was always the emphasis on Marx and Engels—of the Germans.

Under Stalin all that has changed. When Stalin took over from Hitler and what we can visualize in Russia, step-by-step, is one

thing—it is Nationalism, Chauvinism, the return to the old traditions. And we may say that today Russia has got a fusion of a Communist theory and of the Russian Chauvinism—a Russian Nationalist Communism. This was not there under Lenin and it is misleading to regard Russia today as the Russia of Lenin. It is the Russia of Stalin, of the present Stalin; a very late development, which set in after 1933.

This has two consequences: *first,* it has aroused dormant traditions of the Russians. The Russians have regarded themselves since the Sixteenth Century as the guardians of the "true faith." The Russians have had an idea since the Sixteenth Century that they were the chosen people—the people chosen by God to bring, through their faith to the whole of mankind, peace and justice—and to continue the mission of the Roman Empire. You remember that the Roman Empire was once (at least in its idea) a universal empire. And during the first two centuries of the imperial regime, from Augustus to Mark Aurelius, the Roman Empire really brought to mankind (in a way never seen before, never seen since) peace, prosperity, and justice. And mankind did not forget it. Until about 1500 all European people longed for a return of the Roman Empire, of this period of peace and justice, *pax et justitia,* for mankind.

And now, as you know, the center of the Roman Empire which originally was in Rome, Italy, was in the Fourth Century (in 333) transferred from Rome to Constantinople; in other words, a *second* Rome. And, mind, the old Rome had been a *pagan* Rome. Constantinople was a *Christian* Rome. It began as a Christian capital, the seat of the true Christian faith, of Orthodoxy. When Constantinople was overrun by the Turks in 1453, when the Roman Empire fell to the infidels, the question was, "Who will inherit the mission of the Roman Empire—where will be the new Rome?"

It was at that time that the Russians (the only independent people of the Orthodox faith) began to believe that there in Moscow was the *third* Rome, the real Rome, the truly Christian Rome, the Rome destined to bring to mankind peace and justice. And the feeling of being the chosen people—chosen for a very great mission, the mission to spread the true gospel all over the earth—was since then deeply ingrained in the Russian tradition. Lenin had no use for this tradition; Stalin revived it. Stalin regards again Moscow as a *third* Rome, from which a true gospel of peace and justice (named the gospel of "Communism" now) would spread all over the earth.

Now there is a second consequence to which I wish again to draw your attention. It makes Russia's position in the plan of world conquest more difficult, not easier. As long as Lenin preached his Communism for the poor and disinherited everywhere, without any distinction whatever of any leading people, Communism could spread. Today, however, Communism means one thing more—it means the acceptance of *Russian* leadership. It means not only the acceptance of the Communist gospel, not only the promise of a Utopia of plenty, peace, and justice—it means something more. It means that all the peoples should look to *Moscow* as the *third* Rome, as a centre of the universe. This Russification of Communism weakens Communism and does not strengthen it. It weakens Communism for two reasons: *first*, that Russia is even today (and I'm deeply convinced of that) a backward country, backward industrially, backward in administration, backward in communications.

I understand that you had a lecture on "Russia's Economic Problems and Perspectives" this week. I am not an expert in Economics at all and I don't wish to go into the details (just because

I don't know them), but I'm convinced that Russia is still a backward country, relatively spoken, compared to Germany or to Japan.

And here, gentlemen (because the Japanese Treaty is just being discussed in San Francisco) let me say one word about Japan. As you know, Stalin boasts (or rather Stalin's friends boast for him) here and everywhere that Stalin transformed Russia from a backward, agricultural, semi-oriental land into a progressive, advanced, industrialized country. True, to a certain extent, he did it, though it should not be forgotten that Russia was well on the way to modernization in 1914 and might have achieved greater results in liberty if its development had not been broken by Lenin. But, gentlemen, let me point out that the very same thing was done by the Japanese and, in my opinion, more successfully and without this immense amount of sacrifice and suffering of lawless autocracy which Stalin imposed upon the Russian people.

Don't forget that eighty years ago Japan (in 1870) was a backward, primitive, agrarian country, much more primitive than Russia; and that in 35 years (by 1904 or 1905) that Japan defeated Russia. Japan was a transformed country in communications, in industry, in administration—better transformed than Russia, without Bolshevism. If you will look at Japanese shipping or Japanese railroads in 1920 or 1930 and compare them with Russia (and Japan had no primary materials, while Russia had plenty of them), I believe that the miracles of Stalin are by far not as great as the Russian propagandists wish us to believe. On this one point, in my opinion, Stalin made a mistake which Lenin never did—to identify Communism with Russia. It is dangerous for Communism because Russia is still even today a backward country, compared *not* to the United States but compared to Germany or Japan.

But there is a *second* reason. The second reason is that this amalgamation of Communism, this Russian Nationalism, this Russian Chauvinism must arouse the opposition of the non-Russian peoples. True, the opposition cannot show itself always—there is no doubt about it. But I am deeply convinced that in the Soviet Union today (and as you know very well the Great Russians form only a half of the population of the Soviet Union) the non-Great Russian peoples are violently opposed not so much to Communism, maybe, but to Moscow and Moscow's leadership. And among these peoples I wish to mention two, because they are of importance. *First*, the Ukrainians, about 40,000,000 people, who occupy the south of Russia between Moscow and the Black Sea. And the *second* people are the Mohammedan peoples of Central Asia, the Uzbeks, the Turkmen, the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, the Tadzhiks.

We hear again and again of one thing: that the leading Communist officials and writers of these countries (of Uzbekistan or of Ukraina) again and again declare under Soviet Moscow pressure that they erred, that they committed a grievous error by stressing Ukrainian or Uzbek, Tadzhik or Georgian Nationalism. Mind, gentlemen, these people stressing that (who confess to their mistakes and errors) are not Capitalists, not Bourgeois—these are old Communists; and people so trusted by Stalin that they were made Presidents of their own Republics or Chairmen of their Writers' Unions and similar organizations. These old Communists, after thirty years of Communist rule, are Ukrainian Nationalists or Uzbek Nationalists, or Tatar Nationalists, or whatever they be. This resistance is due to the fact that Stalin, following Hitler, created a great Russian Chauvinism of the kind which is entirely similar to that which Hitler created in Germany.

The *second* consequence of this Stalinism is that it will be very difficult to establish harmony should the Soviets succeed to

communize other countries because the Nationalists of these other countries will resist not Communism, but Moscow. This has happened, as you all know, in Yugoslavia. You remember, gentlemen, that only a few years ago (in 1946-1947) Tito was regarded as the Number 2 Man in international Communism, as "Stalin's white-haired boy." And you may remember that in 1946-1947 we were more hostile to Tito than to Stalin. You may remember that in 1946-1947 there were incidents with our airplanes flying over Yugoslavia, and being shot down. Americans had then stamped in their passports (in 1947-1948) that these passports were *not* valid for Yugoslavia—they were valid for Russia.

Now this very same Tito who was regarded as the Number 2 Communist is today not against Communism; he is still a convinced Communist, but against Moscow's leadership, against Russian Imperialism. The very same thing may develop sooner or later (maybe later) in China. It is unthinkable that in spite of Stalin's treating Mao with the utmost consideration to avoid this break—it is unthinkable that two great people, the Russians and the Chinese, each one today at the top of its Chauvinism, Imperialism, "chosen people" idea, can get along with China subordinating herself to Moscow.

I would like to point out in this connection that whether Stalinism is Communism or Russian Imperialism (I would say that Stalinism is both; it is Communism and it is Russian Imperialism, yet I think it would be very wise in our own propaganda, in our own activities, to separate these two aspects), I think it would be useless in China today to direct our propaganda against Communism. The Chinese masses, illiterate, poverty-stricken peasants, cannot understand the discussion about Hegel and Communism and about the principles given by Dr. Burnham—it is entirely beyond them. What they grasp is Russian Imperialism.

And this is one point on which to base our propaganda; not in Europe—in Europe we are facing Communism, there is no doubt about that. In Asia we are facing Russian Imperialism and this emphasis is one of the weak spots in my opinion in the present Russian armor. Or to say differently, Communism was brought in by Lenin thirty-some years ago. What happened to Communism in Russia was that it was transformed, Russified by the continuation of Russian history. History—1000 years of tradition—is an immensely powerful element. And the Russian traditions, the Russian history has again done what it did with other movements coming from outside—it has Russified them.

What we are facing today is again in many ways old Russia; the Russia of the second or Moscow period, the period in Russia which was turning away from Europe and wished to spread its own gospel—the gospel of the "true faith." Today it is Communism to be spread all over the world. But this Communist Russia receives its mentality (and also a fundamental weakness) from the Russian past; a past of autocracy, a past of poverty, a past of illiteracy, a past in which one thing was lacking which, in my opinion, makes the greatness of the West and that is the freedom of the spirit, initiative, looking for new ways. The lonely adventure of the mind which is possible in the West is impossible in an oriental despotism like the one now ruling again in Russia and trying from there to spread all over the earth, using Communism as its vehicle, as its universal gospel, and weakening it at the same time by its own emphasis on the Russian past—on the Russian tradition.

GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 16 October 1951 by
Dr. John A. Morrison

After I had accepted Admiral Conolly's invitation to speak to you on "The Geography of Russia" and began to figure on how to cover the subject in 45 minutes, I felt like the collective farmer in Russia who was given a trip to Moscow as a prize for exceeding the norm for digging sugar beets on his collective farm by 318%. He was taken to the Bolshoi Teatr to see the ballet, "Swan Lake," for a ride on the Moscow subway, photographed with Stalin, and finally taken out to the Moscow radio station. Here he was shown around by the director, who explained to him that the station was so powerful that it could reach to every country in the world. "Ivan Ivanovich, how would you like to tell the enslaved workers and peasants of the capitalist world how glorious life is here in our Soviet fatherland?" But the director had an afterthought, remembering what a sly fellow the Russian peasant is, so he added: "But remember, Ivan Ivanovich, the time on this transmitter is terribly valuable. We can only let you say one word."

Ivan thought a moment, then stepped up to the microphone, grasped it firmly, and shouted, "Help!"

Dr. John A. Morrison studied the geography of the U. S. S. R. at the University of Breslau. He has held positions connected with research in O. S. S. and the State Department. From 1949-1951 he was a member of the faculty of the University of Maryland as Professor and Head of the Department of Geography. At the present time Dr. Morrison is writing on the economic and political geography of the U.S.S.R.

Obviously, my problem is more one of selection than condensation. The best I can hope to do in the time available is to point out *some* of the ways in which its geography and natural resources affect the power of the U. S. S. R. And since maps and pictures save thousands of words, I am going to call in Visual Aids to help me.

There seem to be two points about the U. S. S. R. concerning which there is rather general agreement:

1. It covers a lot of territory; and
2. The regime that governs it is an evil thing with intentions toward our team that are not exactly charitable.

Beyond these two points, there is considerable argument as to the nature of the beast and how it operates.

You will have heard the characteristics and intentions of the regime described and analyzed by other lecturers in this series. I propose to start out by having a look at the first of the two points on which we are all agreed, and consider the implications of the country's large size.

Size and Position as Geopolitical Factors

Just how much real estate *does* the U. S. S. R. cover?

Approximately 8½ million square miles. This is nearly three times the area of the United States—a million square miles more than the entire continent of South America. It is roughly 6000 miles from its westernmost point on the Gulf of Danzig in Longitude 20 degrees East to its easternmost point on Cape Dezhnev, 10 degrees inside the Western Hemisphere, and only 56 miles from Alaska. It has *eleven* time zones compared with our five. Not

counting the area of its satellites, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics covers about one-sixth the land surface of the globe.

Size, alone, is not necessarily important—look at the Sahara Desert. But when the area in question is the home of 200 million people and the seat of the world's second strongest power, the advantages and disadvantages of its size need looking into. Strategically, its great size has both. It has lots of space to sell for time—as Napoleon and Hitler both discovered to their sorrow. An enemy can invade the country deeply and still occupy only a small part of it, even though he may wound it severely. And when the invader's lines of communication are stretched out to the breaking point and he has experienced a Russian winter or two, the Russians—calling on the population and resources of the enormous hinterland—take the offensive.

On the other hand, the immense size of the country, plus the long frontiers with potentially hostile neighbors, have always caused the regime (Tsarist or Soviet) to maintain a large military establishment, even in peacetime. Not only were the frontiers long, but the great distances of the country required that sufficient strength be maintained on each frontier to contain a possible attack across that frontier, for there would not be time to transport forces across the country.

The great size of the country and the inadequacy of her transportation limits Russia's ability to capitalize on her central position in the Eurasian land-mass. At the time of the Crimean War, Russia had only one railway line—that from St. Petersburg to Moscow. Consequently, she had to maintain forces sufficient to cope with the enemy in both the widely separated coastal areas where he might land—the Baltic region and the Black Sea area. When the Anglo-French forces were finally committed to the

Crimea, it was too late for the Russians (with their great distances and poor overland transportation) to build up sufficient strength to displace them.

Even after the Russians had built railways to their most exposed frontiers, the vast distances continued to be a handicap. In the war with Japan in 1904-1905, Russia was unable to move to Manchuria over the new (and at that time single-track) Trans-Siberian enough of her vastly greater manpower and material resources to contain the Japanese attack in South Manchuria.

The double-tracking and virtual rebuilding of the Trans-Siberian, completed in 1938, by no means gave the Russians freedom of action both in the West and in the Far East.

General Deane relates in his book, "The Strange Alliance," that at a conference with Stalin in October, 1944, the Soviet leader stated that the Russians could not enter the war with Japan until three months after Germany's defeat. It would require that much time to move the 30 divisions from the front in Europe to the Manchurian border in order to bring the Soviet forces in the Far East up to the strength necesary to launch a successful offensive against the Japanese. You may recall that the Soviet attack on Japan came just 90 days after VE-Day.

Further improvements to the Trans-Siberian, such as electrification of the western part of the line (which was scheduled for the fourth Five-Year Plan, but apparently not completed) and the opening of supplementary railway routes may reduce somewhat the time required to move forces from West to East, and vice versa. But the enormous distances involved will continue to impose a severe restriction on the advantage of the central position.

The supposed advantage of the central position in the Eurasian land-mass (Mackinder's *World Island*) appears to have captivated the geopoliticians, or at least some of them. I once heard a very distinguished authority on international relations (a political scientist) tell an audience of senior Army, Navy, and Air Force officers that because of her central position Russia could move forces more rapidly to the "rimlands" of Eurasia than could the Western Powers. The map which he was using to illustrate his thesis (a plain outline map) had arrows pointing outward from a hub in Western Siberia. One of the largest arrows pointed to India and the speaker argued that the Kremlin had an advantage over the Western Powers in dealing with Southern Asia because Russia was closer. Not only did he fail to recognize the logistical problems of Russia's great land distances, but he also overlooked the little matter of the intervening Hindu Kush (one of the highest mountain ranges of the world) and the deserts of Iran and Afghanistan where modern means of transportation are not exactly plentiful!

It is probably superfluous to mention to this audience that with control of the sea, the Western Powers, which are maritime powers, could move elements of surface power to Southern Asia by sea more rapidly than Russia could move them by land. As Hartshorne has pointed out: "In terms of naval power capable of transporting land forces, every maritime power is in a central position in reference to all other maritime countries in the world." And the "rimlands" of Eurasia are maritime countries because they are accessible from the sea.

A further, and even more obvious, qualification of the value of the central position is the strength of the surrounding states. In the late 1930's and during most of the recent war, Russia's central position was a disadvantage to her because she faced a strong

and expanding Germany on the West and an aggressive, powerful Japan on the East. She had to be prepared for simultaneous attack from both. And even though Japan ultimately failed to join Germany in the attack on the central position, the Kremlin could never feel certain that she would not if opportunity offered—a constant nightmare for those responsible for Soviet military planning. So, during this last war, military strength badly needed in the West had to watch the eastern frontier. Russia controlled the "heartland" all right, but she was far from ruling Eurasia! Had Germany and Japan been weak, the Soviet Union could have devoted more manpower and capital to the development of her natural resources —thus increasing her long-run capabilities and power. But she had no freedom of choice.

The defeat of Germany and Japan left no strong powers on Russia's frontiers. She now had freedom of choice. She could concentrate on internal development or she could seize the opportunity to expand the area under her control. And when she chose the latter course, she had freedom in the selection of her targets. Our policy is to replace the weakness on Russia's borders with strength. If successful, the central position will once again be a disadvantage to Russia.

Getting back to the matter of Russia's size and its effect on strategy, we must not forget the air. To the layman like myself, it would seem that Russia's size is an asset in air warfare, or at least in static defense against air attack. For an enemy to reach targets in the deep interior, I would suppose that bombers would have to sacrifice bomb load for fuel. And with so large an area, strategic industries can be widely dispersed, thus offering fewer targets of opportunity in the event that it proves impossible to hit the selected target. I say, "can be"—actually, because of the past Soviet propensity for building very large plants, the concen-

tration of industrial output in single plants is more marked than in this country. Thus, before the war 14% of the Soviet iron and steel-making capacity was concentrated in a single plant—that at Magnitogorsk in the Southern Urals. The largest single U. S. iron and steel plant—that of the U. S. Steel Corporation at Gary, Indiana—had only about 6% of our steel-making capacity. Still, the U. S. S. R. has the *possibility* of a very wide dispersion of its vital industry. However, a dispersed industrial structure requires a good transport system. And the very size that makes wide dispersal possible is a handicap to the provision of adequate transportation.

Transportation

Even before the war the average freight rail haul was 460 miles; for coal, 430 miles. Russia's ability to capitalize on the advantages of her central position and to offset its disadvantages, as well as her ability to maintain a rapid rate of industrial development, depend on her transportation system—on its ability to overcome the vast distance of the country.

What other geographic factors affect transportation in the U. S. S. R. ? Fortunately for the Russians, most of their transportation is over level terrain. A relief map of Eurasia shows the Great Plain extending from the western frontiers of the Soviet Union to the Yenisei River in Central Siberia, a distance of 3,000 miles. In its Siberian portion this Plain is one of the flattest in the world as Figure 1 shows.



Figure 1. The West Siberian Plain. Forest-steppe as seen from the Trans-Siberian west of Omsk. (Photo by author)

The Urals form a rather insignificant interruption to this vast expanse of lowland, as is suggested by Figure 2.

Figure 2. The low crest of the Urals west of Sverdlovsk. The monument marks the boundary between Europe and Asia and is on the watershed between the Volga and Ob-Irtysh basins.
(Photo by author)

In his excellent and thoughtful book, *Russia and the Russians*, Edward Crankshaw devotes one of the five parts into which the book is divided to an analysis of the influence of the Plain on the Russian people and their history. He points out that the location of the early Muscovite state in the heart of the East European part of the Plain provided both encouragement and necessity for the expansion of that state.

Inland Waterways

This expansion was facilitated by the rivers of the Plain. Because of their gentle gradient and considerable volume, they are navigable over much of their courses. Thus, the Volga is navigable for vessels drawing up to 12-15 feet all the way up to Gorky, 1200 miles from its mouth; and there is regular steamer service a further 450 miles to Kalinin, northwest of Moscow. Large river steamers operate on the Ob-Irtysh system in the West Siberian Lowland all the way up to Semipalatinsk, not far from the Altai Mountains and 2500 miles from the mouth of the Ob. Even small ocean steamers ascend the Yenisei to Krasnoyarsk where the Trans-Siberian crosses the river, 1300 miles from its mouth in the Arctic.

Figure 3. Small ocean steamer at Krasnoyarsk where the Trans-Siberian crosses the Yenisei 1500 miles from its mouth. (Photo by author)

Even where the Yenisei cuts through the mountains, it is still an impressive stream.

Figure 4. The Yenisei at Novoselovo Pristan south of Krasnoyarsk. View upstream. The small dots extending diagonally to the middle of the river are boats which carry the cable of the swing ferry.
(Photo by author)

Yet in terms of ton-miles of freight, Russia's rivers carry only a small part of the country's total transport load—around 6 or 7 per cent. This is due, of course, largely to the fact that they are frozen over from 2 to 7 months and to the fact that they run in the wrong direction. The largest of them (Ob, Yenisei, Lena) flow north into the Arctic; while others, notably the Volga, empty into land-locked seas. Nevertheless, in many areas they provide the only means of cheap transportation. This is particularly true in the case of the Siberian rivers, which run at right angles to the Trans-Si-

berian Railway and which serve as feeders to it. Thus, grain is hauled to granaries on the river bank.

Figure 5. Granaries on the Yenisei below Minusinsk. (Photo by author)

from which it is loaded into barges or river steamers for transport down river (i. e., to the north) to large storage elevators or flour mills, like that at Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisei as shown in Figure 6.



Figure 6. Flour mill and grain elevators at Krasnoyarsk.
(Photo by George Cressey)

Because they are rivers of a great lowland plain, the watersheads between them are low. Hence, it is possible to construct canals which to some degree offset the disadvantages in orientation of the main rivers. Beginning with Peter the Great in the early 18th century, canals were built and tributaries canalized so that many of the principal rivers of European Russia were connected by the middle of the 19th century. But all the canals built in that early period were built for small barges and, for the most part, had fallen into disuse by the Revolution. However, the overloading of the railways led the Soviet regime, in the early 1930's, to adopt a grandiose plan for the modernization of the inland waterways of the U. S. S. R.

The central feature of this plan is the so-called "Great Volga Scheme." It is a detailed plan for the multi-purpose development of the Volga system for navigation, power, flood control and irrigation. It calls for a series of dams on the Volga, which will insure a depth of 15 feet for navigation and provide hydro-electric power in large blocks. It also calls for canals of the same depth, connecting the Volga with the Don, the Neva, and the Dnieper. Power generated at the largest of the dams—that on the Samara bend above Kuibyshev—will be utilized to pump water out of the river further downstream for the irrigation of several million acres in the Trans-Volga Steppes where the rainfall is so uncertain as to make this a region of rather precarious agriculture.

Three of the seven dams projected for the main river have been completed. The first to be finished was one on the upper part of the river, where it has a course from west to east—north of Moscow. This dam was built to raise the level of the river and create a reservoir from which a canal could lead the water over the divide between the Volga and the small Moskva River, on which Moscow is situated, giving the Soviet capital (now a city of over 5 million)

a plentiful supply of water and also a deep waterway connection with the Volga. You can get some idea of the size of this artificial waterway from the stretch of the canal,

Figure 7. View of the Moscow-Volga Canal.

and from the view over one of the locks in Figure 8.



Figure 8. Lock No. 6 on the Moscow-Volga Canal.

These locks are 950 feet long, 98½ feet wide and have 18 feet of water over the sills. The canal was opened in 1937.

The Great Volga Scheme calls for a waterway of similar dimensions between the Volga at Stalingrad and the Don, at the point where the two rivers are less than a hundred kilometers apart. This is an old project and work on it was supposed to have started in the First Five-Year Plan period (1928-1933). It is reported that work is being rushed on it at present. When completed it will offset one of the two major handicaps of the Volga—the fact that it empties into the land-locked Caspian.

Connection with the Neva and through it, with the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic, will be provided by the widening and deepening of one of the waterways built at the end of the 18th century —the so-called Mariinsk Waterway—named after the canal across the watershed between one of the headwaters of the Neva and one



Figure 9. The water routes between the Volga and the Gulf of Finland.

of the Volga tributaries. The large artificial lake, the third largest lake in European Russia, created by the Rybinsk dam on the Volga is part of this new Mariinsk Waterway.

Connection between the Volga and the White Sea will be provided by the new Mariinsk Waterway and the Baltic-White Sea Waterway, the canals of which (between Lake Onega and the White Sea) were the first built by the Soviet regime—more specifically by the GPU.



Figure 10. The Baltic-White Sea Waterway.

These are scheduled for enlargement to the dimensions of the Volga Waterway.

Completion of the "Great Volga Scheme" will relieve the pressure on the railways. It will also permit the transfer of smaller naval vessels between the Baltic and Black Sea, thus in part overcoming one of the major problems of Soviet naval strategy.

Railways

The Plain also favors railway construction.



Figure 11. The Trans-Siberian on the West Siberian Plain just east of Petropavlovsk. View looking east. The single-track line branching to the south connects the Trans-Siberian with the Karaganda coal fields and the copper mines and smelter near Lake Balkhash, 750 miles to the south. (Photo by author)

From the western frontier to Lake Baikal, no tunnels are needed, and little grading is necessary. On the flat plain between the Urals and the Yenisei, ballast can be laid directly on the ground. And the lack of grades and curves makes for cheap operation. The Urals present no problem: the gradients on the lines crossing this low range are gentle as suggested by Figure 12.



Figure 12. Railway crossing the Urals between Ufa and Chelyabinsk, View west along the Sim River between Simsky Zavod and Vavilovo. (Photo by author)

The great rivers present the only engineering problems of consequence to railway construction in the Great Plain. Because of their size, the bridges over even tributaries are large structures, such as the bridge over the Kama at Molotov.



Figure 13. Railway bridge over Kama River at Molotov. (Photo by author)

Many new bridges have had to be built in connection with double-tracking, or to make possible the use of heavier locomotives and rolling stock. Because of the flatness of the Plain, they can be seen for mlies—like the bridge over the Ob on the new direct line to the Kuznetsk Basin, which bypasses Novosibirsk.



Figure 14. Railway bridge over the Ob River on the Novosibirsk by-pass line to the Kuznetsk Basin. (Photo by author)

In the highland and mountain country east of the Yenisei —a third of the country's area——railway construction is by no means easy. Not only relief but permafrost present a major problem in railway construction and operation. And the deserts and mountains of Central Asia and the Caucasus present their special problems. Yet even in the Great Plain where railway construction is easy, the density of the rail net is far less than in Europe and most of the U. S. A.



Figure 15. Railway accessibility map of the U. S. S. R. The areas in white are within 20 km. of a railway.

No other of the great land empires is so dependent on rail transport as is the Soviet Union. Not only are the distances enormous, the rivers frozen for long periods every year and coastal shipping possibilities limited, but the raw materials of industry are frequently widely separated. Thus, as Shimkin has pointed out,

95% of the iron ore reserves of the country are west of 63 degrees E. longitude,



Figure 16. Principal iron ore deposits of the U. S. S. R.

while 91% of the coking coal reserves lie east of that line.



Figure 17. Distribution of the coal reserves of the U. S. S. R. Each dot represents 50 billion tons of reserves.

The bulk of the Soviet petroleum is still produced in the Caucasus, although a lesser proportion than formerly. The bulk of the Soviet copper, lead, and zinc resources are in Kazakhstan, remote from the consuming centers. The central industrial region around Moscow must get coal from the Ukraine and Vorkuta and is dependent on the Ukraine and the North Caucasus for much of the food consumed.

In spite of its need of railways, the Soviet Union has only about one-fourth the rail mileage of the United States. In view of the vast areas which are unsuitable for settlement, one would not expect the U. S. S. R. to have as many miles of line on the average per 1000 square miles. But even in terms of population, the Soviet Union lags far behind the U. S. A.: in 1940 it had an average of only about 3 miles per 10,000 people, compared with 20 for the U. S. A. and 28 for Canada—more like the U. S. S. R. in environmental conditions. Tsarist or Soviet, the growth of the Russian railway system has not kept pace with the economic development of the country. As a result, the existing lines—at least the major ones—are generally carrying about all that they can. There is little reserve capacity left for meeting emergencies.

In 1937, the freight traffic per mile of line averaged over 3 times the U. S. figure, about 4 times that in Germany, and almost 5 times the British figure. In that year, the Soviet railways, with only about a fourth of the mileage of the U. S. system, carried two-thirds as much freight. Not long before World War II, Voroshilov stated that in case of war the Soviet railways would be called on to do two or three times as much work as in peacetime. In view of the excessive load on the system, people like myself who were following Soviet developments just didn't see how this could be possible. We agreed that the Soviet rail transport system, overloaded in peacetime could not stand the strain of a major war effort. Yet it did.

We failed to take into consideration two factors: (1) The ruthless way in which the needs of the civilian population would be sacrificed, and (2) The fact (it should have been obvious) that as the Germans advanced into Russia the Russians, taking a good part of their rolling stock with them in their retreat, would have more equipment for fewer miles of line.

Even so, the complete cessation of locomotive and car building during the war, the postponement of repairs to the rolling stock and permanent way, plus actual enemy-inflicted damage, brought the Soviet rail system close to collapse. Without the substantial lend-lease shipments of locomotives, it is an open question whether the Soviet railways could have continued to function for another year of war. Restoration of war damage has now been completed and some important new lines are under construction, but the load on the railways has continued to increase. Thus, in 1949 the total freight volume was 523 billion ton-km. as compared with 415 billion in 1940. The reserve of capacity becomes steadily less.

Although the Russians were able to meet the demands placed on their rail transport during World War II, it must be recalled that the main lines in the area not occupied by the enemy were, with minor exception, able to function without hindrance. If the Germans had succeeded in knocking out the seven railway bridges across the Volga, or any of the major bridges on the western section of the Trans-Siberian, the story might have been quite different.

If I had to put forward a candidate for the role of "most critical Soviet weakness," I believe I would vote for its transport!

Mineral Resources

Mere size does not necessarily mean that a country is rich in minerals of economic and strategic importance. However, it is a safe bet that a country which covers a sixth of the earth's land surface has considerable geologic variety. Thus, in the U. S. S. R. there are the recent sedimentary formations of the West Siberian Lowland, thousands of feet in thickness, which so far have not

yielded minerals of significance. Yet bordering this mineralogically poor region on west, south, and east are regions rich in minerals of many kinds.

On the west are the Urals, one of the most highly mineralized zones of the earth's surface. Iron, copper, chromite, asbestos, bauxite, potash, gold, platinum, and oil are the more important minerals of this favored region. There is coal, also, but not of good coking quality and not much of it.

To the southeast lie the Altai Mountains, formed during the same period of mountain building as the Urals and hardly less rich in minerals. Like the Urals, they have been worn down and the older, mineralized rocks exposed. Here are rich deposits of lead, zinc, copper, iron ore, manganese.

Between two north-reaching outliers of the Altai lies the Kuznetsk coal basin with 450 billion tons of high grade steaming and coking coal—the richest and largest coal field of the Soviet Union. Here has developed the third most important concentration of iron and steel making and heavy manufacturing in the U. S. S. R.

South of the West Siberian Lowland is the elevated region of Kazakhstan, with the rather picturesque name of "Kazakh Folded Country." Here are the roots of ancient mountains containing the chief copper deposits of the U. S. S. R., as well as iron, lead, zinc and manganese.

The minerals of the Urals, the Altai and Kazakhstan have provided the bases for the new centers of heavy industry, the development of which started before the war and which expanded rapidly when the older industrial centers of the western part of the country (principally in the Ukraine) fell into enemy hands.

There is not time to survey the mineral resources of the U. S. S. R. and besides I am sure that Dr. Shimkin has treated the matter adequately. Although Soviet production of most minerals is below requirements, the U. S. S. R. is *potentially* more nearly self-sufficient as regards strategic minerals than is the United States. However, comparison of the two countries as to mineral self-sufficiency is not very meaningful. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which we would not have free access to Canadian and Mexican minerals, and so long as we have control of the sea, we can draw on the mineral resources of the entire non-Soviet world.

Agricultural Land and the Food Problem

One might suppose that with so large an area there would be land enough to grow the food needed to support Russia's large and rapidly growing population—estimated at around 200 million at present and at 244 million by 1970. But, while minerals can be mined in mountains, in the desert, and in the tundra, food cannot be produced irrespective of climate, topography and soils.

How much of the huge area of the U. S. S. R. is climatically suitable for the growing of crops?



Figure 18. The U. S. S. R. superimposed on North America in same latitudes.

Figure 18, in which the U. S. S. R. is superimposed on North America, in the same latitude, shows how much of the Soviet Union lies north of the northern boundary of the United States. High latitude does not necessarily mean cool summers and short-growing seasons. Consider England, all of which is north of the 49th parallel. But most of the U. S. S. R. is also remote from the sea and its moderating influence on climate. High latitudes *plus* continentality make for long, cold winters and short growing seasons.



Figure 19. Date at Which Mean Daily Temperature Rises Above 0° Centigrade (32° Fahrenheit) (from Great Soviet World Atlas, Vol. I, Plate 108V)

Figure 19 shows the date on which the mean daily temperature rises above freezing—note how much of the country is still below freezing on April 1. Even though in July most of the

U. S. S. R. is actually warmer than London, the summers in a large part of Siberia are so short that the ground-ice, or permafrost, which formed during the glacial period has survived to this day, only the top few inches thawing during the short summers.

Figure 20. Distribution of Permafrost in the U. S. S. R.

And you all have heard of Siberian winters—with the world's record low temperature of -93° Fahrenheit registered at Verkhoyansk, in Northeastern Siberia—colder even than Newport, but not so raw!

Much of the U. S. S. R. has too short a growing season for successful crop growing. And a large part of the rest of the country has insufficient rainfall for growing crops without irrigation, i. e., less than 12 inches.



Figure 21. Mean annual precipitation in the U. S. S. R.

Even Russia's richest soil belt—the famous chernoziom, or black earth—has either inadequate or uncertain rainfall. If all of this belt were cultivated extensively, as is our chernoziom belt in Kansas, Nebraska and the Dakotas, the uncertain rainfall would not be so serious. But the western part of the belt is the most densely populated part of the U. S. S. R. It is called upon to support over 100 persons per square mile. Hence, it is not surprising that some of the most disastrous famines have occurred in the area of Russia's richest soil. The great "shelter belt scheme," now being pushed by the regime and expected to reduce the incidence of drought, is clear evidence of the marginal character of even this fertile soil.

"Short growing season and deficiency of rainfall limit the area suitable for crop growing to only 8 to 10% of the entire country. The actual cultivated area of the U. S. S. R. is about the same as that of our own country, but it is only 6% of the country's total area, while our cultivated area is some 17% of our total area. Although the cultivated area of the two countries is about the same, it should be remembered that because of our longer growing season and greater precipitation, we can grow a greater variety of crops and their yields are higher."

Futhermore, the pressure of population on our crop-growing land is less than is the case in the Soviet Union. For the 200 million people of the U. S. S. R. the cultivated area averages only 1.9 acres per person, while for our 154 million it averages 2.3 acres. The possibilities of expanding the cultivated area of the U. S. S. R. are not great—perhaps by about one-third, not counting that added by new irrigation. But this increment will be marginal land, agriculturally speaking, because it will be on the colder or drier side of the presently cultivated land, most of which lies in the shape of a large wedge with the base along the western frontier and the tip out in Central Siberia."



Figure 22. The Soviet "Agricultural Wedge."

Because of its marginal character, the new land will have lower yields than that now under cultivation.

In 1940 a leading Soviet agricultural economist wrote that the crop land of Siberia could be expanded by about 7½ million acres, but that wheat could be grown on it only two or three years before having to go over to dry-farming; also, that the yield would be only about 10 bushels per acre. And anybody who has tried to make a living by dry-farming knows that it is only successful in wet years!

Soviet popular writers have had a lot to say about the northward advance of agriculture under Soviet rule. Some progress, doubtless, has been made in the development of strains requiring shorter maturing periods. However, achievements on experimental farms in the Arctic no more constitute a real northward expansion of agriculture than a single swallow makes a summer. The best commentary on Soviet Arctic "agriculture" I know of I came across in a book by a Czech journalist who made a trip by the Northern Sea route to the lower Yenisei. At Igarka, the new lumber port north of the Arctic Circle, he visited the experimental farm. In the farm's potato patch he found a former kulak (probably exiled to the Far North for the "crime" of owning two cows instead of one) and asked him what he thought of growing crops in the Arctic regions.

The kulak replied succinctly: "Why you can grow potatoes anywhere if you put a professor behind every plant!"

Northward expansion of crop growing in the U. S. S. R. not only has to contend with an ever shorter growing season, but with poor soils. The northward side of the agricultural wedge is already deep within the zone of podsol soils—the largest soil belt in the U. S. S. R.



Figure 23. The major soil zones of the U. S. S. R.

These are acid soils with poor structure and low in humus. To make them productive, large amounts of lime and organic fertilizers must be added.

Judging from the ambitious schemes which have been announced, the regime is counting heavily on the expansion of the irrigated area to meet the growing need for food and fibers. There is still considerable land in Central Asia, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Lower Volga regions which, if it had water, could produce heavily because the growing season is long. But the irrigation of these areas will require very large-scale construction. However, the construction of dams and long canals are well suited to the police state, where labor can be supplied in any amount desired—at little or no cost!

All this "remaking the map," as the Soviet writers are fond of calling it, suggests rather strongly that Nature has not been too kind to the U. S. S. R. in the matter of good crop-growing land.

The Urge to the Sea Fallacy

In our quick look at Russia's transportation and agricultural problems we saw the effect of remoteness from the sea. No other major power is so poorly situated in relation to the sea—and few lesser states. Because of its great size and regular configuration, even if the sea washed all its frontiers, much of the country would still be remote from the sea. Europe, west of the U. S. S. R., is a peninsula composed of peninsulas. Because of this, no point in it is more than 400 miles from the sea. If you drew a line 400 miles from the sea bordering the U. S. S. R. (except the Caspian, which because it is land-locked, does not give access to the world ocean), you would find that about half the country is *over* 400 miles from

the sea. And most of the other half (that *within* 400 miles of the sea) lies within 400 miles of the Arctic—Russia's longest sea frontier.

But except for the narrow segment near Murmansk, this sea frontier is of little use to the U. S. S. R. because it is closed by ice so much of the year. And access to the high seas from the small area which is within 400 miles of coasts open the year around —that north of the Black Sea, east of the Baltic, and the Siberian littoral of the Sea of Japan—can be cut off by foreign control of the entrances to these seas.

And it was a long time before Russia reached the borders of these seas.

In view of Russia's historically poor connection with the sea and its phenomenal expansion from a small principality around Moscow to a great continental empire reaching across Eurasia, it is perhaps inevitable that that expansion should be attributed to a conscious "urge to the sea," or a reaching out for "warm water ports."

During the course of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, General MacArthur made a little sally into geopolitics. Speaking with an assurance and an eloquence about non-military matters, which I had thought rare in professional military men, the general had this to say about Russian territorial expansion: "The Russian has always believed that he could not take his rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless he shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries he has been seeking warm water....."

I am sure that this simple explanation of Russia's territorial expansion is familiar to all of you. It has probably not occurred to you to question it. It sounds so reasonable!

I doubt if any geopolitical thesis has received more widespread and unquestioning acceptance—outside of Russia—than this one. You probably encountered it in your high school history text books and they are still teaching it, judging from one that I had occasion to look into not long ago. It had this bold and uncomplicated explanation of Russian history: "Russian history is a story of an energetic land, of people who pushed out from Moscow in all directions in search of warm water ports."

And if the author had been challenged, he could cite the title of a book by one of our most eminent authorities in the Slavic and East European field—Professor R. J. Kerner of the University of California. The title of his book is: "The Urge to the Sea —The Course of Russian History." However, if you will read the book you will discover that the author apparently forgot all about its title, for there is no further mention of the urge to the sea! Instead, the book is an excellent and scholarly account of the role of river, portages, and furs in the expansion of Russia!

But historians are not alone in lending the weight of their authority to this thesis. A few years ago in a lecture at the National War College I heard the same distinguished political scientist who was so impressed with the advantages of Russia's central position say that Russia is "a landlocked country which believes it needs access to the warm water ports south of the country."

It was inevitable that geographers should seize on what appeared to be such a juicy example of the effect of geographical position on the growth of a nation-state. In his book, *The New World,* which first appeared in 1921 and which was regarded as the law and the prophets in the field of political geography to a whole

generation of college students (some of whom were in a position to influence policy-making in recent years), the late Isaiah Bowman explains the territorial growth of Russia in these words:

"In Mongolia and Tibet, in Persia and Afghanistan, in Caucasia and at Constantinople, the Russian has been pressing forward for three hundred years, and no system of government can stand that denies him proper commercial outlets. His slogan has been 'a warm water port'. That explains his reaching out in the Far East to Vladivostok.....; it explains his effort to reach the Persian Gulf.....; it explains the struggle with Turkey and the West European powers for Constantinople."

One of the more scholarly of the avalanche of books about Russia which appeared during World War II was by another prominent American geographer, Professor Geoge B. Cressey of Syracuse University. One of the very few American geographers who have traveled widely in the Soviet Union, his *Basis of Soviet Strength* filled a wide gap in our knowledge of the Russian land and had a corresponding influence on American thinking about the U. S. S. R. Cressey is even more sweeping than Bowman:

"The history of Russia may be written in terms of its search for ocean ports. The Russian Bear will not be content until it finds warm water, and this is equally true whether the government be a Czarist autarchy (sic) or Soviet Socialism."

Now I am sure that none of the writers whom I have quoted would condone specific acts of Soviet aggression, yet their explanation for Russian expansion make it *seem* justifiable. The impression they give is one of a land-locked people driven by an elemental urge to break through the ring of selfish border states to the life-giving sea. For Americans and the peoples of Western

Europe, whose history and development are so closely related to the sea, there is a natural sympathy for the aspirations of another people to enjoy the benefits of close contact with the sea. But the trouble is—the Russian people have never had such aspirations; nor does it appear that the Russian rulers (with the single and notable exception of Peter the Great) have ever been sea-minded. And their own histories do not explain the expansion of their country in terms of an "urge to the sea." I have yet to meet a Russian who recalls having been taught that his country had to expand until it reached the sea—until it had warm water ports. The notion appears to have been Western, probably English or American, in origin.

If you will examine the history of Russian territorial growth, you will find that only in one direction—to and along the Baltic—was Russian expansion motivated consciously, persistently, and primarily by a desire for outlets to the sea. For Russia's economic centers of gravity have always been nearest to that sea. And it was in that direction—towards Western Europe—that Russia had to turn to get the armaments, equipment, and engineers she needed if she were to be victorious in her wars with Poland and her other neighbors. The northward expansion in the days of old Novgorod and the later drive of Muscovy across Siberia were motivated almost entirely by the desire for furs. To say that the Russians' expansion across Asia to the Pacific was because of an urge to the sea is to imply that when the Cossack Yermak crossed the Urals in 1581 the gleam of the far-off Pacific was in his eyes. I doubt if Yermak had even heard of the Pacific. The only gleam in that illiterate ex-bandit's eyes was the gleam of sables!

Once the Russians reached the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk in this search for furs, they needed good harbors on which to base the naval vessels needed to protect their new acquisitions and also to provide means for supplying posts in these territories by sea

from European Russia instead of by the long and weary overland route.

The last acquisition of imperial Russia—Dairen and Port Arthur—was not acquired as a "warm water outlet to the sea," but as a base for further expansion in the Far East. For Dairen to serve as an outlet to the sea for the economically significant parts of Russia—that is, the U. S. S. R. west of Lake Baikal—would be like acquiring Acapulco to serve as an outlet to the sea for the eastern United States! Dairen is the natural port for South Manchuria—and South Manchuria only. Nevertheless, F. D. R. was so strongly convinced of Russia's need for a warm water port that at Tehran he suggested that Russia might have access to Dairen! According to Pat Hurley, F. D. R. hoped that Russia could obtain a warm water port and "come in contact with the free world." Interestingly enough, it was not Stalin who first raised the "warm water port" question at Tehran, but according to Bob Sherwood it was that doughty foe of Russia—Mr. Winston Churchill.

The expansion southward to the Black Sea was, until its last phase (the end of the 18th century), due to the need for grain-growing land—the fertile chernoziom—and to the necessity for containing the Crimean Tatars, whose raids against the Russian frontier were long a great nuisance. Even in the final phase, when estate owners and grain merchants in the newly acquired lands north of the Black Sea demanded port outlets on that body of water, other motives were of equal or greater importance—such as ejection of the Turks from the Black Sea and Catherine the Great's desire to create a new Greek empire with her grandson, Constantine, on the throne of the Byzantine emperors.

As to the expansion across the Caucasus—a natural frontier if there is such a thing—and into Central Asia, to say that it aimed

at the acquisition of warm water ports on the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is to ignore both history and geography. The Russians first crossed the Caucasus at the request of the Christian King of Georgia, who was under attack by Mohammedan Persia and was a number of years before the Russians made up their minds to stay south of the mountains. The conquest of Central Asia was a by-product of punitive expeditions against the Turkomans of the Khiva Oasis who had been raiding the Russian trade caravans to the north. There may have been romantic young officers who had visions of leading their sotnias of Cossacks in a raid on India, but the Russian General Staff certainly was aware of the tremendous logistical problems involved in moving armies across the roadless deserts and high mountain ranges of Persia and Afghanistan. And the government in St. Petersburg must have been well aware that a port on the Indian Ocean would be of little value to Russia commercially, because of the great distances from Russian producing areas and, in wartime, a liability in view of British control of the Indian Ocean.

To generalize from the one direction to which Russia's expansion *was* primarily due to a conscious drive for ports—the expansion to and along the Baltic—and to build from it a geopolitical explanation for Russian expansion in *all* directions is justified neither by the historical record nor by the realities of geography. At best it deflects attention from the real aims of Russian expansion; at the worst it may lead to the unnecessary surrender of important strategic positions which can cost us dearly. However, simple explanations and broad, sweeping generalizations have an unfortunate way of sticking to the mind.

I am reasonably confident that for the rest of my life I will continue to read that Russian expansion has been an urge to the sea, a reflection of the desire for "warm water ports."

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 6 September 1951 by
Dr. James Burnham

Admiral Conolly and Gentlemen:

The subject that has been assigned me today—"The Philosophy of Communism"—is rather puzzling in terms of presentation. Marx, himself, said that with him and with his theories Philosophy was finished forever. "Philosophy," he said in effect, "belongs to an unscientific past—Marxism will replace it."

Looked at from another point of view, it is difficult to present the subject in a single lecture because it is extremely difficult and very abstract. Assuming that the subject exists—assuming, that is to say, that there *is* a Philosophy of Communism—the problem arises: shall we discuss it in a technical, narrow sense, in terms of what scholars used to call "metaphysics," or more broadly?

What I am going to try to do in the time I have this morning is to approach the subject in its broader sense, as the theoretical system of Communism in general. Above all, I want to try to indicate to you something of how a Communist thinks; what terms, what categories, what basic ideas he has in his own mind when he approaches a problem. In this way, perhaps, if you get something of the answer to the question of how a Communist thinks, you may

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Dr. James Burnham edited "The New International," during the 1930's, which was generally recognized as the foremost theoretical Marxist journal. In 1940 (after an extended controversy with Leon Trotsky) he broke definitely with every variety of Communism. He has been a member of the Department of Philosophy at New York University since 1929 until the present time. He is now on leave of absence and is engaged in lecturing and free-lance writing.

be able to project yourself into the position of a Communist and to answer new problems the way he would answer them. In that way you can learn to anticipate his actions in various fields—including that of your own professional interest. Let me add that the system of thought of Communism is very powerful. Don't dismiss it lightly. It is capable of absorbing a man's entire intellectual allegiance.

Finally, I am going to try to indicate, briefly by necessity, how the theoretical system of Communism links up with Communist practice—in particular, with Communist political and strategic practice. I'll use, as I go along, a series of charts that may perhaps make the structure of my remarks a little clearer.

Let me take the first chart.

The Philosophy of Communism: I

Theory of Reality:
(Marx-Engels)

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Reality consists of material particles in a continuous process of motion, change, and transformation.

The "Triadic" principle of dialectic transformation:



The three "laws" of Dialectics:

1. Unity of Opposites
2. Negation of the Negation
2. Negation of the Negaion

If any of you looked over the outline that was distributed a few days ago, you may have noticed that I divided the *Theory of Communism* (the systematic theory) into four main phases. We begin with the basic *Theory of Reality*—a general theory about the nature of Reality—; go on to a *Theory of History*; then to a *Theory of Government and the State*—a theory of society, in particular of the state; and finally, a *Theory of Power*—the theory on which strategy is directly based.

According to the general *Theory of Reality*, all Reality consists ultimately of material particles in motion; that is to say, the Philosophy of Communism is a form of what is called, technically, "materialism." This means that everything else—ideas, soul, God, spirit, mind, and so on—are only indirect expressions of matter, and are not in themselves real. But the Communist insist that their theory is not like that of earlier types of "materialism," because it always treats matter as in process, in transformation, in motion—never as static.

They go on from this basic idea that all of Reality consists of matter in motion to a discussion of what they claim to be the basic principles and laws of the motion of matter. These principles and laws apply, moreover, to all phases of Reality—not merely to matter in its direct sense, but to the expressions of matter in society, in politics, in thought, and in art. Their chief principles they take over from Hegel—the so-called "dialectical principles." According to these Reality evolves or develops through the existence of what they call a "thesis." Then, opposed to this "thesis," an "antithesis" leads (combining in the course of the development) into a "synthesis." You must understand, however, that this new "synthesis" immediately becomes a new "thesis"; an "antithesis" arises, and a still newer "synthesis" is developed.

Let me give you a few examples, although some of them won't make much sense. According to Hegel, for instance, the world around us arises out of a basic triad. There is the thesis, "true being," by which is meant a kind of "eternal reality," or "absolute." Next comes the antithesis to "true being"; namely, "nothing." The combination of "being" and "nothing" results in the *synthesis* of "becoming." "Becoming" is the material, historical world that is in one way real, but in another way (since it fades into something else, since it is only partial)—in another way, is nothing. A curious idea, that Reality as we know it—the world of history, of becoming—is a synthesis of "being" and "nothing."

On the historical side, another favorite triad of Hegel's explained the process of historical development up to our time as involving a thesis of *oriental* civilization, which he said was primarily sensuous and the antithesis of *classical* civilization, expressing reason. The synthesis of these two was "romantic," Western European civilization, having the elements of both sense and reason.

Or consider the forms of government. In terms of development there can be, for example, the *thesis* of "anarchy." As counter, or *antithesis*, to "anarchy" grows up "dictatorship"—the rule of one strong person to solve the problem of anarchy. But these, in their turn, are dissolved into the later *synthesis* of "constitutional government."

Take a case in recent science. Dialectical theorists would claim that in biological theory we have had as *thesis* the conception that heredity alone determines the nature of man. The *antithesis* is the doctrine that environment alone determines the nature of man. The *synthesis*, of course, is a theory that takes both factors into account.

From the more strictly Marxian point of view, the basic historical triad begins with what they understood to be the first condition of society. They believed that man, in the most primitive tribes, was organized on a kind of primitive Communist principle with no private property. Then, with the beginning of what we now call "'civilization," about 6000 years ago, there takes place the rise of "class" society—different forms of class society: slave society, feudal society, capitalist society. The *thesis*, then, is "primitive Communism"; the *antithesis*, "class society." Perhaps you will be able to anticipate that the *synthesis* is the "true Communism" that will succeed the Revolution, which is supposed to combine all the richness of civilization with the purity of primitive Communism, but in a new way—not just primitive ownership of everything in common, but an organization of society such that, though no individual has any special ownership interest in the means of production, all can have an abundance of individual and personal goods.

In our society, there is the triad that defines modern "class relations." The bourgeoisie—that is, the capitalists, the owners that are the means of production—is the *thesis*, and inevitably related to the *antithesis*, the proletariat (or working class) which has no interest of ownership in the means of production. The *synthesis* here is the revolutionary state—the Communist Revolution. I'll come back to this in a moment, in a somewhat different connection.

In addition to the triadic principle, which is the basic principle of the dialectic, there are supposed to be three fundamental laws. These laws are difficult to understand, even more difficult than the triad, because, as a matter of fact, they don't really make very much sense. They have, however, a kind of suggestive value which enters into Communist theory and practice. Let me try to indicate what they mean.

The law of "the unity of opposites." This would be illustrated by such an example as the life cycle of a plant: the plant dies; in the process of dying, it produces a seed; the seed falls to the ground; water and dirt surround it; it starts to grow, and soon you have a new plant. That is to say, the opposites, "life" and "death," are unified in the life cycle of the plant.

Another type of "unity of opposites" (they would claim) would be that between proletarian *terror*—as directed against the class enemies—and Communist *freedom.* Terror and freedom, the two opposites, are actually one in the revolutionary state.

The law of "the negation of the negation." Engels, Marx's associate, tries to illustrate this law from mathematics. You have *minus "a"* in algebra. Then you take another *minus "a"*. These two *negations*, put together, negate each other and give you *plus "a"*. (Of course they don't really give you a *plus "a"*—they give you *plus "a" squared*, but there is a certain sense, perhaps, in which a negation is negating). Or, in terms of the development of the revolution, Marxists would say that the proletarian terror (directed by them), operating against the "bourgeois" terror (of the Imperialist state), produces *freedom.* Still more directly related to the present day: Civil War—that is, war conducted by Communists operating against "Imperialist War," produces *peace.* Therefore, all liberals are asked to sign the Stockholm Peace Pledge.

The third law, *of the change of quantity into quality, is* probably the most important in its political and social application. The most quoted example of it is water turning either into ice or steam. The law is supposed to mean this: in any process, limited quantitative changes take place without any sharp "qualitative" effect. But, at a particular point in the process, the addition of a

very small (or even infinitesimal) quantity results in a complete qualitative transformation, which breaks the orderly, gradual rhythm. Take water, again you can raise the temperature gradually from, say, 32° F., one degree after another, and you can't discern much of a difference; suddenly, at 212° it will completely change its quality—the fluid will become a gas. Conversely, if you lower the temperature, the water will suddenly change into ice. Take the case of a human being: raise his temperature from 98.6 a few degrees more or less, and he will still be all right, but raise it up, say from 107 to 108 and the difference, qualitatively, may be complete, from life to death.

Now this principle, in its application to society and to politics, could be taken as the differentiating point between Communists (on the one hand) and all varieties of Socialists, Social Democrats, Reformists, on the other. Why is that? It may seem odd that so abstract a principle relates so directly to politics.

The Socialists (the reforming kind of Socialists) aim to transform society gradually. This is true not only of Socialists, but of Meliorists of the type of John Dewey and of Liberals. They want to right a wrong here; improve a situation there; make these poor farmers better off; clear up a tenancy situation; raise the wages of the workers, etc. So, gradually, they hope to build up what they would consider a *good* society.

Now, the Communists say that that is not how the process works—that these gradual improvements can go on, but that they do not alter the fundamental *quality* of a society. Society remains "capitalist"—a "class society"—and adapts itself to all of these changes. The water with a temperature difference of 10° here or there isn't going to be altered in its fundamental structure. Eating 4000 calories or 2200 calories per day, or 3000,

is not going to alter the fact that you continue living in more or less a normal way. But suppose that you lower the calories to 200 a day, or (if it's conceivable) raise them maybe to 20,000. Then, very quickly, there would be a complete transformation. Life would be replaced by death.

According to the Communists, the real problem is not of the mere quantitative additions, but *qualitative* change—the change from water, the solid, into ice or gas. It is the change from "capitalist" into "communist" society. The revolution—that moment in the social process when the historical temperature reaches 212° —is the real meaning of the historical process, the real key, the real crux, and it is toward this that their attention is always and invariably directed.

For Communists, reforms and gradual changes have no significance whatsoever except, perhaps, as useful props for agitation and propaganda. They are not interested in reforms; they are interested only in exploiting them, in promoting a situation that will work toward the 212° point where the qualitative change from type of society into another will occur.

There is another general aspect about "dialectics" that I would like to draw to your attention. If we begin to grasp, even partially, some of these terms, and especially the triadic principle —this way of looking at things that says that you don't ever have "a" here and "*not a*" there; that you never have a clear-cut, black-white in the historical process, that there is always black-*and*-white, together; that the "thesis" is always bound up with its "antithesis—if we begin to look at the world through this Communist prism, we will understand, I think, one of the most puzzling points involved in the attitude of Communists.

In the political world of today, the *thesis* is the Soviet Union —"the fortress of the revolution"; the *antithesis* is the non-Communist world and, in particular, the United States, which concentrates the non-Communist power. A Communist projects his mind into what he imagines is going to be the *synthesis*—the world-revolutionary society—so that his view of the world combines the *thesis* and the *antithesis* at one and the same time. This means, among other things, that his judgment of institutions, events, men, actions, in the *thesis* is totally different from his judgment of them in the *antithesis*, and quite justifiable from his point of view.

For instance, is it correct to have strikes—for trade unions to go out on strike? Well, yes and no. You see it's not just "a" and "not-a"; it is not yes *or* no, but yes *and* no. Yes, in the capitalist world, as many strikes as possible, as disruptive as possible, like the present copper strike which is being manipulated by a Communist-led Union for the purpose of disintegrating as far as possible our armament production. Yes, fine! we're 100% for strikes. In the *thesis*, however, of course *not!* In the Soviet Union, that would be "a betrayal of the revolution." No strikes in the Soviet Union—that's treachery—a man would deserve Siberia or death for even talking about strikes.

Is it correct to have the most extreme form of opposition to society, including the demand for its revolutionary overthrow? Of course, yes, in the non-Communist world—in the *antithesis*. And of course no, in the Soviet Union—in the fortress of the revolution. I can believe both of these absolutely and sincerely, if I take "the dialectical point of view."

Are we in favor of disarmament, let's say? Why, certainly, in the *antithesis*—the non-Soviet world—but at the same time and for the same reason and looking at the world in the same way,

I'm all for the maximum of armaments in the Soviet Union. Therefore, I will sign the Stockholm Peace Pledge and talk about pacifism and disarmament at the same time (and maybe on the same occasion), praise the Red Army and its most recent advances in atomic weapons.

This dialectical double-talk helps the attitude of people like some of our own Communists—Alger Hiss, say, Fuchs, Pontecorvo, Noel Field, Lee Pressman, and the others—intelligent men, determined men who, from the ordinary point of view, are seemingly inolved in contradictions. For them there are contradictions, because they reason dialectically.

Let us turn, taking the Theory of Reality as our base, to the Theory of History.

The Philosophy of Communism: II

Theory of History:
(Marx-Engels)

ECONOMIC MATERIALISM

History is determined "in the last analysis" by the process of economic production.

The Pyramid of Social Reality

Philosophy, Religion	)	
	)	
Art, Science	)	"Superstructure"
	)	
Government, Law	)	
	)	
	)	

Class Relations)	
)	
Method of Distribution)	Economic "Base"
)	
Process of Production)	
Matter in Motion	"Ultimate Reality"

The fundamental principle of historical development:

The Class Struggle

Both the Theory of Reality and the Theory of History were developed in their essentials by Marx and Engels. Later theoreticians only added to what Marx and Engels had done. Now this whole historical theory (which can be called the Theory of Economic Materialism) is based upon the central principle that history is determined (in the last analysis) by the process of economic production: technological process (handicraft, or cooperative industry or machines, or mass production) and also the distributive process (in both its physical and financial sense). There may be details in the historical process, little ups and downs, which cannot be explained fully by the process of production, but "in the last analysis" — in the final outcome — it is the process of production that decides what will happen in all spheres — military, governmental, in law, philosophy, religion, art, as well as in everything else. The outcome is inevitable. Granted a certain change in the process of production, sooner or later analogous changes will take place in all other spheres. The Communist revolution, also, is inevitable. In theory, matter in motion according to the dialectical laws is the final philosophical explanation, but that really is not of very great significance. In practice, the basis of explanation is the economic process.

Let's look at this in a structural way, instead of in terms of the law of development. Society can be pictured (according to the Communist theory) as resting on the theoretical base of matter in motion according to the dialectical laws. Then there is the economic base, the processes of production and of distribution, and the class relations that are based upon these processes. The class relations are also economic; slave owners and slaves, feudal lords and serfs, would be examples of two correlative classes. In modern society, there is the class of the owners of industry, and that of the workers who do not own, but merely work for wages—bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Then, as if frosting on a cake, or some kind of decoration or facade, you have what is called, technically, the "superstructure." Government and law, art, science, philosophy and religion—all of these are indirect (in the casual sense) and relatively insignificant expressions of the economic base. They are secondary. They don't affect the outcome except in details, and perhaps in minor elements of timing. "The superstructure is," they say, "the expression of the economic base."

You may notice, if you think about it, that it would follow as a deduction from this conception of society that all science, philosophy, religion, art, and so on are merely class expressions, class theories. Truth is a class truth. You don't just have truth about the world—you have a feudal truth or a capitalist truth. Religion is just an indirect expression of certain peculiarities of the economic structure, or a compensation for some of those peculiarities and difficulties. Communism is committed by its theory to an anti-religious, not merely a non-religious, view. So long as philosophy and religion last, they prove that the problems of the economic base are not properly handled. If these are organized correctly, philosophy and religion will disappear.

Communism is also committed to the view that only Communists can know the truth—all other theories are "class truths." The Communist truth is the only true truth. And they have here an absolute commitment. The fellow travelers, the deluded Liberals, the people who think hopefully that you can reconcile Communism and religion or Communism and genuine science, don't understand the nature of the Communist system. There can be no reconciliation. The Communists may use religion, for a temporary period, to further the revolution at that special moment. But they *must*, according to their own theories, regard religion as false, as illusory, as a delusion and a hallucination. So with any other non-Communist theories—they *must* be committed, in the realm of ideas as in action, to a monolothic, totalitarian view, to the abolition of all ideas except their own.

That last chart pictured the structure of society statistically, you might say; how it is arranged in order of importance, with its economic base, and the superstructure erected on top. If we now consider society from the point of view of its dynamic development, the basic principle of the Theory of History is seen to be the principle of The Class Struggle. This is the steam that keeps the engine going. This is the source of energy that makes things change and happen. In our day, the class struggle (according to Communist theory) means the struggle of the proletariat, or working class, against the bourgeoisie, the owners of the economic plant. There are, of course, other classes in society today. There are peasants, for instance; there are middle-class shop-keepers, artisans, and landlords. In some parts of the world, even feudal lords are left. But these classes are lesser and subordinate from a historical point of view.

The direction in history, and the outcome of this period, are determined (according to Communist theory) by the struggle of

the working class against the bourgeoisie. Modern history is precisely the history of this struggle, the struggle by the proletariat for the destruction, the total elimination of the bourgeoisie, of the whole society dominated by the bourgeoisie, and of all of its institutions. The basic struggle goes on in the economic base, not within the superstructure. The destruction of the bourgeoisie and of the capitalist economic base must, in the long run, mean the destruction of the whole superstructure: that is, of the type of government we have, the type of religion, philosophy, science, art, law, and so on. These would have no foundation to stand on any further.

In the remaining three phases of the theory, we come to the typical additions made by Lenin and Stalin. These follow out suggestions in Marx and Engels that were not really developed by them.

Incidentally, let me go back one moment to the Class Struggle in our time. Note the dialectical nature of this explanation of the Class Struggle. Observe that the proletariat is the *antithesis* The bourgeoisie is the *thesis*. And note a peculiar thing: in destroying the thesis (i. e., the bourgeoisie), in the long run the proletariat will destroy itself, also, because it exists only as the antithesis to the preceding bourgeois thesis. According to the theory, this should mean in the long run the abolition of all classes whatsoever. The great revolutionary *synthesis* would be the ideal classless Communist society.

Now, let me spend a few moments on the Theory of the State.

The Philosophy of Communism: III

Theory of the State:
(Lenin-Stalin)

CLASS DICTATORSHIP

1. The state is the executive committee of the (economically) dominant class.
2. "True democracy" ("communism" or "the classless society") entails the abolition of the state.
3. Class society can be transformed into communism only through the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat.*

According to Communist theory and philosophy, the state or government within any nation or society never represents the people — never represents all the interests of that society. The government is always a form of dictatorship — either disguised or open. The government, or state, is the executive committee, the staff, the political staff of the economically dominant class. In a feudal society it represents the interests of the feudal lords; in a slave-owning society, the interests only of the slave owners. In modern society it represents the interests of the capitalists owning class — the bourgeoisie. And, with respect to all other classes in society, it is a dictatorship counter to their interests, counter to the peasantry, counter to the working class. The government uses the phraseology of universal interest, of public interest, but this (according to Communist theory) is a masquerade, a disguise.

Democratic government, therefore, according to Communist theory, is an illusion; there cannot be such a thing. Government, in the sense of a State with armies, police, and so on is by its very nature dictatorial. Observe a consequence of great practical importance. On the basis of this theory (and this is, in a practical sense, perhaps the key theory) the government of any non-Communist State is a dictatorship representing only the big capitalists', imperialists' interests, and directed against the interests of all the rest of society—workers, peasants, middle-class, intellectuals, pro-

fessionals, even soldiers, I imagine, and sailors. The theory therefore means that from the point of view of a Communist all such governments are enemy governments, necessarily; there is no possibility of avoiding this conclusion. They are representatives of the "class enemy", and by the class theory of the structure of the state this defines the really basic enemy. Communists can regard only the Soviet government (the basic Communist government) as their own government. It follows that all Communists in this country, as in France, in Italy, in England, in India—wherever it may be—are necessarily traitors. They are necessarily, in one or another sense or capacity, enemy agents.

If you think over the implications of this theory, you will see that this is unavoidable; it is unavoidable in theory and also in practice. In practice it may be that some of them are only half-conscious of this at the beginning, but in the long run in practice, as from the beginning in theory, they must regard the government in Washington as an enemy government. They must believe that their real government is the government of the Kremlin. Keep this in mind, I urge you, when you judge the whining talk about "persecution," and the contemptuous way in which some people refer to the efforts to outlaw Communism as "witch hunting"—these are *real* witches and we had better hunt them and hunt them now if we don't want to have still more trouble with witchcraft when more shooting starts. When you hear people say that Communists should be allowed to teach in our schools or universities, and be granted super-rights in the courts, and so on—keep this theory in mind, and it may help also to guide our own practice.

Now it further follows from this Theory of the State that a true democracy would have to mean the abolition of the state, of government, in the theoretical classless society. But the Communists are sensible enough to recognize (and if they didn't, reality

would recognize it for them) that this is a very distant goal indeed. It can't be achieved, as they would put it, all in one moment. Class society can be transformed into the classless society of Communism only by what they call in their technical language, "the dictatorship of the proletariat," the dictatorship of the working class.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat" means the period of transition from Capitalism to Communism. Its functions are, *first*: to destroy (I use the word very literally and advisedly), to destroy all institutions—political, social, legal, religious—of existing society and to destroy along with all these institutions all the associated beliefs and moral attitudes and, *secondly*: (the sort of antithetical task) to build a new society based upon the collective ownership of the means of production and on dialectical, materialist beliefs. If this were actually done, no classes would any longer exist because there would be no economic differentiation to define a class; therefore, there would be no state, the dictatorship would be over, and government would cease to exist.

Nevertheless, the dictatorship of the proletariat, itself—which is our problem: Communist society we can leave for several million years from now—the dictatorship of the proletariat is itself a state and therefore in their own terms necessarily a real dictatorship. They openly state this, and openly conclude that their dictatorship must make use of the proletarian terror, in order to rid society of all the remnants of other classes, other beliefs and institutions. They say that the dictatorship of the proletariat will occupy an entire historical epoch, and that this epoch will be filled with wars, civil wars, and revolutions. Lenin remarked once that it might even be that two-thirds of mankind would be destroyed in the course of this transition, in the course of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but that nevertheless this would be a small price to pay for Communism.

Finally, let's look more specifically at the Theory of Power

The Philosophy of Communism: IV

Theory of Power:
(Lenin-Stalin)

COMMUNIST POWER MONOPOLY

1. The Proletariat "as such" cannot take and hold power.
2. The monolithic Communist Party, as "vanguard of the proletariat," must "exercise" the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.
3. The Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution are equivalent to the specific methods for achieving the specific objective: the communist monopoly of world power.

—here, again, developed by Lenin and carried further by Stalin. It is a very interesting theory in its practical meaning. I'll try to indicate to you why they conclude that the only solution for the Communist Revolution is to establish a proletarian dictatorship. Lenin pointed out that the proletariat cannot itself conduct the state. "It is not mature enough," he said, "to hold power as a class." He explained the difference between the proletariat and other classes which have matured slowly in society and have had many of the elements of wealth and power *before* they took over the state. For instance, the Capitalists grew up in still feudal society. Because they had private property, they could start factories, banks, and businesses, and they learned how to run things before they were developed to a stage where they took over the whole state, as in the French Revolution, and became the really dominant class. But the workers have no ownership interest in

the means of production—the real basis of society in Capitalist society. They therefore don't learn how to run society as a whole. Well, that would seem to make the Communist program impossible, for the program says that you have got to have the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

Lenin solved that problem by his theory of "The Party." "The Communist Party," Lenin says, "is the vanguard of the proletariat, the general staff of the Revolution, and it can and *must* (as he puts it) exercise the Dictatorship of the Proletariat *for* the Proletariat." Incidentally, the Proletariat is intellectually deficient, too, so that those deficiencies have also to be made up for by the Communist Party. The Communist Party, itself, is not Proletarian, and Lenin contended against the view that it should be. The Party does include some individual workers, but many of its members—in fact, most of the leading members of Lenin's own party—are intellectuals and middle-class in origin, not proletarian. But though not itself proletarian in social composition, the Party "expresses the interests of the Proletariat." How do you know? How does any one know that ? By no objective test, outside of the Communist Party itself, because the Communists say that no truth about these things. The authenticity of the Communist Party is self-derived. Only the Communists can know the truth about history.

But suppose that the Working Class at some particular moment disagrees with the Party; that it doesn't vote for it; that it doesn't follow the Party in strikes or an attempted Revolution. Doesn't this show that the Communist Party is not really the Party of the Workers? Not at all, according to Lenin and Stalin; it shows that they are ignorant, and still too stupid. And if the Communist Party is alone, then everybody else is out of step. If

Workers disagree with the Party, it is the Workers who are wrong, and it is the party's business to teach them the truth by methods as severe as necessary.

It's a peculiar thing about how this theory applies to history, when it comes to a question of predicting what will happen. If you will think over what I've just been saying, you'll see that the Party cannot be wrong—there is nobody that can check it. It says, "We represent the Workers," but if the Workers don't follow, that is because they are stupid; the Party has a superior knowledge, and so on. A recent Polish defectee said, "In a way the whole heart of the theory of Dialectics can be expressed in this instance: I predict that the house will burn down. I then throw a can of gasoline on the stove. It does burn down. That is Dialectics. Therefore, Dialectics is proved." You see, I predict that the Communist Party has got to be right, but I won't recognize any possibility or any way in which it can be wrong; and, therefore, I prove that it must always be right.

Or, in the process of history more generally. I predict that Capitalist society is subject to grave social disorders, and then I have my people call disruptive strikes, start sabotage, etc. I say, "You see, my Theory of History is scientifically exact—it can't be wrong." And it is quite true under those circumstances—it can't be.

Now, observe that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is and must be equivalent in practice to the Dictatorship of the Communist Party. This Dictatorship, moreover, must be monolithic; i. e., with no deviation or no opposition or variation. Any opposition to it, or any deviation from it, must by definition express the interest in one or another form of an alien class force: that is to say, must be counter-Revolutionary, and you know what Communists think should be done to counter-Revolutionaries.

The problem of the Revolution, therefore, is to prepare for, achieve, defend, and expand the Communist monopoly of power. Until the monopoly is complete (that is to say, unchallenged and unchallengeable on a world scale), this is, was, and will continue to be the goal of Communism. If this is understood—that the practical, the strategic goal is the world monopoly of Communist power—then everything essential can be understood through this. And if there is any doubt or confusion on this point, then nothing is understood, and I repeat and emphasize NOTHING, no matter how much formal studying has been done in connection with Communism—NOTHING is understood until this is understood. It is to doubts and confusions on this point, on the part of many of our leaders during the past decade, that not a few of the political disasters of this period can be traced.

So long as any one thinks, "Well, maybe this time they *really* mean that they want peace, or maybe they are trying to negotiate an honest agreement," so long as even a moment's doubt on that subject crosses one's mind, one does not understand the first principle of the nature of Communism. The strategic goal of Communism, the deduction which follows from the entire theory and philosophy, is simply a Communist monopoly of world power. This problem was fully realized and the strategic goal first clearly formulated, by Lenin in 1903, at the London meeting of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Since then it has been pursued without deviation.

In the pursuit of this goal, a number of phases are distinguishable—some of them overlapping each other. For example: the 1903 meeting really was the first phase—the formation of the nucleus of the Party. There followed a phase primarily concerned with the formulation of the basic theory and strategic principles.

Along with that went the selection and training of the first cadres. Then, a little later on, to the extent possible a phase of "nibbling" at the social structure—the Communists were not powerful enough to do much more than "nibble" then, primarily by propaganda. Then, in World War I, came the phase of Revolutionary opposition to the war. In 1917, there followed the great "key" phase of this whole period—the conquest of "state power in Russia." This is the big, dividing line. Russia, thereafter, becomes the main base (or as they put it, "the fortress of the Revolution"), and the entire strategy enters a new period.

I won't try to go into the intervening or intermediary phases between then and now—I haven't time for it. I would distinguish them as seven—the principal phases between 1917 and today. I would, however, like to take a moment or two to discuss the immediate phase. I define this as "Phase L *minus* 4," using "L" in the mathematical sense as the symbol of "Limit," and considering that the "limit phase" is the achievement of the goal: that is, the monopoly of Communist power on a world scale.

Now this phase, which I defined first in 1944, still continues: the preparation for the open stage of the Third World War. That is the easiest way in which to state its over-all character. It has two primary aspects: *First*, the consolidation of the Eurasian base; and *second*, the undermining of the non-Communist world. This goal, with its two sub-phases, is carried out in this period by both military and political means, but the military means are secondary and preparatory as against the political, subversive means, which are primary for this period. Incidentally, I would say that L *minus* 3 is to be understood as the open phase of the Third World War, and the defeat of the United States; L *minus* 2, the defeat (or probably capitulation) of the remaining Powers; L *minus* 1, the

internal Sovietization of world society outside of the Soviet Union (this may have been completed in Satellite areas before then). Finally, the process ends at the limit phase—the Communist monopoly.

Incidentally, it seems to me that the survey of Communist philosophy as a whole, and more particularly the statement of the strategic goal of Communism which is deduced from that philosophy and follows necessarily from it, indicate quite plainly the only possible strategic counter-goal for us: namely, the reduction of the power of Soviet-based Communism to impotence. Or, put in other words, the destruction of the Communist regime—the regime in the Kremlin. With that the entire strategy would be undermined, and made impossible of achievement.

You, gentlemen, let me add in conclusion, would seem to me have not a little share in the responsibility for deciding whether that counter-goal will be understood and achieved in time. Thank you!

RISE OF SOVIET POWER

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 19 October 1951 by
Dr. Merle Fainsod

Gentlemen:

What I shall try to do this morning is: first, to call attention to certain features of the Russian background which are important for an understanding of Bolshevism today; second, review the origins of Bolshevism; third, consider the character of the seizure of power in 1917; fourth, see the way in which the Bolsheviks consolidated their power; then, fifth, I should like to examine the nature of the new Communist elite; sixth, look at the main stages in the development of the Soviet economy and Soviet economic strength; and, finally, analyze the nature of tensions and controls in the Soviet system.

Let me begin by noting certain features in Russian development that are important for an understanding of Russia today. First, Russia's backwardness in joining the march of what we call Western civilization. It is worth remembering that Russia was conquered by the Mongols and Tatars in the 13th Century, and that this Mongol-Tatar conquest lasted for about 250 years, until 1480. And while Russia lay prostrate under the yoke of the Asiatic

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conquerors, the peoples of Western Europe were creating a new civilization, going through the Renaissance, transforming the mediaeval structure of society into what we call "modern civilization."

Now those two and a half centuries of Mongol yoke left certain scars on Russia that are still visible. Some of them, I think, are worth noting. First, they left as their heritage an intense and stubborn hatred of foreign rule. To expel the foreign invader from the Russian homeland became a holy mission. Napoleon discovered that and Hitler in the last war, too. It also left as a scar on Russia a certain tradition of government—the peculiar character of Russian autocracy. The formula of the Mongols and of the Tatars, during their years of dominance, had been to keep the Russians divided and to exhaust them by endless tribute paying. But the formula broke down. Out of the confusion of many Russian principalities there emerged one—the Princes of Moscow—shrewd, cold-blooded, hard-headed. They became the agents, the tribute-collectors of the Khan. In the process they learned a great deal from their conquerors, especially about the character of autocratic rule. Then, with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church they revolted and began to gather up what they called "Russia's patrimony"; that is, the lands formerly belonging to Russia. These they welded together into their own autocracy.

They had their Times of Troubles. At the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th Centuries (it's a period that is sometimes called "Russia's War of the Roses"), they had to deal with their competitors among the various princelings of Russia. But the wars ended with a thorough destruction of Russia's princely class, the Boyars, and the Tsar grew in power after his political competitors were weakened.

Under Peter the Great, in the 18th Century, the State became essentially a hierarchy of castes, each one with its appointed duties and responsibilities. The serfs owed duty to the squires; the squires, too, were in their way serfs owing duty to the Tsar—they were privileged, but duty-bound. The Church, too, was subordinated to the State. And at the top of the structure stood the Tsar, the all-powerful Autocrat, successor of the Khans.

In part—as a result of this desperate struggle to free Russia from the foreign yoke, to secure unity, to consolidate power within the State—the Russians lost what few elements they had had of early democratic, political life. A very limited form of local self-government persisted in the villages in the form of the "mir," so called, with its communal lands, its strip farming, and its provisions for periodic redistribution by the village community of the land.

But it is easy, I think, to exaggerate the importance of the "mir." The real struggle to impose constitutional limits on the authority of the Tsar was a product of the 19th and early 20th Centuries. That struggle miscarried. The Tsar made some concessions at the time of the Revolution of 1905, but in the main Russian Tsardom adhered to its traditional ideology of autocracy, of orthodoxy and nationalism, which in practice meant political "absolutism," religious and racial persecution, and thorough-going Russifications. And so the traditions of the Tatar-Khans lived on, even though wrapped in Russian garments.

The Mongol yoke left another persisting impress on Russia—the feeling that since Russia was backward, since it had fallen behind Western Europe, it was necessary to learn from the West; it was necessary to catch up, and if possible even to surpass the achievement of Western Europe. Sometimes, with Peter the Great, this idea was confined only to borrowing techniques of industry,

of technical organization. One of his notable achievements, of course, was the beginning of the building of the Russian Navy. Sometimes, as with the important intellectual school of the 19th Century, called "The Westernizers," it extended to borrowing political ideas and forms of political organization as they borrowed the ideas of Marx.

But whatever form it takes, one catches in Russian history a sense of inferiority before the West—an inferiority which is deep-seated and which even produces, by the way of reaction, a kind of over-compensated Slavophilism with its pride in things indigenously Russian. You see its current expression in the claims that the Russians invented everything we ever heard of, "Anything you can do, I can do better." It is part of this deep sense of inferiority which still persists. And it is important, I think, to comprehend it in order to understand Russian actions today.

Here, for example, is a speech delivered by Stalin.

"The history of old Russia," he says, "is the history of defeat due to backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans; she was beaten by Turkish Beys; she was beaten by the Swedish Feudal Barons; she was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian Squires; she was beaten by the Anglo-French Capitalists; she was beaten by the Japanese Barons. All beat her for her backwardness, for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for governmental backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness."

And he asks, "Do you want our Socialist Fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? We are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years." (This was a speech about a decade ago). "Either we do this, or they will crush us."

These factors which I have stressed: the hatred of foreign rule, the peculiar shape of Russian absolutism with its very limited opportunities for experience in self-government, the sense of inferiority and backwardness before the West, are all important for an understanding of Soviet Russia today.

I want to turn now to an analysis of the development of the Russian revolutionary movements and Bolshevism. The first point that I would like to make about the Russian revolutionary movements is that it is, above all, revolution from above; that its leadership comes from the intellectual classes. Lenin, himself, was a member of the minor nobility. The leader-ship came from that section of the middle and upper classes which we call today "the intelligentsia." These leaders start out as the rankest amateurs of revolution but, as I will try to demonstrate, some of them—out of the fire of their experiences—emerge as professionals, expert practitioners in the revolutionary arts.

Now Bolshevism, in its origins, was a movement of intellectuals who read Marx and who tried to apply the lessons of the Marxian analysis to Russia. Russia was an overwhelmingly peasant country. Marx had written for an industrial situation. Now to understand the appeal of Marx at the end of the 19th Century in Russia it is necessary to see it against the background of a very rapid, industrial development which was beginning to take place in Russia in the last two decades of the 19th Century; Railroad construction, mining, the iron and steel industries, textiles, were all in that period swiftly expanding. The number of industrial workers in the empire increased from 674,000 in 1865 to 2,624,000 in 1900. Up to that time, Russian revolutionaries had looked to the peasant as the great revolutionary class. But the peasantry was slow to awaken and to intellectuals (who were despairing of the peasant-

ry) this new, industrial working class—the "proletariat," so called—seemed to be the voice of the future.

In 1896 there was a big Textile Workers' strike; 30,000 workers were involved in St. Petersburg. That strengthened the conviction of many of these intellectuals that the proletariat would become the instrument of revolution.

The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, of which Bolshevism was an off-shoot, held its first congress in 1898; its second congress in Brussels and London in 1903. At the 1903 congress, divisions developed within the Party. It divided into a group of so-called "hards" and a group of the "softs," and the division was over the character of Party Organization. The "hards," who were lead by Lenin, wanted to build a conspiratorial party of disciplined, professional revolutionaries who would lead the mass of the working class. The "softs," who were lead by Martov, wanted an open, legal, mass Socialist Party, built on the Western European model.

At the 1903 congress, the views of Martov on Party Organization triumphed, temporarily. But, in the election of officers, at the end of that congress, Lenin's faction carried the majority. And because they received the majority of votes at the congress, they became known as Bolsheviks from the Russian word "bolshinstvo" which means "majority." And Lenin's opponents became known as Mensheviks, from the Russian word "menshinstvo" which means "minority."

Now these two factions for a little while still preserved unity in the same party, but under this facade of unity they engaged in bitter factional strife and finally in 1912 Lenin and his faction broke away and organized a separate Bolshevik Party. The name "Com-

munist" was not adopted until after the Revolution in 1918. The reason that it was adopted then was to distinguish them from the Social Democrats of Western Europe, whom they despised.

Now on the eve of the 1905 Revolution (you remember that came after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and was a dress rehearsal for 1917), the Bolshevik faction was insignificant. Its total membership in 1905 (on the eve of the Revolution) was 300. At the height of the 1905 Revolution the party attained a membership of 8,000. They played a far less important role then than did the Mensheviks or the middle class and peasant parties.

The 1905 Revolution was a sharp challenge to the power of the Tsar. But the Tsar met the challenge by a combined policy of concession and repression, and the dynasty survived the 1905 Revolution because in the hour of decision it could still count on the allegiance of the army, the navy, the police, the bureaucracy, the bulk of the landed gentry, and the leading figures of the business world.

By 1917, however, these sources of support had melted away. The war with its vast losses of men, territory and resources and its revelation of impotence, incompetence, and even degeneration in the very highest court circles, its mounting war-weariness, its deprivation, and hunger, stretched the traditional loyalty to Tsardom to the final breaking point. All that was needed was a precipitating incident to reveal how bare and hollow the appeal of Tsardom had become. The incident was provided on March 8, 1917, with bread riots and strikes on the streets of Petrograd. During the next few days the disorders expanded into a general striks and the decisive step toward revolution was taken when mutiny spread to the Petrograd garrison and the soldiers of the regiment refused to obey the commands of their officers to fire on the crowd.

The power was in the streets, but it was still formless, anarchic, without clear direction. The fate of the Revolution turned on who would rush in to fill this vacuum of leadership which had been created.

Out of the chaos of the early days (March, 1917) two centers of initiative began to take shape. One was the hastily organized soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which was dominated by the moderate Socialists; and the other center of initiative was the more conservative group of leaders of the old Duma (the legislature) who undertook to organize a provisional government based on the acquiescence of the Soviets. And so there began, in March, a system of dual power in which the "provisional" government exercised formal authority and the "soviet," with its mass support, retained a kind of *de facto* right of veto and initiative.

In the first month of 1917 the Bolsheviks played a minor role. Their total party membership, on the eve of the March revolution was less than 25,000 in a nation of 150,000,000 people. Yet in the short space of eight months, this tiny band of professional revolutionaries was able to build up enough leverage to seize power. How explain it? One major source of Bolshevik strength was its highly centralized leadership and organization, its activist, disciplined membership, and its clarity about its goal. Another source of strength was its success in exploiting all of the accumulated disatisfactions in Russian society. The Bolsheviks were willing to promise what the masses wanted—land to the peasants, peace to the war-weary army, bread to the hungry. A final source of strength was the fact that they concentrated their efforts on building power where it strategically counted; that is to say, among the sailors of the Baltic fleet, in the Petrograd garrison, in the Armed Workers' Red Guard, in the factories of Petrograd.

In retrospect it is easy to say that if the provisional government had been able to withdraw from the war and carry through a land reform program which satisfied the peasantry, the Bolshevik Revolution need never have happened. Yet to state this alternative, which is so plausibly reinforced by hindsight, is to miss (I think) the tragic imperatives of 1917. Each of the parties which maneuvered for ascendancy on the stage of Russian history in the months between March and November was the prisoner of its own illusions, of its own interests and its own conception of its responsibilities. To the more conservative leaders it was inconceivable that Russia could betray her allies and her own national interests by suing for a separate peace. And, consequently, it was all too easy for them to attribute their own sense of patriotic exaltation to the mass of soldiers, peasants, workers who in fact by 1917 were sick and tired of the war.

For the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Right, like the leader of the provisional government—Kerensky (still alive, living in New York)—the successful prosecution of the war was also the paramount urgency, and the agenda of economic reform was to be postponed until properly constituted legal bodies could be set up to deal with them.

To the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left, who were much closer to the aspirations and expectations of the village, land reform brooked no delay, and the procrastinations of Kerensky threw them into the arms of the Bolsheviks.

The Mensheviks, who saw all the difficulties of building Socialism in a backward country, felt it would be dishonest to offer the workers anything more except the hope of moderate, economic reform.

Lenin had no such inhibitions. His great feat, as a Revolutionary strategist, was to identify Bolshevism with all of the major moving forces of mass discontent in Russian society. He, of course, did not create the war-weariness which permeated the army and the nation, but he knew how to exploit it with one word, "peace," fusing it into the spark of Revolution. The land-hunger of the peasants was an ancient grievance. The Socialist Revolutionaries had built their power in the villages on the promise to satisfy it. But while the Socialist Revolutionaries temporized, Lenin acted and stole their program from under their noses. And with one word, "land", Lenin bought the neutrality of the villagers. Factory workers, of course, constituted the basis of Bolshevik strength. Lenin promised them to take from the rich and give to the poor, and with two slogans "bread" and "workers' control," he captured many of the factory workers away from the Mensheviks.

Now the Bolshevik Revolution of November 7, 1917, was not what we would call a majoritarian movement. It was a carefully planned and remarkably well-managed insurrection, a "coup d'etat." The last free election in Russia (the election to the constituent assembly which took place at the end of 1917) clearly demonstrated that the Bolsheviks' voting strength in the country at large was not more than 25%. But, as Lenin consequently observed, "the Bolsheviks did have, an overwhelming preponderance of force at the decisive moment in the decisive points." In the areas which were strategically important for the success of the insurrection—Petrograd, Moscow, the Baltic fleet, the garrisons around Petrograd—Bolshevik influence was in the ascendency. The enemies of Bolshevism were far more numerous, but they were also weak, poorly organized, divided, and apathetic. And the strategy of Lenin was calculated to emphasize their division, as he divided the Social Revolutionaries over the land question, to neutralize their opposition, and to capitalize on their apathy. Away back in

1902 he had written, "Give us an organization of Revolutionaries and we shall overturn the whole of Russia." On November 7, 1917, the wish was fulfilled and the deed accomplished.

I come now to the consolidation of Bolshevik power. What did that involve? In substance it involved three operations: (1) the military defense of the new Red regime against the White armies and the allied interventionists; (2) the suppression of all opposition political parties inside the country, and (3) the consolidation of the dictatorship of the Party leaders.

Of the Civil War I shall have little to say. The first decision of the Bolsheviks after their ascent to power was to make peace with the Germans. That meant making peace on German terms. The terms were harsh. Lenin argued that there was no alternative. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March, 1918, the Bolsheviks temporarily signed away to the Germans a third of their country and more than half of their industry. That treaty was designed to win them a breathing space. But the breathing space never materialized. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk before the new Bolshevik regime was confronted with Civil War and foreign intervention. The war lasted more than two years. The Bolsheviks were attacked from all sides. But the Allies (the United States, Japan, France, Great Britain) were not prepared to press the attack home. They withdrew their troops and the Bolsheviks survived. And it was in this school that the new Red Army was created.

Coincidentally with the Civil War, all opposition parties were suppressed. For a very brief period (from late December, 1917 until March, 1918) there were three Left Socialist Revolutionaries (who stood close to the Bolsheviks) in the Bolshevik cabinet, or Council of People's Commissars. But they left the govern-

ment as a protest against the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after that the government went back to its original pure Bolshevik composition, and it has remained such ever since.

Lenin, at that time, made no bones about the necessity for dictatorship. "There is no other way to Socialism," he insisted, "but the dictatorship of the proletariat."

"Every time I speak on this subject of proletarian government," he said, "some one shouts 'dictator.' You cannot expect that Socialism will be delivered on a silver platter. Not a single question pertaining to the 'class struggle' has ever been settled except by violence. Violence, when it is committed by the toiling and exploited masses, is the kind of violence of which we approve."

Now the logic of this position led inexorably in the direction of the one-party state and the establishment of the Cheka or Red Terror (the beginnings of the N. K. V. D., and so on). By abolishing freedom for the opposition parties the Bolsheviks made the Soviets, the Trade Unions, and other forms of mass organization obedient instruments for carrying out the will of the monopoly party. When charges of suppression of opposition were made, the usual reply was the one made by Tomsky, one of the Bolshevik leaders, when he said, "Certainly two, three, or four parties may exist under the conditions of working class dictatorship, but only provided that one party is in power and all of the rest in prison."

From the one-party state it was only a short step to the establishment of dictatorship within the party. This was uniquely Stalin's achievement. But Lenin had set the precedent. Away back in 1904 when Trotsky was criticizing Lenin's ultra-centralist ideas on party organization, Trotsky made a very prophetic observation.

"In Lenin's scheme," he said, "the Party takes the place of the Working Class. The Party Organization displaces the Party; the Central Committee displaces the Party Organization; and, finally, the Dictator displaces the Central Committee."

Now the process by which this took place is an interesting one. In 1922, Stalin was appointed General Secretary of the Party. As General Secretary he had his finger on the Party patronage; that is to say, his recommendations were largely decisive in appointments of local and regional Party secretaries who later returned to the Party Congress as delegates—voting delegates.

When Lenin become ill in 1922-1923, the most prominent contender for the leadership was Trotsky. But the man who had his fingers on the Party machine was Stalin. Stalin joined, with two other leaders (Zinoviev, who ran the Leningrad Party machine, and Kamenev, who ran the Moscow Party organization) and together they united to shear Trotsky of a considerable degree of his authority. And they set up a "troika" or "triumvirate"—Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

In that period, Stalin was building up his power. In 1925 this triumvirate fell out among themselves, and Kamenev and Zinoviev moved over to join Trotsky, in opposition. Stalin, in order to defeat them, mobilized his party machine and also allied himself with the so-called "right wing" in the Politburo—Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov. And, together, they got rid of Trotsky and his new allies. Then, having rid himself of Trotsky and his allies, in 1926-1927, Stalin turned around in 1929 to rid himself of the right wing—Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. And the purge of deviationists and oppositionists continued and culminated in the purge to end all purges, the "Great Purge and Trials of 1936-1938," when virtually every old Bolshevik in the Party of any importance was put to death or banished.

In order to give you some dramatic conception of what took place, let me take the Central Committee and Politburo of the Bolshevik Party as it was constituted in 1917 and see what happened to them. There were 24 members of the Central Committee in 1917; 7 died a natural death; Trotsky was assassinated abroad by a G. P. U. agent; Jaffe, one of his co-workers, committed suicide as a protest against the purge of the Trotskyites; 6 more (I shan't read their names) were executed on Stalin's orders and the executions were announced; 7 more were branded as "traitors," and disappeared completely from Soviet public life after 1938 (we assume they are dead; we have no official confirmation). That left, out of the original 24, only 2; one was Stalin and the other was Madame Kollontai, who plays a role of no political importance. Of the original Politburo's 7 members, Lenin died a natural death; Trotsky was assassinated; Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed; Sokolnikov and Bubnov disappeared and were denounced as "traitors" in 1938 (we assume they are dead). Of the original group of 7 only Stalin is left.

What the real reasons were for the liquidation of the old Bolsheviks we may never know. The official reason given was that they were responsible for the assassination of Stalin's heir-apparent, Kirov, who was the Leningrad Party boss; and that they conpired to assassinate others (which may be true). Other reasons given were that they were traitors, that they acted as agents of Nazi Germany, but that has to be taken with considerable grain of salt. But whatever the reasons, the fact remains that the purge — the liquidation of the old Bolsheviks — destroyed the last vestiges of independence within the Party and practically removed at one stroke from the stratum of leadership in the Party, the Government, and the Army—the generation that made the Revolution and prepared the way for the coming to complete power of a new generation—the post-revolutionary generation.

Now I want to talk a little about this new elite, this new group who were catapulted to power over the dead bodies of the old Bolsheviks. We have some very interesting statistics that were released at the last Bolshevik Party Congress in 1939. Let me take first the "top" group, the Regional and Republic Party Secretaries. This is a group of 333. Out of this group of 333, in 1939, 303 (91%) were under 40 years age and 80.5% entered the Party after 1924, the year of Lenin's death. Let's take the "middle" management, of the party—10,900 secretaries of district committees, city committees, area committees. In 1939 92% were under 40 years of age; 93.5% entered the Party after 1924.

What these figures disclose is that the functionaries of the Party who replaced the old Bolsheviks represent a new, post-revolutionary generation; by and large a younger, more vigorous different kind of group. The rise of this new generation is a factor of importance in the development of the Soviet Union. In the first place, it is worth noting that this is a generation for whom the Revolution is either a page in the history books or something which happened so far back in childhood that it has ceased to be a meaningful part of experience. For the preceding generation, the Revolution was the high point in their existence; they made it. They were the agitators, the orators, the propagandists, the people who fought in the Civil War. This new generation is a different breed of cats. Their lives have revolved around the great tasks of the post-revolutionary period—industrialization, collectivization, and more recently the war against the Nazis.

In the second place, this new generation had been educated in a political mold of Stalinite authoritarianism. It grew up in a period when the opposition to Stalin was being broken up; a Stalin cult was being systematically developed. It is a generation which, unlike the old Revolutionaries, had very little contact with the out-

side world and which, indeed, has been deliberately insulated from such contacts. It is a generation, consequently, for which the whole experience of Western democracy is known only in the distorted form of the shibboleths of Party propaganda.

In the third place, this new generation in its leadership cadres is a generation that is deeply indebted to Stalin and his entourage for their positions in Soviet society. He has made possible their rapid rise to power, given them recognition, lifted them to positions of immense influence and responsibility. So far, there are no signs of organized revolt among them and it is highly likely that while Stalin lives the loyalty of this crowd will continue to be given to him. The next crisis is the crisis of the succession. Then we can expect this new generation to have its bout with destiny.

In the fourth place, this new generation—this new leadership—it is worth emphasizing, comes to power with a different background of experience than the old. This new generation is drawn from the new aristocracy of plant managers, engineers, upper bureaucrats, privileged workers and technicians. They are organizers and administrators—not agitators. They do not belong to the party of the under-dog, and they have never had the experience of being under-dog. This is a generation which occupies the privileged and responsible positions in public life. It may be under greater temptations than the last to enjoy and seek to perpetuate its privileges, tho perhaps that still remains to be seen.

As you can see from this analysis, the composition of the party leadership has changed greatly compared with the early years of the Revolution. This new leadership has been brought up in a ruthless, Stalinite mode. It believes in strength, it believes in toughness, it believes in authority, and it believes in control. It

represents the instrument through which Stalin has consolidated his power over the Party, the Government, and the People.

Now I want to turn to the Soviet Union's economic strength and the main stages in the development of the Soviet economy. Roughly, we can distinguish three stages: first, the period of war Communism from 1918-1921; then the period of the NEP, the new economic policy, from 1921-1928; and, finally, the period of the Five-Year-Plan since 1928—the period marked by the great industrialization drive.

The period of war Communism, 1918-1921, was a period of Civil War and intervention. War necessitated subordinating the whole economy to military necessity; the big problem was to supply the front. It was a period when the peasants' grain was simply requisitioned, the private market was abolished, all articles of consumption were distributed on the basis of military needs. The industrial structure was badly shattered by the First World War and the Civil War. At the end of the period the peasants were sullen and resentful. As a result of the repeated requisitions, they refused to raise more grain than was needed to satify their own immediate wants. The result was starvation, under-feeding, and at the end of the period we witness the very significant revolt at the Naval Base of Kronstadt. This time the sailors came out against the Bolsheviks under the slogan of, "Soviets without Communists."

The Kronstadt revolt was put down with great bloodshed. But it did result in a shift of policy—the shift to the N. E. P. from 1921-1928. What did that shift involve? First, a compromise with the peasants. Requisitions and seizures were replaced by tax in kind, and after the peasant paid his tax he was then free to dispose of his surplus in the market. And, second,

while the government retained control of the industrial commanding heights, the key industries, small enterprises which had previously been nationalized were now leased to private entrepreneurs (the so-called N. E. P. men) who were free to trade and operate on the market. The object was to get the consumer goods, industries moving.

"We retreat," said Lenin, "for it is a retreat, that we must admit, but we are not beaten. It is only a step backward, the better to jump."

The N. E. P. period was a period of recovery. By the end of the period, 1929, industrial production began to reach the pre-World War I level and in some cases surpassed it. The production of iron ore, manganese, pig iron in 1929 was still under the 1913 figures. Steel was slightly in excess, 4.9 million tons compared with 4.2 million tons. Coal, oil, and electric power were already substantially in excess. But, essentially, 1929 can be regarded as the year when they just managed to restore the 1913 level.

Beginning with the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, the major emphasis was put on industrialization. And behind the decision to industrialize were important military power considerations. As far back as 1924, Frunze (who was then the Soviet Commissar for war) had pointed out that because of the backwardness of Russian industry and the primitive character of the Russian automotive industry, the Red Army (despite its manpower reserves) could not compete with countries which had a strong industrial basis. Furthermore, he said that the Russian soldier lacked mechanical training, mechanical sense; there was no real opportunity to acquire it.

And so he and other top Soviet military leaders, during the Twenties, warned that unless the technical backwardness of the Russian military force was overcome, the Red Army might well face defeat in future wars. That was one of the principal impelling forces behind the inauguration of the industrialization program, with its emphasis on the basic heavy industries and on the technical training of the Soviet labor force. The first Five-Year Plan created a powerful armament industry. From the beginning, the equipment of the Red Army was given priority over all competing demands.

During the second Five-Year Plan (from 1933-1938), defense industries expanded about two and a half times as rapidly as industry as a whole. The Red Army acquired modern weapons; it was put on wheels and wings. The emphasis was on a mechanized striking force—tanks, artilleries, planes. And it was accompanied by a perfectly tremendous growth in defense appropriations.

The Red Army military budget in 1924 was 395 million rubles. In 1938 the military budget was 34 billion rubles. And since the end of World War II this upward trend in defense expenditures has continued. The 1951 Soviet defense budget is 96.4 billion rubles. In rubles it is about three-quarters of the World War II peak. And we get, of course, continued emphasis on forced draft industrialization. Our best estimates for 1950 indicates a Soviet steel production in the neighborhood of 25.4 million tons; coal production of 260 million tons; oil production of 47.5 million tons.

The Soviet objectives for 1960, indicated in Stalin's 1946 speech, are 60 million tons of steel compared with our current production of over 100 million tons; 500 million tons of coal—

that is about our 1950 production; 60 million tons of oil—our 1950 production is 270 million tons of oil. There is, obviously, a very considerable edge on our side.

But these figures ought to be no occasion for complacency, particularly when it is remembered that a much greater proportion of our production goes to satisfy consumer demands which the Soviet planners ruthlessly limit in favor of new capital expansion and armament.

At the same time this kind of forced draft industrialization program, on which the Soviet Union is embarked, necessarily involves the sacrifice of mass welfare objectives. After armaments and new capital investments are taken care of, there is very little left over to satisfy consumer needs. And the sacrifices and austerities imposed on the workers and collective farmers in the way of shortages of food, clothing, of housing, do generate tensions and dissatisfaction. Every effort is made to assure the masses that these sacrifices are temporary, that they will eventually reap a rich reward in the form of a greatly improved standard of living, but the better life to come has been promised now since 1928. When it is too long delayed, it invites disillusionment. And ideological slogans which are offered as substitutes wear thin with reiteration.

It fell to my lot two years ago to spend some twelve weeks in Western Germany and Austria, interviewing recent escapees from the Soviet Army of Occupation, the Soviet Military Government, as well as former Soviet citizens who were stranded in Germany and Austria at the end of the war and who were unwilling to return to their homeland. When I asked these people about the motives which determined their decision to escape, or not to return, two factors emerged as paramount. One was a desire to enjoy the

superior material attractions of the West; the other was the desire to escape the regimentation, the discipline, the hazards of the police state.

Now the Soviet Union would like to present itself to the world as a monolithic structure of hundreds of millions of happy, contented people, devoted to Communism. But if the evidence of these and other interviews is to be trusted, behind the monolithic facade there exists a not inconsiderable degree of dissatisfaction, frustration and hatred for the regime. This dissatisfaction is kept under rigid control by the powerful repressive machinery which the regime has developed—the omnipresent M. G. B., or Secret Police, and the forced labor camps which await those who make the mistake of expressing their discontent.

The interviews which I had gave no indication that there was any imminent likelihood of an organized uprising which would challenge the authority of the regime. There was general agreement that the power of the Soviet Police made that unlikely. But what the interviews did make clear was that the Soviet Union had more than its share of internal problems, tensions, and discontent. And that, while the regime could control its people, it still could not really trust substantial segments among them.

On what, then, does the power of the regime rest? I would emphasize three things: first, it leans heavily on the support of what we might call the administrative and managerial elite—those who occupy the key managerial and administrative positions, the higher level bureaucrats, the Officer Corps, the plant directors and managers, the top engineers, the Collective Farm Chairmen, and the worker aristocracy of foremen, brigadiers, and stakhanovite workers. In order to consolidate the support of these groups, who plays key roles in the administrative structure, the party incor-

porates them into its hierarchical structure of special privileges and rewards. It treats them as a privileged category and it pays them well. It seeks to draw them into the Party, itself, and to identify them actively with the Party leadership.

The second basic support of the regime (and this is an overlapping category) is, of course, the Party Organization with its membership of 6,000,000 or so. Even more, the hard, inner core of the party—the Party functionaries for whom Party work is a full-time job. And the Party operates as an instrument of leadership, of indoctrination, and of control.

The third main support of the regime, in institutional terms, is its repressive element—the Secret Police, the M. G. B., with its supporting formations in the M. V. D. The authority of the Secret Police extends into every corner of Soviet society and for them terror itself has become a system of power.

This is the pattern of control as it has crystallized in the Soviet system. But for the masses, continuing sacrifices breed continuing dissatisfactions. The existence of dissatisfactions drives the regime in the direction of strengthening its repressive machinery. The Secret Police follows its own laws of growth, increasing in importance and power by the amount of distrust it sows and the discord which it discovers or it invents. And the top leadership—to some extent, at least—becomes a prisoner of the Frankenstein's Monster which it has created, of the intelligence which it provides, of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which it generates. The products are such measures as the effort to seal off the Soviet population from all contact with the West, to mute dissatisfaction by arousing the most primal instincts of Soviet nationalism while

at the same time invoking the apocalyptic vision of the inevitable triumph of World Communism in order to rally the country together.

Now these measures invite their own response outside—a hardening in the attitude of the non-Soviet world towards the Soviet Union. And the vicious circle is completed as the Soviet regime finds in such developments outside both the occasion and the justification for putting even greater emphasis on its program of capital expansion and armaments, and for tightening the controls to deal with the dissatisfaction which such intensified programs generate. It is difficult to see how the Soviet regime can break out of this circle, even assuming some desire to do so. It is possible to imagine a theoretical escape in the collapse of the West, either through disintegration within or through military defeat in which Soviet arms win a cheap and easy victory. But this contingency will remain remote as long as, and only as long as, the West maintains and builds up its economic and military strength.

It is also theoretically conceivable that the circle can be broken by a broad settlement of differences between East and West, but the existing state of tension, and the long-term doctrinal outlook of Communism do not promise a hopeful prospect for such an agreement. And so the vista immediately ahead is a continuation of the uneasy truce, neither total peace nor total war, a shadowy No-Man's Land in which we and the Russians are feeling out each other's strength and in which danger lurks on all sides.

Given this setting, the Soviet regime seems doomed to continue to feed on crises and emergencies, to emphasize the industrial development which build up its military potentials, to sacrifice

mass welfare objectives in the interest of power and to rely on its bureaucratic apparatus and totalitarian controls to keep popular discontent in check. That is the moving equilibrium in which the Soviet leadership is seeking to stabilize its position. It rests on the premise that the regime can continue to extract great sacrifices from its own population and that it can still control it. It is a premise for which history has still to provide an ultimate test.

SPIRIT OF TITOISM

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 22 October 1951 by
Dr. Bertram Wolfe

I. *Ambiguities in the Marxist Attitude on the National Question*

There is a certain ambiguity in the Marxian attitude towards the national question, which is the first matter which I propose to examine. If you read the *Communist Manifesto,* you will find on the one hand a declaration that the workers have no country to defend; next, that their aim is to establish themselves as the nation; next you will find an economic or market theory of Nationalism and Internationalism — that the idea of nationality grows up only when the nationwide market has developed so that you would automatically expect a feeling of nationality to coincide with the size of a given national or nationwide market.

On the other hand, you also have a declaration concerning the rights of complete restoration of Poland as an independent nationality in the *Communists Manifesto.* Poland was geared at that time part into the German market, part into the Russian market, part into the Austrian-Hungarian market. So it is quite obvious that Marx has abandoned his own economic interpretation

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of Nationalism in favor of recognition that there is a kind of demi-urge that has lived underground, something of the spirit of the Polish people which demands the restoration of Polish national independence. Thus even in the *Communist Manifesto* we find an ambiguity on the national question, which I take as the first background point in an approach to the question of Titoism.

Second, you will find in the relations between Lenin and Stalin a certain ambiguity on the national question. In 1920 Lenin was preparing a document (a series of propositions or theses) for the Communist International Congress *on the National and Colonial Question.* He sent a copy of it to Stalin for his opinion (as he did to a number of other people) and Stalin wrote back a criticism, expressing a disagreement with Lenin's thesis. Now that criticism (and I call your attention to the early date—June 12, 1920) — that criticism is extremely interesting.

Stalin writes,

> "For nations which made up part of old Russia, our Soviet-type of federations may and must be accounted expedient as the road to unity. These nationalities either did not have a state of their own in the past or have long lost it, in view of which fact the Soviet centralized-type of federation will graft itself onto them without any serious friction. But the same cannot be said of those nationalities which did not make up a part of old Russia—which existed as independent formations, developed their own states and which, if they become Soviet, will be obliged by force or circumstances to enter into one or another governmental relationship with Soviet Russia.
>
> "For example, a future Soviet Germany, Soviet Poland, Soviet Hungary, Soviet Finland—" (now this

> is 1920, and is a basic document which we might call Stalin's "Mein Kampf") "these peoples, having had their own state, their own army, their own finances, will hardly agree—even though they become Soviet—to enter at once into a federal bond with Soviet Russia of the type of the Bashkir or Ukranian. For a federation of the Soviet type would be looked upon by them as a form of diminution of their state independence, as an attack upon it. I have no doubt, therefore, that for these nationalities the most acceptable form of rapprochement will be a Confederation." (By which he means a kind of alliance or loose union of nominally independent states). "I say nothing of the backward nations; for example: Persia, Turkey—in relation to which or for which the Soviet type of federation and federation, in general, would be still more inacceptable."

This criticism of Lenin's thesis (which, by the way, Lenin rejected) indicates that as early as June 12, 1920 Stalin already had a concept of a future Soviet Germany, a Soviet Finland, a Soviet Hungary. He recognized that they could not directly enter into the Soviet Union "Federation" and he proposed a transition form which today he calls "The System of People's Democracies." Thus the first approach of Stalin to what today we call "Titoism" can be found in this document. Now where can you find this document today? It is not in Stalin's Collected Works. He has excluded it from the canon of his Collected Works because it is too revealing. Nevertheless, you can find it in Lenin's Collected Works—in the Russian Third Edition, volume XXV, page 624, as a footnote, in which Stalin's criticism written to Lenin is given in full. It is a document worthy of much more study than our leaders have so far given it.

The third point in Stalin's special views on the national question to which I wish to call to your attention, is a contempt on Stalin's part for the right of borderlands and neighbors to genuine independence. On October 20, 1920, he wrote:

> "Central Russia, this is the fireplace of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the help of the borderlands rich in raw materials, fuel, products of production.... The separation of the borders would undermine the revolutionary might of Central Russia ....In the circumstances of the war to the death that is flaring up between proletarian Russia and the Imperialist Entente for the borderlands, there are possible only two outcomes:
>
> EITHER together with Russia.....
> OR together with the Entente.....
> There is no third possibility.
>
> The so-called independence of the so-called independent Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only a deceptive appearance covering up the full dependence of these governments (if you will excuse me for calling them governments) from this or that group of Imperialists."
>
> (PRAVDA, October 20, 1920; Stalin's Collected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 351-363).

The fourth constituent element in the Stalinist attitude towards Titoism I find in his definition of an "internationalist." On August 1, 1927, he said,

> "A *revolutionary* is one who, without reservation, unconditionally, openly and honestly is ready to defend and protect the U.S.S.R., since the U.S.S.R. is

> the first proletarian revolutionary state in the world. An internationalist is he who unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the U.S.S.R., because the U.S.S.R. is the base of the world revolutionary movement. And to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement is impossible without defending the U.S.S.R."

The last point of ambiguity in this Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist attitude towards the national question I offer in the form of a conversation between Bukharin and Armstrong, who wrote a book on Tito. Bukharin said to Armstrong,

> "National rivalry between Communist states is by definition 'an impossibility.'"
>
> "By definition it is impossible for the Soviet Union to be Imperialist; by definition it is impossible for the United States not to be Imperialist; by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is peaceful and by definition whatever the Soviet Union does is democratic. And so we are not surprised to find that national rivalry between Communist states is by definition 'an impossibility.' Just as Capitalism cannot live without war, so war cannot live with Communism."

Bukharin did not live long enough to learn better.

II. *The Break Between Stalin and Tito*

We turn now to the open break between Tito and Stalin. This open break is as significant for our understanding of the Communist international, or the Coninform, as that famous unhealing fistula was for gastro-intestinal observation. You remember there was a doctor who once tried to operate and heal a

fistula in the stomach of a living man. He failed; so he finally put in a window, took advantage of that open porthole, and continued to examine the functioning of the stomach and the intestines through it. Thus modern gastro-intestinal science developed. In the same sense the break between Tito and Stalin opened a window into the deeply secret processes that go on inside the Cominform. In the early days of the Comintern there were public debates, rival proposals, and thus we could get some notion of what went on. But, increasingly, the Comintern became monolithic, and with it came unanimity and overwhelming blanket secrecy. Were it not for this break we would have very little notion indeed of how the Cominform functions.

How shall we interpret the break between Tito and Stalin? We can interpret it first in emotional terms and say that Stalinism underrates the everlasting determination of peoples to be themselves. The 20th Century's chief lesson thus far, I should say, is that national independence is one of the few things for which men are willing to fight and to die.

Secondly, we can interpret it in historical terms—people with different experiences, different traditions, different cultures, inevitably have differing values. Even a World State would never be able to bleach out all the varied national colors from life.

Third, we can interpret it in terms of national interest and national traditions. The Yugoslavs have a tradition of resistance to outside tyrants—a tradition formed in the struggle against the Turks, strengthened in the struggle against Hitler, and now given fresh life and meaning in the struggle against Stalin.

Fourth, we can interpret it in terms of a special Balkan political tradition. Every Balkan Communist, every Balkan Socialist,

every Balkan Democrat, every Balkan Liberal, has been brought up in the tradition of the need for a Federation of Balkan Republics. When we speak of "The Balkanization of Europe" we have in mind the same thing which has been the curse of life in the Balkans. The Balkan peninsula has been the playground of Great Powers—France, Austria Hungary, Germany, Russia—and Balkan patriots have long felt that the only way their lands could cease to be a playground of the Great Powers was if they were to federate and form a genuine Federated Power of their own. So it was almost automatic for Communists in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania, as it would have been automatic for Socialists or for Republicans and Democrats, the moment they came to power in all those countries and felt a kinship with each other—it was automatic to propose a Balkan Federation. But, at that moment there was only one great power that was still to be kept out of the Balkans by a Balkan Federation: namely, the Soviet Union. And Stalin reacted angrily to the proposal of a powerful Balkan Federation which might have stood up against him.

Fifth, we can interpret the Tito break in terms of personal conflict, and this is the more instructive because Tito is a kind of "pocket" Stalin. Of all the disciples of Stalin, the one that learned most from him and was closest to him was Josef Broz, known as Tito. Now Stalinism is a jealous "ism." It is a kind of ersatz religion in which Stalin has become the infallible, the omniscient, the omnipotent leader and father of the peoples. The *vozhd* is a jealous *vozhd* and beside him there is no other *vozhd*. He may have disciples — twelve, or twelve times twelve, or any number—but he may not have partners, associates, or second-string leaders. The disciple who challenges this becomes by definition a "Judas Iscariot."

Sixth, we might interpret Titoism in idealogical terms. We might bear in mind that orthodoxies tend to breed heresies; dogmas—challenge; commands—disobedience. Then the heresies, in turn, will claim to be orthodoxies, even as so many heresies in the Christian churches appeal to "primitive Christianity." So Titoism has appealed to "primitive Leninism" against Stalin's modifications or "betrayals" of what Tito claims to be orthodx Leninism. It is within this closed circle that Titoism has developed, and only now—reluctantly, hesitatingly, dubiously— some of Tito's ideologues are beginning to question certain tenets of Leninism itself.

III. *The Multiple Appeal of Titoism*

Having made this multiple interpretation of the development of Titoism, I want to suggest something of the multiple appeal of Titoism. It appeals to national patriotism against treason to one's country; yes, and even to the class that a Communist professes to represent. Wherever you have to put the interests of the Soviet government above the interests of your own country, your own people, and against your own working class—then you are faced with the problem of treason. Reluctance to commit these forms of treason is one of the appeals that Titoism makes to the Communist in other countries.

Second, it appeals to "primitive Leninism" as a return to purity of doctrine and true equalitarian internationalism.

Third, it appeals to fellow travelers "out on a limb" and anxious to climb down without any loss of revolutionary posture. I refer to an O. John Rogge in this country or a Ziliakus in England. The cold war having created an intolerable situation for people out on that limb, the problem was how they could climb

down, yet still appear faithful to some kind of revolutionary doctrine. Tito gave the answer, which I think helps to explain why a Ziliakus or a Rogge becomes so ardent a Titoist.

Fourth, Titoism has an appeal to his neighbors still needing a Balkan Federation to defend themselves — to Italy and to Greece.

Fifth, it is of especial interest to the Atlantic Pact Nations, for it represents the crack in the armor, the breach in the walls. I have every sympathy for the plight of the Yugoslav people who are still under the heel of a totalitarian dictatorship and from their standpoint it would certainly be much better if Tito were a Democrat and not a totalitarian Communist dictator. But from the standpoint of our interest at the present phase of the cold war, I can't help thinking that Tito is more useful to us as a Communist than he would be as a Democrat.

IV. *Factors Which Made Titoism Possible*

Now I turn to the genesis of the Tito break. The first aspect that we must consider is the special circumstances under which Titoist Yugoslavia was born. Like Poland, Yugoslavia resisted German invasion from the outset. There is this difference, however, that Poland resisted both Hitler and Stalin while Titoist Yugoslavia resisted Hitler only when Stalin and Hitler broke.

Second, Yugoslavia is an ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare and although its main armies were easily smashed by the Wehrmacht, yet in the mountains of Yugoslavia guerrilla warfare was never abandoned.

Third, the Tito forces participated in the final liberation of Yugoslavia and functioned as a kind of junior ally to the Soviet Army.

Fourth, their moutains were never fully occupied by Hitler as their country was never occupied by Stalin. It was the only East European state to escape Red Army occupation, therefore theoretically self-liberated.

Fifth, geographically, Yugoslavia is farthest from Russia of the so-called "People's Democracies." It has no contiguous border with the Soviet Union. It has direct contact with the non-Communist world — with Italy, with Greece and with the open sea along the shores of the Adriatic. These, then, are the special circumstances which made possible the rise of Titoism.

V. *Differences Which Led to the Break*

Now I should like to examine some of the differences — muted, but stubborn — that developed between Tito and Stalin long before either of them recognized that these differences were leading to a break. On March 5, 1942, Moscow sent a cable to Tito, criticizing him for being too pro-Soviet and too openly Communist in his conduct of the struggle inside Yugoslavia. I quote a few sentences from the Moscow cable:

> WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION THE FOLLOWERS OF ENGLAND AND THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IS ASSUMING A COMMUNIST CHARACTER AND THAT IT INTENDS TO SOVIETIZE YUGOSLAVIA. THE BASIC AND IMMEDIATE TASK CONSISTS NOW IN THE UNIFICATION OF ALL

ANTI-HITLER ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO CRUSH THE OCCUPIER AND ACHIEVE NATIONAL LIBERATION. IS IT REALLY TRUE THAT BESIDES THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR FOLOWERS THERE ARE NO OTHER YUGOSLAV PATRIOTS TOGETHER WITH WHOM YOU COULD FIGHT AGAINST THE ENEMY ?"

Now this is an instruction—not to cease to plan for a Soviet Yugoslavia, but to slow up and dissimulate the tempo of progress in that direction. We thus find that Tito is more Communist and more openly pro-Soviet than Stalin wishes him to be at that moment. A similar instruction went to Mao and, as you know, Mao Tse-tung accepted the instruction and continued to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek, but Tito stepped up his campaign against Mihailovich after receiving this cable. The Soviet Union continued to maintain a "hands off" appearance until very late.

There was no Soviet mission in Yugoslavia until February, 1944, although there was a Military Mission from Britain from May, 1942 on. In 1944 a Yugoslav brigade, trained in Russia, came equipped with uniforms with royal Yugoslav emblems and only after Tito protested were the emblems removed. In 1943, while Stalin was still uncertain whether Mihailovich or Tito would come out on top and still wished to avoid alarming the Western powers, he gave no direct help to Tito. Tito was puzzled, angered, and the only answer he knew was to step up his offensive and campaign of propaganda against Mihailovich. Only when the Americans and the British showed no unfavorable reaction and when all sorts of people in America and in Britain began to echo Tito's propaganda that Mihailovich was a Nazi collaborator—

only then did Stalin conclude that his cautions and fears were exaggerated and only then did he begin to give open help to Tito.

Another curious document of 1942 is a lecture from Stalin to Tito on what "Internationalism" consists of during World War II. I quote:

> " The defeat of the Facist bandits and the liberation from the occupier is now the basic task and is above all other tasks. Take into consideration that the Soviet Union has treaty obligations with the Yugoslav king and government and that any open actions against these would create new difficulties in the common war efforts in the relations between the Soviet Union and England and America. Do not consider your struggle only from your own national viewpoint, but from the international point of view of the English-Soviet-American coalition. Strengthen your positions in the people's liberation struggle," (you see Stalin is not averse to what Tito is trying to do), "and at the same time show more elasticity and ability to maneuver."

On this Tito commented to his close crony, Mosa Pijade,

> "I did not give too many explanations to Grandpa. I merely asked for more weapons to carry out his instructions."

And Grandpa, in turn, sent word that there were "technical difficulties" which prevented the sending of more weapons.

Next, it is well to remember that the party which Tito now leads is truly a Titoist Party. A bit of biography will help.

Tito was born Josef Broz in 1892 in Hapsburg, Croatia. He was a war prisoner of the Russians in World War I. There he was indoctrinated by the Bolsheviks, joined the Red Army, and got his first military training in the civil war that followed in Russia after World War I. Sent back to Yugoslavia, he became Secretary of the Metalworkers' Union of Zagreb. In 1928 he did a tour of duty of five years in jail, where he met Mosa Pijade, who was a fellow inmate, and their close friendship and collaboration began. When he got out of jail, he got a postgraduate course in the Lenin School in Moscow.

From the Lenin School he was sent to Paris to carry on some important Comintern duties in connection with the Spanish Civil War. In Paris he steeped his hands in the blood of "The Purges" when the Blood Purges were carried into Spain and served to demoralize the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. By this participation in the Purge, Tito rose from an obscure second rank figure in the Yugoslav Communist Party to the chief of that party. For those earlier leaders who had stood in his way and were his superiors, largely disappeared in "The Purges."

In 1941 the Yugoslav Party numbered 12,000 members. Less than 3,000 of them survived at the end of the Second World war, but by 1948 those 3,000 had swelled to 470,000 — most of whom never knew any leader but Tito.

Now a glance at the Balkan Federation question. Dimitrov visited Tito at Bled in the summer of 1947. Their principal subject of conversation was the setting up of a Balkan Federation. Dimitrov for Bulgaria and Tito for Yugoslavia issued a joint communique about the immediate steps for the setting up of a Federation of Balkan People's Democratic Republics. Stalin re-

acted instantly with anger. Dimitrov was forced to retract and disclaim their joint initiative in articles which were published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIA. But Tito did not publish a disclaimer. This, therefore, is a key point in the break.

Nevertheless in the autumn of 1947 (when the Cominform was established as a public body with the primary aim of fighting the Marshall Plan and a secondary aim of setting up a federation of satellites in the Balkans under Soviet domination which would be just the opposite of a Balkan Federation such as Dimitrov and Tito had envisaged) — at that point Tito was still the shining example and his country the most advanced of all the People's Democracies that had been created during World War II. The Cominform headquarters were in Belgrade. Tito was regarded as the outstanding of the Balkan leaders. Every one admired him for his power, for his having attained that power independently, and for his general manifestation of independence. Yugoslavia was being used throughout the world by Communists and fellow travelers as the model Communist state of those that had been newly born. Only after the open fight between Stalin and Tito were headquarters of the Cominform switched from Belgrade to Bucharest.

Now let us examine the relations between Stalin and Tito during the critical period. Tito visited Moscow in April, 1945. He came back with a twenty-year treaty of friendship and mutual aid, with a military mission to run his army, an economic mission to integrate his industry into the Soviet economic plan. And he learned, to his dismay, that that plan envisaged Yugoslavia as a kind of second-class agricultural, raw material, metal-producing land, subordinate in rank to Czechoslovakia, to Poland and to Hungary, for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were slated for a greater degree of industrialization. I do not have

to tell you that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary possessed a greater degree of industrialization at the moment they were taken over by the Communists.

Tito was, moreover, at that interview urged into open battle with his own people. One way in which Stalin keeps puppets as puppets is to get them thus into open struggles with their own people. He was urged to go head-on into forced collectivization of Yugoslav agriculture. He recognized that his army was to be reduced to an auxiliary troop of the Soviet Army and that the whole scheme reduced Yugoslavia to a subordinate part in a detailed blueprint from Moscow to all her satellites. He recognized, too, that far from "withering away," this form of state domination was destined to grow stronger and the Soviet Empire would be ever more unified and the Balkan portions of it ever more subjected and coordinated into the Soviet Empire. He was put before the dilemma that Yugoslavia was to remain as before — poor, backward, weak, dependent, and subject to the will of greater powers, in this case the Soviet Union.

He paid a second visit to Stalin in May and June, 1946. Here they went into more detail on the same matters. He learned that the U.S.S.R. was going to reorganize the Yugoslav Army with modern tactics and modern equipment. There was to be no national manual of arms in this thoroughly national Guerrilla Army, but it was to take the Soviet manual of arms, just as, a little later, Hungary was ordered to teach its soldiers to take commands in Russian as well as in Hungarian. There was to be no national arms industry — generous equipment with weapons but if at anytime they wore out or at any time Tito needed new munitions for them, he would have to come "hat in hand" to the Soviet Union once more. There was a Soviet Mission to go to Yugoslavia and take virtual command of the Yugoslav Army,

just as the Yugoslavs were permitted to send a Mission to Albania to take virtual command of the Albanian Army.

The Soviet Intelligence was to teach the Yugoslav Intelligence how to operate and was to have such plenary powers that it could easily by-pass the Yugoslav Intelligence and act as an espionage system on Tito and his fellow Communists. The Soviet technicians were to get notably higher salaries, and, as the Soviet Army officers, were to get plenary powers, and be in key spots.

VI. *Tito Draws First*

Tito left Moscow crestfallen and conferred with his Balkan confederates for closer cooperation to make counter-pressure so that the Communists of the Balkans would be treated with more wisdom (as he thought) and more dignity than had thus far been the case. For the moment all the leaders of the other Balkan countries looked to Tito for leadership, not realizing how far things would go. There followed a period of maneuver. The Comintern, or Cominform, was ordering a sudden drastic turn to the "left," in connection with the stepping up of its "cold war." In America, Browder was "ditched." In Czechoslovakia, Masaryk and Benes were driven to their doom. Tito, as a good Stalinist, recognized the symptoms and made a sudden ultra-left swing himself — went way to the "left" of the orders which he expected would come from Moscow any day, and announced that he was determined "to liquidate immediately all remnants of Capitalism in trade and in industry and agriculture." This drastic turn to the left is something for which Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav agriculture are still paying the penalty at the present moment, as each day's budget of news indicates.

Stalin was as smart as Tito and when he saw Tito taking this left turn on his own so that he could not be criticized as an "opportunist," he recognized that this meant "fight." And so the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began secret consultations with selected members of other Central Committees concerning Tito's "errors" and Tito's "excessive independence." And the Cominform (which had been set up for the fight on the Marshall Plan) now sharpened its offensive instruments for a major war on Tito and Titoism.

In late 1947 the Cominform met in Belgrade — on September 27 — and Tito was still a leader among the Cominform leaders. He criticized heads of other Communist Parties for their timidity. He was shown sympathy by Dimitrov, by Gomulka, by Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania. Even Thorez and Togliatti, who were present, were hesitant and showed some admiration for the courage and the independence that Tito was showing. Zhdanov, representing the Soviet Union, was also friendly to Tito, but he was in the beginning of his eclipse in the Soviet Union and died in 1948. His people were rapidly removed from places of power.

At the beginning of March, 1948, the Vice Premier of Yugoslavia, Kardelj, went to Moscow in a vain effort to persuade Moscow to send more machinery for the purpose of the industrialization of Yugoslavia. He came back empty-handed. On March 18, the Soviet government secretly withdrew all military advisors and instructors from Tito's Army, charging that they were "surrounded by hostility." On March 19 they withdrew all civilian missions, charging "a lack of hospitality and a lack of confidence." On March 20, Tito demanded an explanation.

He wrote to Molotov, "We are amazed. We cannot understand. We are deeply hurt. Openly inform us what the trouble is."

On June 29, 1948, the unsuspecting world was startled by the publication of a Cominform blast against Tito entitled, "Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"; and a Tito counter-blast, defensive in character but nevertheless obviously a counter-blast. The break was in the open. The period is an instructive one; it was the period when the Berlin crisis had come to a head. Berlin was being blockaded by the Russians. We were debating whether we should smash the blockade by running armored trains, properly defended, through the blockade lines.

At that time the Soviet military men were considering a military plan in case open war should begin. That military plan involved something which was of great importance to Tito and helps to explain Stalin's attitude towards Tito's Army. The plan was to smash westward, through Germany in a frontal attack towards France and the Atlantic; but, at the same time to outflank France by sending an army through the relatively less mountainous areas, following the valleys of the Po and the Adige and the Plains of Lombardy; then striking up into France through the most accessible of the passes, thus hitting our troops from the rear at the same time they were being hit from the front by the major forces of the Soviet Army.

This makes clear why it was that Stalin conceived of Tito's Army not as a guerrilla force to defend the mountains against invasion (for the only conceivable invader was the Soviet Union), but as an auxiliary troop to serve the Soviet Army and to become a part of it in that outflanking movement in case war should actually break out. Stalin insisted upon equipping Tito's troops to be such an auxiliary force in a Soviet regular army while Tito dreamed of maintaining his troops as essentially mountaineer guerrillas to defend the sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia in case of any attack.

This same period was one in which U.N.R.R.A. supplies had been completely used up and the Yugoslav Trade Delegation in Moscow was begging in vain for aid in the industrialization of the country to get its Five Year Plan of Industrialization underway. It was directed instead to gear its minerals and ores into the more advanced industries of neighbor countries and of the Soviet Union.

VII. *Soviet Imperialism*

This brings us to the notion of Kremlin Imperialism, which Tito's break has made so clear. The subordination of the Yugoslav Army into an auxiliary troop; the subordination of the Yugoslav economy into the over-all plans and profits of Soviet industry; the attempt by the Soviet Union to get proconsul's rights and extra-territorial status for its agents; its ambassador to be entitled to interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs; its agents to have the right to access to state secrets; its right to organize its own intelligence service to spy on the Yugoslav leaders, to be exempt from Yugoslav espionage and to recruit Yugoslav citizens as Soviet spies; its insistence that Soviet officers should get three or four times as much salary from Yugoslavia as the Yugoslavia generals and to have over-riding powers; its insistence of the rights of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to interfere in the affairs of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav state.

Now Soviet Imperialism combines all the imperialisms that have ever been invented in the long history of man. From the most ancient direct pillage and plunder and kidnapping of populations and extermination of elites to leave peoples leaderless, and the sowing of waste lands for strategic purposes, to the early 20th Century form of economic penetration and then has

super-added its own forms of expansion of the total state through terror, concentration camps, deportations, police systems and the like.

Let us examine for a moment what we might call "classic economic Imperialism." The Soviet Union had set up (as Tito has now made clear by publishing the documents) mixed companies, *juspad* and *justa*—shipping and aviation. Theoretically, the stock is owned 50-50 by the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government, but the Soviet government paid in only 9.83% of its share during the period in which the Yugoslav government had paid in 76.25% of its share. The managing director in Yugoslavia was a Soviet appointee; his assistant was a Yugoslav who was ignored for all practical purposes. Soviet planes were allowed to fly into Yugoslavia, but Yugoslav planes were not allowed to fly into the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia paid 52% more for her freight shipments on the Danube than the Soviet Union did and 30% more (for reasons that are not clear to me) than any other satellite did. In other words, here was a system of direct economic exploitation thinly disguised under the guise of an equal partnership.

Similarly, the army equipment of Yugoslavia was left without replacement parts to keep it in subjection. Yugoslavia sent metals (principally iron) to Czechoslovakia and had asked in return for machinery in order to manufacture trucks. Czechoslovakia under Soviet orders sent not machinery to manufacture trucks, but sent trucks, meaning "you will never manufacture your own trucks." Yugoslavia found all its molybdenum monpolized by the Soviet government. Its cost of production was fantastically high — 500,000 dinars per ton according to the Yugoslav White Book; but the Soviet monopoly paid only the world price—instead of 500,000 dinars, 45,000 dinars—so that

Yugoslavia lost 455,000 dinars on every ton that was delivered, and the more it delivered the most it lost.

Finally, in this relation of metropolis to colony there was an ill-concealed basic contempt. One example will suffice: In one of the notes of the Soviet government to the Yugoslav government dated August 30, 1949, you will find this sentence, "The puppy is feeling so good that it barks at the elephant." Nevertheless, the puppy has so far checked the elephant, so we must now examine how the puppy managed to hold the elephant at bay.

First, Stalin had unexamined illusions as to the absoluteness of his own power. Up until that time no one had been able to stand against him. Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev — they all looked bigger to him then did little Tito, but at his breath they were blown over. He had only, he thought, to sound the trumpet and the walls of Tito's pocket Kremlin would collapse; he had only to hurl an anathema and Tito would vanish in a puff of smoke. Not only Bukharin, Trotsky and Zinoviev proved vulnerable to his anathema, but he had no difficulty with Poland, Hungary and Rumania. However, Tito had a power center of his own just out of reach. Moreover, he was the perfect disciple — a kind of pocket Stalin.

VIII. *The Crack in the Kremlin Wall*

In the chess game which now ensued they both played by the same book. He was able to anticipate each move. Every time Stalin touched a piece, he envisaged the entire alteration or configuration of the game — for he was playing the same game. He was invited to Moscow to parley — he politely declined the invitation. He was invited to Bucharest to parley at

the Second Cominform session — he stayed away. Attempts were made to assassinate him — he protected himself well, though not as cautiously as Stalin does.

But there is an invisible wall which helps to protect him. There is danger in assassinating him before he has been discredited, before he has gone through the process of acknowledging his errors, discrediting himself, spitting in his own face, crawling, apologizing and doing all the other things that Cominform leaders have to learn to do at certain stages in their careers. Only then could he be safely exterminated, confessed "purged," or assassinated. But to assassinate him before this has happened is to make a banner and a martyr of him. This, too, protects him. A coup d'etat was tried against him, but he comes from a land where people, as we say in Mexico, "learn to get up early"; that is, he drew first.

In April 1948, before the open break, he threw Hebrang and Zujovic in jail, recognizing that they were secretly organizing a Stalinist faction in his party. They are still in jail. When General Arso Jovanovic was trained in Moscow and returned to serve in his army, then packed his bags one night and made for the frontier, Tito seemed to get the jump again and Jovanovic was shot trying to escape.

A "revolution" in Yugoslavia has been called for, and called for, and called for — but the call falls on deaf ears. Tito, who had enormous opposition in his own country, undoubtedly has less opposition today than he had when Stalin attacked him, rather than more opposition. With his internal opposition, every knock from Stalin is a kind of boost. He has gradually moved over into the position of a national hero. Without ceasing to be a Communist he is also in the position of a national hero,

defending Yugoslavia's independence against a great, bullying power. Therefore, Stalin's committees in exile have been branded as "puppets," "traitors," and Tito himself is a hero even with the people who resent his total state regime.

Charging Tito with ingratitude and lack of discipline has not proved effective, so Stalin has tried more complex ideological attacks. But an ideological attack permits an ideological defense. The Cominform has said that Yugoslavia has a police regime, terror, no party democracy, holds no party congresses. Tito answers, "You have a police regime; you have terror; you, also, have no party democracy; you hold no party congresses."

So every article of the indictment has become *a fortiori* an article of the indictment of the Stalin regime itself and this is the most distressing thing that has happened to Stalin since he came to power. Gradually Tito has stepped up his defensive until it has become an offensive, and he has done it with rare tactical skill. Today the Soviet regime is truly on the defensive against this tiny, ridiculous "puppy who is barking at the elephant"; on the defensive because from inside the Communist camp come the clear words of truth about Soviet Imperialism and Soviet terror and Soviet ruthlessness which, when they come from non-Communists, have less effectiveness. This is the true crack in the Kremlin wall of infallibility. Therefore Stalin cannot tolerate it and refuses to tolerate it but he tries expedient after expedient, move after move, and every time playing by the same book, having gone through the same hard school, having a somewhat better moral case, Tito out-guesses him and blocks each move on his part.

There are only two possible moves which might bring results. One of them is to run all his neighbor states into an

attack — an open war upon him. This is too dangerous. Danger No. 1 — that the armies of the Balkan neighbor states are themselves infected with some admiration for this assertion of independence of a Balkan power; Danger No. 2 — Tito has (on a Balkan scale) a mighty good army and may not be overthrown without the intervention of the Soviet Union; Danger No. 3 (and largest of all) — during the period when Stalin wants neither total peace nor total war he cannot risk an open attack upon Tito, for out of a local war too easily can come a total war.

Now there is a certain logic to Tito's position which we in the democratic lands watch with the closest attention. He is engaged in a critique of Stalinism which has ended with a complete rejection of Stalinism. Nevertheless, the structure of his own state is still basically Stalinist in character: that is to say, he still has his political prisoners; he still has his forced collectivization; he still has his one-party state; he still has his secret police; he still has his terror—all the things he learned from Stalin. He has glossed them over a bit, undoubtedly softened them a bit as his relations with his own people become less tense; nevertheless, the structure is there. But the logic is one which compels him anxiously to reexamine that structure. I do not say to dismantle it—that is what we are watching with interest—but certainly he is constantly re-examining it.

The logic also of his position requires him to seek allies. He has been forced into calling off the war on Greece and in Greece. He has been forced into closer relations with Greece, Turkey, Italy and Austria (which is all that is left of the possibilities of a Balkan Federation against Soviet aggression). He has been forced to apply for help from the Free World, and we have given him help, and that too has its logic. We have not

made conditions. We have had much debate as to whether we ought to make conditions and what conditions we ought to make, but the fact is that we have made no conditions. We are not endorsing his internal regime, but on the other hand neither are we making our critique of this internal regime a major criterion at present. The major criterion is that he represents a crack in the Cominform. He represents a Communist defiance, a Communist aggression in Imperialism that emanates from the Soviet Union, and he represents a struggle for independence of his country against the Soviet Empire. These things we are prepared to support to the extent that we are now supporting them because in the kind of world in which we live they are definitely assets, creating a better situation rather than a worse situation.

The full logic of his position is limited by his own dogmas and predispositions. I have recently spoken with Bebler and I found that Bebler, Kardelj and Pijade (who are the major theoreticians of Titoslavia) are approaching very tenderly the question of re-examining Leninism. They are brave and bold in re-examining Stalinism. They are at the point now in their thinking where they are asking themselves, "Shall we also re-examine Leninism to see if in Lenin, too, there was some imperfection which gave rise to Stalinism ?" And they are beginning to come to the conclusion that there was. How far that process will go, I do not venture to predict.

The final thought that I would like to leave with you is this: there is also a logic to Stalin's position. Leninism was defined by a Russian Marxist once as "Marxism a la tartar" (Marxism with tartar sauce). If that is true, we will have to find a much more drastic qualification for Stalinism. It is a kind of mountaineer blood-feud Marxism, geared to a total state and an aspiration to total rule of the world. But there within the

Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist camp Stalinism has suffered its first check. And I do not believe that Stalin is so dumb as not to learn from what has happened.

Just as the British after 1776 never lost another colony, so Stalin has determined after June, 1948, never to permit another Tito and never to lose another Yugoslavia. But Britain's response was appropriate to the organic nature of the British regime. It was a slow, hesitant, blundering but incessant loosening of the bonds, until the British Empire changed (and is still changing under our eyes) into the British Commonwealth of nations.

We have watched India break the bonds and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. I hope (and believe) that we will yet watch Egypt break the bonds and remain in organic relation to the Commonwealth. We have watched Ireland (where the situation was more tense certainly than in Egypt) break the bonds of colonialism and yet remain a part of the Commonwealth. So with Burma. In other words, the process continues and Britain has never lost another colony because according to its own inner nature it has gradually loosened the bonds.

Now according to the inner nature of the Stalin regime the direct opposite procedure is taken — to tighten the bonds. Being the ruthless total state that it is and Stalin being the kind of man he is, he can think of nothing but to squeeze tighter; to coordinate the countries more rapidly into his machine; to hasten the conflict between rulers and ruled; to remove those who have any roots in their own country and put in their places puppets who are completely dependent upon him; to let loose a hail of blood purges, executions of faithful and devoted Communists like Laszlo Rajk, Traicho Kostov, Clementis, Gomulka,

and like loyal collaborators such as Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia. There has been hail of accusations of Titoism, and one by one the men who have national roots in their own country, in their own Communist Parties and in their own laboring classes — these men have been executed in advance of the possibility that they may some day commit the crime of considering the interests of their country as different from the interests of the Soviet Empire.

However, there is also a danger in that method of solving the problem of Titoism. When you draw the bonds tighter and tighter you augment the potential discontent. Thus the Soviet Empire appears to grow tighter and stronger with its more ruthless coordination of all of its parts, but at the same time that introduces fresh elements of weakness into every one of the lands that Stalin dominates.

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

A Lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 4 September 1951 by
Dr. Demitri B. Shimkin

Since 1928, Soviet economic development has, in essence, represented the progressive realization of the patterns foreshadowed by the First Five-Year Plan. This has been particularly true in the emphasis laid on heavy industry, in the organizational forms of agricultural enterprises, in the geographical distribution of industrial centers, and in the lay-out and functioning of the nation's transportation system. In the last five years, however, fundamental new problems have become evermore pressing. The rigidity of agricultural organization has become a bottleneck, hindering rapid growth of the non-agricultural labor force. Droughts in 1946 and 1950 brought out once more the paucity and indifferent quality of developed agricultural resources. The unevenness of economic growth throughout the Soviet Union has permitted no relaxation in the heavy pressure upon the country's transportation network. The limits in productive capacity from developed mineral deposits and operating industrial plants have been closely approached. Satellite territories in Eastern Europe and the Far East now demand increasing economic integration and development to serve effectively as outer bastions of Soviet power. Above all,

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challenging the western world, so greatly superior in economic potential, would call for an utmost effort in direct military production.

An examination of Soviet alternatives in economic action and an evaluation of indicated plans, viewed from the standpoint of these growing problems, are the objectives of this review of Russia's economic potential. It comprises four parts: a delineation of the general accomplishments of the Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1946-1950; a summary of the major economic problems faced by USSR today; an evaluation of known aspects of Soviet and satellite economic plans; and an indication of the broad possibilities for further economic expansion by the Soviet sphere.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC ACOMPLISHMENTS: In March, 1946, less than a year after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union promulgated a Fourth Five-Year Plan of economic reconstruction and expansion. The plan was fundamentally aimed at achieving in 1950 the goals laid down for 1942 by the Third Five-Year Plan, which had been interrupted by the war. The differences between the two plans were few, notably postwar reductions in petroleum and fertilizer production targets.

By the end of 1950, the goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan in mineral production had been substantially achieved, except for a definite failure in natural gas output (See Figure 1). Electrical-power production and railroad ton-mileage slightly exceeded the anticipated levels. In contrast, the manufacturing of non-military commodities, from farm tractors and civilian trucks, to window-glass, cotton cloth and paper, failed by appreciable margins to reach the 1950 goals. Non-agricultural employment in 1950 totalled 35 million persons, or some 18% more than had been foreseen. This fact reflected corresponding failures to meet man-year pro-

ductivity goals; it also meant far greater pressure upon the meager housing facilities of the Soviet Union than anticipated. In agriculture, only cotton production exceeded plan; however, grain and sugar-beet outputs were only slightly below target levels. On the other hand, the hay, flax and sunflower seed programs were marked failures. The increases in livestock numbers between 1945 and 1950 averaged less than two-thirds of those planned. Finally, while the reconstruction of manufacturing and transportation facilities in the war-devasted regions was successfully accomplished, extremely little progress was realized in the construction of new plants and rail lines. Such important projects as the Orsk and Rustavi steel mills, the Novosibirsk Automotive Plant[1], and the South Siberian Railroad remained unfinished.

By the end of 1950, Soviet mining manufacturing and railroad ton-mileage had reached levels 40 to 50% higher than the pre-war peaks. Especially important advances were realized in aluminum and electrical power output which reached over thrice and nearly double the pre-war peaks, respectively. The number of farm tractors produced in 1950 (81,000) was considerably more than achieved in 1937 to 1940, but far under the peak of 103,000 reached in 1935. Man-year productivity in non-agricultural pursuits exceeded that of 1940 by some 10%, a gain entirely ascribable to post-war increases in the work week, to 48 hours. In agriculture, the only important rise above pre-war production was in cotton[2]. This was desperately needed to supply mills in the satellite areas and China; domestic output of cotton cloth in the USSR failed to regain the pre-war figure.

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[1] In the South Urals, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and Western Siberia, respectively.

[2] Nearly 40% in comparison with 1940, a poor year; only some 15% above the average for 1937-40. Data from L. Volin, U. S. Department of agriculture.

The most important effect of World War II on the Soviet economy was to force a tremendous eastward shift. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan period, the major effort changed from new development east of the Volga to reconstruction in the west. Nevertheless, the net result of the past decade has been to increase the significance of the Volga, Urals, Siberian and Turkestan economic regions to the following degrees:

> In mineral production, from 25% to 50% of the nation's total.
>
> In electrical power output, from 24% to 37%.
>
> In rail-freight originated and terminated, from 28% to 41%.

It must be noted, however, that the share of these eastern regions in both total and urban population, and in developed agricultural land is no greater today than it was fifteen years ago. Another point is significant: within European Russia, the Central Regions and the Ukraine have maintained a fairly steady development, while economic stagnation has marked not only the war-damaged western frontiers but also the Caucasus.

How did Soviet economy, at the completion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, compare in stature with the American? In mineral consumption, electrical power production, and, evidently in total industrial output, civil and military combined, the Soviet: American ratios in 1950 closely approximated 1:4. Even with the production of the Eastern European satellites added to the Soviet total, the ratio in comparison with the United States did not exceed 1:3; or, in comparison with the Atlantic Powers jointly, 1:5. The Soviet Union manifested relatively greater strength than a quarter of the American output in coal and lead, and in the production of cotton cloth, but exhibited much greater comparative

weakness in petroleum and natural gas, and in a wide series of civilian manufactures, ranging from trucks to paper. In agriculture, forestry and fishing, the mean ratio was about 6:10; on a per capita basis, however, the supplies of these products available to the Soviet Union was less than half the American. The outstanding Soviet weaknesses lay in cotton and, surprisingly, timber production.

SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: As was indicated earlier, many serious economic problems confront the Soviet Union today. These difficulties must, however, be viewed in proper perspective. They are unquestionably serious enough to hamper and delay the achievement of many Soviet economic and strategic objectives, and they might prove dangerous in an all-out war or comparable extraordinary emergency. But under present conditions they cannot stop a growth in the total power of the Soviet sphere, and certainly they presage no collapse.

In my opinion, the most important adverse factor in the Soviet economy since the end of World War II has been the great load of armaments, including the atomic energy program. This military burden seems clearly to have exceeded even Soviet anticipations. Lags in construction, and gaps between goals and performances in civilian manufacturing, simultaneously with excellent records in mineral production, electrical power output and transportation, give clear evidence on this point. Heavy militarization has cut deeply into supplies of labor, electrical energy, metals, chemicals and tools available to the civilian economy. Large-scale stockpiling has also been an indubitable factor in reducing civilians supplies.

Factor	Unit	Reached in 1950	Ratio 1950 to Planned Goals	1939/ 1940 Peak	U. S. 1948 Output
Mineral production:					
Coal (bitum. equiv.)	Mill. m.t.	220	1.06	1.6	0.35
Petroleum	" "	35.0	0.99[5]	1.2	0.12
Natural Gas	" m.[3]	2.51	0.28	1.2	0.02
Steel ingots	" m.[1]	2.48	0.97	1.4	0.31
Copper (electrolytic)	Thous. m. t.	(2.90)	1.12	1.8	(0.30)
Lead, primary	" "	(144)	0.92	(1.6)	0.39
Zinc, primary	" "	(128)	0.99	(1.6)	0.26
Aluminum, primary	" "	(180)	1.00	3.2	0.31
Cement	Mill. m. t.	10.6	1.01	1.8	0.30
Total[2]	Bill. U. S. 1937 doll.	1.57	(1.0)	1.5	(0.25)
Manufacturing:					
Farm tractors	Thous. Units	81[3]	(0.74)[3]	3.0	0.12
Trucks and cars[4]	" "	400	0.80	1.9	0.08
Superphosphate	Mill. m. t.	2.6	0.96[5]	1.7	(0.30)
Window glass	" m.[2]	66	0.82	1.1	—
Cotton cloth	" m.	3.98	0.83	1.0	0.44
Paper	" m. t.	1.23	0.92	1.5	0.14
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries:					
All grains	Mill. m. t.	(95.0)	(0.93)	1.0	0.60
Wheat	" "	30.2	—	—	0.85
Sugar beets	" "	23.4	0.90	1.1	1.3[6]
Unginned cotton	" "	3.7	1.2	1.1	(0.25)
Cattle	Mill. head	57.2	0.87	1.0	0.73
Fish catch	Mill. m. t.	1.72	0.78	1.1	0.82

Factor	Unit	Reached in 1950	Ratio 1950 to Planned Goals	1939/ 1940 Peak	U. S. 1948 Output
Timber cut (roundwood)	Mill. m. ^{3}	155	0.86	1.4	0.43
Electrical Power Output	Bill. kw-h	90	1.0	1.9	0.27
Railroad Freight	Bill. m.t.kw-h	594	1.1	1.4	0.64
Civilian Non-Farm Employment	Millions	(34.5)	1.2	1.3	0.80
Men, 15-59, *in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing*	Millions	(35.2)	—	1.1	4.4

Notes:

1. Probably includes a substantial proportion from scrap.
2. Excludes gold, silver, stone, sand and gravel.
3. Converted from "15-h.p."units; average calculated power per tractor—33 h.p. Percentage of plan achieved for the entire period 1946-1950.
4. Excludes an equivalent of 25% additional in spare parts.
5. Reduction from 1942 goal in Third Five-Year Plan.
6. Includes cane sugar.

Finally, the severe restrictions on trade which the western nations have imposed as counters to the Soviet threat have had a gradually cumulative adverse affect.

Next in significance appear to be the great Soviet shortages in productive capacity of all descriptions. Blast and open-hearth furnaces, electrical-power stations, housing and factory space, transportation, and farm equipment are all being used with great intensity. In general, the production reserves available to the USSR today are far smaller than in 1940, and negligible by comparison with the United States. Shortages in capacity are, of course, inherent in any rapid industrialization. However, they have been aggravated in the Soviet Union by substandard construction and manufactures, poor maintenance practices, and inadequate allowances for amortization. Also significant since 1937 has been the great lag in new construction resulting from the diversions of materials and labor to direct military ends.

Closely allied to the problem of inadequate reserves of capacity are the continuation of obsolete and inadequately diversified production, as well as slow growth in labor productivity. Transportation and agricultural equipment have been especially characterized by the continued output of a limited range of old models. The attempt to achieve maximum production with a minimum investment has led to frequent deficiencies in belt lines and other internal transportation systems; in the diversification of machine tools; in the adequacy of control devices, which has in turn prevented the wide use of automatic production and, especially, quality control; and in space-allocation, lighting, ventilation and heating. These factors, combined with poor living conditions and a very high proportion of women and children in industry, have resulted in low productivity.

Low man-hour productivity both in urban occupations and on farms has resulted in a severe labor shortage, aggravated by the tremendous losses of men in World War II and by the maintenance of a huge standing army. To meet this problem, the Soviets

have put great pressure on workers, prohibiting unauthorized changes of employment and making compulsory not only a 48-hour basic work week but also overtime within wide limits. Labor discipline has been extremely harsh, backed by criminal penalties for violations. The Soviets accelerated the entry of urban women into the labor market by the currency conversion of 1947, which virtually wiped out individual savings. In consequence, the present proportion of women in non-agricultural employment, nearly half, closely approximates the World War II peak. Further growth of urban employment, to a degree unanticipated in 1946, has been maintained by the conscription of 14 to 17-year olds, largely farm children, for industry and the railroads. Up to now, the growth of city population by the mass transfer of adult farmers, as happened during the collectivization of agriculture in the 1930's, has been inhibited by the following factors.

First, the losses in power suffered from the slaughter of horses and the destruction of mechanical equipment during World War II have not yet been made good. Second, even by Soviet standards, urban housing and service conditions are too limited for much additional crowding. Third, the collective farmer, enjoying somewhat greater political and economic freedom, a greater security of subsistence, than his city cousin has been reluctant to leave the land. His rights to a place on the farm have been guaranteed by a charter in perpetuity. Nevertheless, the revocation of these rights which began in 1950 may be the beginning of a new era of forced urbanization.

Many raw materials have also been in short supply. In minerals, the non-metallics, particularly diamonds, fertilizers and sulphuric acid basics, have been especially deficient. Other weaknesses include petroleum, zinc, tin, molybdenum and cobalt. In agricultural commodities, the supplies of fibers, rubber, leather,

and protein sources have been conspicuously weak. As mentioned previously, timber production is also low. All of these shortages have been intensified by the decline of trade with the west, the need for supplying the satellites, and the disproportionately great demands of armaments.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE ECONOMIC PLANS: At the present time, the position of the Soviet Union is anomalous—that of a planned economy without a highly publicized plan of national economic development. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, which was to begin in 1951, has been either delayed or completely abrogated. Instead the main Soviet effort is ostensibly to be devoted, for the next five to six years, to the accomplishment of a series of grandiose water-development projects.

These plans may be divided into three groups: the Volga-Don Basin projects, the South Ukrainian projects and the Turkmen Canal scheme. The first of these is an old plan, started in the mid-1930's and originally scheduled for completion in 1947. Two parts of the Volga plan have already been completed, the Ivan'kovo-Uglich and the Rybinsk dam systems on the Upper Volga which have created a large reservoir above Rybinsk and have a capacity of 460,000 kw. if all the planned dynamos have been installed. Two other dams, near Gor'kii on the Volga, and Molotov on the Kama, started in 1933 and due to be completed in 1938-39, must yet be finished; they are to have installed capacities of 400,000 and 500,000 kw., respectively. All of these dams except the one at Molotov are wide but low structures, raising the natural water levels only by 36 to 49 feet; the Molotov dam is to be higher, with a head of 115 feet.

Lower on the Volga, two new dams are to be built at Kuibyshev and Stalingrad. They are to be largely of eathern

construction, some two miles long, and 66 to 85 feet high, exclusive of parapets. Electrical power capacities of 2.0 and 1.7 million kilowatts, respectively, are to be installed; half the power generated to be transmitted to Moscow. The two reservoirs, each in excess of 16 million acre-feet capacity or equal jointly to that of Hoover dam by itself, are to irrigate an overall total of some 10 million acres. To aid this purpose, two principal canals, one 60 miles south to the Sarpa lakes and the other 200 miles east to the Kamysh-Samar lakes, are to be dug as outlets for the Stalingrad reservoir.

West of Stalingrad, work on the Volga-Don canals is in progress. This canal, 62 miles long, must lift the waters of the Volga some 250 feet; those of the Don, 125 feet. To accomplish this, 13 locks will be needed. Below the canal, at Tsymlyansk, the Soviets are constructing a low but exceedingly long retaining structure consisting of a 500-yard wide dam and two earthen dikes totalling 13,000 yards. The structure is to raise the water level of the Don by 86 feet, creating a reservoir of some 10 million acre-feet capacity, which is to regulate the flow of water to Rostov, and to permit the irrigation of 1,850,000 acres, facilitated by canals aggregating 350 miles in length. The power to be installed at Tsymlyansk is to total 160,000 kw.

The South Ukrainian projects comprise essentially the construction of the following: a dam on the lower Dnyepr at Kakhovka, with a reservoir of nearly 11.5 million acre-feet capacity; another dam, on the Molochnaya River to the southeast, and a diversionary canal from the old Dnyeprstroi reservoir to the Molochnaya River, carrying the flood-waters of the Dnyepr hitherto spilled and thus filling the Molochnaya basin to a capacity of 5 million acre-feet. From these basic structures a series of irrigation canals totalling 560 miles in length will be needed to distribute water throughout the

Southern Ukraine and Crimea. New irrigated land is to aggregate 3.7 million acres; power capacity at Kakhovka, 250,000 kw.

The Turkmen project envisages the construction of a dam diverting much of the waters of the Amu Darya from the river's delta and the Aral Sea southwestward, via canals and old streambeds, to the Caspian. The main purposes of this project are alleged to be the irrigation of 3.2 million acres, and the provision of industrial water supply to Krasnovodak and other mining centers.

The evaluation of these projects is extremely difficult, since very few technical or economic data regarding them are available. Nevertheless, I would like to summarize a number of my impressions:

1. Although these projects involve very large undertakings in moving earth and laying concrete, none of them are inherently impossible from the standpoint of present-day technology. However, the degree to which these projects appear to be serious plans rather than fanciful schemes differs greatly. Technically, the most dubious appear to be the Turkmen project, the Stalingrad-Kamysh-Samar lakes canal, the Tsymlyansk dam, and the Volga-Moscow transmission lines. It should be noted the Amu Darya is still a completely unregulated river, with tremendous variations in discharge, carrying an extremely heavy load of silt. The effectiveness of a dam just above the delta is thus very doubtful. In addition, the complete absence of industrial facilities in, or even transportation to, this region would make necessary a very large scale of preliminary investment. In regard to the Stalingrad canal, I will simply state that not even the route has yet been determined. The Tsymlyansk dam, while technically not difficult to build, will face very difficult maintenance and seepage problems, since it is being constructed on deep, unconsolidated sands. Finally, the

planned transmission lines from Kuibyshev and Stalingrad to Moscow would strain Soviet technology to the utmost.

2. At the same time, it is essential to note that all of these projects can be phased, and that alternative plans are fully possible for the later phases. In general, the first effects of dam construction would be to facilitate local water supplies and navigation; the power facilities can be built up very gradually, since the small drop characterizing all the sites involves numerous small generators rather than a few giants. Furthermore, the power developed can be used locally, or transmitted for varying distances. In the Volga project, as laid out in 1937, barely 20% of the power from Kuibyshev was to be transmitted to Moscow. Instead, most to be used locally for power-intensive industry and irrigation, while the bulk of the remainder was to be transmitted to Kazan, Gor'kii and Ufa. The pre-war variant of the lower Volga project anticipated using nearly all the power for non-ferrous metals, fertilizer, synthetic rubber and other plants to be located near the dam site. The enormous power and water requirements for the manufacture of fissionable or fusionable atomic raw materials are well known; thus it is conceivable that the Volga projects might eventually augment Soviet atomic potential rather than furnishing power to Moscow.

3. The construction time for these projects, especially the irrigation schemes, is almost certain to be far greater than anticipated. Numerous bottlenecks for simultaneous progress on these various plants are evident, e. g., limited quantities of heavy earth-moving equipment, cement, and electrical-generating machinery. In consequence, the probable rate of investment is unlikely to exceed a moderate fraction of Russia's total investment capacity, leaving the bulk for a more general Fifth Five-Year Plan, intensified aid to the satellites, or a rapidly accelerating armaments program.

4. The economic effect of these programs, excluding the Turkmen Canal as unlikely of accomplishment, may be the following. Extremely important gains in electrical power production, without corresponding pressures on coal mining or transportation, are probable. So too is the development of large water supplies on the Volga and in the Southern Ukraine for industrial and urban use. Substantial accessions to Soviet air and atomic power would be plausible by-products.

From the standpoint of navigation, both gains and losses may be foreseen. A deep-water channel from Tsymlyansk to Moscow and to Molotov in the Urals would be of great advantage to the Soviet Union, providing significant relief to the railroads which link the great central Russian, Ukrainian and Urals' industrial complexes. On the other hand, the loss of at least 16% of the Volga discharge because of water diversions and increased evaporation from reservoirs would accelerate the already-rapid drying up of the Caspian Sea. The northern shore would recede possibly 40 miles in a couple of decades; Kara Bugaz Gulf, already a separate lake would disappear. Maintenance of transportation on the lower Volga and in the Caspian would be both difficult and costly. The effects on the important Caspian Sea fisheries would be disastrous. Much of the same can be said for the prospects of the Don below Tsymlyansk, which faces loss of some 40% of its discharge.

5. The projects envisage irrigating some 15.5 million acres of land. They do not emphasize, however, that nearly a million acres of cultivated land have already been flooded in the creation of the Rybinsk reservoir, and that the new reservoirs would flood an additional four million acres. Thus the net gain in cultivated land would ultimately total barely 3% of the acreage sown in 1950; the net gain in agricultural production, not more than 6 or 7%. Clearly, these plans provide no long-range solution to Russia's

agricultural problem. The purported amelioration of climatic conditions through these projects is, of course, nonsense.

Let us now consider briefly the satellite plans for economic development. For Poland, Czechoslovakia and presumably, Eastern Germany, there is envisaged a 70% increase in mineral production within five years. Fuel output is to rise by about a third; cement, to nearly double. Pig iron, copper and zinc production are supposed to be more than tripled. In manufacturing, the planned increases range from 40% for shoes, to 70 to 95% for locomotives, radios, textiles, motor vehicles and electrical-power output. Three new industrial centers are to arise, near Cracow, in the Warsaw area, and in the vicinity of Frankfort on the Oder. Generally speaking, the plans anticipate a rate of growth in industry comparable to that achieved by the Soviet Union during the First Five-Year Plan. However, conditions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany today are far less favorable for rapid industrialization than those in the USSR in 1928. Their populations are already 55% to 75% urban; their agricultural practices are relatively advanced. Furthermore, they must import a great part of their raw materials. All cotton, much timber, two-thirds of the iron ore, all steel-alloying metals, many non-ferrous metals, and such basics as sulphur minerals and phosphate rock must come either from the Soviet Union or the west. In addition, these countries carry armaments loads comparable to that of the USSR in 1939, rather than in 1928. Only substantial Soviet aid can avert the failure of these plans.

The plans for Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are even more ambitious, calling for a 175% increase in mineral production within five years, and for the creation of many completely new industries, ranging from fertilizers to bicycles. Here again, Soviet aid would be indispensable for success.

POTENTIALITIES AND ALTERNATIVES: Let us summarize the data presented thus far. First, the Soviet Union, by the end of 1950, achieved an industrial output 40-50% above its pre-war peak, and a quarter as great as the American in 1948-50. In agriculture, it essentially regained the pre-war level, roughly 60% the current American output. Second, the Soviet economy today faces serious problems deriving from the impacts of an armaments race with the West; of shortages in productive capacity; of obsolescence and inadequate diversification in many technological areas; of low man-power productivity; and of numerous raw-material shortages. Third, the absence of a Fifth Five-Year Plan currently leaves the bulk of Soviet investment capacity without known commitments. The water-development projects now underway are certain to be completed at a slower speed than planned. They are likely to be most valuable in augmenting Soviet electrical-power production and industrial water supplies, and in improving transportation within the Volga River basin north of the Caspian Sea. Sharp increases in Soviet air and atomic energy capabilities may be results. Finally, the Eastern Europe satellites have been committed to industrialization programs substantially beyond their capabilities without substantial Soviet aid.

In conclusion, I would like to indicate the longer-term economic potentialities and alternatives of action which appear to be open to the Soviet sphere today. It is my belief that the USSR has the manpower and investment capacity at present to be able to double its industrial output within ten years. Such an increase, however, could be achieved only by continuing austerity, limiting armaments, and avoiding exports of capital. By such means, Russia could largely solve her food problems, through increased irrigation and, above all, systematic land improvement in the old Central Russian and Ukrainian agricultural areas. Considerable expansion in mineral output could be achieved, especially in Kazak-

hstan and Central Siberia. New industrial centers in these areas, and in the underdeveloped regions of Central Russia could, in conjunction with a moderate length of new railroads, greatly reduce the nation's weaknesses in transportation. The potential rate of economic growth by the satellite areas would, under such circumstances, be rather slower than the Soviet.

The second alternative would be accelerated economic growth in the satellite areas, including Manchuria, achieved by large capital flows from the USSR, and hence slower Soviet development. Such a program would gain more output with less investment and would create strong outposts, east and west, for defense or offense. Potential Titoism and the vulnerability of immensly long communication lines would, however, be paramount problems.

The final alternative would be a virtual cessation of economic expansion in favor of an all-out armaments effort soon followed by an attempted seizure of Western Europe's industrial potential.

Which alternative or combination of alternatives the Soviet Union may have chosen is an unanswered question of decisive significance.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service where a collection of books are available for loan to individual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948)

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

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> To increase each officer's knowledge of the fundamentals of war, strategy, tactics, logistics, weapons, national and international affairs and other related subjects which contribute to an understanding of warfare.
>
> To improve each officer's reasoning powers and ability to apply his knowledge to specific problems in order to arrive at a logical solution.

Taken together, these two functions — knowledge and reasoning power—produce the mental capacity essential to a mastery of the art of war.

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Conduct a Strategy and Tactics Course
Conduct a Strategy and Logistics Course
Conduct a Command and Staff Course
Conduct Correspondence Courses in Strategy and Tactics, Logistics, and International Law
Sponsor Research in Tactical and Logistical Techniques