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U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS

Issued Monthly
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS CLASS OF JUNE, 1952

THESIS

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE U. S. AND U. S. S. R. AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE FUTURE WORLD SITUATION

by Commander J. B. Burks, U. S. N.

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This thesis was selected by the Academic Board as the outstanding paper from among those submitted by students of the Strategy and Tactics Class.

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THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE FUTURE WORLD SITUATION

INTRODUCTION

In analyzing the subject assigned to me for my thesis I realized that I had only the haziest notion of exactly what "foreign policy" is; I had forgotten most of the details of early United States history; I had never actually formed a comprehensive picture of Russia or the Russians; and what I knew of Communism and Soviet diplomacy had been picked up mainly from newspapers and commentators.

I did quite a bit of general reading on the subject but finally concluded that if I expected to form my own opinions on the foreign policies of the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics I would have to fix clearly in my mind the exact nature of "foreign policy" and then study the history of the foreign policies of the two nations in detail.

I did this, and commenced tracing and discussing the foreign policies of the United States. I considered and treated this section in detail. My conclusions, based on hindsight, are not meant to be criticisms of the loyal Americans who formulated our policies.

In studying Russian foreign policy I soon concluded that it was, and continues to be, a synthesis of Russian geography, history, economics, Marx-Lenin philosophy, and Stalinism. I did not dwell on the details involved, but attempted to point out the ultimate effect of Soviet foreign policy on the world, and to correlate this with the present and future foreign policies of the United States.

I

FOREIGN POLICY; ITS MEANING, CONCEPT AND ELEMENTS

Foreign Policy is a statement of principles under which a nation conducts its relations with other nations; those principles

form a framework for the evolution of courses of action. Stated objectively, it is the underlying principles governing the national strategy for obtaining national and international objectives. Foreign Policy embodies the strategy of the four sources of international power: psychological, political, economic and military. Foreign Policy is normally made, or caused to be made, by the head of a government and is executed by its foreign office. In sound practice the policymaker is limited in scope by his country's national potential, and limited in fact by his military might. For successful foreign policy, at least until the advent of the millennium, a nation's military policy must be consonant with its foreign policy. All foreign policy must be based on the elemental and fundamental premise that one must expect to pay for his objectives, and he must have the immediate means or the readily available potential means for discharging these obligations. Violation of this premise causes insolvency the consequence of which is loss of prestige and perhaps bankruptcy.

There are many fundamental elements that enter into the formulation of any nation's foreign policies. The following are some of the more comprehensive elements: the geographical location and topography; the industrial and agricultural capacity; natural resources and strategic stockpiles; the quality and quantity of transportation and communication lines; the population and its ideology; technological development and available manpower; the armed forces, actual and potential; and the national mind, or will, of the people. In addition to these fundamental elements there are also many contributing factors to the making of foreign policy, such as domestic politics, economic and military objectives, public opinion, and objectives of the various other governmental agencies. In any democracy major foreign policy must reflect, or closely approximate, the prevailing viewpoint of the people of that nation, notwithstand-

ing the fact that foreign relations is the function of the executive branch of the government.

A typical example of the evolution of foreign policy can be demonstrated by taking a nation as it first comes into being. Its primary policy objectives are the preservation of its territorial integrity, its security, political and ideological independence, and the attainment of a reasonable standard of living for its population. As the nation matures, these basic objectives are expanded in order to achieve additional prosperity and welfare, added security, and to launch its program of historic aspirations and manifest destiny. This may also be the starting point for exportation of its unique ideology.

In time, a national philosophy and policy emerge that are reflected in a practically unalterable core of foreign policy for this new nation. However, in the execution of this firm core of national policy new objectives, new temporary policies, and policies of expediency are made. This group may be classified largely as immediate objectives to be achieved or as tasks to be accomplished in attaining the core policy. This evolution of policy is continuous, and provides a superstructure on the fundamental core of foreign policy. This superstructure of principles must be flexible and capable of allowing adjustments and alternatives, substitution and revocation.

By the time this new nation has attained such importance as to become a power which must be reckoned with by other nations, it will have committed itself to certain obligations. In order to survive and progress it must have the strength and power to back up these obligations. Either this nation must have such strength and power itself or it must formulate a foreign policy that will bring about alliances with other nations as necessary to achieve the combined requisite strength. The ultimate of this nation's growth is determined by its own strength and power and the strength and

power of its allies. Its foreign policy objectives should always be consonant with this power. The degree of this balance of power and strength versus obligations and commitments is relative to the inherent danger of the power and strength of opposing combinations of nations. The juggling of alliances and policies essential to this procedure is commonly called "power politics". Politics, prior to the atomic age and the time of modern transportation and communications, could be regional in character, but under present world conditions it is global in nature and forces all foreign policy into the realm of world politics.

For this country to maintain its security and well-being among the nations of the world, history indicates that one of three conditions must be met. Condition one: This country, alone or aided by close allies, must have the national strength or collective strength to enforce continuously its will upon the other nations of the world. If this will is expressed in terms of evil and selfishness, or is contrary to the tenets of Christianity, such a nation or group of nations eventually will become internally corrupt and fall. (Great Britain maintained such a strong position in the world for about a hundred years after the fall of Napoleon.) Condition two: A small country may be so geographically located, its national objectives so limited and closely regulated and the unanimous determination of its people so great that it can remain isolated from the rest of the world. (Switzerland serves as a modern example of this condition.) Condition three: Establish an effective world organization based on a charter containing the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the member nations (similar to or the same as the United Nations Charter). To be effective this organization must be composed of all the principal world powers and a very large part of the other nations, the value of the vote of each nation to be relative to its national

strength and position. It must have broad, basic rules or laws (International Law) which all members agree to abide by and support. It must have the necessary military strength to bring recalcitrant nations into line and the proper functional organization to permit the immediate use of this military power and such other sources of power as are at its disposal. It must provide for the representatives of the member nations being responsible to the people of that nation, as well as to its government. It must support a reasonable, broad and generous economic policy. The member nations must carry out a program of disarmament. A world organization such as pictured has not yet appeared in the history of the world. It is an extension of the principle of "collective security", but a sound and practical working organization has never evolved because the necessary compromises involved in obtaining agreement among the nations have always vitiated vital requirements essential to its success.

II

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE U. S.

The American Revolution through the Monroe Doctrine

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the emergence of three great rival nations: England, France and Spain. The problem of power became an acute problem for self-preservation among the three nations and each strived to achieve power in the same manner. First they tried to build up their home manufacturing for export for a favorable balance of trade, and second, to amass the largest number of colonies possible. The second means was essential to the first, for the colonies not only provided the raw materials for the home manufacturers but provided the assured market for their exports. It was in this atmosphere that the English colonies of North America in 1775 commenced their revolt.

The odds were overwhelmingly against even the possibility of a successful revolt by these Americans unless an ally could be obtained. France, traditionally, was the logical ally for opposing England and, at this time, particularly did not desire to allow England to continue the commercial monopoly and utilization of America's resources. As a result, in 1778, the United States and France became Allies and the new American nation became legally embroiled in the entanglements of the old world. The United States entered into this alliance with fear and trepidation, but when England, recognizinug the very strong ties she still held with America, backed the United States against France and Spain in the settlement of borders of the new nation, the American people realized that a primary principle of their foreign policy was to profit from the disasters European nations brought to one another. Carrying out this principle meant a policy of avoiding any and all permanent entanglements, keeping out of European politics and keeping Europe out of the internal affairs of the United States. In 1793 President Washington issued America's Neutrality Proclamation.

The thirteen American Colonies were recognized by the Treaty of 1783 as a sovereign and independent country. The fledgling nation was war-torn, bankrupt and poorly united under the Articles of Confederation, without military power and populated by only a few more than three million people. But as weak politically, economically and militarily as she was her people had never weakened in the fight for their ideal—Freedom. This will of the people was translated into words that emerged as the Constitution of the United States. This document set forth the organization for a democratic nation dedicated to freedom and based on the tenets of Christianity. Its Bill of Rights reflects the ideology of the people for whom it was framed.

By following closely the policy of neutrality, regardless of

contrary temptations and provocations, the United States took advantage of the opportunities afforded by embroilments of France, Spain and England, so that by the beginning of the nineteenth century she had rid her soil of foreign flags and had extended her territory to more than double its original size. She had also gained time to grow strong and to establish her new government on a sound foundation. Her pioneers looked toward the west coast and her seamen and tradesmen looked to the far reaches of the seas. In 1812, at the height of the adolescence of this young nation, and after the devastating Embargo placed by President Jefferson on all United States shipping in an attempt to force England to recognize the rights of the freedom of the seas, the United States abandoned the policy of neutrality and went to war. When France collapsed in 1814 and left the United States to face England alone, that new nation was only too glad to sign the Treaty of Ghent which Britain offered.

With the final defeat of Napoleon, England reigned supreme leaving France, Spain, Russia and Austria to form the Holy Alliance as a balance of power. This combination of monarchial governments decided that it was time to suppress the expansion of this new ideology of democracy when the Spanish colonies to the west of the United States revolted and set up republics. This was a dire threat to the United States' security and also to her future aspirations of expanding her western borders beyond the limits of the Louisiana Purchase to the Pacific Ocean. But fortunately for the United States, Britain's interest was directly concerned in this threatened operation of the Holy Alliance. She did not want to lose the lucrative trade of these new Spanish-American Republics and she did not want the establishment of any European powers to challenge her dominant trade position in the new world. George Canning, Britain's Foreign Minister, offered a flattering proposal to the United States in which the two nations would make

a joint declaration that no European powers were to interfere in the interests of the Americas.

This was a momentous decision for President Monroe. The United States had prospered mightily in abiding by the cardinal principle of neutrality with no entangling alliances. On the other hand, the peril of The Holy Alliance seemed as disastrous now without an ally as the Revolution had appeared to Washington when he took France as an ally. Were Britain's interests sufficiently involved that she would, from self-interest, interpose her omnipotent fleet between Europe and America without an alliance?

John Quincy Adams, United States Secretary of State, strongly opposed this proposal because there was a proviso in it that neither England nor the United States would acquire any of Spanish America. To Adams this limited our expansion to the west and assured England of not only continuing her trade with these Republics but also that her former colonies would never grow to challenge her. He was not willing to pay this price for the assured and continued help of England in protecting the Americas for the Americans. His views prevailed.

After this decision was made, but before it was announced, President Monroe, in talks with the British, was assured that for the present Britain would protect America from The Holy Alliance. Based on this temporary assurance, President Monroe made a unilateral announcement to the world that henceforth the Americas were no longer open to colonization. This pronouncement has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine, a principle of American Foreign Policy that has undergone many interpretations but has never yet been set aside.

At the time of this declaration of "America for the Americans" the United States had no army or navy worth mentioning.

It was made purely and simply on the strength of the belief that England, to protect her own interests, would put her navy behind this policy and back it up. There was no assurance of this belief in the form of an alliance or written agreement; in fact, the Monroe Doctrine was not a written document and has never had formal written recognition by any nation. It has become a policy recognized by international law much the same way as common law gains legal status. This policy, the cardinal principle of our foreign relations for the remainder of the nineteenth century, was the first of a series of policies that violated the tenet of successful foreign policy: the pronouncement of an international intent without the source of power to enforce it.

Monroe Doctrine to World War I

During the remainder of the nineteenth century, despite a disastrous civil war, the United States rounded out her own territorial limits. Only two major steps relating to foreign policy transpired during this period; in 1880 the United States belatedly commenced building a powerful steel fleet, and in 1898 Secretary Blaine created, by gathering together delegates from all the American Republics in Washington, what was later to be known as the Pan American Union.

It was during this period from 1850 to 1900, however, that the United States extended her commitments over an immense section of the surface of the globe. Partly by design and partly as a result of the force of circumstances, the United States became an imperialistic power. The Czar of Russia decided that Alaska was more of a liability than an asset and decided to sell this American territory to the United States. The United States reluctantly bought the territory, its first non-contiguous possession.

Having acquired and incorporated California and the other Pacific States into the Union, it appeared essential to connect the east and west coasts of the United States by a short water route through Central America. Cuba, owned by Spain, was a key to the defense of such a route, so the United States went to war with Spain to free this island. In the process she annexed the Hawaiian Islands for a coaling station, took Guam, and by the Treaty of Paris was ceded the Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico. In 1879 a coaling station was established in Samoa, but it was not until 1899 that the United States and Germany finally agreed to divide the Samoan Islands so that a portion of them became officially part of the territorial possessions of the United States.

It is important to note here that it was with great reluctance that the United States abandoned her policy of isolaion to the extent of acquiring territory so far distant. Had these distant acquisitions been made in the light of a clear foreign policy in the East, the United States would have demanded all of the Spanish-held islands. Instead, Spain sold the Marianas, Carolines and Ladrones, except Guam, to Germany—island barriers between Hawaii and the Philippines.

The year after American Independence was won the first American merchantman sailed to China. After acquiring a Pacific sea coast, trade with the orient became much more important. The Cushing treaty with China gave the United States most-favored-nation rights; Commodore Perry pried his way into Japan to negotiate the first general treaty Japan had ever made with a foreign power. The resultant booming trade with the Far East, in connection with the recently acquired Philippine Islands, set the stage for America's position in the Orient. As Walter Lippman put it, "Thus by the acquisition of the Philippines the United States had placed itself at the geographical center of the empires of Eastern

Asia, and at the strategic crossroads of their lines of communications." 1/ Secretary John Hay enunciated the policy of the United States in his notes on the "Open Door" in China and further declared that it would be the policy of the United States, among other things, to seek a solution which would preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity.

At the start of the twentieth century the United States had grown to the point that her population exceeded that of all other independent states except China and Russia. She had within her own territorial limits the resources to make her almost economically independent; she had a flourishing merchant fleet, a booming industry and a strong navy. Against the power and strength she possessed she had committed herself to the protection of the Americas as outlined in the Monroe Doctrine; the protection of her Alaskan territory, her Pacific empire, and her other foreign acquisitions; had underwritten the territorial and administrative integrity of China as outlined in the Open Door policy; but she had maintained her isolation in regard to Europe. She was the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere and one of the dominant powers in the Far East, but not until Theodore Roosevelt became President did American leaders recognize that the United States was a world power and, as such, could no longer escape the responsibilities inherent in this position.

Although President Roosevelt and his closest advisers recognized the extent of the commitments of the United States and took steps to build up the necessary power to satisfy these obligations, it appears that the American public perceived only the dramatics of the President's "Big Stick" policy. The President built the Panama Canal and a navy with a battle line second only to that of Britain.

1/ U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1943.

He assiduously courted the favor of England and France and he was aware of Germany's ambitions and Japan's potential in Asia. The American public and President Roosevelt's two immediate successors, Taft and Wilson, would not face the reality of America's responsibilities as a world power; they wanted to continue in the role of isolationism and continue to reap the profits of unrestricted trade. This ideal was pursued. As a result, the United States had no concrete courses of action to implement her foreign policy.

World War I

In 1914, when Germany overran Belgium in an attack on France to dominate Western Europe, the United States was profoundly shocked; but when Germany caused the North Atlantic Ocean to become unsafe for free trade, President Wilson issued an ultimatum to Germany based on Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare on America's merchantmen. Germany, in desperation, defied this ultimatum and President Wilson led the nation in a holy crusade for the idealistic purpose of making the world safe for democracy. This was the unrealistic manner in which the American public and the Administration chose to face real threat of a German-Russian empire in the west allied with Japan in the East.

Upon the conclusion of this war, Wilson's aims for peace, as listed in his Fourteen Points address, were as idealistic as his expressed reasons for going to war. As a result of the President's inspiring idealism he became the moral leader of the world, but at the conference table for a peace agreement he faced the grim realities of world politics. The most that was salvaged from his lofty ideals was the insertion of the Covenant of the League of Nations into the Treaty of Versailles as Part One. The Americans, disillusioned and yet fearful of again becoming entangled in Europe's wars, preoccupied themselves with domestic affairs and politics and again turned their backs on the responsibilities of world leadership.

Even though the American people were revolted over their active participation in this European War which was waged by them on a moral issue, and even further discouraged when their President failed so miserably to incorporate into the peace the ideals contained in the Fourteen Points, they still felt that something concrete should be done to outlaw war. They were not, however, prepared to take positive action to the extent of forming any entangling alliances, or making any armed forces commitments which might force America to go to war again. Because of this feeling, the United States refused to join the League of Nations and negotiated a separate treaty of peace with the Central Powers, thereby condemning this first attempt at an international governing body.

Post World War I

Attempts were made, nevertheless, by the United States to bring peace to the world and in 1921 President Harding called the Washington Conference in an effort to dissipate the dark clouds of war brewing in the Far East. Japan had become a modern world power in the short time since Admiral Perry had let in the light of the Western World. Japan was now dominant in the East and her imperialistic appetite was whetted to a fine edge. At the conclusion of World War I President Wilson agreed to Japan's being given control of all the German Pacific Islands and Germany's spheres of interest in China. Japan was urged to move out of Siberia in order to avert her intervention in the newly formed state of the United Socialist Soviet Republics. The gift to Japan of these islands which lay between Hawaii and the Philippines decreased the potential power of the United States in the East in a much greater magnitude than it added to Japan's power. England and France, their economy almost at the breaking point, greatly desired and needed the markets of the East. The situation in the East was fraught with danger, both to the peace of the world and to the Far Eastern position of the United States.

At the Washington Conference the following agreements were reached: the "Four Power Pact" in which Britain, France, Japan and the United States agreed to respect one another's rights in the Pacific, abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; the Nine Power Treaty under which the signatories agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and to uphold the principle of the Open Door policy; a Naval Disarmament Pact wherein Britain, the United States and Japan agreed to a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ship limitation; and, because of Japan's reduced ratio, an agreement by the United States not to fortify certain of her Pacific Islands such as Guam and the Philippines.

The Washington Conference temporarily cleared away the war clouds, but it left Japan a free hand as the dominant power in the Far East. The emotional desire for peace with no inconvenience to American trade, no cost to the people, and with no entangling alliances or violation of America's isolation (except for vague agreements), had been accomplished in the Orient. The fact that American commitments had thereby been increased and her power in the East decreased did not appear to be a consideration in America's foreign policy. The diplomacy of Secretary Hughes was outstanding and the United States won many diplomatic successes during the Washington Conference, but the isolationist policy was no more than scratched in the making of these alliances and agreements.

America's European policy was one of strict isolationism, although the Administration realized that she was one of the commonwealth of world nations and must take an interest in such matters as the World Court and the League of Nations. As a consequence, a cautious, reluctant cooperation with these world bodies was attained. Observers were sent to the League of Nations and the United States participated in and signed the Kellogg-

Briand Peace Pact in 1928. Had Italy, in 1931, and Japan, in 1935, not defied the League in such a flagrant manner as to cause its dissolution, the United States might have finally joined that world assembly.

The United States emerged from World War I as an economic giant. From a debtor nation owing some three billion dollars before the war, she was now a creditor nation to the extent of about sixteen billion dollars. [1] Most of this money was owed to the United States by the Allies, particularly France and England. Whereas the United States had increased her industry immensely during the war and the reconstruction period following, England and France were all but bankrupt, their industry and manpower old and worn. Europe could pay her debts to the United States, possibly, by payment in goods. But the United States did not want repayment in goods—that meant competition with her own industry—so she erected such high tariff walls that repayment could not be made except in money, which European economy could not stand. Trade was stifled and the economies of the world became strained to the breaking point. American private investment in Germany under the Dawes agreement attempted to stabilize the German economy, but France had already taken her bond, the German Rhur, in lieu of defaulted reparations from Germany so that the only result of these investments to a stricken Germany was to enable her to pay her reparations, a part of which was returned to the United States in loan repayments.

The Great Depression resulted in the United States not being repaid most of her war loans, with the consequence that the American public became even more entrenched in its policy of isolation. With the soundest economy of any nation in the post-

[1] America's Foreign Policies, Past and Present, Thomas A. Bailey, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1943.

war world, the proper strategic use of this source of international power undoubtedly would have changed the course of history.

Setting the Stage for World War II

The first of a series of military steps which eventually embroiled most of the nations of the world in the Second World War took place in 1931 when Japan seized Manchuria in an aggressive operation which was described, by the United States Minister to China, as being a deliberate action which "must fall within any definition of war". The Japanese Government, in face of this overt act, denied that it had any territorial designs on Manchuria and that it desired to continue friendly relations with China.

The League of Nations set up a commission to investigate the situation in Manchuria. This commission reported that the Japanese military operations could not legitimately be claimed to be in Japan's self-defense, and, further, that such actions as she had taken were not compatible with existing international obligations.

These findings were approved by the League and the United States endorsed the findings and conclusions of the League. The League passed a resolution: "It is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris".[1]

Earlier, the United States had unilaterally issued the "Non-Recognition" policy which stated that the United States would not recognize "any situation, treaty, or agreement" which might be brought about by means contrary to the obligations of the Kellogg-

[1] Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations dated March 11, 1932.

Briand Pact. The United States also, in February 1932, proposed to the British Government that they issue a joint statement invoking the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the Far Eastern controversy. The British Government declined to accept this proposal.

The ultimate sanctions invoked by the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, the United States and the League of Nations were a bar to the legality of any title or right obtained by Japan in her war upon China.

It appears that the position of all the larger nations of the world can be summed up in the statement of the United States Secretary of State in regard to proposed legislation for an arms embargo against Japan: "Further, we would not under any circumstances agree to participate in an international embargo of this kind unless we had secured substantial guaranties from the Governments of all the great powers which would insure against the effects of any retaliatory measures which the Japanese might undertake". [2] An agreement to effect such guaranties could not be obtained among the peaceful nations whose national economies were in turmoil and whose military strength was at a low ebb. Economic and military weakness provide an atmosphere of fear in which moral forces stagnate.

The Japanese militarists were quick to recognize and grasp Japan's situation. In 1933 they served notice of their intention to withdraw from the League of Nations and in 1934 gave notice of termination of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament. With peace treaties broken and rearmament agreements severed without retaliatory measures being taken to halt

[2] Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, U. S. State Department, Washington, D. C., 1942.

her aggression and violence, Japan set out to dominate the Pacific and secure Asia for the Japanese.

In Europe, Germany served notice of her withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1932. This action was taken upon the first proposal for a concrete plan based on immediate steps for actual disarmament. On the same day she also severed her connections with the League of Nations.

In May of 1934 Norman Davis, in an address summarizing the attitude and policy of the United States, said:

> "We are prepared to cooperate in every practicable way in efforts to secure a general disarmament agreement and thus to help promote the general peace and progress of the world. We are furthermore willing, in connection with a general disarmament convention, to negotiate a universal pact of non-aggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party. The United States will not, however, participate in European political negotiations and settlements and will not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute anywhere. In effect, the policy of the United States is to keep out of war, but to help in every way to discourage war."

In this statement we have the official pronouncement of the United States Foreign Policy regarding the treaty-breaking, the violence, and the open warfare which were taking place in Europe and Asia. The objectives of this policy, as pointed out, were to help discourage war and to keep the United States out of war. The obvious interpretation by Japan and Germany of these announced objectives was a green light for their present aggressions and preparations for aggression, insofar as the Western Hemisphere was concerned.

In the early part of May, several weeks before Mr. Davis' foreign policy announcement, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, made an address in Washington warning the people of the United States of the dangers of the international situation. He spelled out the reasons for seriousness, and appealed to each citizen to awaken and come to a realization of the problems facing the United States. Less than five weeks later, in another address at Williamsburg, Virginia, Secretary Hull issued another grave warning to the people of the nation. Both of these warnings were based on detailed reports of United States foreign representatives who individually and unanimously reported that both Germany and Japan were fast building up strong, aggressive military forces and fostering in every way possible a hostile and militant spirit in their peoples. They pointed specifically to those conditions that were unmistakably dangerous to world peace and indicated the many reasons to believe that Germany and Japan had formed a secret alliance. Again, in June of 1935, Secretary Hull made public addresses in which he told the people of the ever-increasing signs of another war, and warned that he could not assure them that the United States would be immune to them.

In 1933, the Secretary of State requested legislation for an arms embargo whereby the President might deny munitions and arms shipments to aggressor nations. This legislation was drawn up, but not enacted, by Congress. In 1935, the Nye Senatorial Committee made public a report disclosing activities of bankers and international arms racketeers in the first World War. These findings were sensationally and very effectively published, along with the fallacious conclusion that the intrigue of these war profiteers in the sale of arms and munitions to belligerents had brought about the entrance of the United States into World War I.

Aroused by this concept, and by the public warnings issued by the Government that the world was again at the brink of war, Congress passed a resolution known as the Neutrality Act which forbade the shipment of arms, munitions and instruments of war to any belligerent country. This Act also provided for the licensing of arms exports, the prohibition of transportation of arms by United States vessels to belligerent states, and the restriction of travel by United States citizens on vessels of belligerent states.

The Neutrality Act marked the acceptance by the American people of abandonment of the traditional policy of Freedom of the Seas, the immediate reason given for the United States' entrance into World War I.

This desperate attempt to legislate isolation had grave consequences in the field of foreign policies and diplomacy. It blocked any attempt to aid the victim of an aggressor and, ironically as it may be, indirectly, but very positively, helped the aggressor. As ultimately enacted into law in 1937, this Neutrality Act maneuvered the United States into a position in which she was furnishing the raw materials for the weapons and instruments of war which eventually would be used against her.

Leading to Pearl Harbor

In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. In 1936 Hitler tore up the Treaty of Locarno and fortified the demilitarized Rhineland Zone. In 1937 Japan again attacked China. In 1938 Hitler occupied Austria and dismembered Czechoslovakia. During the first half of 1939 Hitler completed the destruction of Czechoslovakia and seized Memel, while Italy invaded Albania.

During this period the President of the United States was in a dilemma. He recognized that much had to be done by the

United States; domestically, and in the field of foreign relations in regard to the war which was unfolding both in the East and in Europe. He hesitated between what had to be done and what the people of the United States thought ought to be done. In an address to Congress on January 3, 1936, the President summarized the foreign policy of the United States in general, and ended by saying that the United States had but one role to play if those nations who sought selfish power continued to threaten the peace of the world. That was:

> "through a well-ordered neutrality to do nothing to encourage war; through adequate defense to avoid embroilment and attack; and through example and all legitimate encouragement and assistance to persuade other nations to return to the days of peace and good-will."[1]

In the field of foreign relations this policy took positive form in the Neutrality Act, numerous diplomatic excursions, and successive Pan American Conferences, culminating in the Lima Conference in 1938. Although the Good Neighbor Policy achieved no apparent success in Europe or Asia, in the Americas this policy, as silhouetted by Bad Neighbor Policy of the Axis Powers, produced an unprecedented solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. A final interpretation was made of the Monroe Doctrine; this policy was now to be a joint policy, no longer a unilateral policy of the United States.

Exhortations, pleas and appeals for peace were made by the Government of the United States to the aggressor nations, on the grounds of decency, integrity, international law, and other moral grounds. Such diplomatic moves were ignored.

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[1] Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1942.

In the field of domestic policy the President was able to proceed cautiously in building up the defense forces of the Army and Navy. A constant educational program was pursued by the President and Secretary of State, with the object of dispelling the American public's illusion that it was possible for the United States to remain aloof from the affairs of Europe and Asia and see the countries which represented our way of life go under one after another until we alone were left to face the hostile victors.

The American people continued to watch with horror as Germany invaded the Low Countries and then conquered France. They saw the alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan proclaimed openly, with the ambitions of each nation set forth. They were finally convinced. American public opinion caught up with the times, and with this awakening threw neutrality out and commenced the very un-neutral act of supplying Britain with the munitions and equipment she needed for war. The transfer of fifty destroyers to Britain was soon followed by the first Lend-Lease agreement, which was a pledge of unlimited aid to all nations resisting aggression.

In order to fulfill this pledge and to prepare the defense forces of the United States, American industry was set to full speed ahead. The United States was then in the war economically and commercially, but it remained for the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor to set the whole nation, with all its psychological, economic, political and military forces, fully into the struggle against the aggressor nations.

Hindsight and Public Opinion

What were some of the world consequences which may be laid partly at the door of the United States because she did not have clear foreign policy objectives aimed at world prosperity and peace?

Had the United States had the strength in being, and the National Will to cover her commitments prior to World War I, Germany might not have dared violate America's policy of Freedom of the Seas. This could possibly have prevented World War I, and would have, at any event, brought it to an early close.

After the Armistice of 1918, the United States, with the soundest economy in the world, could have used this source of international power to try to build a world of economic stability. Had the United States backed President Wilson, the acknowledged moral leader of the peoples of the world, at the Paris Peace Conference, the course of world events could have been radically changed.

If the United States had ratified the agreement with England and France whereby England and the United States would guarantee France their immediate armed support in case of a repeated German aggression, France might have reduced her great land army, with the consequent reduction of arms by other European nations, thus withdrawing one excuse Hitler had for building up the armed forces of Germany.

Had the United States not passed the Neutrality Act and proclaimed to the world that she was determined not to be drawn into a second World War, Hitler would definitely have given pause to the consideration of the might of the United States in his bid for world domination. The blindness of the Neutrality Act prevented aid to England and France against Germany when Germany and Japan were allies and Japan a recognized adversary of the United States in the Far East.

The foregoing "IFS" and many, many other similar ruminations may be indulged in, but the fact remains that the people of

the United States either did not recognize, or chose to ignore, the position and the responsibilities of the United States in the world.

The United States reached physical maturity about the middle of the nineteenth century and launched into imperialism and into the troubled waters of international relations. Prior to this time her principal relations with other countries related to the security and integrity of the Americas and to democracy. This tremendous plunge into the midst of foreign affairs, via the path of imperialism, was a natural process which was inevitable and would have evolved under any conditions, since the United States had grown to her physical and economic enormity in relation to the other nations of the world.

Unfortunately, the American people were not prepared for this step and were most reluctant to take it. As a matter of fact, public opinion did not support this clear-cut change in policy. The Congress, in approving the turn to imperialism, (as exemplified by the United States acquiring the Philippines by the barest margin) did not mean by this to endorse a policy of European entanglements. This endorsement was not a reflection of the will of the people. Neither the Congress nor the people of the United States recognized the inescapable truth that a decision had been made to enter into the affairs of the world.

The tragedy of this situation was confounded by the fact that the American people did not see and were not educated to the necessary and absolutely essential requirement of active participation in world affairs after the United States had irrevocably become an important member of the commonwealth of nations of the world. Furthermore, the American people did not comprehend, and were not educated to the fact, that the welfare of their nation was entirely relative to the welfare of the other

nations; that the security and peace of their nation were inextricably related to the peace and security of all other nations.

Since the people of the United States, as represented by public opinion, would not recognize the responsibilities and obligations of a world power, their foreign relations reflected this attitude; the international policy of the United States was one of laissez faire. Their foreign policies were policies of expediency, dictated by the various objectives of national and economic policies; policies unrelated to the future course of events in the world; policies predicated on the isolation of the Americas from the affairs of Europe.

The United States indulged herself in this unrealistic situation until she was drawn into the world conflict of World War I. This catyclysm did not open the eyes of the American people to the fundamental issues because they entered into this war, as they were led to believe, on the idealistic and emotional issue of morality.

President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the League of Nations swept the world on this wave of morality, and contained the principles for a true and lasting foreign policy for the United States. Tragically, the world—and the United States in particular—was not yet ready for such an idealistic and comprehensive policy.

European powers murdered the principles contained in the Fourteen Points, and the United States again bowed out of her world responsibilities and obligations and returned to her unrealistic position of isolation. With her failure to join the League of Nations this instrument was deprived of its chance to achieve effective results.

Tragically, the American People, as voiced by public opinion, were not yet educated to the elementary fact that the United States, now the outstanding world power, must have a foreign policy which comprehended the security and prosperity of the other nations of the world. Fortunately, many American politicians and most of her statesmen did comprehend these facts.

It may be considered that the United States pursued an international policy objective after the first World War by her participation in the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and by her other activities relating to reduction of armament and efforts to bring about international peace. However, when it is considered that all of these efforts failed to provide the means whereby the United States, or any other nation, could enforce the provisions included in these efforts, it is apparent that even though the objective was stated and pursued, no tangible means of achievement was provided or intended, except that of a moral nature. The failure of the Paris Peace Treaty was a clear indication that the world was definitely not yet ready for morality to supercede the force of power.

The United States did not yet have an objective or means which it would support to achieve lasting security and prosperity, its ultimate foreign policy.

In view of the Neutrality Acts of 1935-7 it is further evident that the people of America were still unalterably firm in the belief that the affairs of the other nations of the world were not really their affairs and that they would not again get involved in them. World War II enveloped Europe and Asia, but American public opinion persisted in the illusion of isolation. It took the final physical attack on Pearl Harbor to abolish this illusion.

World War II

When the conduct of a nation's foreign relations with another country can no longer effectively be carried out by diplomatic channels, a resort to military force is the means traditionally used for the settlement of differences between these countries. Arbitration, the application of sanctions, and the effects of world public opinion are forces which may be employed between the breaking-off of diplomatic negotiations and actual warfare, but if the forces of the conflict are great enough the differences will be settled by military force.

Once war is commenced, foreign policy is directed to the successful prosecution of the war and subjugated in all respects to this end, even at the expense of its peace objectives. Foreign policy, then, during war is aimed at those temporary objectives necessary to win the war and the long-range national objectives to be attained by the successful conclusion of the war.

The United States was drawn into World War II for her self-preservation and the preservation of her way of life. If she persevered, what were her policy objectives, or peace objectives to be?

The determination of the American people to stay out of war, the energy and persistence the United States demonstrated in trying to effect world disarmament and peace pacts among nations, the humiliation and sacrifice of prestige she underwent, and the sincere efforts of the United States Government toward an improvement of international relations prior to World War II, point clearly to the fact that the American people recognized and appreciated the fact that war never solves problems.

The American people had finally learned that if they did not want wars they must actively prevent them by taking over the leadership of the world and directing those forces which can outlaw war. They recognized, at long last, that isolation could no longer, in the modern world, mean security and future prosperity. What action, then, could the United States take to prevent the recurrence of war? And what would be required of the United States to promote her future prosperity and well-being? What were her foreign policy objectives to be in order to attain security and prosperity under her new concepts? And by what principles must she be guided in her future courses of action to achieve her objectives?

President Roosevelt, in his annual message to Congress in January 1941, proclaimed "The Four Freedoms":

> "In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.
>
> The first is freedom of speech and expression. . . .
>
> The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his way . . . .
>
> The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants. . . . .
>
> The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of

physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world."

This message from the President of the United States was followed in August 1941 by a "Declaration of Principles, Known as the Atlantic Charter, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom". This was a declaration "to make known certain common principles in the national policies . . . . on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world". These principles were:

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will af-

ford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden or armaments."[1]

On January 1, 1942, the United States proposed that the nations arrayed against the Axis powers join together in a declaration pledging cooperation in the prosecution of the war, agreeing not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies, and subscribing to the principles and program of purposes embodied in the Atlantic Charter. Such a "Declaration By United Nations" was signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and forty-four other allied nations.

Although the "Four Freedoms" and the Atlantic Charter indicated the kind of world the President of the United States wanted after the war and a very general, but complete, program of objectives that were to be desired, it was not until September of 1943 that the Congress of the United States, as voicing the pub-

[1] A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-9. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Govt. Printing Office, 1950.

lic opinion of America, expressed itself in the Fulbright Resolution as "favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes".[2]

A statement of purposes having been arrived at, the processes or machinery by which these purposes might be attained must be formulated. Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells reports that at the beginning of the war Prime Minister Churchill desired, at least to start with, regional organizations to provide this framework; Stalin wanted a military alliance, with the United States, Great Britain and Russia running the world, and instituting such measures as the alliance deemed fit; President Roosevelt considered that these purposes could best be achieved by means of the United Nations.

The organization of the United Nations was little more than in the idea stage at this point, but the President felt that the consequences of the war and the revolutionary forces working in the world would render Great Britain impotent, and the United States would not be powerful enough to stand alone. He stated that, "great power aggression can only be forestalled by effective collective security".

Assuming that they would win the war, the United Nations had accepted the framework of the United Nations Organization as the machinery by which fundamental and idealistic purposes expressed in the Atlantic Charter were to be eventually formed after the war. By what practical means and methods could the world be

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[2] Wells, Sumner, **Seven Decisions that Shaped History**, Harper & Bros., Publishers, New York, 1950.

initially straightened out and set on its feet in order to give the United Nations Organization stabilized member nations, which were to form its body?

Russia would be left as the only Power on the Eurasian Continent; the United States would be the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, and because of her overwhelming superiority in sea and air power would dominate the Pacific Ocean area; the United Kingdom would be dominant in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

This distribution of power in the world was realistic, so it followed that these Nations would be the ones to decide the initial problems of the world, from a practical standpoint. And from a practical standpoint, as long as these powers remained as the three great powers it would remain up to them, regardless of the international organization, to continue to decide the conduct of affairs of the world—either together or in combination, or each one separately. If there was not a sincere endeavor on the part of all three great powers to cooperate, the effectiveness of the world organization would be lost. The other member-nations of the organization could have very decisive influence, but the power-nations would necessarily rule.

The United States learned from World War I that it was very highly desirable to arrive at agreements as to political and territorial decisions as early in the war as possible. Henry L. Stimson observed in this regard:

> "The first job of the big nations is to establish a guaranty of peace under the atmosphere of which the United Nations can be set going. This requires that territorial acquisitions deemed essential as 'defense posts'

must be settled. Before each of the big nations feels it is safe, a condition of unreality exists in guaranteeing other small nations peace."[1]

Should the United States and Great Britain take the calculated risk of bringing up these questions with Russia at this time? The United States was afraid of the results of such a procedure, in terms of its effect on the prosecution of the war by Russia, and also afraid that Russia might make separate peace terms with Hitler if she did not get what she wanted. The final blueprint of the United Nations Organization was not expected to be ready before late 1943 or early 1944. Should the questions of political and territorial decisions be brought up before Stalin agreed to this organization? Would this imperil it? If Russia would not agree to the provisions of the United Nations Organization, it meant a return to spheres of influence and power politics, and probably a final fight between the spheres of influence. In 1942 the United States had two courses of action: (1) create an International Planning Commission and work out the solutions during the war, or (2) refuse absolutely to discuss political or territorial questions until the Peace Conference was assembled.

The United States set up a committee for the first course of action, but Stalin would not agree to a discussion of these problems at this time; then reversed himself at Teheran, and at Yalta commenced his demands. By forcing Russia to reach an agreement on political and territorial decisions prior to or shortly after her victory at Stalingrad, it seems probable that Stalin would have settled for much less than he finally demanded. Russia, too, had her fears that the United States and Great Britain might make

[1] Stimson, Henry L., On Active Service in Peace and War, Harper Bros., New York, 1948.

a separate peace with Hitler, and American Lend-Lease was a mighty bargaining weapon had it been properly used.

It is interesting to note that the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and Russia all had different views on the settlement of political and territorial problems. President Roosevelt expressed an abiding faith in two panaceas: (1) plebiscites for self-determination of boundaries, and (2) establishment of free ports in Europe (Kiel) and Asia (Dairen). Prime Minister Churchill maintained that English-speaking nations should dictate the settlement of post-war problems. Marshall Stalin dusted off one of Lenin's tenets and proclaimed: "Not one foot of foreign soil".

The fatal failure of the United States was not to have had a definite, clear-cut, practical Peace Plan with distinctly stated objectives which, when accomplished, would provide political and territorial divisions to create potentially stable political, economic and social entities for membership in an international organization. The consequences of this lack of an explicit post-war policy were the haphazard agreements reached with Great Britain and China at Cairo, and with Great Britain and Russia at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

The major decisions reached at these conferences regarding foreign policy concerned both Europe and the East and were considered separately. The underlying principles guiding President Roosevelt at these conferences in regard to the problems in the East (as stated by Under Secretary of State Wells) were about as follows:

The Japanese invasion of China and South-east Asia had aroused the people's desire for freedom and increased the momentum of the wave of nationalism sweeping into this part of the

world. This new revolutionary force presaged the end of Western Imperialism. The means to provide stability and to solve the problems resulting from this upheaval was to be the United Nations Organization. Specifically, France should let Indo-China go to United Nations trusteeship; the Dutch should take the Netherlands East Indies into full partnership; Great Britain should expedite dominion status to Malaya and India, eventually giving them full self-government; and Korea should get her independence, but until capable of self-government, be put under the trusteeship of Russia, China, Great Britain and the United States.

China was to be the big power in the East, with very close working relations between the Chinese Government and the United States government. There were three essential features in building China into the Great Power of the East. First, differences between Russia and China must be composed in order that Russia would not aid the Chinese communists. This meant an agreement with Stalin that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government was to be backed by the Big Three. (Stalin agreed to this.) Second, a civil war in China must be prevented at all costs, since this would not only ruin China, but would bring about discord between the United States and Russia by forcing the United States to aid the Nationalist faction while Russia furnished aid to the Communists. Third, and most important, since the other two conditions also depended on this, was to build up China's economy. Chiang Kai-shek claimed that for China to become economically and politically stable all territories which had been taken away from her, including Hong Kong, would have to be returned. The President did not expect Churchill to give up Hong Kong, but he did expect that after the Kuriles and Sakhalin Island were returned to Russia, and Dairen made a free port, Stalin would not want more than trade facilities in Manchuria.

Since China was to be the keystone of the Orient so far as United States foreign policy was concerned, President Roosevelt had three objectives to be attained for the Far East: (1) restoration to China of all territories previously taken from her by conquest or coercion; (2) support for the Nationalist Government; and (3) agreement between China and Russia which would preclude Russian interference in China's internal affairs or any encroachment on her territory.

The broad principles guiding the President in achieving agreements relating to major European problems were as follows: the dismemberment of Germany into zones of occupation, with supreme authority exercised by Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom (but France should be given a zone of occupation and be made a member of an allied control commission for Germany); reorganization of the present government of Poland on a broader democratic basis and the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which would be pledged to hold free and secret ballots in the determination of its form of government and its leadership; redefining of the eastern boundary of Poland to the Curzon Line, with her western boundaries extended; free elections for the defeated and occupied areas of Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Austria, with occupation troops removed and their sovereignty returned to them as soon as responsible and stable governments were organized; the return to France of her dominant position in Western Europe; reasonable reparations, so assigned as to make the payments come from the war-making potential and not from that part of the economy which contributes to a nation's peaceful pursuits; assistance, rendered in every way, by the United Nations to provide all nations the means for their people to establish internal peace and thereby facilitate the formation of governments of their own choice by free elections.

In effect, the President's policy in undertaking to make postwar agreements with Stalin and Churchill was that of returning Europe to its approximate status-quo of 1938, and of providing to all the peoples of Europe the free and unfettered right to choose the kind of government and the kind of leaders they wanted. This was based on the premise that a world organization, similar to the General International Organization agreed to at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, would be established for the maintenance of international peace and security. It was also premised on the principle that colonialism and Western Imperialism were things of the past.

Post World War II

If, at the beginning of the war, the United States had had detailed plans as to what the peace terms should be, and practical working means and procedures of executing such plans, they would have formed a basis for agreement at a time most likely to reach concrete agreements favorable to the United States' point of view and policies. If war is the extension of a country's means of obtaining its political, idealogical or economic objectives after the method of diplomacy has broken down, then it seems that the United States did not know precisely why she went to war, other than in very broad terms. In brief, the United States did not wage a political war, or a war to obtain certain specified results which would, if she won, provide her security and well-being; she waged a war to end the war which already was in being.

Therefore, when the final outcome of the war had been determined, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt reached only very broad agreements as to how the world was to be made a place of security for all nations. The decisions reached at these conferences were in general accord with the President's policies, except for Stalin's

demands in China which the President was forced to concede as the price for Russia's promise to participate fully in the war against Japan.

It was entirely a matter of speculation as to Stalin's sincerity in respect to these decisions. In the light of present events, it seems inexcusable that the American people did not learn from the peace conference at the end of the first world war that it was absolutely essential to maintain American troops and America's war strength on the field of battle until America's conditions for peace were carried out, or were sure of being carried out. Instead, the American people "threw their guns to the ground as soon as the last shot was fired".

Indicative of the thinking of even the best-informed people of the United States is Admiral Leahy's statement regarding the agreements reached at Yalta:

> "1. Russia was our ally, and up to June, 1944, took the full force of the mighty German Army.
>
> 2. Fears expressed by many, some in high places, that Russia would make a separate peace with Germany, particularly when we were unable to mount a second front in 1943, had proved unfounded. Russia had kept every military agreement made before that time.
>
> 3. As for political agreements, we had reached at Yalta the first major understanding regarding the postwar world. Russia had shown a conciliatory attitude on the United Nations, on giving France a voice in the control council of Germany, and in agreeing to a reorganization of the Polish and Yugoslav Governments. In fact, on almost every political problem, after a forceful statement of their

views, the Russians had made sufficient concessions for an agreement to be reached, on paper at least."[1]

The record shows, however, that from the time the United States demobilized, Russia commenced her flagrant evasions of—and finally utter disregard for—the promises and agreements she had entered into with the United States and the United Kingdom.

The United States had again violated a cardinal principle of foreign policy, that of entering into obligations and contracting commitments that she did not have the force to carry out.

President Theodore Roosevelt once said, "I never take a step in foreign policy unless I am assured that I shall be able eventually to carry out my will by force". W. H. Lawrence quotes President Truman, in the September 20, 1951, New York Times, as saying, "Russian agreements are not worth the paper they are written on", and that, "unless you are in a position to enforce agreements, they will not be kept. That is the reason for the defense program".

During the post-war period, when the United States did not have the forces available to back up her commitments and was able only to "request" compliance by Russia with her policy agreements, Russia extended her domination over 700 million people from the Elbe to the China Sea. There are about 600 million more people in Asia and the Pacific who are not yet under the dominance of Russia, but because of the instability of their new governments they, too, may come under the influence of the U. S. S. R. Russia has imposed her control over twelve independent states during this period, and by fraud, violence, terrorism and penetration is attempting to extend this dominance throughout the world. [2] What is

[1] Leahy, William, I Was There, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1950, p 317.

to be the foreign policy of the United States in regard to this aggression?

Perhaps the most important aspect of present-day American Foreign Policy is the acceptance by the American people that the oceans should no longer be considered as barriers but, rather, as bridges connecting the United States to the rest of the world. Accepting this, they also realize and accept the fact that it is essential for the United States to take an active part in the affairs of those nations with which she is connected. In equal importance, and growing out of this realization, is the unanimous opinion of the American people that the sources of international power of the United States be developed to the extent that she have the strength and power to back by force any commitments or obligations she incurs.

Reflecting this opinion of the American people, President Truman, in March of 1947, announced what has become known as the Truman Doctrine: "Totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States".

This Doctrine expressed the policy of the United States Government in seeking to block Soviet expansionism. This was to be accomplished by building an effective system of collective security—a vast undertaking, since the economic, military, and moral forces of the members of this collective pact must be built largely from the resources of the United States. Situations of strength must be set up in Europe, in the Middle East, in Asia and in the Americas.

2/ John Foster Dulles, War or Peace. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1950.

Economic aid to the collective security nations was provided by the Marshall Plan and by the Point Four program. The Schuman Plan was backed by the United States as a bold measure for pooling the coal and steel industries in Western Europe and breaking down local trade barriers. The North Atlantic Treaty was formed for pooling the military strength of the democracies in the North Atlantic, for expanding the air and naval base systems, training and equipping these forces, and developing a military production potential.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan, a bilateral security treaty between Japan and the United States, and Mutual Defense Treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand were all signed as a part of the collective security idea in the East; the Rio Pact brought the Americas in.

The building of a deterrent force against attack has been started in the United States. This is to consist of a powerful military force, in being and available, and a production base capable of immediate expansion. The size of this force is to be such that it will guarantee an attack to be not only costly to an aggressor, but in the long run unsuccessful.

The Collective Security System is a policy within the framework of the United Nations which will provide the necessary force to deter an aggressor. The power to prevent war and impose peace is not inherent in the United Nations Organization, but the United States will continue to use this body to discourage aggression, to provide a forum where disputes can be settled peacefully, and as a sounding board for world opinion. It is to be used as an instrument to promote the security and well-being of the world and holds hope for an international organization which may yet provide "peace in our time".

III

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS

The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and Its People

The people of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics occupy an area of about one-sixth the land area of the world. There is no authoritative figure available, but it is estimated that they number about two hundred million and are composed of mixed races and tribes, of which probably fifty percent are Slavic or Great Russian. There are certain historical points of background which have greatly influenced these peoples. The Great Russians centered around Moscow were subjected to many invasions from the East, but always prevailed over the invaders, although the ways of the East left their mark on the people. That they did not experience the great Renaissance, in European terms, when art, architecture, literature and music underwent that tremendous revival which profoundly affected Western Civilization, has been another great influence on the Russians. There was no Reformation, or growth, of liberalism; the effect the French Revolution had on Western Europe was not duplicated in Russia.

The Russia of today is a totalitarian state based primarily on the theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and on Russian imperialism. It is governed by the Bolshevik Party of about six million communist members, who rule the remaining 190-odd millions by coercion and persuasion. It is a one-party system, with control vested in the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which is directed by the Politburo. Stalin, the dictator of Russia and the leader of the Communist Party, is superimposed over the existing structure of Government. He is the father, the teacher and the

friend of all the Russian people and they accept him and his structure of government unequivocally.

The Communist Party leaders attributed the entire weakness of Russia to the backwardness of her people and every force possible was used (regardless of consequences to the people) to bring about the education of the people and the development of western industrial and technical methods. One of the results of the successive five-year plans, the great purges, and the use of political slave-laborers, to overcome this backwardness, is the preponderance of young people in the nation and in its government. The average age is probably between 30 and 35, and there are not many old people left. About 85% of the people of this young nation are literate, and there is keen competition for advancement to higher schools of learning. Inherent in their ideology of dialectic materialism is the concept of perpetual conflict. In this atmosphere of conflict few signs of human kindness, compassion, courtesies and good humor are found. They are a serious people.

When the Communist Party seized power it set about to abolish religion. The Party considers religion the opiate of the people, and since it is against the doctrine of Communism, every party member is ipso facto an atheist. Religious practice by non-party members is tolerated, and the Orthodox Church remains a force, but now it is a force which supports the state; it, too, is a tool of the Party.

There is no exchange of ideas between the people of Russia and the people of other nations. An "iron curtain" has been thrown around Russia to preclude thinking that is not along the line of "truth" as prepared by the Politburo of the Central Committee. The Russian Government has no public information control. This control of all media of mass communication is vested in

the appropriate departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This Party direction is designed to preserve the Communist regime in power and to protect the infallibility of the Kremlin. By this means, most persistently and effectively, the prepared "truth" is disseminated to the people of Russia, not only through the press, radio, movies, and television, but by party workers teaching small groups by explaining a single idea carefully and thoroughly. If a deed or an act promotes the cause of communism, it is "good"; if not, it is "wrong". What is "truth", what is "right", and what is "wrong" can, according to the Communist concepts, change as necessary, and is not absolute. The iron discipline of the hard core of the Party members provides for the complete acceptance of any thesis promulgated by the Politburo. These Party members exercise authority over the only sources of public information and consequently the people are served this particular thesis. In brief, public opinion is the opinion of the leader of the Communist Party, Stalin.

Russia, in line with the Marxian principle that private enterprise results in exploitation of men who have no capital, has taken over the means of production, the land and natural resources. Naturally, they have a planned economy, the control of which is in the hands of the Communist Party. The principle of free trade, free transportation and private enterprise, as opposed to state-regulated foreign trade and transportation and a state-controlled economy, gives rise to the Russian concept of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism.

While not much is known about the organization of the Russian foreign office, the Narkomindel, it is certain that the formulation of policy is in the hands of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is interesting to note that from 1923 until 1944 there was only one all-union Narkomindel. In 1944

this was changed and each Union Republic was allowed to enter directly into negotiations with foreign governments, except, of course, all policy and commitments had to be first cleared by the Politburo. This meant sixteen foreign offices in the U. S. S. R. If Russia could, on this basis, secure a seat in the United Nations for each of her Republics, she would have a very large voting bloc in the Assembly and possibly secure control of the Council at certain times.

If the underlying aspiration of the Communist Party, as proclaimed, is to change the political, economic, cultural and social aspects of the world, the Foreign Policy of the U. S. S. R. will be used as a tool for the accomplishment of this mission, since the Politburo both formulates and executes the policies. In examining the foreign policy of Russia then, attention should be directed to the Politburo of the Central Committee which controls the government and the public opinion of the Russian people.

Dictatorship by Committee—The Politburo.

The Politburo is a committee headed by Stalin who has the complete direction of the Communist Party and Soviet Russia. It is not responsible to anyone above, nor is it responsible to a parliament or congress or to the people. If it makes mistakes, which it does since it is composed of men, these mistakes are covered up and concealed from the people; there can be no investigations, questions, or airing of abuses since it is infallible so far as the Russian people are concerned. All Communist Party members are implicitly obedient and loyal to the Politburo—their lives depend upon this. In controlling the political, ideological, economic, social, psychological, moral, and military forces of Soviet Russia, the Politburo has tremendous powers which in thirty-four years have been

used well enough to restore the boundaries of Peter The Great and add the satellite countries to the west and China to the east.

The Politburo uses the Party as its instrument for offense in foreign policy, and its vast military forces in defense of these policies. The Party members form a corps which possesses the qualities of great industry, perfect obedience, devotion to duty, energy, loyalty, courage, and a willingness to put up with any hardship in carrying out instructions. They are thoroughly schooled and trained for their positions and are well rewarded. If they fail in their responsibilities they are demoted to the status of the common worker, a very low state of being in Russia, or they are liquidated. The military forces, including those of their satellites, at present total about 9 million men.

Lenin Finds a Nation for Communism.

In November 1917, just eight months after the end of the monarchy, the Bolshevist overthrew the provisional liberal government of Russia and the new Communist government came into being. Its first action was to secure peace at any cost from without and from within. At Brest-Litovsk Russia signed a humiliating peace treaty with Germany, and then set about forming a stable government inside Russia. During this period of isolation which lasted until 1922, all the countries of the world, with few exceptions, severed diplomatic relations with the Communist government at Moscow and established an economic blockade around her. The threat of social revolution used by the Soviets was considered a menace to world order and stability.

The following ten years were spent by the Russians in attempting to establish relations with the other nations of the world and in safeguarding the internal and international security of the

newborn state. Her earliest recognition was obtained in the Orient, soon followed by recognition by the Weimar Republic of Germany and a most-favored-nation treaty with her. This Treaty of Repallo was an achievement of note at this time and brought about her recognition by other European nations as well as Trade Agreements with many more, including England. A remarkable change in attitude of other countries toward Russia came about as a result of Stalin's announcement that the Communist Party had accepted his interpretation of Marxian doctrine that a socialist state could continue to exist in a capitalist environment. This change in doctrine was, in fact, a prerequisite to entering into non-aggression and non-intervention pacts by Russia.

As would be expected of this young, struggling state which was desperately putting its every resource into building up its economy both inside and out, Russia was obsessed with fear for her security, until such time as she could become strong enough to protect herself. Her foreign policy reflected her military weakness when she was the first to sign the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and when at a disarmament conference sponsored by Rusia, proposed a 75% reduction in armaments. This eventually was signed (although radically modified) and known as the Litvinov Protocol of 1929. At the League of Nations disarmament endeavors Russia proposed the complete abolition of land, sea and air armaments within one year. At the same time, a resolution was passed by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern which stated, "The aim of the Soviet proposals was . . . . to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulate that disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism".[1] Comintern activities throughout the world increased the democracies' distrust of Russia and brought about a rupture in diplomatic relations with Britain

[1] International Press Correspondent, English Edition, Vienna, November 29, 1938, p. 1596.

and China, as well as tension and treaty reprisals with other nations of the West.

The Quest for Security

When Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, Russian fears for her security reached a fever pitch. Germany's treatment of Russia in World War I was still fresh in the Soviets' mind; the allusions in "Mein Kampf" to German aspirations in the east, and the well-known German hatred for communism and the Slavic peoples, haunted Stalin. Japan, Russia's traditional enemy in the Far East, was rapidly expanding into China in an aggressive orgy, and Siberia was on her list for seizure. The Japanese signature to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 announced the common purposes of Russia's two most dreaded and powerful enemies. Stalin exerted every effort, and this time with sincerity, for closer cooperation with the democracies and for security agreements with every nation. All foreign policy was subjugated to the single policy of meeting or averting the expected attacks by Germany in the west and Japan in the east. Although having formerly denounced the League of Nations in vituperative terms, Russia became a member of that organization in 1934, "for the attainment of common aims".

The Communist leaders of Russia were hard-pressed. Russia had completed one five-year plan and was on the second one, but her heavy industries were poorly developed, her lines of communication were in a deplorable condition, her whole industrial capacity for military support was weak, and her armed forces were poorly organized and without experienced leadership. Nevertheless, the Party had conditioned the bodies and minds of the people so that they were tough and ready to protect their Soviet fatherland. That they were willing to fight and not to appease was repeatedly demonstrated in Stalin's expressions of willingness to take count-

ermeasures when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland; in his invitation to France, Great Britain and the United States to confer on the possibilities of collective action to prevent further aggression after Germany's seizure of Austria; and in Russia's readiness to support Czechoslovakia if France would do the same.

Russian Imperialism Takes Form

In 1925, when the Politburo found that it was essential to the rapid growth of the economy of Russia to have satisfactory trade agreements with the capitalist countries, Stalin interpreted the Marxian doctrine to mean that socialist states were not necessarily incompatible with capitalist states. Even though it was clearly against doctrine to give up fighting capitalism throughout the world, the U. S. S. R. joined the League of Nations and formed collective security pacts with the democracies whenever she could. In 1935 when the United States protested violation of Soviet anti-propaganda pledge, the Russian Government denied any responsibility for the Comintern.

The foregoing selected instances, plus many more, seem to demonstrate clearly that the Marxian ideology could be, and was being, interpreted to fit the policies which were most beneficial to the security and well-being of the U. S. S. R. It was an indication that the Politburo had made a major decision to establish communism throughout the world, primarily by making the U. S. S. R. dominant in Eurasia, and that all other means were to be subordinated to this. It indicated without a doubt that, to accomplish their immediate aims, the policy-makers of the Party were free to deviate, as necessary, from the fixed dogma of the Marxian ideology. Was this a temporary deviation from doctrine, or was Stalin definitely changing the ideology to conform with his ideas

of a mighty Russian Empire which would dominate the world and thereby enforce socialism on the world?

Regardless of the pressure engendered by the danger of attack by Japan in the East and the Central Powers in the West, and the knowledge that she was unprepared for sustained war, economically or militarily, Stalin stood staunchly by his clear-cut policy of Russian domination of Eurasia. He repeatedly professed, then and later, that Russia did not want any territorial accessions, but when Great Britain, in 1938, initiated conversations on the possibilities of forming with Russia an antiagression front, Russia demanded a guaranty of the Baltic States. As Stalin knew, Britain would not consent to this guaranty unless she was desperate. Stalin, with his superior and unexcelled grasp of the situation, was at this time setting the stage for a truce with Germany, by which he expected England to be forced to accept his terms for mutual assistance. During whatever period of time this truce could be maintained, he also intended to do all that a clearly conceived plan would enable him to do toward preparing Russia for a final showdown fight with Germany.

As shown by his address to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, delivered in March of 1938, Stalin was willing, and thought his chances best, to enter into an alliance with Western Powers to defeat the Central Powers, provided the alliance could be made on his terms. In this speech he declared the Soviet foreign policy to be based on: (1) peace and strengthening of business relations with all countries; (2) peaceful, close, and friendly relations with neighboring countries; (3) support of nations victimized by aggression that are fighting for independence; and (4) readiness to defend Soviet borders.

The Soviet-German Truce

When the Munich Conference failed to bring peace and it became clearly apparent that Germany was going to continue her expansion, Great Britain and France renewed talks and negotiations with Russia for collective security. Great Britain would not agree to the Baltic Pledge and Stalin, without discontinuing the negotiations with France and Great Britain, entered into talks with Germany and astonished the world by signing a Russo-German non-aggression pact. This treaty prohibited attack by the signatories on each other and forbade them from joining any alliance aimed at either party. The following month, September 1939, Hitler and Stalin signed a treaty partitioning Poland. During the brief respite of peace, while Hitler prepared and deployed his forces for the assault on Western Europe, Russia prepared to close in on the Baltic and invade Finland.

With perfect timing, Russia overran Finland and obtained the territorial concessions she required for her security in the north, but she was careful not to go too far in arousing the suspicions of Hitler, nor to offend, any more than had already been done, the United States and England. During the summer of 1940, Stalin occupied the Balkans and demanded, and got, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Rumania.

In September of that year, when Germany, Italy and Japan signed a mutual assistance treaty specifically exempting relations with the U. S. S. R. in its provisions, Stalin knew that Hitler had reached the decision to turn to the east and stop Russian aggression in the Balkans. Stalin brought the issue to a test when he signed a non-aggression treaty with Yugoslavia. Germany invaded Yugoslavia the next day and Stalin immediately completed a five-year neutrality treaty with Japan and announced to the world that Rus-

sia was ready to rebuff any encroachment of Soviet territory. Germany, Italy and Rumania declared war on the U. S. S. R. on June 22, 1941.

The Politburo's Preparation for Survival

Since the day in 1933 when Hitler took over Germany, Stalin had prepared his Soviet Republics for this time when Germany would invade Russia. He had used this time well, not only in preparation for the final struggle, but in preparation for Russia's dominance of Europe after the war was over. He had unflinchingly resisted the temptation to enter into security pacts with the Western Powers on their terms. The calculated risk of a concerted German-Japanese attack on Russia, with England and the United States remaining outside, was justified by Churchill's immediate assurances of support when Hitler declared war on Russia and by the United States' declaration of aid to all those nations opposing Nazism. The fortuitous treaty of neutrality with Japan was a masterpiece of diplomacy.

If, at the beginning of 1933, the Communist leaders of Russia had any reputation for integrity, honesty, truthfulness or human decency, they sacrificed it between then and World War II. But the Communists had rationalized this duplicity in their ideology which they could always fall back on. They were self-righteous in the thought that what was done was done for Communism and Russia. Therefore, it was not "wrong", it was "right". Under such a philosophy, international agreements, understandings, and all standards of behavior were thrown away. Stalin's policies had attained his war aims, material things. Since his ideology did not recognize the spiritual values of integrity and truthfulness, except as reflections of materialism, neither he nor his people lost their self-respect, outwardly.

As well as time had permitted, Stalin and his band of intellectuals in the Politburo, with the loyal devotion and help of the other six million communists, had prepared the Soviet Union and its 190-odd million people for the ordeal of an invasion by the highly trained and mechanized armies of Hitler. Now was the crucial time for the survival of the State, and for Communism. Was the control of a few communists over the vast majority of non-communists in the Soviet Republics sufficient to cause them to starve, as well as to be killed by the enemy, in the protection of a government which had subjected them to nothing but merciless hardship, mass murder, and unrepresented government?

Lenin had said that it would take the sacrifice of two generations to fully establish socialism, and the Communist leaders did not make the appeal to non-communists on the basis of politics. They went back to the traditional love the people had for Mother Russia. They even went so far as to change the soldiers' oath of allegiance from a pledge of allegiance to "workers of the whole world" to "the Soviet fatherland", and the soldiers took this oath as "citizens of the Soviet Union" instead of as "sons of the working class". The Communist leaders' success in obtaining the support of the people, in preparing the boundaries of Russia prior to the conflict, and in obtaining Lend-Lease material from the United States during the conflict, is testified to by the valiant defense of Stalingrad and Moscow, and the gradual annihilation of the invading German forces. By January of 1943 the tide of battle had changed, and the eventual victory of Russia and the United Nations was in the offing.

Russia in World War II

During this first crucial period of the war, the Communist leaders of Russia had but one immediate national and international objective—survival. Cooperation with the democracies was com-

plete, as witnessed by the following actions: Russia pledged adherence to the Atlantic Charter; suspended the atheist publication Antireligioznik; announced that Japan was a common enemy of Russia, Britain and the United States; broadcast a full statement on United States shipments to the U. S. S. R. (when charged by the American Ambassador of withholding this information from the people of Russia); and officially disbanded the Communist International in June, 1943.

Typical of the Soviet's time of need was Stalin's comment on the dissolution of the Comintern: it "exposes the lie of the Hitlerites that Moscow intends to intervene in the life of other nations". And again, when stating his program of action for Soviet-Anglo-American coalition in November of 1942, he urged the Allies:

> "to destroy racial exclusiveness, to recognize the equality of nations and the inviolability of their territories, to liberate enslaved nations and restore their sovereign rights, to acknowledge the right of each nation to order its own affairs, to extend economic aid to nations which have suffered and to assist them in regaining their material well-being, to restore democratic freedoms, and to destroy the Hitler regime".[1]

Stalin had three great fears: first, the United States and Great Britain might sign a separate peace with Hitler; second, the United States and Britain might not open a second front in Western Europe; and third, the United States might use her Lend-Lease aid to Russia as a bargaining agent for post-war settlements. As a consequence, Stalin attempted, and was able, to postpone any political or territorial decisions until after the Teheran Conference in November 1943, at which time he had an assurance from

[1] Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, Library of Congress, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1947.

the United States and Britain that they were committed to an invasion of Western Europe in June of the following year.

Not only had Stalin assured himself of an American-British invasion, but he had aided and abetted the United States in her refusal to accede to Churchill's plan of invasion through the Balkans. The United States' choice of the most efficient military plan of invasion of Europe, in opposition to Churchill's political plan, indicated clearly to the Communist leaders of Russia that the United States was concerned strictly with smashing the forces of Hitler, and also that she trusted Russia in the post-war settlement of European problems.

Stalin's fears vanished. He could now proceed with Russia's post-war plans with impunity. He had only to cooperate until the invasion was begun. After that the United States and Great Britain would be dependent on Russia's pressure on Hitler's eastern flank to relieve the pressure of the western invasion. Stalin was thus assured of continued and increased Lend-Lease aid from the United States, and it was now the time for Britain and the United States to fear that he might bargain with Hitler for a separate peace.

Russian Imperialism in Action

Beginning in April of 1944, when the Red Armies invaded Rumania, the Politburo commenced what has never ceased—methodical Russian aggression of other sovereignties.

As the Allied forces closed in on Germany from the Atlantic Ocean, the forces of the Kremlin closed in from the east. The Red Army occupied all the territory it covered, while General

Eisenhower refrained from this practice in order to concentrate all the Allied forces on the job of crushing the German armies.

After Germany's unconditional surrender and the swift dissolution of the American forces which followed, the tide of the Red Army flowed steadily over the area until it covered all the territory east of the Stettin-Triest line. In addition, the Kremlin requested oil concessions in Iran and demanded joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Dardanelles. The surrender of Japan found the Red Army in possession of Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. As its price for participation in the final onslaught on Japan, the Kremlin had demanded, and received, the southern part of Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, Port Arthur, and a virtual control of Dairen and the Chinese-Eastern and South-Manchurian railroads. Because of this deal, China was forced to conclude a sweeping political and economic accord with the U. S. S. R., for which Chiang Kai-shek received the Soviet leader's pledge for the respect of her sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in her internal affairs.

As a result of World War II, and by his diplomatic maneuvers, Stalin had incorporated eastern Poland, eastern Finland, part of east Prussia, the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, the Carpathian Ukraine, Tannu Tuva, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Not only had Stalin carried out his political and territorial policies but Edwin Pauley of the United States revealed that the Kremlin had been allocated fifty percent of all the German reparations.

Until the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Russia had lived up to all military agreements and, except in the case of Poland, had seized upon every opportunity to show her desire for peace. The Soviets entered into agreements at Bretton Woods, the Dum-

barton Oaks Conference, the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, and had also approved the United Nations Charter. The United States and Russia were allies during World War II for a common purpose: preventing Hitler's Germany from dominating Europe and preventing Japan from dominating the East.

But the Americans and the Russians were cooperative just so long as the common purpose demanded. Once the objective was attained, the people of the United States felt secure; not so with Stalin. He again had to deal with his perpetual fear, the obsessing fear for security, which cannot be satisfied until there are no longer capitalist states in the world. Stalin's cooperation ceased. His objective now was diametrically opposed to the aspirations of the American people for "business as usual", peace and prosperity. Stalin's policy was the frustration and final defeat of capitalism, by every means short of national war on a world-wide scale.

Russia's violation of the 1942 treaty for withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran; her continued occupation of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans; her mockery of the Potsdam Agreement pledges; her conquest of China; her promotion of continual guerilla warfare in Indo-China, Malaya and Burma, and outright warfare in Korea; her refusal to join an effective atomic weapon control plan; and her constant opposition in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization are all examples of Soviet aims. The Soviet foreign policies, since the defeat of Hitler became certain, have consistently reflected the determination of the Politburo to continue its fight for security—the eventual destruction of capitalism.

IV

THE EFFECT OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE U. S. AND THE U. S. S. R. ON THE FUTURE WORLD SITUATION; SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Fundamental Foreign Policy of the U. S. S. R.

Fundamentally, the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union are attempting to create a socialist world empire governed by the Communist Party. Lenin's principle in achieving this aim was to build the U. S. S. R. into a powerful military machine to support a policy of subversion in the capitalist democracies which would culminate in revolution. The Communist Party members would then usurp the governmental control of these countries. This pattern would continue until eventually the Comintern would obtain the balance of power in the world and the remaining capitalist nations would fall like a row of dominoes.

Without changing the objectives, Stalin gradually changed the policy by emphasizing the means by which it could be obtained. In 1933, Stalin recognized that if Russia could survive Hitler's bid for the domination of Europe, the U. S. S. R., in the resulting chaos, could be in a position to dominate Europe by a vigorous policy of aggression, i. e. political and economic imperialism. Stalin adopted this policy of "Russian dominance" of Europe and quickly applied it to Asia when the fortunate opportunity in China so unexpectedly developed. This was to be the pattern of extension of communism by the "Stalinists".

The offensive force in this policy of aggression was still to be the communist party members, but they were now to be the agents of Russian Communists, not the Communist International. The

military power to support this aggression was to be furnished by the Soviet Union and directly controlled by the Russian Communists. This Russian military force was to be maintained at a level which would be a threat to any combination of capitalist nations that might endeavor to stop Russian imperialism.

To perpetuate her domination, Russia would provide political control, by police methods and economic orientation, to secure economic dependence on the U. S. S. R. and her satellites. The manner in which the Communists have followed this fundamental policy, and its success, have been related.

Fundamental Foreign Policy of the U. S.

The fundamental foreign policy of the United States is the security and well-being of its people. The present principles governing the means for accomplishing this are: (1) the containment of communist aggression; (2) the restoration of the balance of power in Europe and Asia; (3) the stabilization of the economy and governments in the backward nations; and (4) the continuation of the Monroe Doctrine and free trade. The instruments to be used are: (1) the military potential of the United States; (2) collective security by regional mutual assistance pacts; (3) economic and temporary military support; (4) Pan Americanism; (5) reciprocal trade agreements; and (6) the United Nations Organization.

The attainment of this policy is to be perpetuated by the United States maintaining a military and economic superiority in the world, scaling down armaments in all nations, and improving international relations to the degree that the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter will be implemented in accordance with the International Law now being prepared.

The Effects of These Foreign Policies on the World

The immediate effect of these policies on the world is to divide the world into three camps; first, the United States and those nations revolving around her in the liberal economy system; second, the U. S. S. R. and those nations in her controlled economy system, most of which are also politically dominated by Russia; third, the under-developed countries which are experiencing the throes of the "Wave of Nationalism". (Generally speaking, these countries are neutral.) In the first category are about 800 million people; in the second, 725 million; and in the third 740 million.

An era of "not peace, not war" was born out of this situation of power politics. In this uneasy and unstable balance of power, a vast and terrible struggle for superiority exists between the Communist camp and the Free World. Practically all of the neutral countries (the significant ones) are subjected to the sources of power at the command of the United States and the Soviets; both of these nations are struggling to obtain ultimate superior military power in order to provide security in the enforcement of their other sources of power.

The only foreseeable bridge to this chasm existing between the first two camps is an improvement in international relations to the point that the United Nations Organization can provide and enforce satisfactory solutions to world problems. Short of a bridge, one or the other of the opposing camps will breach the gap and engulf the other, either by military conflict or after an economic collapse. Until the gap is bridged or breached, the "cold war" and wars of "limited objective" will continue.

Sources of International Power Used in Achieving Policy Objectives

The Communist-world and the Free-world will employ the

four sources of international power—politics, psychology, economy and military force—in the two completely different ways that are inherent in their distinctly different ideologies and economies.

The employment of the political, psychological and military factors has been previously discussed in tracing the foreign policies. The economic systems of the United States and the U. S. S. R. will be discussed further because economy is the primary source of power used by the United States, and an important one used by the Soviets, in their struggle for domination of the world.

The United States now stands predominantly the greatest industrial nation in the world and she is also preeminent in world economy. This is the result of a policy of economic imperialism. This policy not only furthers the national policy of providing a higher standard of living in America, but is providing the chief source of international power used by America to attract and maintain a collective security group. If this economic power is great enough to deny the Soviets the industrial base and stabilized economy to support large, modern military forces, and if the free world builds up superior forces, it will obtain the balance of power and dominate the world by military force until a better means of world control can be effected.

That the United States maintain economic supremacy in the world is predicated on free and equal world trade in which the democracies' free enterprise system can operate.

Collective security groups, or allies, provide free markets and, because their strength depends on stable economies of their own, will join their military strength with the United States to prevent Soviet-controlled economy from being enforced on themselves or on other nations.

The geographic location of the United States, her transportation system, resources, modern industrial plants, and technical skill will provide products which will sell in a free market to the exclusion of Russian products, and will also maintain a high standard of living for all those peoples involved in the free enterprise transactions—as long as they are economically healthy. The policy of the United States is to promote the economic strength of other free nations by financial aid, advice and promotion of cooperation among these nations.

The policy of free enterprise imperialism is not to dominate other people, nor to allow any other nation to dominate them, their politics or their economy. The policy is to promote a sound economy in a free country; this provides the fertile ground necessary for free enterprise to grow and flourish.

One of the patent qualities of the force of economic power is that every free man can see what this force is doing for HIM. When it helps HIM to a better life, he will work for it and he will protect it. This can unite people, and it can unite nations. Free enterprise is essential among free nations; unity is essential to both.

The Free-world needs the markets of many of the undeveloped countries, as well as those of her allies. Seventy-five percent of the United States' "vital" raw materials come from these countries. Forty-five percent of Western Europe's and thirty percent of America's manufactured exports go back to these countries. [1]

The United States does not seek colonies nor accept the policy of colonization. She does not seek to impose her form of government on other countries. She does propose to keep other

[1] Eisenhower Reveals Europe's Plight, U. S. News and World Report, September 7, 1951.

nations from imposing their domination on free countries by forceful methods, trickery or deceit. If America's allies in Western Europe were seized by the Russians, these backward countries would be forced into the Soviet economy. It is a vital interest of the free world that free trade is kept open in these countries. The controlled economy of communism cannot compete successfully with the free trade of democracies.

The economic policies of the United States are consonant with the aims expressed in the United Nations Charter. If and when the free world builds up a military force sufficient to impose its will on the communist world, these economic policies of free and equal trade privileges throughout the world will be attained. The machinery of the United Nations Organization will then stabilize the economy of the world and provide the "freedom from WANT" of all nations, which is an essential ingredient for world peace.

Soviet controlled economy has all the advantages of unlimited authority without responsibility or accountability to those it hurts or helps, the people. The economy, like the individual, is a tool of the State. It is a powerful and dangerous weapon in the hands of a dictator. It is dangerous to those who support it and to those who oppose it.

Russian imperialism is motivated traditionally by economics, but it is also motivated by ideology. One is used to advance the other, and vice versa. The ultimate aim is to gain political control of a country, and then by police methods, purges and penetration to control the country in all respects. To prevent any more Titoism, each satellite's economy is oriented in a manner which makes it completely dependent on Russia and her other satellites.

Russian imperialism, therefore, has two objectives. The

first objective is to gain economic superiority over the free world, maintaining a military superiority which will permit her to enforce her will on the world. This is the same aim the free world has. Secondly, however, Russian imperialism is directed towards imposing its ideology and control along with its economic system.

Political control of a nation is, of course, a requirement of controlled economy. Thus it is inherent in Russian imperialism that the communist leaders control the politics of such nations as are in the sphere of Russia.

The Kremlin exploits its ideology and patently false promises of economic aid in attracting nations to her sphere. This form of exploitation is quite naturally most effective under conditions of instability of government and economic chaos; Russia's policy is to create and encourage this instability with every means at her disposal. Her ideology and her promises offer HOPE where there seems to be none. The Communist Party workers provide dynamic leadership and visions of power and wealth and food. The leaders of an unstable government soon find that they and their country are inextricably enmeshed in the web of Russian communist control.

Russian imperialism, unlike American imperialism, is in conflict with the aims expressed in the United Nations Charter—a world composed of free and democratic nations.

The foregoing views are not those expressed by the Soviets. The communists take every opportunity to "declare" that it is only by socialism that the aims of the United Nations Charter can be achieved. But all the free world, and those who have the opportunity to learn *all* the facts, are now convinced that there is little

relation between Communist "words" and Communist "deeds". We must judge the Soviets by their deeds alone.

It is necessary to point out, in contradiction to the foregoing statement that governments in the Russian sphere are "inextricably enmeshed in the web of Russian communist control", that Yugoslavia has disaffected herself from Russian control. Yugoslavia's leader, Tito, has not renounced communism or controlled economy, but has broken from the absolute control of the Politburo. The free world does not approve of communism, totalitarian governments or controlled economy, but since Tito is not under the domination of the Kremlin, the free world has accepted Yugoslavia into the camp of those nations who are free from the absolute domination of another nation.

Likewise, the statement that all nations subject to Russian imperialism lose their political and economic control to the Politburo possibly has an exception. Sardar K. M. Pannikar, India's ambassador to Peiping, has unequivocally stated that the Mao government of China is not a tool of the Politburo. √ Mr. Pannikar is not a communist and has been in a position to obtain an unbiased appraisal of the situation. History will provide the answer to his assertion.

The sources of international power exerted in this conflict comprise every means known to man, ethical and unethical. The outcome of the conflict is uncertain, but in the last analysis the force of military power will decide the issue, either by its actual use, or by the threat of its use.

√ New York Times, October 29, 1951, page 1.

Conclusions

The foreign policy of the United States, in the attainment of the objectives of well-being and security for her people, has an unprecedented high standard of living to testify to its success. America also has a plan for the peace and security of the world, the United Nations Organization, as an example of her continuing struggle for security.

The United States, in her foreign policy, has in the past made two cardinal and fundamental errors. First, she has repeatedly failed to match her commitments with the force necessary to satisfy her obligations. Second, she has failed, or has chosen to ignore, her position and responsibilities in the world. To these two deficiencies could be added the folly of the American public's trust in an idealistic international organization to make peaceful settlements of world problems. In the generations to come, perhaps the fight for this highly moral, but now impractical, attainment will be the salvation of the world.

Most of the deficiencies pointed out in the chapters tracing the foreign policies of the United States can be laid at the door of American public opinion. The structure of government in a democracy is unsuited for the formulation of wise foreign policies and their support with necessary military might unless public opinion reflects an alert and clear understanding of the problems facing the nation and the world.

Indicative of this situation at present is a poll taken by George H. Gallup, in October 1951. Mr. Gallup has this to say:

> "The most disturbing fact about the present American scene is the ignorance on the part of a large segment of our population regarding issues vital to their

very existence. Normally, lack of information on the part of some of the voters has little effect upon national policy. But when this same lack of knowledge is widespread, the consequences can be dangerous. When the public is reasonably well-informed on any issue, it generally comes to the right conclusion.

I have listed five of the most important 'areas of ignorance' which affect the thinking of large segments of the population.

The first area of ignorance concerns foreign affairs.

What is the state of knowledge regarding some of problems of combating Communist aggression which face us in the Orient and Europe? To get some idea of how well informed the voters of this country are we devised a very simple set of questions which our interviewers put to a cross-section of the adult population in a recent survey.

These are the questions which we asked of the cross-section:

(1) Will you tell me where Manchuria is?

(2) Will you tell me where Formosa is?

(3) Will you tell me what is meant when people refer to the 38th parralel?

(4) Will you tell me what is meant by the term 'Atlantic Pact'?

(5) Will you tell me who Chiang Kai-shek is?

(6) Will you tell me who Marshall Tito is?

Certainly there is no question here that should stump any citizen. Yet only 12% of all adults we questioned could answer all six correctly. A higher percentage—19—could not answer a single one! The amazing thing is that virtually all of these people read a newspaper and listen to their radios daily.

Last June, when the Iranian situation was boiling to a crisis, only four Americans in ten knew where Iran was, and only three in ten knew what the trouble in Iran was all about.

Keystone of our European foreign policy is the Marshall Plan. Yet after the plan had been in effect for more than two years, one third of the American voting population either knew nothing at all about the Marshall Plan or had mistaken ideas concerning it." [1]

Likewise, this article points out the ignorance of the average cross-section of the American people in domestic affairs, its misconception as to the destructiveness of the atom bomb and the fallacious conclusions arrived at thereby, and the inability of many Americans to "envisage the awesome effect of another world war on our present civilization".

Mr. Gallup further found from his polls that 77% of the American people have never even heard of the Point Four Program

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[1] What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us. The New York Times Magazine, November 4, 1951.

and only 5% understand what it is trying to accomplish; more than half don't know what the "Voice of America" is or what it does.

The American people are largely ignorant of the impact of ideas on other nations. Apparently they have not realized that it is essential to them to understand what is going on in the minds of the other peoples of the world, rather than expecting those peoples to think and react as Americans do. So long as they fail to know what is going on in the world and to understand why it is going on, public opinion cannot and will not support foreign policies leading to the things America must do.

Some of the things which must be done are: recognize the fact that Germany is the key to Europe and that the key to Germany is European unity; advertise by effective means what the United States has to sell and what the free world has to offer; provide a reasonable, broad and generous economic policy, based on self-enlightenment; prevent a single aggressive power from dominating Europe or Asia; and build up quickly a military force second to none. Behind a shield of power the United States can, if she and her allies remain united in spirit as well as in action, and firmly, patiently and consistently act with true neighborliness, produce and maintain peace and world stability.

The foreign policy of the Communist leaders of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to make the world safe for communism and to change the world's political, economic, social and cultural structure for the benefit of the Soviets has had unprecendented success. In the five post-war years alone, Stalin has extended his empire over 600 million additional people, without involving a Russian soldier in battle. In thirty-four years this small band of Communists has extended the Russian empire over a majority of the Eurasian land mass which contains nearly four-fifths of the world's

population, and from its central position ,the "heartland", threatens to dominate both Europe and Asia. The Kremlin controls over 800 million people; has taken the independence from Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Tibet and China; governs East Germany; and is fighting for the control of Korea, Indo-China and Malaya. The communist party workers are operating locally throughout the rest of the world. By stirring up trouble and sabotaging constructive efforts, they are softening it up for eventual absorption into the Soviet Empire.

Stalin's foreign policies were coldly and clearly calculated in 1933 to achieve his aims. He has kept the Russian military strength strong and ready by expending for this purpose nearly one-third of the national effort of the Soviet Union and its satellites. He has never yet succumbed to the temptation of extending permanently his domination to areas isolated from Soviet territory. He has not voluntarily wasted Russia's strength by resorting to arms, except in the case of wresting territory from Finland at a critical time. He has educated the Russian people and is using the most progressive methods to instill into the bodies and minds of the Soviet youth the strength and spirit of militant aggressiveness. He has exploited the Russian people and resources in order to build up a heavy industry capable of supporting his military establishment. His course has zig-zagged, but it has never deviated from the fundamental policies of building a Russian State which will dominate the world, and the establishment of the communist ideology throughout the world.

The communist methods have been unscrupulous, merciless, cruel and bestial. As to whether Stalin will carry out his foreign policies by unleashing Russian forces to visit destruction on civiliza-

tion can best be judged by his remarks to Anthony Eden in December of 1941. While talking to Eden in regard to Hitler's extraordinary genius in building in a short time such a collossal power from a ruined and divided people, Stalin said, "but Hitler has shown he has one fatal defect. He does not know when to stop". Eden smiled and Stalin added, "You are wondering if I myself will know where to stop. But I can assure you that I will always know where to stop". [1]

A Note of Hope

A note of hope and sanity in the bleak future to which the conflicting policies of communism and capitalism have condemned the world is Dr. James Bryan Conant's prophecy:

> "I see a worried humanity endeavoring by one political device after another to find a way out of the atomic age. And by the end of the century this seems to have been accomplished, but neither thru the triumph of totalitarianism nor by the advent of world government. Neither the forces of good nor evil will prevail to the extent prophesied by some writers in the last few years. The Marx-Lenin dogmas are still honored in vast areas, but so, too, are the watch words of the 18th century French and American Revolutions—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. But time and local conditions have greatly modified the operational meaning of both the philosophies of dialectical materialism and Christian rationalism."[2]

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[1] **Seven Decisions That Shaped History, Harper Bros. Publishers, New York, 1950.**

[2] **A Skeptical Chemist Looks Into The Crystal Ball, New York Times, September 6, 1951.**

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RECOMMENDED READING

Current Books

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these of interest.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Some of the publications not available from these sources may be obtained from the Bureau of Naval Personnel Auxiliary Library Service, where a collection of books are available for loan to indiidual officers. Requests for the loan of these books should be made by the individual to the nearest branch or the Chief of Naval Personnel. (See Article C-9604, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 1948).

Title: *Force Mulberry.* 240 p.

Author: Stanford, Alfred. N. Y., William Morrow & Co., 1951.

Evaluation: An excellent account of the work that went into the planning and execution of the artificial harbors used for the Normandy invasion. The author was connected with the project from the very beginning and in the invasion served as Deputy Commander for the harbor at Omaha beach. Skillfully and interestingly written, this book shows the maze of cross-purposes at high command levels and the reluctance toward the use of new methods. The author has outlined the SNAFU situation of the rush construction program, the training of personnel, the cross-channel towing and the assembly under fire and described how the driving energy of the men assigned got the job done. Recommended reading not only for its description of the harbor project but also for its insight into the uncertainties and difficulties of a large scale invasion.

Title: *Negotiating With the Russians.* 310 p.

Author: Dennett, Raymond and Johnson, Joseph E. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1951.

Evaluation: A symposium of ten prominent men relating their experiences and reactions while negotiating with the Russians during the period 1940-1950. The purpose and scope is

to present the record of how we negotiate with Russians and what happens when we do. It is not a record of American foreign policy as such. There is no summary of conclusions nor any analysis of the meaning of this difficult decade of negotiation. However, the record of the experience of these men and their informed and careful judgments convey for thoughtful readers both a lesson and a warning. This is a very timely publication relating a story as it appears in retrospect. It provides clues to the answers of such questions as, "Can we negotiate with the Russians?" "What does negotiation mean?" "What happens when we negotiate?" and, "Is it worthwhile?" The tasks confronting our present representatives now negotiating the "Cease Fire Agreement in Korea" will be appreciated by the reader and it will be understood why six months of talks has produced no more than a stalemate.

Title: *Closing the Ring.* 749 p.

Author: Churchill, Winston S. N. Y., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951.

Evaluation: This fifth volume of Churchill's history of the Second World War covers the period from the beginning of the summer of 1943 to the evening of 5 June 1944—the events preceding the "Overlord" landing. Many of the events related in this volume have been discussed in other current writings. However, this work is Mr. Churchill's contribution to history from the point of view of the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. No study of the history of this period could be complete without the point of view of one who played so important a role in making this history.

Title: *The Armed Forces Yearbook,* 1951. 460 p.

Author: Brassey's Annual. N. Y., Macmillan Co., 1951.

Evaluation: For sixty years Brassey's Annual was the yearbook of the British Navy. Last year's and this year's issues, however, have been expanded, (1) to embrace the activities of all three Britain's armed services and (2) to present a number of well-written articles on military subjects of universal interest. The sterile, traditional title is in no way suggestive of either content or scope. Out of thirty-one chapters, eighteen are devoted to such topics as, "Soviet and Western Strategy," "Chinese Armed Forces," "The Pattern of Future War," "Tank Warfare," "The Potential Menace of the Sea Mine." Chapters are con-

tributions of individual authors selected by the editorial staff. The list of these authors includes such names as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Major-General J. F. C. Fuller and Sir Henry Tizard. Brassey's Annual should be very valuable for reference use in the study of many aspects of the current world military situation and Western defense.

Title: *Failure in Japan.* 262 p.

Author: Textor, Robert B. N. Y., John Day Co., 1951.

Evaluation: The author makes a critical appraisal of the efforts of General MacArthur's Military Government to democratize Japan. The book deals with reemergence of the reactionary "old guard" political elements, the failure of occupation policies to break up the industrial combines, obstruction of the growth of democratic trade unionism and inept handling of public information and education. In the opinion of the author the United States stands to lose the peace in Japan unless drastic steps are taken along some such lines as indicated by him. The book throws light upon the risks involved by commanders who undertake to put a ban upon all critical material written about one's work or policies. It will be of value to students of military government and to all who are interested in Japanese and Far Eastern Affairs.

Title: *United Nations and Power Politics.* 462 p.

Author: MacLaurin, John. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1951.

Evaluation: In his preface, the author states that one who writes on a political subject in these times, owes the reader an explanation of his views as a necessary background to understanding his objectives. He frankly states that he believes in the expansion of civil liberties rather than restricting them; in the stimulation of kindliness and sincerity in public office rather than heartlessness and hypocrisy; he dislikes police or military rule; and believes that governments should be checked through informed and freely expressed public opinions pressed home through democratic processes. The Charter of the United Nations is used as the basic outline for this book.. The principal articles of the Charter are taken up and considered, one by one, followed by a summation of the facts and debates concerned with political issues or incidents to which such Charter provisions are applicable. Many of the subjects covered, such as "Iran and the U. S. S. R." "The Berlin Crisis," "The Military Staff Committse," "The Atomic Energy Com-

mission," should prove of especial interest to the staff and students of the Naval War College. This book is an excellent study of the Charter of the United Nations and of the role of the United Nations in the political and economic conflicts of the nations of the world today.

Title: *Inflation and Mobilization.* 98 p.

Author: Simmons, Frederick L. Claremont, Calif., Claremont College, 1951.

Evaluation: The author, a leading authority on economic trends and policies, considers such important problems as how to control the inflationary spiral, and what measures should be taken to preserve a sound economy throughout the years of rearmament and mobilization. He suggests that "pressures of loyal citizens" may wreck our economic system. In the foreword, the statement is made that "patriotic Americans with mistaken ideas are vastly more dangerous to the future of our country than card-carrying communists and fellow travelers." The author, in the series of lectures that make up this book, attempts to point out some of these mistaken ideas and show wherein they are fallacious, and then point out some of the things that should and must be done. Although some of his tables and statistics are a little difficult for a layman to understand, the explanations are excellent. The book should be read by all hands.

Title: *Master Spy.* 286 p.

Author: Colvin, Ian. N. Y., McGraw-Hill, 1951.

Evaluation: A narrative of Admiral Canaris' operations from 1935 until his death in early 1945, while serving as Chief of the German Military Intelligence Service. The book aims to prove that Canaris aided the enemies of Germany during this period. The organization and techniques of an intelligence service are treated rather sketchily. Although no effort is spared to demonstrate Canaris' disloyalty to Hitler by aiding the enemies of the Nazis, the book is probably factual in the main.

Title: *Realities of World Power.* 334 p.

Author: Kieffer, John E. N. Y., David McKay Co., 1952.

Evaluation: A long-awaited book—a one package, lucid version of geopolitics, centered around and written particularly for the United States in "Today's World." As the preface states: "The purpose of this book is to explain in non-technical

terms the complexities of the world of power politics in which we now live. It is also an exposition of the latest thinking in the field of geopolitics—that dread calculus of conquest Hitler misapplied." This study follows the little-understood field of geopolitics from its origins in the misty philosophies of early German proponents of power politics, through the various schools and stages of development to the world of today—and to the particular position of the United States vis-a-vis that world. If the book has any fault it is that the author, in attempting to write so that all readers may understand him, sometimes obviously oversimplifies his cases—but that is a minor weakness which, perhaps, adds rather than detracts from the appeal of the book. Mr. Kieffer has recently had background experience in the Armed Forces (the Air Force) and is currently on active duty at the Air University. As might be expected, his concepts are somewhat colored by his air viewpoint but, nevertheless, he has a thoroughly realistic and broad approach to his subject. This is a work that should be read by all Americans—(for whom the author states it was written). It is recommended for all officers of the Naval War College.

Title: *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare.* 206 p.

Author: Summers, Robert E. N. Y., H. W. Wilson Co., 1951.

Evaluation: A symposium of excerpts of speeches and writings about the background, scope, effectiveness and weaknesses of the U. S. psychological warfare program. There is also a section dealing with proposals for improving the program. Each section is introduced by a short summary comment by the author, but the reader is left to draw his own conclusions. Although some excellently written excerpts are included, the first 117 pages deal mostly with statistical data. This would be of interest to those in need of factual information about the U. S. psychological warfare program. The remaining pages contain many profound observations concerning national strategy and policies. These pages are recommended for reading in connection with global strategy studies.

PERIODICALS

Title: *Mediterranean Rescue.*

Author: Gallery, Rear Admiral Daniel V.

Publication: COLLIER'S, January 19, 1952, p. 25, 67-69.

Annotation: Describes one of the biggest air-sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean's history to locate two pilots from the Aircraft Carrier CORAL SEA.

Title: *How Strong Is Red China?*

Author: Hanrahan, Gene Z.

Publication: COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, January, 1952, p. 34-38.

Annotation: Evaluates the economic, military and political factors which, combined with the strategic geography of China, play an important role in her strength.

Title: *Background for Russian Action.*

Author: Hittle, Lt. Col. J. D.

Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, January, 1952, p. 47-59.

Annotation: Discussion of East-West problems which illustrate that basic objectives and methods of Communist Russia derive from origins deeply rooted in the history of the Russian nation.

Title: *First Story of Naval Air Power.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 18, 1952, p. 28-33.

Annotation: An interview with Vice Admiral John H. Cassady, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, in which he replies to questions on naval air power in Korea, the role of aircraft carriers and other questions on naval air operations.

Title: *The Sovereign Position.*

Author: Voight, F. A.

Publication: THE FREEMAN, January 14, 1952, p. 233-235.

Annotation: Develops the thesis that, in the present conflict between Russia and the West, the decisive position is the Dar-

danelles—and, if held in sufficient strength, will enable the West to influence events in Southern Asia and the Far East.

Title: *Is Stalin in Trouble?*

Author: Crankshaw, Edward.

Publication: LOOK, January 29, 1952, p. 26-31.

Annotation: Contends that Stalin's bid for world domination has seriously upset the planned economy of Russia and has strained the people to the limit.

Title: *Red China's A-Bombs.*

Author: Deverall, Richard.

Publication: THE NEW LEADER, January 21, 1952, p. 2-3.

Annotation: Reports that Soviet and Chinese scientists are operating a huge atomic-bomb plant and arsenal in Red China's Sinkiang province and that the plant is under the direction of a distinguished British scientist, Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo.

Title: *Limited and Unlimited War.*

Author: Spaight, J. M.

Publication: ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY, January, 1952, p. 6-8.

Annotation: Defines limited and unlimited warfare, cites the Korean war as an example of limited war and suggests that the pattern of limited warfare may be followed rather than risk the serious consequences of all-out conflict.

Title: *General Eisenhower's Elephants.*

Author: Arthur, C. S., Cdr., U. S. N.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1952, p. 45-49.

Annotation: Discusses the over-all strategy for the defense of Western Europe, warns against attempting an offensive ground warfare and argues that the preparedness effort must be centered primarily upon naval and air strength.

Title: *An Analysis of the Strategic Areas in Asia.*

Author: Strausz-Hupe, Robert.

Publication: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January, 1952, p. 1-7.

Annotation: Surveys South Asia's strategic assets and liabilities and outlines the alternatives and capabilities of U. S. policy in regard to that area.

Title: *The U. S. Military Mind.*

Publication: FORTUNE, February, 1952, p. 91-93, 202-208.

Annotation: Attempts to give some idea of the efficiency of the U. S. military machine by presenting a brief view of its managers.

Title: *Africa: Strategic Prize of the Century.*

Author: Herald, George W.

Publication: UNITED NATIONS WORLD, February, 1952, p. 17-20, 46-47.

Annotation: An analysis of the opening moves in the struggle between East and West for the world's second largest land mass and its faulous natural wealth.

Title: *Red China's Three Top Field Commanders.*

Author: Hanrahan, Gene Z.

Publication: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, February, 1952, p. 54-61.

Annotation: Gives a short profile of three of the six top Chinese Communist field commanders upon whose capabilities and limitations the military fortunes of Red China rest.

Title: *General Ike's Air Force.*

Author: Peck, James L. H.

Publication: FLYING, March, 1952, p. 11-13, 63-64.

Annotation: An evaluation of the strength of Allied Air Forces in Central Europe which presents estimate on the number and types of aircraft available at preesnt. (SACEUR chart, p. 12; table, giving information on NATO's defensive air strength, p. 13).

Title: *A Military Analysis of Russian Preparedness.*

Author: von Rohden, Herhudt.

Publication: AVIATION AGE, February, 1952, p. 6-18, 23.

Annotation: An assessment of Soviet air power and strategy by the last Chief of the War Science Office of the German Air Force, who served in Russia during World War II, and warns that the Russians are in no way inferior in the technical accomplishments that bring success in warfare. Recommended for all officers at Naval War College.

Title: *Blockading China: What Navy Can Do.*

Publication: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, February 22, 1952, p. 54-59.

Annotation: An interview with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in which he discusses the possibility and effectiveness of a naval blockade of China and other questions on the Far Eastern situation. Recommended for all officers at Naval War College.

Title: *The Unreported War in Indonesia.*

Author: Marshack, Alexander.

Publication: THE AMERICAN MERCURY, February, 1952, p. 37-47.

Annotation: Traces the background and developments in the undeclared war between Dutch forces and Indonesians who were supposedly granted independence in 1949.

Title: *The U. S. Shapes a Middle East Policy.*

Author: Wells, Wickham.

Publication: THE REPORTER, March 4, 1952, p. 5-7.

Annotation: Discusses policy in the Middle East and outlines the new U. S. policy based on short-term military and long-range economic objectives.

Title: *George F. Kennan: Policy-Guesser.*

Publication: THE FREEMAN, February 25, 1952, p. 325-326.

Annotation: An editorial on the appointment of George F. Kennan as Ambassador to Russia, quoting some of his statements on Russia and the Far East to show that just as earlier

experts failed to read MEIN KAMPF, Mr. Kennan has evidently failed to read the Soviet blueprint for world conquest which clearly defines the Russian strategy of destroying the West through the conquest of Asia.

Title: *Open Covenants.*

Author: Beer, Max.

Publication: UNITED NATIONS WORLD, March, 1952, p. 32.

Annotation: Lists the regional alliances to which almost every member nation of the UN belongs and points out that the UN program for collective security has been aided by these regional agreements.

Title: *Growth of NATO: From a Senate Resolution to the Lisbon Conference.*

Author: Reston, James.

Publication: THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 2, 1952, Section IV, p. E-5.

Annotation: Summarizes the history of NATO: the origin of the pact, obligations and accomplishments up to and including the Lisbon meeting.