

# Reflections on China's Maritime Strategy: Island Chains and the Classics

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## Introduction

My task today is to reflect on the influence on current Chinese maritime strategic thought by the individuals we might describe as “classic maritime strategists.” These include, of course, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Others might include P.H. Colomb, Herbert Richmond, and Raoul Castex; I add to this latter group Admirals John (“Jacky”) Fisher, Ernest King, Arleigh Burke, J.C. Wylie, Elmo Zumwalt, John Lehman, Sergei Gorshkov, and Liu Huaqing. Several of these never wrote down formal maritime strategic thoughts, but their organizational and leadership contributions made a strategic difference in their nation’s maritime narrative. And while they probably never saw an ocean, Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz are strategists who deserve consideration in a discussion of Chinese maritime strategy.

Sun Zi’s focus on deception, for instance, is certainly germane to the twenty-first century emphasis on electronic and information warfare, expressed in innumerable reports of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) exercises and in naval and civilian leaders’ exhortations to that navy.

China’s propensity for “teaching a lesson” as a strategic goal when employing military force in a situation perhaps deemed inappropriate by Western analysts fits into Clausewitz’s discussion of two types of war, limited and absolute, despite that strategist’s lack of maritime experience.<sup>1</sup>

As for defining “maritime strategy,” I would just offer the usual pabulum matching necessary resources with attaining national maritime goals. A modern maritime strategy must involve air, space, cyber, sea and land forces operating jointly throughout the maritime environment, from the littoral to “blue water.” These are all objectives of repeated PLAN exercises.

The concepts of “command of the sea,” “sea denial,” and “sea control” remain useful discussion points and, of course, a nation’s maritime strength includes both naval and commercial maritime forces and infrastructure. China certainly is fulfilling these characteristics.

The relationship among national naval power, economic development, and international relations underlies Chinese maritime strategy, currently framed by the “near seas,” the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas; the “middle sea,” including much of the Philippine Sea; and the “far sea,” the waters outside the second island chain.

Current Chinese thought also acknowledges Corbett and Mahan’s strategic views emphasizing the importance of economics and trade, lines of communication at sea, and employing naval power to attain national security aims.

I also note Wylie's comment that the purpose of sea power is "the actual establishment of control on land" or "the "establishment of governing control over the enemy in his own land," which may echo Corbett more than it does Mahan, but also reflects current Chinese concern about Taiwan and other disputed islands.<sup>ii</sup>

Wylie also denigrated the concept of a single, coherent maritime strategy, stating "the requirement is for strategies of depth and breadth, flexible and adaptable, which by intent and by design can be applied to unforeseen situations."<sup>iii</sup> Mahan also was well aware of the complexity of warfare, which "could not be encompassed by any system of theory."<sup>iv</sup>

Related is Mahan's emphasis on the need for oversea naval support bases, a concept appreciated by the PLAN as it conducts deployments to the Gulf of Aden. While the "string of pearls" is more verbiage than reality, China is currently negotiating with Djibouti to join several other nations in establishing a logistics facility in that country.<sup>v</sup>

Beijing's focus on strategic maritime issues is understandable, given China's 10,250 nautical miles (nm) of coastline, more than 6,500 islands claimed. China also has eight of the world's ten largest harbors in the world, its shipping fleet is the world's fourth largest, "ocean-related activities" comprised almost 10 percent of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009, and its economy—and hence political stability—is heavily dependent on sea borne trade.<sup>vi</sup>

### **Maritime Strategy in China**

The nineteenth century Western onslaught on Qing China brought home to many officials the necessity of modernizing their country's military might, including its navy. The dynasty succeeded in organizing and equipping a modern navy, but foundered in wars with France and Japan. Those failures resulted largely from the absence of inadequate training, unified command, common doctrine, and a clear strategy.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged in 1949 with no navy to speak of; its initial maritime force was imported from the Soviet Union, as was its initial maritime strategy, the "Young School" of the 1920s. This defined a naval role largely limited to supporting the army's operations ashore.

### **Chinese Leadership**

Mao Zedong wrote in 1953 "we must build a strong navy for the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggression." In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for "a strong navy with modern combat capability," although emphasizing its role in coastal defense. Jiang Zemin urged the navy in 1997 to "build up the nation's Great Wall."<sup>vii</sup> Hu Jintao implied strategic maritime concerns when he urged the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004 to "accelerate the transformation and modernization of the Navy . . . and make extended preparations for warfare in order to make greater contributions to safeguarding national security and world peace."<sup>viii</sup> He later noted the importance of maritime border issues, Taiwan's status, and "protection of China's expanding national interests," including missions other than war.<sup>ix</sup>

Most recently, Xi Jinping's enunciation of a "China Dream" has engendered articles calling for a strategy of "outward-oriented military power," to include "limited global military power . . . capable of protecting distant sea lanes."<sup>x</sup>

### **Liu Huaqing's Vision**

China's most influential flag officer has been Liu Huaqing who played a role similar to that of Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. Liu's "sea daddy" instituted dramatic changes in maritime strategy during a long tenure as Soviet navy commander. Gorshkov no doubt influenced Liu, but the latter's ability to make significant changes was delayed by the 1966-1976 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the following three-four years of political disarray.

His 1980s plan for modernizing the navy is usually described as a three- stage program<sup>xi</sup>:

- By 2000, the PLAN would be capable of exerting sea control out to the First Island Chain, defined by the Kurile Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, and the Indonesian archipelago.
- By 2020, sea control would be enforced out to the Second Island Chain, defined by the Kuriles, Japan and the Bonin Islands, the Marianas Islands, Palau, and the Indonesian archipelago.
- By 2050, the PLAN would operate globally, with aircraft carrier battle groups.

The immediate obstacles confronting Liu in the 1980s were a longstanding continental security perspective, internal PLA resource battles, and domestic politics; these had to be overcome through the nitty-gritty of implementing a maritime strategy addressed by Arleigh Burke and demonstrated by John Lehman. The Chinese military was and remains dominated by the army in terms of leadership, numbers, and influence, but that appears to be changing in favor of the other services.<sup>xii</sup>

### **The First Chain**

The initial goal of Liu's strategy—command of the sea out to the First Island Chain—was not realized by its target date of 2000 or, one might argue, even by 2014. He did succeed, however, in the key goal of gaining the support of China's civilian leadership support for the increased resources to develop a 21st-century navy to achieve the nation's strategic maritime goals.

Chinese analysts today identify classic naval missions as the reasons for a maritime strategy. Presence, protection of sea borne trade, counter-piracy, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), deterrence, and preparing for joint warfare at sea in defense of vital national security interests, including power projection ashore, are all being exercised by the PLAN.<sup>xiii</sup>

These efforts have been publicly subsumed by Beijing's insistence that China's "core interests" are inflexible strategic requirements: "state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution, overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development."<sup>xiv</sup>

These concerns, issues, thoughts, missions, and plans are elements in China's undeclared maritime strategy. "National reunification" obviously refers to Taiwan; "state sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" include Xinjiang and Xizang Provinces, but likely also includes contested insular land features in the East and South China Seas. If these latter are "core interests"--and since Beijing reserves entirely to itself the definition of that category--the application of a Chinese maritime strategy becomes more problematic.<sup>xv</sup>

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China has built a navy capable of impressive regional presence and discreet global operations. Developing the doctrine and operational capabilities to bring its new naval power to fruition requires naval leadership capable of succeeding in the contentious national and military resource allocation process. Admirals Shi Yunsheng and Wu Shengli appear to have fared very well the PLAN in that process, establishing the navy as a key element in China's strategic position as a major power.

Beijing has not openly promulgated a formal maritime strategy, but it has published important documents addressing the maritime theater.<sup>xvi</sup> One is the 1998 "National Ocean Policy of China."<sup>xvii</sup> Another is the Defense White Papers, the most recent of which was published in February 2013.

The Ocean Policy identifies important maritime concerns, including:

- safeguarding [China's] marine rights and interests," outlined in the 1992 "Law of the People's Republic of China on its Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zones."
- strengthening "the comprehensive development and administration of its coastal zones . . . and protect[ing] the offshore areas," and "form[ing] costal economic belts and marine economic zones."
- planning and implementing "development of marine resources and the protection of the marine environment," while improving "monitoring, surveillance, law enforcement, and management" of that environment.
- "reinforcing oceanographic technology research and development"
- "setting up a comprehensive marine management system," and
- actively participating in "international cooperation in the field of marine development."<sup>xviii</sup>

China's series of *Defense White Papers* are important indicators of Beijing's maritime strategic thought.<sup>xix</sup> The 2004 *White Paper* claimed "the Navy has expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations." The 2006 *White Paper* then stated "the Navy aims at gradual

extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations...,” which was followed by the 2008 version’s statement “since the 1980s the Navy has realized a strategic transformation to offshore defensive operations.” The PLAN’s strategic aim was described in the 2010 *Defense White Paper* as “in line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy...”<sup>xx</sup>

The 2012 version described the Navy’s role in a national defense focused on “safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development . . . . tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s lands, inland waters, and territorial waters . . . [and] safeguard its maritime rights and interests” pressured by the ongoing sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas. Defending the security of territorial waters is repeated as integral to “National Defense Policy.”

### **People’s Liberation Army Navy**

Beijing’s creation of a large modern navy capable of operating in the 21st-century maritime arena is an achievement marked by three milestones.

- Admiral Liu Huaqing’s early 1980s strategic plan for a three-stage plan to build a modern Chinese navy.
- the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and
- the successive deployments of Chinese naval task groups to the Gulf of Aden.

Recent PLAN exercises demonstrate that it can operate 21st-century ships on deployment to far seas, although the strategic theory espoused in public by Chinese analysts still utilizes a maritime paradigm based on island-chains, which does not fit with traditional naval strategic theory. However, the Chinese version of “defense” is an “active defense” concept that enhances the PLAN’s ability to defend the near seas. The mission is “to do all we can to dominate the enemy by striking first. . . . as far away as possible.”<sup>xxi</sup>

### **Strategic Debate?**

Most significantly, despite the large annual defense budget increases, China appears to be adhering to a goal of 2050 for achieving a completely modern military. Hence, the PLAN also probably sees itself at the halfway mark in its overall modernization program.<sup>xxii</sup>

Representatives at the early spring 2012 meeting of the National People’s Congress, in Beijing, vociferously criticized the lack of a maritime strategy, calling for the government to “formulate and promulgate a complete, comprehensive, and systematic maritime development strategy, with all the national political, economic, military factors being brought into consideration!”<sup>xxiii</sup>

Despite the lack of a published maritime strategy, the PLAN plans and operates along lines of guidance from China’s National Command Authority (NCA), that equate to a strategy.

Beijing delineates defensive maritime security zones in which it aims to prohibit foreign surveillance and reconnaissance activities or any other actions it finds objectionable. This provides the basis for a

maritime strategy with legal, national security, domestic political stability, and fleet composition components.

For instance, during the 2010 discussion of U.S. aircraft carrier deployments to the Yellow Sea, following the *Cheonan* incident, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated “We resolutely oppose foreign military ships and aircraft coming to the Yellow Sea and other Chinese adjacent waters and engaging in activities that influence China’s security interests.”<sup>xxiv</sup> This view, combined with the aggressive actions against foreign fishing craft in the South China Sea during the past decade or more, and actions against U.S. surveillance aircraft and ships all point toward a view of “sovereign” waters far in excess of those delineated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

## Conclusion

A January 2012 assessment of “China’s naval rivals” focused on the U.S. Navy as “a strategic opponent of the Chinese Navy.” Japan was then highlighted as a more immediate concern, based on “naval hatred stretching over 100 years Diaoyu Island [Senkaku Islands] sovereignty, maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, and the possibility of Japanese military interference in the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea.” Vietnam and the Philippines were listed as “local tactical opponents” and India as a “potential blue water opponent.” The analysis concluded that the “Chinese Navy now faces a maritime competition structure that involve a broad maritime region, great depth, and multiple opponents.”<sup>xxv</sup>

The PLAN has almost certainly gained influence within the NCA during the past two decades, but the question remains about the degree to which the PLAN influences the national security policy making and strategic thought in Beijing. The navy commander first became a member of the Central Military Commission in 2004, but an admiral served on the Politburo Standing Committee since Admiral Liu Huaqing retired in 1997.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Sun Zi may be credited, or blamed, for what might be a dangerous weakness in Chinese maritime strategic thought: an unrealistic belief in the ability to control unintended escalation during an incident at sea, as evidenced in various crises since 1950. Whereas Clausewitz (“friction”) and Mahan certainly understood the uncertain nature of events at sea, Sun Zi argued that one can plan for almost any eventuality in war.<sup>xxvii</sup>

China is attempting to become both a continental and a maritime power, a difficult transition, rare in history. France, Germany, and Russia all failed to do so. A former U.S. commander of Pacific forces, Admiral Robert Willard, has opined that China “aspires to become a ‘global military (power)’ by extending its influence beyond its regional waters.”<sup>xxviii</sup> If China succeeds in building and deploying an effective, global navy, it will have beaten the historical odds.

In 1999, I wrote that “the PLAN required to carry out Liu Huaqing’s strategy would include task groups of missile-firing, power-projection capable ships supported by nuclear-powered submarines and tactical air power.” This force structure (Deng Xiaoping’s statement that “without air cover,

winning a naval battle is out of the question”) is still nascent, but appearing on the horizon.<sup>xxix</sup>

That campaign is being guided by a *de facto* maritime strategy that indeed draws on the usual stable of classic strategists: Corbett, Mahan, Sun Zi, and Clausewitz. China does, then, have a maritime strategy.

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<sup>i</sup> PLA involvement in Korea in the early 1950s was a disaster in terms of personnel losses, but is considered a “victory” because of the continuation of the North Korean state; and the PLA’s performance in Vietnam in 1979 was by Deng Xiaoping’s own measure poor—but considered to have taught Hanoi a “lesson” about actively opposing Chinese policies. See Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (eds.), *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949* (Armonk, N.Y.: ME Sharpe, 2003); Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.), *The Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005); Edward O’Dowd, *China’s Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War* (London: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>ii</sup> Quoted in John B. Hattendorf, “Introduction” to J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy*, Classics of Sea Power series (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), xxvi.

<sup>iii</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>iv</sup> Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), 113ff.

<sup>v</sup> “Djibouti Wants to Reinforce Military Cooperation With China,” *Shabelle Media Network* (Modadishu: 28 February 2014), at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403010068.html> (accessed 02 March 2014).

<sup>vi</sup> This data is from “Sailing on a Harmonious Sea: A Chinese Perspective,” *Global Asia* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010), at: <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/sailing-on-a-harmonious-sea-a-chinese-perspective/> (accessed 28 February 2014).

<sup>vii</sup> Quoted in Cha Chun-ming, “Chinese Navy Heads Toward Modernization,” *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong: 11 April 1999), B6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (FBIS-CHI)-1999-0418.

<sup>viii</sup> Quoted in “Chinese President Meets Deputies for Military Meetings,” *Xinhua* (07 December 2011), at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/06/c\\_131291648.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/06/c_131291648.htm) (accessed 29 January 2012).

<sup>ix</sup> Discussed in James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Mission’,” *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 27 (09 January 2009), at: <http://www.fnvaworld.org/download/tibet-related-doc/Hu-PLAs-missions-2008.pdf> (accessed 14 May 2012).

<sup>x</sup> “The China Dream on the Threshold of the Dream of a Strong Military,” *Zhongguo Meng Shi Yui de Qinagjun Meng*, quoted in David Cohen, “In a Fortnight,” *China Brief* XIV, Issue 3 (Jamestown Foundation: 06 February 2014), at: <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/inafortnightcb/> (accessed 25 February 2014).

<sup>xi</sup> Taylor Fravel, of MIT, provides a very useful collection of articles addressing South China Sea issues at: <http://taylorfravel.com/> (accessed 26 February 2014).

<sup>xii</sup> First, China’s 2004 Defense White Paper stated “The PLA will promote coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force.” Second, at the CCP’s Eighteenth Party Congress, in November 2012, President Hu Jintao emphasized that the other services would be playing a more important role in China’s military, asserting “We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security.” Third, General Xu Qiliang argued that “We should, . . . lay stress on strengthening the building of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery.” Then, in November 2013, a senior MR commander speaking at the U.S. NDU stated that the PLA was going to become more balanced, with the army being deemphasized in favor of the navy and air force. Finally, in January 2014, Chinese military analysts described a “new joint command system” reflecting “naval prioritization.”

<sup>xiii</sup> See Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Annapolis: USNI Press, 2010), Chs. 7,8; David Liebenberg and Jeffrey Becker, “Recent Personnel Shifts Hint at Major Changes on the Horizon for PLA Navy Leadership” (Arlington, VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, 07 February 2014), at: <http://www.cna.org/news/commentary/2014-2-7-recent-personnel-shifts-hint-major-changes-horizon> (accessed 25 February 2014).

<sup>xiv</sup> “China’s Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted,” *Beijing Review* (26 August 2013), at: [http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-08/26/content\\_29824049.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-08/26/content_29824049.htm) (accessed 25 February 2014).

<sup>xv</sup> This final thought is mine; indeed, given the positive trend of relations between Beijing and Taipei under the Ma Ying-jeou administrations, and Beijing's continental grasp on Tibet and Xinjiang, China's "core interests" seem relatively secure in 2012. The core interests issue is discussed in Michael Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior," (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.), at: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS\\_FINAL.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 14 May 2012).

<sup>xvi</sup> See, for instance, Fei Shiting and Chen Xiaojing, "Enrich and Strengthen the Nation Through Maritime Development—PLA Deputies to the NPC Call for Introducing a Maritime Strategy," *Jiefangjun Bao* (09 March 2012), 7, in OSC-CPP20120309787007.; Rear Admiral Yin Zhou's statement in "China's Maritime Strategy Being Tested Amid South China Sea Disputes," *Beijing Caijing* (24 October 2011), at: <http://english.caijing.com.cn/2011-10-24/110914257.html> and Major General Luo Yuan, quoted in Russell Hsiao, "Military Delegates Call for National Maritime Strategy to Protect Expanding Interests," *China Brief* 11, Issue 4 (Jamestown Foundation, 10 March 2011), at: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=37629&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=79f56b556ae0003e6afc755934e1fa54](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37629&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=79f56b556ae0003e6afc755934e1fa54) (both accessed 14 May 2012). The degree of policy-making incoherence in Beijing was indicated in a July 2011 speech by Major General Zhu Chenghu, reported at: <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-07/1792964.html> (no longer available online), who called for a South China Sea strategy "where the lead agency is the State Oceanic Administration with input from the PLA, MFA, PSB, Ministries of Agriculture, Transportation, Defense, Customs, and coastal provincial governments.

<sup>xvii</sup> This is an old document, but still seems accurate in describing China's current maritime policies: "National Ocean Policy of China," Information Office of the State Council (Beijing: May 1998), at: [http://www.jodc.go.jp/info/ioc\\_doc/Technical/158387e.pdf](http://www.jodc.go.jp/info/ioc_doc/Technical/158387e.pdf) (accessed 13 May 2012). But also see "China Issues Plan for Maritime Development," *Xinhua* (26 April 2012), at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/25/c\\_131551501.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/25/c_131551501.htm) (accessed 07 June 2012).

<sup>xviii</sup> Ibid., 76-78. Also see Liu Shuguang, "China's Marine Economy," *East Asia Forum* (17 November 2011), at: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/17/china-s-marine-economy/> (accessed 16 May 2012), who reports that "national-level marine economic-development zones" have been established by Guangdong, Shandong, and Zhejiang Provinces.

<sup>xix</sup> May be found at: [http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm) (accessed 14 May 2012).

<sup>xx</sup> I am indebted to Dr. Nan Li, of the Navy War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, and to Dr. Thomas Bickford, of the Center for Naval Analyses, for this discussion.

<sup>xxi</sup> Anti-access/Area Denial apparently is not discussed, per se, in Chinese literature, although Shi Xiaoqin, "The Boundaries and Directions of China's Sea Power," in Peter Dutton, et al (eds.), 137, advocates the PLAN developing "the capacity to deny access to the [U.S.] navy to China's sea territory." The PLA's "Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines" (ASCEL)—or "counter-intervention"—approximates that operational policy and is discussed in Anton Lee Wishik, "An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLA's Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines," *China Security*, No. 19 (2011), 37-48, at: [http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=48](http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48) (accessed 14 May 2012). Major General Peng Guangqian, *Research on China Military Strategy Issues* (Beijing: PLA Press, 2006), 248, quoted in Wishik, 3 and in Michael A. McDevitt, "The PLA Navy Anti-Access Role in a Taiwan Contingency," a paper prepared for the 2010 Pacific Symposium on "China's Naval Modernization: Cause for Storm Warnings," National Defense University, Washington D.C., 10 June 2010, 3.

<sup>xxii</sup> My discussion with Dennis J. Blasko. Also see Blasko's "An Analysis of China's 2011 Defense Budget and Total Military Spending: The Great Unknown," *China Brief* 11, Issue 4 (Jamestown Foundation, 11 March 2011), at: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=37631&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=517#UqTo\\_14aU00](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37631&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=517#UqTo_14aU00) (accessed 08 December 2013).

<sup>xxiii</sup> My conversations with Captain Bernard Moreland, USCGR (Ret.), former USCG representative in Beijing; my conversation with the Director of MOFA's Bureau of Boundary and Maritime Affairs (Beijing, December 2012). For a useful explanation of China's coast guard organizations, see Lyle J. Goldstein, *Five Dragons Stirring up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China's Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities*, *China Maritime Study No. 5* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, April 2010). Nine such organizations are noted in Fei Shiting, Chen Xiaojing, "Enrich and Strengthen the Nation Through Maritime Development -- PLA Deputies to the NPC Call for Introducing a Maritime Strategy," *Jiefangjun Bao* (09 March 2012), 7, in OSC-CPP20120309787007 (accessed 10 March 2012).

<sup>xxiv</sup> Statement is at <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chngxh/tyb/fyrbt/jzhsl/t714888.htm> (accessed 22 December 2011).

<sup>xxv</sup> Hai Tao, "The Chinese Navy Has a Long Way to Go to Get to the Far Seas," *Guoji Xianqu Daobao* (Beijing), in OSC-CPP20120109671003 (06 January 2012), accessed 09 February 2012.

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<sup>xxvi</sup> Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” *SIPRI Policy Paper No. 26* (Stockholm: SIPRI, September 2010), note the PLA’s reputation as “hard line” on issues such as Taiwan’s status, but conclude that PLA influence on national policy-making remains “difficult to assess.”

<sup>xxvii</sup> Discussed in Scott Fitzsimmons, “Evaluating the Masters of Strategy: Comparative Analysis of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, and Corbett,” *Innovations* 7 (2007), at: <http://www.ucalgary.com/innovations/files/innovations/Fitzsimmons-EvaluatingtheMastersofStrategy.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2014).

<sup>xxviii</sup> Quoted in Yoichi Kato, “U.S. Commander Says China Aims to be a ‘Global Military’ Power,” *Asahi Shimbun* (28 December 2010), at: <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201201270279.html> (accessed 30 January 2012).

<sup>xxix</sup> Bernard D. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in Susan M. Puska, ed., *People’s Liberation Army After Next* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, 2000), 296; Deng is quoted in John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 10.