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# Maritime Power and International Security

## EMC Chair Symposium

Working Papers



The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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# WELCOME FROM THE EMC CHAIR

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Derek S. Reveron  
U.S. Naval War College

Welcome to the Naval War College and our tenth EMC Chair symposium. This event brings experts together from academia and the national security community to discuss the relationship between maritime power and international security. Participants will reflect on contemporary maritime challenges, strategic approaches to advance and defend national interests, and future roles for maritime power. The implications are important for understanding the types of missions combatant commanders will execute and the types of equipment and training the Navy must provide to support these missions. Panels will address power projection, deterrence, special operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security cooperation, and maritime strategy.

In an effort to share expertise with the Fleet and national security community beyond this event, the succeeding pages contain the working papers participants prepared in advance of the symposium. The five panels are:

- ♦ **Panel 1: Power Projection**

Projecting power appears increasingly difficult in theaters like the Western Pacific and greater Indian Ocean, where local powers field low-cost weaponry to exact a high price from deployed naval forces. Devising methods and hardware for piercing anti-access defenses, keeping up adequate numbers of platforms to sustain combat losses and prevail, and firming up alliances with local powers are only some of the challenges inherent in twenty-first century power projection. Power projection also unfolds in new domains such as cyberspace, where local defenders can oppose stronger outsiders operating in their environs, while the United States can harness cyber operations of its own to strike at these antagonists. To make sense of these trends, the panel will consider how the future operating environment affects force planning, future contingency planning, and opportunities to chart a path for future maritime forces.

- ♦ **Panel 2: Deterrence**

Conventional deterrence has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, on the Korean Peninsula, and in the South China Sea. In varying degrees, the U.S. and its partners have been unable to prevent state and non-state actors from deterring behavior contrary to U.S. interests. If they escalate, many of these crises could lead to direct threats against the U.S. and its partners. What do these trends portend for the future of deterrence? Deterrence strategies have to be credible based on a combination of will, capability, and capacity. Have these key elements of national security all been irrevocably eroded, or are the threats we face simply not deterrable? At the same time, the costs of nuclear modernization and replacement of rapidly aging systems are soaring, which has been estimated by the CBO to be \$355 billion over the next decade. At what point do we price ourselves out of the triad? All of this in the face of the second nuclear age where mutual destruction is not assured in all cases and where the undeterred forces could cause large-scale destabilization. This panel will investigate these trends and ask, how can we revive conventional and nuclear deterrence?

- ♦ **Panel 3: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief**

The U.S. military is routinely called upon to assist the U.S. Agency for International Development in responding to major disasters overseas that threaten the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens, as well as those of other countries. U.S. Armed Forces possess a broad range of rapidly deployable capabilities that have proven critical to life-saving and relief efforts during complex crises, when other responding organizations' capabilities have been exceeded or are unable to provide a comprehensive response given the magnitude of the disaster. This panel examines potential strategies, concepts, training opportunities, or organizational changes that the U.S. military sea services can institute to improve the efficacy of civilian-military humanitarian

responses. When conducting humanitarian operations during major disasters, how can the U.S. military sea services work more effectively with the various actors in the humanitarian community? Are there any capabilities, training opportunities, or strategies that should be further explored to increase response effectiveness?

♦ **Panel 4: Special Operations**

*Naval Operations Concept 2010* articulates power projection missions to include “counterterrorism, ... and counter-proliferation missions, strikes and amphibious raids conducted to kill or capture terrorists; destroy insurgent training camps; capture pirates or other criminals; seize illegal arms and contraband; rescue hostages; and secure, safeguard or remove weapons of mass destruction (WMD),” missions that very closely align with Special Operations missions. The combination of Special Operations Forces and Navy platforms provide operational reach that cannot be equaled by land-based forces in many areas of the globe. Looking forward, Special Operations Forces possess capabilities that have the potential to assist the Navy with difficult operational challenges. This panel will look at intersection of Navy and Special Operations strategy, roles and missions in the current and projected operating environments.

♦ **Panel 5: Security Cooperation**

The U.S. military in general and the sea service in particular have a long tradition of international engagement or influencing the security environment. Throughout history, naval officers such as Commodore Matthew Perry and Admiral William Crowe, played critical roles in U.S. foreign policy formulation and implementation. Officers like these provide ready examples that the military engages in diplomacy, promotes military-to-military activities, and designs regional security initiatives to advance and defend U.S. national interests through security cooperation. Primarily funded by the Department of State and developed in concert with U.S. embassies, security cooperation is increasingly viewed as essential to national security to confront common challenges and ameliorate budget decline.

This symposium in part fulfills the mission of the EMC Chair to support the Navy’s efforts to develop thinking about maritime security. Additional materials can be found at [www.usnwc.edu/derekreveren](http://www.usnwc.edu/derekreveren).

Events like these are possible through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, the hard work of our Protocol & Events Department, and the commitment to academic excellence by the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Naval War College.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

# HADR and SAR Cooperation in Southeast Asia: on the Right Track?

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Euan Graham

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My presentation focuses on Southeast Asia as an important sub-region within the 'Indo-Pacific' macro-region for Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) cooperation. This has been pointedly highlighted by the mixed record of responses to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines in late 2013, the ongoing search for MH370 still missing since March 2014, as well as the successful multinational operation to find and recover Air Asia flight QZ851. How evolved are regional frameworks for maritime cooperation in these areas; what are the major constraints, and what else does this tell us beyond the direct humanitarian and maritime safety requirements that need to be addressed?

While it should be recognized upfront that HADR and SAR cooperation pose discrete sets of operational and political challenges, they have jointly emerged and acquired wider significance as the preferred common denominators for regional defense engagement and capacity building, with a particular onus on Southeast Asia. Though neither area is especially controversial SAR, as a mainly maritime activity, is less problematic for regional cooperation than HADR, which is land-focused and therefore more prone to sensitivities from affected states about foreign, especially military, 'boots on the ground'. SAR collaboration is not without complications either, as exposed during the initial stages of the multinational search for MH370, as well as limited regional support for the 1979 SAR Convention.<sup>1</sup>

HADR and SAR cooperation in Southeast Asia is at the same time a window on to the strengths and limitations of maritime cooperation in the wider region, and its evolving strategic dynamics. There is an argument to be made for broadening the analytical frame of reference to include the big players in Northeast Asia, most of which are prone to natural disasters, as well as host to military and civil response capabilities with the potential to engage in extra-territorial HADR/SAR operations. However, natural disasters and humanitarian situations affecting Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea – though frequent in occurrence and sometimes transnational in their effects – fall usually within the capacity of afflicted states to respond at the national level, and are therefore less relevant from the cooperative aspect between states. Operation *Tomodachi* is rightly regarded as a successful case study in HADR cooperation within a bilateral alliance context. But Japan's March 2011 triple disaster was a rare event, with perhaps only limited precedent value. However, a connection can be drawn from *Tomodachi* to Tokyo's decision to launch the largest overseas HADR operation involving the Self Defense Forces, in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, in November 2013 – in support of the initial US-led relief effort. Haiyan also had an important catalytic influence on HADR cooperation within Southeast Asia, serving as a wake-up call for a more robust collective response capability than has hitherto been developed through the 10-member Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

At a wider level, the sheer size and diversity of the Indo-Pacific macro-region works against meaningful generalisation. The need for collaborative search-and-rescue and disaster-relief frameworks across such an expansive, disaster-prone littoral area is one obvious common denominator interest linking Asia's various littoral sub-regions. Natural catastrophes like the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and man-made accidents like MH370 are 'Indo-Pacific' by virtue of the large number of affected states, requiring multinational responses on a macro scale. More localized severe-weather events affecting coastal and islands states in Asia, and a shared vulnerability to inundation from the sea, have further underscored the transnational nature of the threats faced, and the pressing need to deepen cooperative frameworks and to improve regional disaster resilience.

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<sup>1</sup> Text of SAR Convention: [http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue-\(SAR\).aspx](http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue-(SAR).aspx).

Southeast Asia is arguably the critical ‘hinge’ sub-region of the Indo-Pacific, connecting Asia’s two great oceans, via some of the most important transit waterways in the world – raising the strategic importance of maritime and aero SAR. It hosts several enclosed and semi-enclosed seas including the South China Sea – the Indo-Pacific’s logical centre of gravity. When it comes to major HADR/SAR contingencies most Southeast Asian countries, being smaller or less developed than states in Northeast Asia, have only limited military and civil response capabilities to call upon at the national level. In addition to capability gaps, the region’s porous and predominantly maritime geography means that transnational spillover effects are more common. Lingering political constraints and trust deficits continue to limit the potential for cross-border cooperation, especially where borders or maritime jurisdiction are disputed.

Typhoon Haiyan, the most powerful recorded storm ever to make landfall, has refocused attention on the need for improved HADR coordination across Southeast Asia, building on the foundations of cooperation that were laid a decade ago following the Indian Ocean tsunami, but which have since developed unevenly. This gives grounds for cautious optimism that Southeast Asian countries are becoming more seized of the imperative to improve frameworks and to build collective capacity for HADR relief efforts, including through ASEAN. In April 2014, Singapore announced the launch of a Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre, designed to align military HADR efforts in Southeast Asia. The experience of two major search and locate operations for Malaysian-operated aircraft in 2014 has further pushed multinational cooperation in the air and maritime domains further up the regional policy agenda, although at the international level these two SAR regimes remain mis-aligned.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

# How the Navy Can Save Marine Mammals from Being Overwhelmed by Sound

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Joshua Horwitz  
The Ocean Foundation

Two decades of negative publicity from sonar-related whale strandings have obscured the Navy's innovative advances in other areas of environmental protection, including recycling at sea and developing biofuels that reduce the Fleet's energy costs and carbon footprint. Most significantly, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has been among the earliest and most rigorous investigators of global climate change. Its landmark studies in the Arctic, beginning in the 1970s, first confirmed and then measured ocean warming, melting ice, sea rise, and other disruptive consequences of climate change.

Horwitz will present the "sonar v. whales" confrontation as a case study in the Navy's navigation of the troubled waters of environmental compliance over the past two decades. Drawing on lessons learned from battles fought in court, and in the court of public opinion, Horwitz argues that the Navy now has a golden opportunity to demonstrate its good stewardship of oceans: by leading the fight against ocean noise.

By sharing with industry some of its proprietary technology assets – such as satellite telemetry, simulation software and computer modeling, ship-quieting technology, and passive acoustic monitoring – the Navy can reverse the rising tide of noise pollution from the primary commercial sources: international shipping, and oil and gas exploration.

We live in too dangerous a world to beat our swords into plowshares. But by sharing the knife-edge of its acoustic and quieting technology, the U.S. Navy can cut the Gordian Knot of noise pollution, and rescue marine mammals from one of the most drastic changes to our global climate: rising levels of ocean noise.

Author Joshua Horwitz spent seven years researching and writing *War of the Whales: A True Story*, which documents the Navy's long-running struggle with environmental and animal rights activists over the impact of sonar exercises on marine habitats. This high-profile public relations and legal battle rose all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008, while legal skirmishes over sonar exercises in California and Hawaii continue today.



## PANEL 1: POWER PROJECTION

# Reports of the Death of the Aircraft Carrier are Greatly Exaggerated

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Bryan G. McGrath

The FerryBridge Group LLC

### Introduction

The forward deployed power projection capability of our nation's large-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carrier force remains both operationally relevant and strategically critical to the sustainment and advancement of U.S. national security goals. No other element of U.S. naval power is as flexible and effective across the span of requirements for naval forces, from presence to conventional deterrence to conventional war-fighting. Threats to the carrier and indeed all naval forces are proliferating, but the suggestion that somehow new technologies or new concepts of operation have rendered maritime naval aviation power projection irrelevant is historically incorrect, intellectually misguided, and if taken to a predictable conclusion, destabilizing. The United States Navy can and must ensure the continuing viability of its most effective platform for projection power across the range of requirements by ensuring that its embarked air wing evolves to provide a more balanced warfare mix capable of long range strike in contested environments.

This section of the presentation will cover a range of attributes of the carrier and its embarked air wing, but none more important than its flexibility. It will reinforce the notion of the carrier strike group as a combat system for projecting power and sea control, and the role that a versatile and interchangeable air wing plays in those missions.

Further, I will make the argument for large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers as being superior to smaller nuclear or smaller conventionally powered carriers. I will base these arguments on a mix of cost and effectiveness.

### The Threat

In this section of the discussion, I will survey the current and anticipated future threats to the aircraft carrier specifically and naval forces in general. I will discuss historical analogies to past threats and the actions taken to counter them. The vaunted Chinese "anti-access and area denial" (A2AD) threat will be discussed in detail, to include its reconnaissance/strike support complex, its capability relative to the carrier strike group, and a discussion of the degree to which this comparison suffers from a "uniqueness bias" among modern analysts.

A theoretical conflict with China will be posited here, one in which the role of properly equipped (i.e. evolved air wing) aircraft carriers is discussed as part of a Joint, combined arms campaign. This section is designed to counter popular, parodic interpretations of modern naval warfare which are often little more than ill-thought through scenarios that ignore the power of the Joint arsenal and riskily employ the aircraft carrier in intellectually questionable ways.

### Alternatives to the Aircraft Carrier

Some scholars and thinkers (Wayne Hughes, Jeff Klein, Phil Pournelle, Jerry Hendrix) have put forth concepts and ideas about how to move beyond what they conclude are increasingly obsolete large-deck, nuclear powered aircraft carriers. My argument will proceed from the suggestion that these thinkers generally arrive at their notions after having essentially conceded that the Navy's budget is static at best, but more likely is in decline. In their view, the Navy's piece of the pie is shrinking, and so we have to devise new and innovative ways of projecting naval power that avoid the costs and risks of the aircraft carrier. Those costs include of course, the opportunity costs of not building platforms and systems that they hold dear as a result of spending \$12.B once every five years to purchase a CVN. In their view, that money could be more wisely spent across a panoply of different options that present new and different operational challenges to potential adversaries.

While there is much goodness in their thinking, it all suffers from a sense of strategic error, one in which they take as a given the static or declining nature of budgets for the Navy. This is of course, a rational approach to take, given the lack of a clear consensus on defense spending and the approach to take to the re-emergence of great power dynamics. Where I find error in their thinking is that spending on the Navy MUST continue in the direction it is headed. My contention is that were a coherent strategic discussion to be held at the highest levels of our government, one detached from slavish adherence to the worship of "Jointness", American Seapower would emerge as a common sense priority in our national security investment strategy, akin to Eisenhower's emphasis on nuclear weapons in the "New Look" of the 1950's.

Even were such a debate not to happen however, there are flaws in their logic, which spring primarily from their alternatives not being extensible across the range of operations for which carriers and their air wings are most suited. For instance, Jerry Hendrix has argued for proliferating small, fast patrol vessels and also for investing more of our power projection capability in the submarine force. Both ideas make are defensible and sensible, were the nation thinking about INCREASING its spending on naval power. Hendrix though, clearly is NOT basing his arguments on additive power, but he is making the argument that the Navy should transform its current, carrier-centric approach to sea-control and power projection to one which favors vesting more combat power under the sea surface and distributing it more widely across the sea surface. Each of these approached fails the extensibility test. While more power under the sea has a huge payoff in combat operations, it has little value in terms of naval presence or conventional deterrence. And while proliferating a great many fast patrol boats adds mightily to naval presence and somewhat to conventional deterrence, they are less capable in a high-end war-fight. Only the aircraft carrier and its air wing is extensible to each of these requirements for naval power.

## PANEL 1: POWER PROJECTION

# Sustaining Power Projection Against Cheap, Many, and Accurate

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Thomas X. Hammes

National Defense University

In the near future, power projection will become more complicated, uncertain, costly, and vulnerable. U.S. forces will go from today's happy situation of nearly uncontested use of the sea and air over most of the planet, to air and sea contested by even relatively small powers and insurgents. Many will also challenge our ground forces even at extended ranges. Complicating the problem, our previously secure rear areas and logistics systems, both in and out of theater, will be subject to attack.

Further, western forces must be prepared to fight a range of opponents across the spectrum of warfare from high intensity conventional conflict to super empowered small groups. Rapid changes in political, social, economic, and technical conditions are dramatically changing both why and how these forces will fight. Convergence of information, nano-technology, drones, and artificial intelligence technologies will provide all combatants with long-range, cheap, autonomous weapons that will be well-suited to attack both the combat forces and the logistics elements of a western force. In response, western militaries must rethink their operational concepts to exploit these same technologies. Well thought out and practiced new concepts can greatly reduce but not eliminate the threat to power projection.

### Organizing for the Future

To understand the impact of the convergence of technologies and the strategic environment on power projection, it is useful to break it into three areas – strike, denial, and amphibious operations.

Strike capabilities include missiles, gunfire, manned, and unmanned aircraft. To use these systems, the attackers need to see the target; pass the information to the firing agency; move the platform within range of the weapons system; and have the weapons successfully penetrate to the target, hit, and destroy it. The increasing anti-satellite, electronic warfare, ballistic, and cruise missile capabilities are already challenging our ability to execute all of these functions. Thus we need to carefully consider how we will overcome these challenges – and even more carefully about what kind of targets are worth expending this kind of effort. Given the historically poor success rate of strike only campaigns, our focus should shift to how strike can assist the other methods of power projection.

While not normally thought of as power projection, sea and air denial do perform that function. By denying the use of the commons to an opponent we attack his economy. While not as immediately destructive as strike operations, denial is easier to accomplish since it can be done from a distance. If properly executed it can have a system wide impact against an enemy that is integrated into the global economy. Further, denial can be accomplished by naval platforms that are either less expensive (small ships/commercial rentals) or less vulnerable to attack (submarines, mines, and small submersibles.) Further, a new generation of self-deploying mines could be developed based on a small, autonomous, submerged drone. Such drones would participate in both the strike and denial areas.

Amphibious operations cover the spectrum from amphibious landings to NEOs to humanitarian operations. The advent of GRAMM, smart mines, and cheap drones mean amphibious assault against a well-defended beach is no longer a viable option. NEO and humanitarian operations must be prepared to deal with attacks on the fleet elements using missiles, drones, and GRAMM. However, cheap, composite, autonomous drones may well be the biggest challenge. Hobbyists are building and flying these systems at ranges from 5 to 3000 kilometers. Farmers have fully autonomous systems and some companies are using them regularly for trans-Atlantic ocean surveillance flights. In short, swarms are about to become a reality. They will be a mix of manned and unmanned platforms. Further the unmanned will be a mix of autonomous and remote controlled systems. While the United States may hesitate to use autonomous weapons such as aerial drones that take a day or two to reach the target or

surface or submerged drones that require days to weeks or even perhaps months to reach the target area, our opponents are unlikely to be so cautious. With the exception of self-deploying mines or small submersibles, these systems are unlikely to sink a naval platform. However, they can achieve mission kill by striking an aircraft on the flight deck or the hanger deck; or by destroying the ship's radars.

### **Challenges for Power Projection Forces**

This highlights a key problem for power projection forces -- the current concentration of capabilities in few but large and capable platforms. As even insurgent groups develop the capability to reach out beyond the horizon to damage or sink major platforms, the political risk will be much higher. Will the President risk a carrier or LHA to interject American power into a third world fight? At the operational level, can a power projection force operate effectively if its major sea and air bases can be attacked? How about if any buildup of fuel and ammunition ashore is subject to attack?

Tactically the defense is becoming dominant – similar to the way it was in land warfare between 1863 and 1918. At the same time, winning still requires the United States to remain on the strategic and operational offensive. In order to succeed in this environment, the United States is going to have to rethink how it operates and also what systems/platforms it buys. We are going to have to accept that opponents will be able to find and successfully attack our systems. In response, we must develop robust capabilities that can sustain significant damage – to include the loss of ships—and keep fighting. We will have to think through out to remain operationally on the offensive while seizing the advantage of remaining tactically on the defensive. Myriad threats to power projection combined with declining budgets require joint forces to think hard about operational concepts – both the how and the why of power projection. We must then test them thoroughly in free play games and exercises in order to maintain this critical capability for the United States.

## PANEL 1: POWER PROJECTION

### Evidence of the Influence of Seapower on Politics

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Erik Gartzke  
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*– The findings provided here are preliminary. Please consult the author before referencing –*

The ability to project power is a critical feature of national influence. It is not just what a nation can do, but where it can exert its coercive power that matters. In this regard, naval power has long been considered a unique national asset. At the same time, it is useful to consider that influence can be applied in at least two ways, either extending the scope of national power to coerce in the policy sphere or to claim discretion over new territory or sea space (compellence), or deployed to maintain the status quo and limit the likelihood of conflict (deterrence). Most often, maximizing one of these goals naturally limits the other. Projecting power to the greatest extent possible must increase the risk of war (deterrence failure), while exercising influence more conservatively limits the risk of conflict in a given space or time, but only at the price of diminished national influence (compellence failure).

I explore these issues quantitatively, using several datasets that have not previously been analyzed together. This process is necessarily complex and the materials provided here are both preliminary and cursory. I find that power is double-edged and platform contingent. Mobility, firepower and stealth—long associated with sea power—are both important in projecting power and a significant contributor to increased risk of interstate conflict. I lay out these preliminary findings as commentary on a series of tables (included). Other details of this project are available as a research paper that can be acquired from the author.

Table 1 reviews the impact of naval tonnage on the locations of disputes (when they occur). Each statistical model is estimating the impact of several variables on the distance of the location of a dispute from the capital of either the initiator or target of a dispute. Each of the five models in Table 1 includes information about the total defense spending for each country in the dyad experiencing a dispute. In most cases, the statistical model also allows for an interaction between initiator defense spending and target defense spending. There are also controls included for annual trending in these data (Carter and Signornino 2012). Details of the basic model of the location of disputes again appear elsewhere (Gartzke 2015).

I explore the impact of naval power on where states fight quantitatively by looking at annual observations of total naval tonnage across many countries over much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In all of the models in Table 1, naval tonnage has some significant effect on where disputes occur, even when taking into account the general impact of defense spending. Initiators with larger navies (more ships and/or larger ships) tend to carry out disputes farther from home, while the targets of disputes are more likely to fight stand-off contests the larger their naval capacity, again regardless of overall military investment. The effect of naval tonnage in projecting power further from national capitals is independent of proximity (distance, contiguity) or of the quantity or defense spending by states in the dyad.

The effect of naval power on the location of militarized contests is further clarified with a look at the distinctive impact of capital ships. Models 3-5 in Table 1 include annual data on the number of battleships, aircraft carriers, and submarines for each nation. Battleships and carriers are closely identified with power projection. However, these capital platforms do not appear to significantly increase the distance at which nations fight, over and above the impact of naval tonnage generally. In three out of four cases, the coefficients are negative. Only submarines have an effect on dispute location that significantly differs from tonnage. Interestingly, submarines tend to be associated with disputes that occur farther from home.

In addition to influencing the location of disputes through power projection, military power could affect the probability of warfare. Though it is widely believed that greater capabilities condition conflict (increasing or decreasing disputes), current thinking about the causes of war emphasizes uncertainty about the balance of power, interests or costs, rather than these factors themselves directly. Intermediate processes such as diplomacy and force posture are often much more important in determining conflict than are the tools of war. Negotiations in the shadow of war also occur in the shadow of power, leading diplomats to make deals that reflect what would result, should war occur. Bargaining failure, leading to war, is then most often the result of different expectations about the balance of power, interests or costs.

Bargaining theories paradoxically imply that military power will influence conflict most where and when national resolve or capabilities are most in doubt. Naval power—which is disproportionately potent in projecting power—is more than possibly some other domains a source of uncertainty. As is widely recognized, mobility, firepower and concealment (esp. submarines) make naval power especially adept at projecting power. However, these same qualities also make naval power worse in some sense at signaling resolve. The ability to project power implies the ability to withdraw or fail to deploy platforms to/from particular locations autonomously and without warning. The concentration of firepower characteristic of capital ships means that they can influence the local balance of power. However, the fact that this impact is contingent on force posture means that other nations must speculate on whether they will be confronted with floating arsenals or not. At the same time that more questions exist about preferences and priorities of an adversary, states wielding naval power must be tempted to use these assets to further the scope and scale of their policy ambitions, rather than simply dedicating power to minimizing the prospect that opponents will attack.

Table 2 lists results from estimating the determinants of dispute initiation. Note that the overall balance of defense spending has no significant effect on whether states fight. In contrast, naval tonnage has a significant and positive effect for both initiators and targets of militarized disputes. The second model uses a proportional measure of tonnage, with similar results, though these are less dramatic. Differentiating between platform classes, battleships do not significantly increase conflict propensity, though their effect is positive. Both aircraft carriers (mobility, firepower) and submarines (stealth) significantly increase the probability of dispute behavior within a dyad. Interestingly, it is target's arsenal that is more important. Uncertainty about an opponent's force posture, resolve or intentions is most critical for a potential initiator, since targets that underestimate an adversary are not likely to increase the risk of war without also becoming more likely to become the initiator. Formal bargaining models typically treat uncertainty of the initiator as the more important determinant of dispute onset. Uncertainty appears most critical for initiators of conflict, even as the most mobile and capable or stealthy platforms appear to be more destabilizing.

As an additional check of this possibility, Table 3 disaggregates submarines into attack (diesel, nuclear) and ballistic missile submarines. Of stealthy platforms, ballistic missile boats are presumably the least aggressive and most oriented to deterrence rather than power projection. These submarines (the third set of columns) are stabilizing, being significantly less likely to be associated with a MID. In contrast, larger fleets of attack submarines are associated with increased dispute propensity, perhaps again because these platforms are both capable of influencing the tide of battle (should nations fight) and not ideal in terms of making fixed and credible claims involving limited objectives with considerable certainty. As was suggested by Table 2, it is the target's capabilities that are most critical in fomenting or inhibiting conflict. Platforms with significant ability to inflict harm (firepower) over large areas (mobility) and with little warning (stealth) are inherently less credible commitments.

The research detailed here is at a very early state. Much remains to be done to clarify, test and refine this evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that it is possible to at least summarize these findings as follows: First, there is extremely strong evidence of the widely believed but difficult to document claim that navies provide power projection capabilities. Funding for increased naval tonnage appears to increase the range at which nations can extend their influence beyond expenditures for military capabilities in other domains. At the same time, it would be naïve to believe that naval power possesses

no drawbacks. Larger naval tonnage is associated with an increase in dispute propensity, over and above the effect for defense spending generally (defense spending has no systematic effect on the probability of conflict in these analyses). The effect of naval power in increasing conflict propensity is heightened by the most potent and particularly stealthy platforms (aircraft carriers and submarines). A forward posture such as the air/sea battle strategy (recently relabeled to something long and incomprehensible), for example, heightens U.S. influence in the Pacific. However, it does so in a way that makes eventual conflict more likely. This tradeoff between being effective in the event of war and increasing the risk of war may or may not be in the national interest.

Table 1: Estimated Effects of Naval Capabilities on the Locations of Disputes (OLS, MID)

Distance to MID	Initiator	Target	Target	Initiator	Initiator
Variable	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)
Naval Tonnage A	0.600 *** (0.125)	-3916.7 *** (866.6)	-0.330 *** (0.0793)	0.613 ** (0.205)	0.319 ** (0.114)
Naval Tonnage B	-0.212 † (0.0830)	6346.3 *** (1288.7)	0.491 *** (0.129)	-0.218 (0.181)	-0.419 *** (0.0633)
Battleships A			2.068 (24.88)		
Battleships B			-15.90 (23.33)		
Aircraft Carriers A				-19.43 (19.83)	
Aircraft Carriers B				-14.69 (16.36)	
Submarines A					6.158 *** (1.825)
Submarines B					0.917 (1.614)
Mil. Expend. A	11.31 *** (3.081)	0.232 (3.019)	-1.320 (3.027)	10.75 *** (2.368)	7.763 ** (2.451)
Mil. Expend. B	-2.231 (2.465)	9.358 *** (2.907)	12.25 *** (2.713)	-2.748 (3.694)	-1.348 (3.664)
Mil. Exp. A x B		-0.0330 (0.0262)	-0.0318 (0.0282)	-0.0341 (0.0285)	-0.0327 (0.0327)
Distance	247.7 *** (43.51)	0.677 *** (0.0869)	0.687 *** (0.0953)	0.752 *** (0.0863)	0.767 *** (0.0851)
Contiguity		424.1 (266.0)	329.2 (316.0)	485.3 (253.8)	445.6 † (217.1)
Intercept	39209308.3 * (14924993.1)	16115194.0 (12460680.9)	-9346624.5 (38908915.6)	-15731990.4 (32556679.4)	3225299.5 (32172867.0)
N	2138	2138	1842	1842	1842
R <sup>2</sup>	0.3335	0.4318	0.4810	0.5032	0.5175

Significance levels : † : 5% \* : 1% \*\* : 0.5% \*\*\* : 0.1%

Table 2: Estimated Effects of Naval Capabilities on Dispute Initiation (ReLogit, MID)

MID Initiation	Tonnage		Battleships		Carriers	Submarines
Variable	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)	Coeff (S.E.)
Naval Tonnage A	0.144 *** (0.0338)	1.469 * (0.531)				
Naval Tonnage B	0.183 *** (0.0285)	1.576 * (0.601)				
Battleships A			0.0197 (0.0103)			
Battleships B			0.0160 (0.0115)			
Aircraft Carriers A				0.0103 † (0.00447)		
Aircraft Carriers B				0.0163 *** (0.00276)		
Submarines A					0.00138 (0.000785)	
Submarines B					0.00208 * (0.000795)	
Mil. Expend. A	0.0729 (1.113)	1.498 (1.311)	2.432 † (1.166)	1.461 (1.151)	0.495 (1.590)	
Mil. Expend. B	0.913 (1.190)	2.153 (2.017)	2.938 † (1.305)	1.787 (1.271)	0.446 (1.558)	
Mil. Exp. A x B	-3.248 (7.727)	13.55 (9.543)	-11.46 (8.342)	-6.224 (8.163)	-5.948 (9.171)	
Distance	-0.219 *** (0.0271)	-0.221 *** (0.0267)	-0.216 *** (0.0305)	-0.245 *** (0.0285)	-0.218 *** (0.0286)	
Contiguity	1.106 *** (0.140)	1.073 *** (0.133)	1.623 *** (0.149)	1.584 *** (0.143)	1.582 *** (0.141)	
Alliance	-0.394 * (0.142)	-0.297 † (0.140)	-0.416 ** (0.157)	-0.482 ** (0.155)	-0.382 † (0.155)	
Maj. Power A	0.902 *** (0.130)	0.633 *** (0.147)	1.124 *** (0.149)	1.192 *** (0.134)	1.143 *** (0.144)	
Maj. Power B	0.305 † (0.130)	0.0457 (0.191)	0.805 *** (0.150)	0.787 *** (0.133)	0.762 *** (0.143)	
Intercept	-2.602 *** (0.203)	-2.649 *** (0.189)	-3.310 *** (0.199)	-3.242 *** (0.195)	-3.298 *** (0.199)	
N	149,655	149,655	217,279	217,279	217,279	

Significance levels : † : 5% \* : 1% \*\* : 0.5% \*\*\* : 0.1%

Table 3: Estimated Effects of Submarine Classes on Dispute Initiation (ReLogit, MID)

MID Initiation	Attack Submarines				Ballistic Missile	
Variable	Diesel		Nuclear		Coeff	(S.E.)
	Coeff	(S.E.)	Coeff	(S.E.)		
Diesel Submarine A	0.00156 (0.000813)					
Diesel Submarine B	0.00258 *** (0.000812)					
Nuke Attack Sub. A			-0.000005 (0.00544)			
Nuke Attack Sub. B			-0.0129 (0.00696)			
Nuke Missile Sub. A					-0.00961 † (0.00416)	
Nuke Missile Sub. B					-0.0141 ** (0.00483)	
Mil. Expenditure A	1.239 (1.341)		1.598 (2.047)		3.911 † (1.604)	
Mil. Expenditure B	1.423 (1.428)		6.329 † (2.670)		5.258 *** (1.431)	
Mil. Expend. A x B	-4.591 (9.053)		-10.13 (8.160)		-10.04 (8.178)	
Distance	-0.219 *** (0.0284)		-0.215 *** (0.0300)		-0.219 *** (0.0307)	
Contiguity	1.584 *** (0.140)		1.644 *** (0.154)		1.651 *** (0.155)	
Alliance	-0.383 † (0.155)		-0.226 (0.156)		-0.248 (0.158)	
Major Power A	1.129 *** (0.145)		1.214 *** (0.133)		1.222 *** (0.134)	
Major Power B	0.727 *** (0.144)		0.888 *** (0.125)		0.903 *** (0.125)	
Democracy A			0.0765 *** (0.0221)		0.0770 *** (0.0220)	
Democracy B			0.119 *** (0.0232)		0.117 *** (0.0230)	
Democracy A x B			-0.0226 *** (0.00288)		-0.0229 *** (0.00289)	
Intercept	-3.305 *** (0.200)		-3.816 *** (0.257)		-3.796 *** (0.252)	
N	217279		214593		214593	

Significance levels : † : 5% \* : 1% \*\* : 0.5% \*\*\* : 0.1%

## PANEL 2: DETERRENCE

# Thoughts on the Robustness of Deterrence and the Affordability of the Triad

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James Scouras

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Two questions are fundamental to the current debate about deterrence. First, is deterrence robust or is it fragile? Second, how much should we be willing to spend to recapitalize the nuclear triad? Of course, these questions are related. If deterrence is robust, we may not have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to recapitalize the triad; we might not even need a triad. If deterrence is fragile, it may cost a lot to address those weaknesses that we can rectify.

### **Is deterrence robust or is it fragile?**

Many military historians have credited the strategy of deterrence with preventing both global nuclear war and large-scale conventional war in Europe throughout the Cold War. And the Soviet Union was a far more fearsome adversary than is Russia, China, or any other state today. So, why should we be concerned about the health of deterrence?

The answer to this question lies in the confluence of several factors. First, there is an increased appreciation of the role of luck in preventing nuclear war during the Cold War. The Cuban missile crisis, the Able Archer exercise, and many other crises might well have ended very badly but for the vagaries of fortune. Second, newer and prospective nuclear adversaries are more opaque than even the inner workings of the Kremlin. North Korea is perhaps the best example of this, but it is also true for Iran and China. In addition, new nuclear states are, by definition, inexperienced in nuclear diplomacy, may be unduly risk tolerant, and are tempting targets for preemption by established nuclear states. Third, we are extremely concerned that terrorists might acquire a nuclear weapon and be immune to the logic of deterrence—hence our emphasis on preventing that from happening, rather than counting on deterring terrorist nuclear use afterward. Someday, we may need to revise this emphasis.

There are other, more subtle, factors at work as well. In particular, the nuclear “taboo” (more precisely, the “tradition of nuclear nonuse”) has had at least an indirect role in keeping the nuclear peace. Although it is difficult to determine exactly what its contribution has been, the taboo may be in danger. This is partly because the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now found only in the dim recesses of our collective consciousness. But, more fundamentally, perhaps it is because no taboo lasts forever without periodic violation, which is necessary to reinforce the taboo. Unfortunately, violation in this case means nuclear war.

Finally, we are now asking more of deterrence than we used to, and more than we can reasonably expect it to deliver. It was clear to all during the Cold War that we invoked deterrence to prevent the realization of threats to truly vital interests, principally the survival of the country. Our stakes in Syria or Ukraine or Taiwan, for example, do not approach our stakes in the Cold War unless crises in these areas escalate to global nuclear war. And all nuclear states appear to be acutely aware of the nuclear shadow in which these conflicts play out. So, while nuclear deterrence has been working to prevent direct military conflict between nuclear states, it has not had—nor should we expect it to have—much of a role in preventing conventional conflicts in which the United States has less than vital interests but in which other states do have vital interests, which is the case for all three of these examples.

Can conventional deterrence work for lesser threats when nuclear deterrence cannot? Much is made of US conventional dominance, but such dominance does not extend to every corner of the planet. It is not clear that we would have conventional dominance against China in a Taiwan scenario or on the Korean peninsula, or against Russia in Ukraine or even the Baltic states. Moreover, there is a limit to the number of conventional wars we are willing to fight and our adversaries know this. Lesser

conventional threats, such as limited cruise missile attacks, may not rise to the level needed for deterrence. So, the specter of conventional war is generally a much more tenuous mechanism for deterring regional conflicts than the specter of nuclear war is for deterring nuclear attacks.

If regional adversaries are armed with nuclear weapons, the problem is far more complex and dangerous. How can we prevent nuclear-armed regional adversaries from brandishing—and using—their nuclear weapons in the face of what they perceive as threats to their vital interests, including US intervention in their region? There is no silver bullet for this. Conventional capabilities that can preemptively destroy nuclear delivery systems, cyber capabilities that can interfere with national command and control or the operation of these systems, and missile and air defenses that can intercept them in flight could all potentially help. So, of course, could the threat of nuclear retaliation. But the United States might also have to rethink its role in the international order. Assuming the role of global policeman may become too dangerous.

### **Recapitalizing the nuclear triad**

I now turn to the question of the cost of recapitalizing the nuclear triad. I think the appropriate metric is not *cost*, but rather *affordability*. Cost is—essentially—the financial resources required for a program. By contrast, affordability considers both cost and the criticality of the benefits derived from the program. It may be costly to pay \$10,000 or even \$100,000 per year for a cancer treatment drug, but you might well consider it affordable—or try your best to find a way to make it affordable—considering the alternative.

We already made the decision that recapitalizing the sea-based leg of the triad is affordable. We have a program for replacing Trident submarines and we continue to produce Trident missiles. Although the SSBN program is not cheap, it is affordable. In fact, for the benefits we derive from it—specifically, a secure nuclear retaliatory force—it is affordable at almost any price. I believe it has broad support across the political spectrum and will proceed to completion, even if it encounters development problems and cost overruns. We also have plans for a new long-range bomber that we could upgrade, relatively inexpensively, for nuclear capability.

So then, the triad recapitalization issue boils down to whether or not we should replace the aging intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Again, looking at this from an affordability perspective, the principal benefits of maintaining an ICBM leg of the triad are:

- ♦ A substantial number of ICBM aimpoints prevents a cheap shot that destroys essentially all our strategic forces other than SSBNs at sea. Peer or near-peer adversaries could be tempted to undertake such an attack in a crisis and, more worrisome, we do not want every small nuclear power to have this capability.
- ♦ Either a substantial number of ICBM aimpoints or ICBM silos hardened to current capabilities would be survivable against current and projected Chinese nuclear forces.
- ♦ Although feasible numbers or achievable silo hardinesses would not substantially protect against a Russian attack, at least they would extract a significant price from Russia for attacking our ICBM force. And, such an attack would result in substantial US casualties, primarily from fallout, that should give pause to Russia as it contemplates the likely nature of the US retaliation.
- ♦ We could even design an ICBM force that would provide a substantial survivable retaliatory force against a large Russian attack, but this would require an alternative basing mode at significantly larger cost.

In addition to benefits, we must consider drawbacks to maintaining an ICBM leg of the triad. It can be argued that ICBMs perpetuate the centrality of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. If we are trying to move toward a world without nuclear weapons, why not start with ICBMs? That would be a particularly good place to start as they are on “hair-trigger” alert and would require launch on warning to survive a Russian attack. Thus, they are particularly destabilizing. Finally, ICBMs would require overflight of Russia to reach China and other potential Asian adversaries. Such overflight could lead to inadvertent war with Russia.

So then we consider the net benefit (benefits minus drawbacks) and the cost to determine affordability. My personal view is that we can keep costs relatively low by maintaining silo deployment and achieve all the benefits except survivability against a large-scale counterforce attack from Russia. But even that scenario is preferable to a large-scale nuclear war in which Russia does not attack ICBM silos.

### **Summary**

To summarize, my perspective is that because the stakes are so high, because our understanding of our adversaries is so shallow, and because new threats to its efficacy are constantly emerging, nuclear deterrence (like liberty) requires eternal vigilance. We cannot take for granted that the success of nuclear deterrence is assured just because we can use surviving nuclear forces to inflict grievous damage on any adversary. In fact, deterrence nearly failed more than once during the Cold War when we did, in fact, have that capability. Nor can we be complacent that our conventional dominance assures the efficacy of conventional deterrence, as evidenced by its numerous failures listed in the charter for this panel. The good news is that we can afford whatever we decide we need to underwrite, at least for nuclear deterrence. The challenge is to wisely decide what we need.



## PANEL 2: DETERRENCE

# Thinking About Deterrence: Are We as Smart as We Think?

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John B. Sheldon

George C. Marshall Institute

Is there a credibility problem with how the U.S. seeks to deter unwanted actions and belligerence by other actors on the international stage? It would seem that for many in the national security community there is indeed a problem. I personally fear that the problem is not so much our actual and potential adversaries, nor our military capabilities and technology, but rather our understanding of deterrence and its purpose. The views I present here I have held for some years now, especially since the reemergence of deterrence as the latest concept *du jour* in the mid-2000's. They seem to me to be applicable today.

The U.S. national security establishment is prone to strategic amnesia on the one hand, and enamored with fads disguised as strategic insight on the other, and this might explain America's rediscovery of deterrence over the past decade. After a period of seeming strategic excess, senior officials and military officers are slowly realizing that the United States cannot do everything; that some threats to national security are either immutable or intractable and that preemptive and preventive military action is unable to deal with them effectively. A growing number of national security thinkers have trotted out deterrence, the ruling strategic paradigm of the Cold War, as the answer to these myriad, diffuse, and stubborn threats.

In reality deterrence never went away, it remained as background noise to the perceived strategic priorities in Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Afghanistan again, and now Iraq again. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has maintained a comparatively large nuclear arsenal (despite the periodic cuts in warheads during the past two decades) that is supposed to be the strategic backstop for U.S. national security when and if all else fails. U.S. conventional forces also serve as a deterrent to the majority of entities that could plausibly threaten the U.S. directly, or threaten its interests abroad.

The awkward fact is that the absence of a WMD attack, or a conventional attack by another state, against the U.S. is not, ipso facto, evidence that this overall force structure has actually *deterred* potential wrongdoers. Similarly, the fact that countries such as Russia in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, and by China in the South and East China Sea, have resorted either to military force or a form of belligerence to press their interests, is not evidence that deterrence on the part of the United States has *failed*. Among some of the problems with deterrence are that, like intelligence, one is only confronted with its intricacies, nuances, and shortcomings when it fails. Further, deterrence *cannot* fail where it has not even been attempted. The U.S. and its NATO allies have hardly signaled to Moscow that their vital interests are at stake in the Donbas and the Crimean peninsula; in the same vein, the U.S. position on the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas has been to not take sides and urge all concerned to resolve their differences in international diplomatic and legal forums. It seems to me that misconceptions about U.S. deterrence are commonplace, but not in Moscow, Beijing, or Raqqa. Rather, it seems that we veer between those who naively think that the mere mention of deterrence and the very existence of military forces somehow inherently deters, through to an embarrassing self-flagellation about how useless we are at deterrence when it has not even been attempted (through signaling, deployments, etc.) or is not necessarily deemed to be in U.S. interests.

We should add to this that successful deterrence is impossible, or almost so, to gauge. After all, how do we know that Cold War deterrence through mutual assured destruction actually worked? Sir Michael Howard once made such a claim when he wrote, "What is beyond doubt, however, is that we effectively deterred the Soviet Union from using military force to achieve its political objectives ..., "<sup>1</sup> yet equally plausible is the explanation that the Soviet leadership was just as reluctant to start a nuclear war as Western leaders, and for largely the same reasons, of which deterrence may not have been one.

This pause for thought aside, the Cold War often evokes nostalgia among those concerned with and about deterrence. In those days, the enemy was easily identifiable, its capabilities were largely known, and entire bureaucratic entities and large swathes of Western academia were devoted to gleaning its

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 161.

intentions. Some pine for those halcyon days, often forgetting that for all of its conceptual simplicity (and this is a simplicity only understood with the luxury of hindsight) we lived under the appalling shadow of utter nuclear annihilation. If deterrence had failed before 1989 very few would have survived to debate its finer points. Today's threats are myriad, diffuse, and often hard to gauge with any measure of comforting certainty and accuracy, even though the meta-existential element of nuclear annihilation or global war has largely receded. This is not to suggest that the possible threats we face are not serious, but they do not threaten to remove human civilization as we know it from the face of the earth, at least for the time being. That's the good news. The bad news is that among the U.S. and other Western powers, deterrence, like the work of Carl von Clausewitz, is often invoked more than it is understood. Compounding this, our ability to deter may be hampered not just by our imperfect understanding of the concept, but also by our difficulty in discerning how and why the character of war is changing and what this means for U.S. interests and in turn, foreign and defense policy.

We should also be concerned about our tendency to miss the bigger picture. Deterrence is about deterring war, not attacks against capabilities in particular domains. Deterrence demands that senior officials signal to adversaries -- actual and potential -- that certain actions from them which threaten U.S. national security and critical interests will elicit certain responses to protect national security and defend those critical interests. Such signaling uses scarce diplomatic and political capital, and it is also an exercise in credibility. It is strange that such scarce capital should be wasted on attempts to deter attacks in the space and cyber domains while at the same time inadvertently signaling to such adversaries that we care more about attacks against satellites and network penetrations than we do about any wider conflicts. Such thinking must leave adversaries wondering just how serious the U.S. is about its national security, concomitant interests -- and deterrence. This is not to say that preventing attacks against space and cyber do not have a role, but this role must be subservient to a wider deterrence approach that provides linkages between the space and cyber domains and the other strategic domains, as well as to wider U.S. interests.

Misconceptions abound about deterrence in its contemporary context, particularly in official statements and documents. For example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, called for a "new model for deterrence theory."<sup>2</sup> Was Admiral Mullen challenging a deficiency in the body of deterrence theory, or rather, how that theory is applied to a complex contemporary strategic environment? More worrisome than this is the popular idea that the overall objective of U.S. defense policy should be to deter.<sup>3</sup> Such an opinion infers some unique insight into how much is enough for deterrence to be achieved. Given the diffuse nature and growing number of contemporary threats, and the fact that many of them cannot be reliably verified by traditional technical means, how can anyone plausibly claim that they know how much deterrence is enough? Another concern is the idea that niche areas of capability, such as space and cyberspace, require their own deterrence strategies in order to deter others from attacking U.S. interests in these domains. This idea is false. Furthermore, such an approach dangerously deters us from using these critical domains to their fullest capacity to further our security and interests. It also misses the point of deterrence and, in turn, wastes both capability and scarce diplomatic and political capital.

## Conclusion

The credibility of U.S. deterrence does indeed suffer from a credibility problem, but not necessarily for reasons often given by critics. Deterrence is about preventing unwanted war, not attacks against particular domains. Deterrence is not the objective, but should be the happy by-product in the prudent pursuit and protection of vital U.S. interests. Deterrence is conceptually simple but difficult to achieve. We diminish our chances of success by mangling deterrence at the conceptual level. Absence of adversary action, or indeed the existence of adversary action, does *not* automatically imply either deterrence success or failure. Lastly, successful deterrence is a happy confluence of capability, credibility, and signaling. Absent any one of these ingredients, there is little chance that our words and deeds can achieve the condition of deterrence.

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<sup>2</sup> Michael G. Mullen, "It's time for a new deterrence model," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 51, (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter), 2008, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, General Kevin Chilton, USAF, and Greg Weaver, "Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2009, pp. 31-42. One wages war, not deterrence. The successful waging of war can have great deterrent value.

## PANEL 2: DETERRENCE

# Peace Is Our Profession, Again

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Karl P. Mueller  
RAND Corporation

Recent cases of international instability in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the western Pacific have perhaps inevitably led to a modest wave of hand-wringing about the international system descending into disorder, the United States facing the sunset of its superpower status, or deterrence being revealed as a chimera. However, we should try not to panic. The world is far less dangerous (especially but not only for the United States) than it used to be, America may not loom over the rest of the world like it once did but Washington was never able to bend all international events to its will, and deterrence is alive and well—and, in fact, increasingly important.<sup>1</sup>

The question of why we are so ready to imagine that the world is coming apart at the seams is an interesting one, given that objective analysis consistently reveals that wars are declining in frequency and severity, good and democratic governance is continuing to spread to an unprecedented degree in spite of instability in the Middle East, the United States is not being subjected to the wave of catastrophic terrorism so widely prophesied after 9/11, and nuclear proliferation is continuing to happen only at a glacial pace. It is easy and probably not unfair to blame cable news programs and the blogosphere for spreading dismay (although this would not seem to account for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was born in 1952, saying that the United States faces greater peril now than at any point in his lifetime). But it would seem to be characteristic of a deeper tendency. Americans also have a long history of thinking crime is rising when it is actually declining, of being afraid to fly because planes sometimes crash even though airline accidents have become very rare, and of generally failing to recall how bad the good old days actually were.

No, deterrence isn't broken. In the East and South China Seas, the title character is making itself unpleasant to its neighbors with low-level acts of imperialism instead of big ones not because deterrence is weak but because it is strong. The same is true of Russia in Ukraine—a country whose non-membership in NATO is due to the fact that the West decided years ago that fighting a major war to protect it from Russian aggression would not be worthwhile, a policy that remains firmly in place at least for now. Boko Haram, ISIL, and Al-Shabaab are causing misery in their respective corners of the world, but it is they that are doing so rather than state-sponsored terrorists because for the most part states do not sponsor terrorism anymore, at least overtly. That deterrence failures do still happen from time to time isn't a sign that deterrence no longer works, it's a reminder that deterrence can be hard even in a world where it mostly succeeds.

For twenty-five years or so deterrence has lost some of its luster in the United States. Associated with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, the concept has often seemed anachronistic in an era where the most obvious threats to U.S. national security have been few and feeble, while some (but by no means all) terrorists appear essentially undeterrable because they value conducting attacks very highly and care little for whether these will lead to a realistic political goal. Meanwhile, military thinkers

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<sup>1</sup> Deterrence is causing someone not to do something they might otherwise do because they expect to be worse off if they do so than if they don't. In international politics the "something" is usually attacking another country, so that when a war starts it means that deterrence has failed. There are narrower definitions of deterrence that limit the term to threats of retaliatory punishment, or the use of military force, or nuclear weapons, but a broad definition is usually best: you can deter through threats of punishment against an aggressor, by many military or non-military means, or by threatening that an attack will lead to the aggressor's defeat ("deterrence by denial"), or by promising that aggression will not bring the anticipated fruits of victory even if it is successful. Deterrence can also be achieved by reassurance or promises of rewards in order to make not attacking look better than attacking does, although calling this "positive deterrence" as some scholars have occasionally proposed, rarely elicits a favorable reaction.

often interpret the national goal of “deterring and defeating aggression” as meaning “preparing to defeat aggression, which usually ought to deter it.”

Indeed, if a prospective attacker believes that starting a war will lead to defeat, deterrence is likely to be on strong ground, so the Latin adage “if you desire peace, prepare for war” is not bad advice as Latin adages go. However, there are two reasons why it is important for U.S. strategists to take the goal of deterrence seriously in its own right. First, sometimes states start wars they do not expect to win, or at least are not confident of winning. If not going to war looks awful, attacking even on unappealing terms can appear to be the least bad option—this is often the rationale for starting preemptive or preventive wars. Thus being able to defeat the enemy may not be sufficient to deter. The same can be true if the prospective aggressor misperceives the fact that attacking will lead to defeat, either because of refusal to accept the truth (like Japan in 1941) or just being very wrong about the prospects due to hubris or miscalculation. In any of these circumstances, the ability to defeat the enemy may fail to deter because deterrence happens (or doesn’t) in the mind of the opponent—reality matters to deterrence only insofar as it shapes what the adversary believes.

On the other hand, in many cases being able to defeat the potential opponent isn’t necessary for deterrence. For example, the previous point notwithstanding, states typically do not start wars that they expect will be long and costly even if they expect to win in the end. Presenting the enemy with the prospect of victory not being cheap and easy may well be enough to do the deterrent job. Certainly it is still more appealing to make victory look impossible, but that may be much more expensive to accomplish, or if the adversary is very powerful or inconveniently away it may be effectively infeasible. So it may be difficult in years to come to persuade Beijing that an invasion of Taiwan would fail, or to convince Vladimir Putin that Russia would lose if it invaded the Baltic states, but making such an action appear too expensive to be worthwhile might be well within reach at the same time.

This is important because although preparing to defeat and to deter an opponent often involve the same actions, the two goals can call for different policies. The optimal military force posture to defeat an attack may not be the same as the best one to persuade the enemy that attacking would be a bad idea. There can also be tradeoffs between defense and reassurance (the security dilemma), in which foregoing some actions that would provide protection if deterrence fails may be desirable because doing so will increase the chances of avoiding a costly war in the first place. We are still suffering the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s failure to appreciate this fact in 2003, leading to the costliest failure of deterrence in recent U.S. history.

This brings us back to the assertion with which this discussion began, that deterrence is becoming more important to U.S. national security than we may be used to. The argument is a simple one: the United States has largely run out of wars that we wouldn’t mind fighting. Qaddafi and Saddam are dead. The potential wars we now contemplate—against China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and a few other countries and non-countries—are largely ones that would be terribly expensive, either in the waging or in dealing with the post-conflict aftermath, even setting aside the risk of nuclear escalation in those cases where it is a concern. Although winning a Sino-American War worthy of that name would be better than losing one, it would be much, much worse than avoiding it on reasonable terms. Achieving such a victory would thus be a strategic failure of epic proportions. In short, we do not want to “deter or defeat” China, we want to deter it, full stop, and this objective should guide our military planning.

## **PANEL 3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF**

### **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Asia-Pacific**

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Colin G. Chinn  
U.S. Pacific Command

#### **Introduction**

In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the question is not whether a disaster will occur, but when and where the next disaster will happen. Globally, the environment is constantly changing and evolving, and climatic factors are increasing the frequency and severity of disasters. Most nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific have a whole-of-government disaster response plan, which frequently includes the military in a key response role. Even the best of these plans and national response systems can be easily overwhelmed by severe disasters, necessitating foreign assistance, as was seen with Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013.

The U.S. Sea Services possess unique capabilities that, when called upon, can contribute to and increase efficiency of disaster relief throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific (Foreign Humanitarian Assistance). Additionally, U.S. Sea Services routinely conduct engagements throughout the region that build capacity for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) within individual partner nations and regional multilateral organizations.

U.S. Navy Medicine plays a critical role for both Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and HA/DR capacity-building engagements, while providing high quality health care in support of global operations anytime, anywhere. U.S. Navy Medicine personnel deploy with and support Sailors and Marines worldwide, providing critical mission support aboard ship, in the air, under the sea and on the battlefield. New adaptive naval medical capabilities are being developed that will provide agile, quick medical response options for FHA and HA/DR capacity building engagements. U.S. Navy Medicine conducts global health engagements, such as Pacific Partnership, that build capacity of partner nations' civilian and military disaster response systems, ultimately enhancing security in the region.

#### **Pacific Command Background**

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) consists of 52% of the earth's surface, 36 countries, over half of the world's population, and consists of six of the world's 10 largest Armies. The Indo-Asia-Pacific also consists of approximately 60% of the world's Gross Domestic Product and about 50% of the world trade. Natural disasters are a fact of life in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Up to 60% of the world's natural disasters occur within the USPACOM AOR with more disaster related deaths occurring in the Indo-Asia-Pacific than any other region in the world. Disasters in the Indo-Asia-Pacific have increased nearly 400% in the last decade (2002-2011) from the decade prior. Increasing disaster risks in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are driven by the twin problems of increasing exposure of people and economic assets to disaster effects and the inability of the most vulnerable groups to cope with disasters. The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and the ensuing nuclear disaster in March 2011, as well as Southeast Asian floods, were major contributors to a staggering \$294 billion in regional economic losses, representing 80% of global losses due to disasters in 2011.

#### **Organizational Changes (Rebalance)**

The U.S. government's rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific is a long-term effort increasing our national emphasis on the region although USPACOM has always had strong relationships in the region, exemplified by the presence of five of the U.S.'s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. This region is paramount to global security and prosperity, and DoD cooperation with partner nation militaries strengthens that security. USPACOM's rebalance efforts through DoD global health engagements supports and strengthens our traditional alliances and enhances our presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

## **Strategies**

USPACOM's strategy focuses on strengthening alliances and partnerships; providing assurance of U.S. security commitment to the region; and effectively communicating our intent and resolve to protect U.S. interests and ensure the region remains stable and secure. Through these priorities, USPACOM aims to maintain open access to the shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Maritime Security is a key component of this strategy. USPACOM works closely with the U.S. Government (USG) interagency and partner nations to improve maritime security and maritime domain awareness capacity throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Many of the nations in the USPACOM AOR are maritime centric and eager to cooperate with the U.S. on Phase 0 (shaping) and contingency operations with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Sea service assets stationed in theater have the ability to provide global coverage, forward presence, and crisis response for an array of contingencies, to include disaster response.

USPACOM global health engagements in the region support security and stability by building the capacity of military and civilian health systems to respond to disasters and health emergencies at the local, national, regional and global levels. We synchronize our global health engagement efforts closely with our USG interagency partners also working in the health realm. Our global health engagements enhance the readiness of our own forces to respond to disasters when called upon.

## **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Capabilities**

When a disaster occurs in a foreign nation, a series of events must occur for the USG to respond with FHA, starting with a disaster declaration. The U.S. DoD supports the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), the USG lead federal agency for FHA, by providing military unique capabilities, such as logistics, transportation, and command and control support, as requested by the government of the affected nation and by USAID/OFDA. Of 66 disaster declarations generating U.S. response in Fiscal Year 2011, DoD was requested to respond to six percent, and of those only a very small percentage included a military medical response. While the likelihood of DoD disaster response is small, the unique characteristics of the U.S. Sea Services in the USPACOM AOR make them well-suited for rapid disaster response when required. Sea Service assets can generate and project large amounts of clean water, rapidly deliver supplies, equipment and manpower, and provide airborne surveillance.

The U.S. Navy can deploy and support itself without the need for functional facilities (airfields, ports, etc.) at a destination that may be damaged or destroyed as a result of a disaster or contingency. The flexibility of afloat forward staging base training allows us to both prepare in Phase 0 via HA/DR capacity building engagements, and be ready to contribute to FHA response when required. The ability to operate and provide support for a disaster from an afloat platform significantly reduces stress on an overloaded HN infrastructure. In addition to afloat platforms, the U.S. Navy has the ability to send Forward Deployed Preventive Medicine Units ashore to assess and mitigate public health and infectious disease issues early in a disaster response.

The U.S. Navy is exploring possibilities to field medical payloads which will potentially provide a quicker response capability through the use of existing and future ship classes, as well as adaptive, agile, and modular medical force packages. The concept requires continued development and experimentation to determine what can be accomplished and how modularity will be used, but when successful, this will allow fleet commanders the flexibility to have the right medical capability (type and size) at the right place (afloat or ashore) at the right time to respond across the range of military options. Once in place, these innovations will serve as force multipliers, providing flexible response options for FHA.

The U.S. Marine Corps complements the U.S. Navy's capabilities with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The MEU provides a forward deployed, flexible sea-based Marine Air Ground Task Force capable of conducting amphibious operations, crisis response and limited contingency operations. These Marine forces bring additional resources to include manpower, sealift with landing craft that can directly egress

onto beaches, and airlift such as transport helicopters for rescue and cargo movement and the MV-22 Osprey which allows great range and speed for the delivery of relief items. The 31st MEU, based in Okinawa, Japan, has provided support to multiple regional FHA operations including the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 (Operation Damayan), where the MV-22 Osprey was used as a heavy lift force multiplier.

In any FHA operation, it is critical that the DoD is well coordinated with USG interagency, HN government (to include military when appropriate), and international coordination mechanisms such as the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance cluster system. Dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency.

### **Global Health Engagement**

USPACOM theater security cooperation engagements focused on HA/DR are a key Phase 0 mechanism to build relationships, enhance capacity for disaster response, and increase interoperability between nations and organizations. HA/DR training, exercise, and exchange venues such as Pacific Partnership (led by the U.S. Pacific Fleet), Pacific Angel (led by U.S. Pacific Air Forces), and Pacific Resilience Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange (led by U.S. Army Pacific) provide opportunities to build partnerships and collectively prepare for response before disasters strike. Increasingly, these engagements are taking on a multi-sectoral approach, recognizing that disaster response involves many disciplines. They also incorporate USG interagency stakeholders, partner nation civilian agencies and militaries, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Through training, exercises, and global health engagements, USPACOM can conduct anticipatory planning and coordination prior to a disaster response and determine the potential capabilities that may be required for a response, as well as ensure it is suitable for the local context.

USPACOM global health engagements are a cornerstone of theater security cooperation activities. Within these global health engagements, USPACOM is focusing efforts on assisting partner nations to increase health capabilities and build capacity, and has largely reduced direct patient care activities such as MEDCAPs, DENTCAPs, and VETCAPs. USPACOM global health engagements include training of first responders, exercising patient movement techniques, subject matter exchanges on preventive medicine topics, and much more. Activities that build partner nation capacity facilitate long-term impact.

USPACOM HA/DR and global health engagements are conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally. A key forum for military multilateral engagement is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers Meetings-Plus (ADMM+), which includes 18 nations and is organized into six Expert Working Groups (EWG) focused on specific topics. The ADMM+ EWGs on Military Medicine and HA/DR conducted a large multilateral exercise of a disaster response scenario in 2013, and are currently planning for a second exercise in 2016. Within the ADMM+ framework, 18 nations' militaries are able to come together and exercise, share experiences and lessons learned, and prepare for future disasters within the region.

While working closely with our USG interagency partners, we are also working to build civil-military coordination within partner nations through global health engagement. An example of this is the USPACOM Blood Safety Program, operating since 2009 in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It fosters cooperation between Ministries of Health and Defense for blood collection, testing, storage, and administration. It has resulted in the development of national guidelines for blood administration and the creation of HN training teams. Through partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, it has increased infrastructure capability in Lao PDR and Cambodia with the construction of Regional Blood Donor Centers. This will result in a Regional Blood Program that is interoperable among the Lower Mekong Region, facilitating more readily available safe blood products for treatment of patients before and after a disaster.

## Conclusion

In the USPACOM AOR, global health engagements build partnerships, strengthen alliances, and build national and regional capacity for disaster response and health emergencies. Engagements that utilize Sea Service platforms and assets build U.S. readiness for FHA as well as enhance regional disaster preparedness. Pacific Partnership was developed as an annual HA/DR-focused engagement after the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami; since 2006 this U.S. Pacific Fleet engagement has built disaster preparedness and resilience in many nations in the USPACOM AOR. As Pacific Partnership has evolved it has progressively expanded multilateral involvement, with participation of vessels from Australia, New Zealand and Japan in recent years, leading to enhanced regional interoperability. It has been an example of the transition from focusing on direct patient care to building health capacity through a program of educational exchanges and training. Pacific Partnership engages with HN governments, regional organizations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, building relationships that are critical for a coordinated response when disaster occurs. Pacific Partnership has engaged in the Philippines five times. The Philippines also regularly co-hosts the annual exercise BALIKATAN with the U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, which exercises HA/DR scenarios and includes health engagements. The Philippines has also co-hosted multiple Pacific Angel engagements focused on HA/DR. When Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013, U.S. DoD responded with primarily lift and logistics support; no DoD medical response was requested by the Government of the Philippines. Could this be an indirect measure of effectiveness for the many health and HA/DR capacity building engagements USPACOM conducted in the Philippines over the last decade?

U.S. Sea Services capabilities are agile, forward deployed, ready resources for both capacity building engagements and FHA in the disaster-prone Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM global health engagements are a powerful strategic enabler for full-spectrum theater security cooperation. Global health and HA/DR engagements support U.S. national security objectives by promoting security and stability in the Indo-Asia Pacific. Together with our allies and partners in the region, we can build resilience and be better prepared for collective response to the next disaster.

## PANEL 3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

# Civil Military Engagement: Humanitarian Views of Civil-Military Coordination during the Response to Typhoon Haiyan

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Vincenzo Bollettino

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

Increasingly, the U.S. and other international militaries are called on to provide disaster relief in the wake of large natural disasters. Since 2004, the U.S. military deployed to disaster zones 40 times. Between 2003 and 2006 alone, the U.S. deployed military assets 15 times for disaster relief. (*Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination*, pp. 5) Many of these disasters took place in the Asia-Pacific: 45% in all between 1980 and 2009, accounting for 83% of deaths due to natural disaster between 2000 and 2008. (*Same Space - Different Mandates: A Civil-Military Guide to Australian Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response*. May, 2012, pp. 1) In many of these contexts, militaries and humanitarian organizations occupy the same space and undertake similar tasks in support of international humanitarian relief efforts.

### Methods

There have been very few systematic attempts to collect detailed information about the nature of civil-military engagement or about the factors associated with positive or negative views held by civilian and military actors regarding the effectiveness of coordination. This study provides a step in the direction of providing empirical data on civil military engagement. A survey instrument was designed based on: an analysis of the literature on civil military engagement in response to natural disasters; a field assessment mission to the Philippines immediately following Typhoon Haiyan; and from input from leading experts. The survey was made available online from May 1, 2014 to August 30, 2014. A total of 64 surveys were completed. This was a targeted convenience sample, not a random sample.

### Interpreting the results

The data from the surveys support anecdotal accounts that the coordination between civilian and military actors during disaster relief efforts in Typhoon Haiyan worked well. The survey instrument used in the study incorporated basic demographic questions about the respondent, their role in the response, their role within their organizations (the categorical variables), as well as Likert scale questions designed to capture humanitarian aid worker perceptions of the characteristics of civil-military engagement in the humanitarian response (the continuous variables).

### Who responded?

The survey respondents were by in large a skilled group of professionals with many years of professional experience. Fully 46% of respondents had more than 10 years of professional experience and 62% had greater than five years of professional experience.

### Training



Despite significant levels of professional experience, many respondents had modest levels of exposure to civil-military training or participation in joint exercises. Just under half of respondents were familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. 12% of respondents stated that the Oslo Guidelines were used to develop organizational policy on engagement with military actors. 67% of respondents noted that their organization utilized military assets or support to assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Only 21% said their organization did not rely on military assets, while 12% were uncertain. 32% of organizations that utilized military assets did so for more than two weeks, with 18% of organizations relying on support for between 6 and 14 days, and 23% for five days or less. While military assets were important, most agencies did not rely primarily on military assets to deliver aid.

## Perceptions

This study supports the claim that civil-military engagement in response to Typhoon Haiyan was well coordinated and effective. 67% of respondents noted that their organization utilized military assets or support in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 71% of respondents said that military assets enabled more efficient delivery of aid to populations in need. Only 2% suggested otherwise.

**Graph 1:** The provision of military assets were value added in that delivery of aid was more efficient (aid reached communities more quickly than if military assets were not available)

When asked whether coordination with military actors hindered operations, only 5% of respondents suggested that this was the case. 63% said that coordinating with military actors did not hinder operations. The remaining 32% did not express an opinion. 64% of respondents said that overall, civil military coordination functioned well. Only 3% claimed that civil-military coordination did not function well.



**Graph 2:** Respondents views of the usefulness and timeliness of international military responses to requests for assets or assistance. Question: “Request for support from military actors led to a useful outcome on the ground” (Blue bar). Question: “Requests for information from military actors were made in a timely manner.” (Red bar) y-axis: Number of respondents.

## Limits

This study was designed to begin filling the gap in data on civil-military engagement in response to natural disaster. There are some inherent limits to the research design. The first is that this study does not use a random sample of humanitarian aid workers, but relies on a convenience sample of leading humanitarian organization staff known to have been responsible for relief programs during the response to Typhoon Haiyan. Another limit of the study is when the study was undertaken. The survey was not distributed until six months after the disaster, which may have had the effect of limiting the number of respondents. Finally, this survey is a measure of humanitarian aid worker perceptions. Nothing can be inferred about how the local disaster affected community views the effectiveness of civil military coordination, nor can inferences be made about military perceptions of their interaction with humanitarian organizations.

## Conclusion

On the whole, humanitarians viewed civil-military coordination as effective and efficient. Furthermore, humanitarians felt that international militaries and the Philippines Armed Forces played an important role in ensuring that aid reached people in need, particularly in the early days of the response. The study highlighted that, despite humanitarian perceptions of effective coordination, less than half of respondents were familiar with the Oslo Guidelines, and only 12% of respondents thought that the Oslo Guidelines were used to develop organizational policy on humanitarian aid agency engagement with military actors. Serious consideration should be given to greater dissemination of the guidelines, especially to those that have not yet participated in formal civil-military training courses.

## PANEL 3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

### Operational Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

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Michael Marx  
United Nations

Coordination between humanitarian and military actors in large-scale natural disasters has improved significantly over the last decade. The lessons from recent large-scale disasters, starting with the Asia Tsunami response in 2004, have led to marked improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of natural disaster response. Response operations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines has demonstrated that military assets, in particular foreign military assets (FMA), can provide timely, unique, and critical capabilities, especially in the early phases of a response operation.

However, there still exists the need for better coordination between humanitarian and military actors, particularly in the areas of information sharing, gaining common situational awareness, and deploying assets based on identified needs on the ground. When decisions are made to accept and deploy FMA, there has rarely been a shortfall in the number of assets that are deployed; however, increased focus should be on deploying the right types of assets to produce the desired impact on the ground. Two common challenges to a coordinated response are in the ability of the affected country to receive, integrate, and coordinate the FMA that is arriving, and for assisting nations to deploy the right capacity to provide effective and rapid assistance to the affected people. Part of the challenge is related to problems in assessment methodology and in gaining a common situational awareness quickly enough to assist decision makers in deploying the appropriate military capacity. There is a tendency for nations to deploy FMA because it is available or in the proximity of the disaster – to push assets from overseas rather than to pull assets forward based on the assessed needs on the ground. The number of nations deploying FMA in response to large-scale natural disasters – often 25 to 35 nations responding in each of the major disasters over the last decade – can create significant problems and competition on the ground, especially when there are limited ports of entry into the affected area. This is further complicated by the deployment of hundreds of humanitarian organizations from the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

There are military capabilities that are commonly needed in many large-scale disaster response operations, including: air lift and ground transportation, production of potable water, logistics planning and execution, engineering and the restoration of the humanitarian infrastructure (repairing and clearing roads, restoring bridges, ports, airports, and removing rubble and other debris in order to open up lines of communication), specific medical/surgical capability, information technology, and operational planning. Several nations have organized their military disaster response to meet these common needs, utilizing a modular approach that can be tailored to meet the needs on the ground.

Naval services often have many or all of these capacities within their organizational structure. The U.S. military sea services, because of its global presence, ability to project capability and tailor its organization, and rapid decision making by the national command authority, is often critically positioned to respond quickly with many of the right capabilities to meet the needs on the ground. Maximizing this effect requires preparation that includes dedicated training and exercising to meet this mission set, improving disaster response doctrine, establishing and maintaining networks and contacts – both within the military communities and with humanitarian response organizations, and developing relevant standard operating procedures, plans, and agreements (military to military and military to humanitarian).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) is mandated by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to coordinate the overall relief effort, in support of the affected nation, and to serve as the focal point for humanitarian civil-military coordination, both for the United Nations system, as well as for the broader humanitarian community. UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors

which is essential to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. OCHA is also one of the few humanitarian agencies with dedicated civil-military capacity within its organization, with humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) officers at headquarters and deployed in relief operations.

OCHA's role in humanitarian civil-military coordination is to facilitate effective coordination between humanitarian and military actors in both the preparedness and response phases, bringing together policy and guidance, operational support, and a training program for the humanitarian and military communities. OCHA also serves as the custodian for the various sets of global and country-specific guidelines, operational guidance, and handbooks, including the *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, or the "Oslo Guidelines". For military actors, OCHA can serve as the "front door" to the humanitarian community, providing information, contact points, and operational coordination on the ground.

OCHA's UN-CMCoord Training Program provides various levels of training for humanitarian and military actors. The UN-CMCoord Course brings together humanitarian and military practitioners to familiarize participants with humanitarian civil-military coordination concepts and principles and its practical applications in the field. Because it is conducted at the regional level, it assists in addressing regional-specific challenges and contexts, brings together practitioners who work or will work together, and establishes effective operational networks. OCHA also provides other levels of training, including the Supporting Humanitarian Action in Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) Course and the SHARED Training of Trainers (ToT) Course, both of which are designed specifically for a military audience and can be tailored to meet operational or geographic needs. Another advantage of the training program is that it provides access to an existing network of close to 4000 military and humanitarian disaster practitioners, both on the ground in disasters and virtually through several on-line platforms.

While improvements in coordination between humanitarian and military actors have certainly been made, there remains a requirement to improve the efficiency of humanitarian civil-military response operations. Much of this can be realized through collaborative training, realistic exercises, cultivating operational networks, and establishing the substantive dialogue and information sharing platforms that are needed to respond more effectively in future emergencies.

### PANEL 3: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

## Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Can Thinking about Strategic Surprise Help Maritime Decision Makers and Planners Prepare?

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Joseph DiRenzo III

U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command

“It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous within a few years.” Arthur C. Clarke, 1962

The visual and audio images that the international media provide us when reporting a natural disaster can evoke a range of emotions and numerous questions. As the death tolls rise and heart wrenching images of mass destruction, caused by tsunami or earthquakes appears across television screens world-wide, the true scope of the natural disaster is visually understood. This is followed quickly by a collective effort to respond and help --- by its very nature, international maritime humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief is neither routine nor easy. The stakeholders change, the level of devastation varies...there are different “playbooks” but every one of these events are unique. This is part of the problem.

Additionally, following such an event, pundits, analysts, and decision makers alike often ask themselves “why didn’t we see it coming”? This type of analysis is difficult to do when examining any type of scenario. The “difficulty factor” is compounded when the event considered involves conducting humanitarian operations during major disasters. All surprise cannot be prevented in a completely reliable manner --- BUT we can look at consequences of such events and be better prepared to respond. The decision, however, are based on risk vs cost.

So, what can be done to better prepare for this type of event? Can adopting an approach to analysis, which stretches conventional wisdom by considering “strategic surprise,” facilitate the U.S. military sea services to work more effectively with the various actors in the humanitarian community, increasing response effectiveness? By thinking about the truly unexpected, or we can be better prepared to address a maritime event of this magnitude?

To ensure that everyone is working off the same framework for discussion it is imperative to provide a key definition. Researchers Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, in their essay “Ahead of The Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” noted that a *strategic surprise* differs from a “run of the mill surprise” in that it produces significant organizational and societal impacts, challenges conventional wisdom, and is hard to imagine.<sup>1</sup> Key on the words --- “significant organizational and societal impacts, challenges conventional wisdom.”

So using this definition as a starting point, the devastating 2010 7.0 magnitude Haiti earthquake was, a “strategic surprise,” which triggered a significant multi-national government and NGO maritime humanitarian response, which was compounded by the total destruction of the primary harbor in Port Au Prince. The level of destruction was significant:

- ♦ Approximately 220,000 people died
- ♦ Approximately 300,000 people were injured
- ♦ 60% of Government Buildings and 80% of all schools in Port Au Prince were destroyed or damaged

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, “Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed. *Blindside: How To Anticipate Forcing Evenets and Wild Cards In Global Politics* (Baltimore: Brookings Institute Press, 2007) 93–108.

But the Haiti earthquake also provides an opportunity as a focus point to better prepare for the next event that requires a humanitarian assistance response. International actions in Haiti provide a foundation for leaders and their staffs to unleash thinking that ponders not only the disaster itself but the impacts of a second- and third-order magnitude that encompasses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of our coordinated effort. This type of innovative thinking goes beyond classic strategic/operational planning and demands a more abstract, but very real methods of addressing those things that should not catch us off guard.

In 2012, strategist and retired U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Walter Jajko, writing for the Institute of World Politics, added to Schwartz and Randall's perspective on strategic surprise, noting that this type of outcome is perspective driven. Why? Because decision makers and planners thinking are framed by biases, sensitivities, or even blind spots over time from culture, experience, weakness, and our needs.<sup>2</sup>

Schwartz and Randall conclude that "the myth about strategic surprise is that the surprise is difficult to identify. Yet, if by uncertainties in the world around us are recognized and explored, important phenomena can often be seen—and monitored—as they emerge."<sup>3</sup>

Bringing together government, non-government, and international partners to consider the range of disasters that identify, acknowledge, and address strategic surprises that would result in significant devastation, and humanitarian operations is exceptionally difficult. The issue is compounded when you apply this approach to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of decision making.

As HA/DR planners consider Strategic Surprise in that they also need to be realistic in their process and use a framework developed for warfare to ground their thinking. As Professor Colin Gray of the University of Reading notes, "The problem is not surprise. Surprise happens!...to adapt the common exclamation. Rather the problem is the effects of surprise. Surprise, by definition is in the hands of our enemies who are attempting to paralyse the dialectic of war. (But the effects of surprise, by and large, are in our hands. We cannot aspire to be surprise-proof. We can, however, aim to be proofed against many, perhaps most, of the malign effects of surprise." (Gray, 2005))

Gray continued, "Surprise, even strategic surprise, is not a panacea solution to the uncertainties of war, or the strengths of the enemy. History records few cases, where decisive victory was achieved as a result of the achievement of successful strategic surprise. Even when surprise is secured, so what? What are its strategic benefits, its effects? If we are alert and flexibly adaptive, we should be able to ensure that no enemy who catches us by strategic surprise would profit by the deed". (Gray, 2005) Adding, "the condition of potential strategic surprise is driven by the geopolitical context, not by technology, culture, or clever briefers."

Again, consider the Haiti earthquake. Could HA/DP planners have anticipated it? According to Fred Tasker's article, written for the Center for Research on Globalization, ".it was no surprise to geologists. For years, they'd been predicting a quake in Haiti — possibly as powerful as magnitude 7.2. The problem was they couldn't say when." Continued Tasker, "Geologists had long warned about seismic pressures building up along the Enriquillo Fault Line that runs from Jamaica eastward through Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and into the Enriquillo Valley in the Dominican Republic. The fault line is part of the boundary between the North American and Caribbean tectonic plates"<sup>4</sup> Should planners have considered this as a real possibility even though the science was open-ended?

The short answer is both yes and no ----- by considering a framework of strategic surprise there is a belief that the idea of a group think mentality, which can impact creativity, will not be the dominate approach. One consideration in HA/DR planning, which can help derail Group Think, is to adopt a "disruptive think" approach and inject some junior officers and mid/senior grade enlisted into the discussion, asking to what they think might be a strategic surprise in the maritime environment that will

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<sup>2</sup> Walter Jajko, "Strategic Surprise," The Institute of World Politics, Eagle Online, 19 September 2012, from [www.iwp.edu/news\\_publications/detail/strategic-surprise](http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/strategic-surprise).

<sup>3</sup> Schwartz and Randall, "Ahead of the Curve."

<sup>4</sup> Fred Tasker "Haiti Earthquake had Been Predicted for Years, 14 January 2010, Miami Herald.

require HA/DR actions. This could potentially bring different/outside perspective to the group. In addition there must be a realization that planners and analysts alike must expand their tradecraft training to include looking at the dynamics of events which are considered strategic surprises being a reality which needs thoughtful analysis and enhanced discovery.

The CIA's Jack Davis, writing for the CIA's Sherman Kent Center's Occasional paper series, "analysis often focuses on depicting plausible future developments that would contradict the prevailing judgment of analysts as to the likelihood, timing, modalities, or security implications of a potential threat, effective execution requires special skills in alternate analysis tradecraft".

By imploring a strategic surprise mindset into HA/DR planning, elements of Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) can be realized. Specifically, "Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises.<sup>5</sup> Human suffering moves the United States to act, and the expeditionary character of naval forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance.

In today's globally connected world, news of humanitarian crises and natural or manmade disasters is reported almost immediately. Forward-deployed naval forces provide timely response and assistance. Although the primary focus of naval forces remains combat readiness, our multipurpose capabilities allow those same forces, with minor modifications, to be equally adept at providing relief that mitigates human suffering. Given our forward posture, inherent mobility, and highly flexible nature across many capability sets, US naval forces are the force of choice for such missions"

Thinking about surprise-like events is a good first step. However, thinking is not enough. We have to collectively plan starting with the leadership.

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<sup>5</sup> Naval Doctrine Publication One (NDP 1), page 30.



## PANEL 4: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

# Counter-Unconventional Warfare is the Way of the Future. How Can We Get There?

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### **The Growing Threat of Hybrid Warfare**

Counter-UW, to a large degree, is about responding to the increasing use of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has been defined as a combination of conventional, irregular, and asymmetric means, including the persistent manipulation of political and ideological conflict, and can include the combination of special operations and conventional military forces; intelligence agents; political provocateurs; media representatives; economic intimidation; cyber attacks; and proxies and surrogates, para-militaries, terrorist, and criminal elements.

Hybrid warfare places a premium on unconventional warfare (UW)—defined in military doctrine as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government. External sponsorship often provides the motivation, resources, and support to people attempting to destabilize international and regional security. Some examples of this strategy include the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008, Russia’s current activities in Ukraine, and potential future Russian moves in the Baltics, as well as Iran’s use of surrogates such as Hezbollah. Accordingly, a United States capacity for counter-UW is absolutely necessary.

### **What’s Different About Counter-Unconventional Warfare?**

Counter-UW is distinct from counter terrorism (CT) and counter insurgency (COIN). CT operations tend to be short-term, time-sensitive, intelligence-driven (reactive) operations with immediately visible results; i.e., has the kill or capture been achieved or not? Counter-UW, by contrast, is protracted and proactive. The results are expressed in negative terms: what areas are not under insurgent control? What opportunities have been denied to them, and what objective has the enemy failed to achieve? Meanwhile, COIN operations are designed to contain and defeat an insurgency while simultaneously addressing the root cause. As a result, COIN tends to generate a very large footprint and high U.S. signature. Counter-UW, on the other hand, is executed by a smaller force and is more narrowly scoped. It has a small footprint, a low signature, and is specifically designed to deny an adversary the ability to use surrogates as a path to strategic success. Building upon the lessons learned from more than a decade of CT and COIN, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) can develop this military capability to deny adversaries the capacity to employ unconventional warfare to achieve strategic goals. USASOC is uniquely suited for counter-UW because of its combination of capabilities, including military information support operations (formerly known as psychological operations or PSYOPS), civil affairs, Special Forces (Green Berets), robust and scalable command and control capacity, and a growing “reach-back” capability in all these areas to support forward operations from the U.S.

### **More Than Special Operations Forces**

While SOF will have the primary counter-UW role within a larger whole of government effort, hybrid warfare and counter-UW have implications beyond SOF. China’s pursuit of unrestricted warfare has not yet included the use of surrogates or para-military forces—unless you count the intimidating use of the Chinese Coast Guard—but their UW capabilities should not be discounted. The U.S. should expect more than a conventional fight in any military conflict with Russia, China, Korea, Iran, or Syria. Hybrid warfare, on display now in regional conflicts, will one day be turned against the U.S. and our military forces.

Counter-UW should be included in joint and service exercises, as well as operational and contingency plans. Additionally, the military services should explore how to integrate a supporting SOF counter-UW campaign within their broader operations.

### **An Uncertain Path Ahead**

Counter-UW requires a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive and integrated pursuit of political warfare, including economic sanctions, diplomacy, the use of surrogates, military and law enforcement support to partner nations, and strategic communication and information operations. The U.S. has not displayed a strategic whole-of-government capacity beyond CT, counter-narcotic, and counter-proliferation tactical operations coordinated by joint interagency task forces. A considerable effort and strong leadership will be required to create this capacity. This task is so enormous it may take congressional legislation to create a strategic-level national counter-UW capability. Much depends upon the willingness of national leaders to commit to conducting protracted counter-UW operations in sensitive, hostile, and denied environments. Counter-UW requires early and long-term investment. Timely decisions—prior to a crisis—are needed, presenting a real problem. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has rarely invested in developing long-lead options like counter-UW. It should start now, immediately preparing counter-UW capabilities in eastern Europe and the Baltics to counter future Russian use of hybrid warfare. It will be all too easy for institutional forces to argue against counter-UW activities and related preparation based on fears that they will be destabilizing, escalatory, or difficult to control due to the central role of surrogates. Regardless of the potential downsides of counter-UW, the alternative—allowing our adversaries strategic advantage through the unopposed use of surrogates and proxies—will always be the worse option.

## PANEL 4: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

# Post-Bin Laden SOF Operations, Strategy, and Reflections on Future Threats

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Department of the Navy

The post-bin Laden world ushered in a new wave of cautious optimism and speculation about the demise of al-Qa'ida as a global movement and a reduction in jihadist threats aimed at the West. As the troop drawdowns in Afghanistan were happening, heightened expectations about less terrorism directed toward the West faded quickly. What seemed to have changed the optimism was not the likelihood of terrorism on the scale of the 9/11 attacks so much as the explosion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in its drive to establish a caliphate.<sup>1</sup> The mania was compounded by the specter of homegrown terrorism such as what recently occurred in Canada and France, along with a growing list of jihadi or ISIS-inspired low-level attacks across the West.<sup>2</sup> The narrative shifted to 'lone wolf' terrorism and the threat springing from ISIS-controlled sanctuaries—eerily reminiscent of al-Qa'ida's use of its sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. What's more, exigent threats against the West from al-Qa'ida affiliates in places like Yemen and Somalia looms large.<sup>3</sup>

Our key concerns, then, in the brief essay that follows is to argue provocatively that the future of SOF will demand more unconventional warfare options developed and executed—more surgically by Naval Special Warfare forces—into those sanctuaries. These sanctuaries are found in tribal spaces, and often times these crisis areas are within the operational reach of U.S. maritime forces, which is a key theme explicit in *Naval Operations 2010*, and with the *U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*.<sup>4</sup> Decidedly, maritime reach and the access it affords SOF is an important competitive advantage that the U.S. still holds. Still, an argument made for intensifying unconventional warfare capabilities is not an overwhelmingly original argument right now. Several articles on unconventional warfare by practitioners have spurred a quiet, but persistent debate on its rediscovery, strategic importance, and some even make the case—perceived as somewhat heretical in some circles—that it is no longer the sole province of U.S. Army Special Forces.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps less provocatively, Naval Special Warfare forces should seriously consider broadening and validating their own unconventional warfare capabilities in the future.<sup>6</sup> Suffice it to say, there is general consensus among practitioners that

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<sup>1</sup> Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *New Republic*, September 1, 2014,

<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119259/isis-history-islamic-states-new-caliphate-syria-and-iraq>.

<sup>2</sup> Shreeya Sinha, "Ottawa Shooting Is Latest Growing Number of Attacks Linked to Extremism," *New York Times*, October 23, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/world/americas/in-the-west-a-growing-list-of-attacks-linked-to-extremism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%22%22%3A%22RI%3A7%22%7D>.

Rukmini Callimachi and Andrew Higgins, "Video Shows a Paris Gunman Declaring his Loyalty to the Islamic State," *New York Times*, January 11, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/world/europe/amedy-coulibaly-video-islamic-state.html?src=xps>.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36: 8, 635-653, posted online July 7, 2013, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802973>.

<sup>4</sup> Both of these documents can be retrieved from the following websites: <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf>. [http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/irregular\\_warfare.htm#appendix](http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/irregular_warfare.htm#appendix).

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, David Maxwell, "Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces," from the *War on the Rocks*, Online Blog site, posted August 12, 2013, <https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Unconventional+Warfare+Does+Not+Belong+to+Special+Forces&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8#rls=en&q=Unconventional+Warfare+Does+Not+Belong+to+Special+Forces>. See also, for example, Rob A. Newson, "Counter-Unconventional Warfare, Is the Way of the Future, How Can We Get There?" from the *Council on Foreign Relations* Online Blog site posted October 23, 2014, <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/10/23/counter-unconventional-warfare-is-the-way-of-the-future-how-can-we-get-there/#more-1007>.

<sup>6</sup> John Burnham, "Adapting the Force to Fight: Naval Special Warfare," *Proceeding Magazine*, July 2009, vol. 135/7/1, 277, <https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Adapting+the+Force+to+the+Fight:+Naval+Special+Warfare+%7C+U.S.+Naval+Institute&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>. Burnham makes the point that Naval Special Warfare has a rich legacy of supporting irregular warfare, which is an accepted term of art that includes unconventional warfare as a subset. The full extent of

unconventional warfare options are important capabilities to counter future threats, however, the exact organizational, institutional, and operational design can be set-aside for the time being.

Before proceeding to this author's conceptualization of the future threat, and offering prescriptions for SOF strategy to stir further debate, two points are worth stressing again, which brings us full circle to our thesis: First, our enemies exploit tribal space. Second, much of the world's vulnerable tribal space is near water—and we should not cede this contested space to our enemies.

### Contested 'Tribal Space'

Exploiting tribal dynamics and jihadi militant's ever-growing sanctuaries is not accidental. This idea can be unwrapped further by reading Sociologist David Jacobsen and Natalie Deckard's important scholarly work done on a "Tribalism Index" that reveals that tribal space is where jihadists are "nurtured".<sup>7</sup> But now, from the vantage point of a post-9/11 milieu, tribal societies are thrown completely out of balance because of political upheaval, wars, and terrorism.<sup>8</sup> To sum up, this wide scale disruption on a macro-level of tribal societies—a clash between central governments and the peripheral tribal edges—is to a certain extent complementary with conclusions reached in a more tapered study of the consequential violence of 'malign tribalism' and that such conditions demand an increase in unconventional warfare options abroad.<sup>9</sup>

To balance the notion of tribalism in the context of ISIS, for example, one of the most serious and yet little-known al-Qa'ida strategists, Abu Bakr Naji's is worth examining in greater detail. His writing seems to show that he understands tribal dynamics deeply. Most pressingly, it is important to note that wide-scale polarization and chaos seems to be part of the ISIS scheme for expanding the caliphate. William McCants, a fellow at West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center, translated alarming jihadist words and ideas of a relatively obscure al-Qa'ida strategist. McCants translated Abu Bakr Naji's—a pseudonym—*Management of Savagery*, into English.<sup>10</sup> In a similar vein, Ryan highlights Naji's argument for a "new kind of tribalism based on mutually reinforcing bonds of faith-based loyalty."<sup>11</sup> Taken together, both of these points—a new kind of transnational tribalism and polarization—can compound strategic designs for our enemies abilities to stir those passions—like ISIS is doing—and channeling those malign desires toward a harmful end, from their sanctuaries. This intercommunal discord presumably begins a bloody path to an eventual Sunni caliphate in line with ISIS aims that will have dire implications for the West.<sup>12</sup> Put simply, our aim here is to catalyze a straightforward understanding of

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unconventional warfare activities can be debated, but within the NSW community it is not formally grounded institutionally, or a central part of its core training—tactics, techniques, and procedures—in terms of the most recent definition of unconventional warfare. See, for example, "The Great UW Debate," *United States Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned*, June 2011, online: [http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/ch\\_6.asp](http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/ch_6.asp). With respect to NSW and UW, it is important to note that even within U.S. Army Special Operations circles there has been persistent debate over the definition of UW. In 2009, UW was redefined as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area." It is this more narrow definition that we are concerned with in terms of NSW.

<sup>7</sup> David Jacobsen, Natalie Deckhard, "The Tribalism Index: Unlocking the Relationship Between Tribal Patriarchy and Islamist Militants," *New Global Studies*, May 7, 2012, from the web, <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ngs.2012.6.issue-1/1940-0004.1149/1940-0004.1149.xml>.

<sup>8</sup> Akbar Ahmed, *The Thistle and the Drone* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). In general, Ahmed provides a convincing narrative on tribal disruption that he describes as conflict between central governments and the peripheral tribal edges. This is an important contribution to better understand the idea of the interplay among tribes and jihadists exploiting tribes and using tribal space as sanctuaries.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Kaplan, Christopher P. Costa, "On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence" in *Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26: 16-18, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, "Jihadi Thinker Emphasizes the Media's Importance," *National Public Radio*, July 10, 2006, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5545157>. In addition, the English translation can be found online at *West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center* website, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/stealing-al-qaidas-playbook>.

<sup>11</sup> Michael W.S. Ryan, *Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 186.

<sup>12</sup> Lawrence Wright, "ISIS's Savage Strategy in Iraq," *the New Yorker*, June 16, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/isiss-savage-strategy-in-iraq>.

why SOF, particularly those forces aligned with the Combatant Commands, combined with Navy-wide irregular warfare capabilities, needs to prepare more unconventional warfare options.

### **Strategy Prescriptions for SOF Operating in the ‘Peripheries’**

First, those crafting long-term counter-terrorist strategies must be conscious at all times of the implications of tribes and tribal space. So, in some contingencies we must be prepared to discreetly disaggregate select engagements with the central state leadership and risk unilaterally engaging with tribes as long-term potential allies—those on the peripheries of the state. This must be done with the same precision and care that we might use for any other sensitive implementation of statecraft. This also means that Special Operations Forces should not just wage unconventional warfare, but those forces should be viewed as a deliberate instrument and strategy for building partners and allies in tribal space outside of war zones. Unmanned drones have a place and value for counter-sanctuary strategies, too, yet on-the-ground SOF engagements may be far less damaging over the long haul, if they are done strategically—and scoped conservatively.

Second, strategists must be prepared to process the full impact of a decade of warfare, drones and weaponry on the next generation of would-be terrorists who have been traumatized by Western ways of warfare—toxic war zone memories may well antagonize and lead to more political violence directed against the West. For its part, SOF must continue to build, lead, and leverage indigenous allies quietly—but aggressively—and disrupt al-Qa’ida affiliates in those sanctuaries before they attack U.S. interests.<sup>13</sup>

Lastly, to the extent that we are prepared to acknowledge that the U.S. Navy laid down a healthy foundation for understanding the importance of these irregular contests in the *Vision for Irregular Challenges*, it is also worth noting that this essay should serve to provoke more thinking along the lines of unconventional warfare gaps in U.S. Navy capabilities. After all, this paper is only a point of departure for debating and considering a precise framework for recasting unconventional warfare as part of the U.S. Navy’s irregular warfare future—to address the kind of asymmetric threats the U.S. will continue to face.

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<sup>13</sup> Larry Shaughnessy, “Panetta: America Beating al Qaeda but hasn’t won yet,” *CNN Blog*, 20 November 2012. <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/20/panetta-america-beating-al-qaeda-but-hasnt-won-yet/>. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was quoted as saying that going after al-Qa’ida and their “affiliates is unconventional warfare” and that the “campaign against al-Qa’ida will largely take place outside declared combat zones using a small-footprint approach that includes precision operations.



## PANEL 5: SECURITY COOPERATION

# Security Cooperation: Overview of Statutory Authorities and Debate

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“Security cooperation” is a relatively new term, but security cooperation activities are a longstanding element of the U.S. naval presence abroad and their importance to the U.S. Navy’s contribution to maintaining international security may well grow. The term encompasses security assistance conducted under State Department authorities, as well as activities that have long been staples of the U.S. Navy’s presence abroad, such as large-scale training exercises, combined forces humanitarian activities during port visits, and disaster relief assistance. In his March 12, 2014 Navy posture statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations refers several times to activities that involve security cooperation, citing the Navy’s 2020 mandate to provide a stabilizing presence, with its attendant premium on U.S. military presence in-and in support of partner nations and the mandate to provide “innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches” to security that include the deployment of hospital ships and ten new joint high speed vessels (JHSVs) designed to project and sustain forces in response to a wide range of military and civilian contingencies such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and the need to conduct counterterrorism (as well as irregular warfare) missions.

Some trace the origins of the growth of security cooperation to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategic engagement requirement, first articulated in 1997. Certainly, the events of Sept. 11, 2001 and their aftermath heightened the emphasis on these and other means for the U.S. military to engage abroad. Post 9/11 mandates to stabilize weak or “failed” states through counterterrorism and other measures designed to prevent conflict or its reoccurrence have led to a greater number of DOD security cooperation mechanisms.

Since the 1960s, the bulk of security cooperation assistance and activities have been provided through State Department security assistance authorities and budgets (the core programs of which are Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training) and administered by the Department of Defense. These programs began with sizable military aid packages post-World War II, beginning with military assistance programs to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and expanding to the new NATO allies soon thereafter. Congress established what has been regarded as the enduring “traditional” DOD-State division of labor for foreign assistance, including military assistance, with the enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, by accepting a Truman Administration proposal (although not incorporated into law) delegating primary responsibility for directing all assistance under that Act to the Secretary of State with the close participation with the Department of Defense (DOD).

With a few exceptions, this division of labor held for the large military assistance programs, and most recently formalized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1968. The rationale for the Secretary of State’s primary role was formally articulated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a 1955 Executive Order: The Secretary of State, under the President, “must be the official responsible for the development and control of foreign policy and all relations with foreign governments, to include policies affecting mutual security.” The formal division of labor established by the FAA, at first only for assistance provided under that act, assigns the Secretary of State responsibility for “continuous supervision and general direction” of military assistance, including military education and training and civic action,” and assigns the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for administering that assistance. In 1976, this arrangement was extended to military assistance provided under all U.S. government programs.

Changes in the international environment, the nature of threats, and congressional attitudes towards foreign assistance and the departments of State and Defense, with huge budget implications,

have combined to slowly muddle the clear legal separation between State and DOD roles. Since the 1980s, when Congress began to bestow authority on DOD to provide assistance to foreign militaries and governments using DOD funds, first with the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements authority, then with authorities to counter narcotics trafficking, and then in the 1990s through the 2000s for counterterrorism, and most recently in the 2010s to assist foreign defense institutions some have perceived a “militarization of foreign policy.” One marker of this evolution, the “Section 1206” Build Partner Capacity authority first legislated in 2005 as DOD’s first major global train and equip authority , was codified (made “permanent” law) by the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act this past December as Section 2282 of Title 10. Nevertheless, many of these new DOD authorities require the “concurrence,” i.e., the approval, of the Secretary of State, and Section 1206 also requires DOD and State to “jointly formulate” programs.

For those who view these new DOD authorities as one indicator of the “militarization” of foreign policy, DOD is perceived as increasingly conducting foreign assistance activities without adequate oversight from the State Department and exercising greater influence the tenor of foreign relations and foreign policy through its activities. For others, the trend represents an unfortunate shift of budget priorities from the U.S. military as a fighting force to one where the increased emphasis on the strategic engagement mission that threatens to train personnel and resources from preparation and weapons procurement for combat missions. The bottom line for some who hold both perspectives is the current situation argues for a new and coherent conceptual framework for State-DOD collaboration on security assistance, but this is a debate that has yet to begin.

For the short-run, some have perceived an ever tighter national budget as constraining the growth of security cooperation activities. Nevertheless, Congress’ creation in December 2014 of the \$1.3 billion DOD “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” may permit an increased level of activity for at least the current fiscal year. The CTPF legislation did not create new authority, but provides substantial new funding to conduct activities under existing laws.

## PANEL 5: SECURITY COOPERATION

# Maritime Power and International Security: A Planner's Perspective

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W. J. Wesley

U.S. Pacific Fleet

I am delighted to provide this paper on “Maritime Power and International Security: A Planner's Perspective” as I endeavor to describe U.S. Pacific Fleet's role within the Asia-Pacific Rim or the Indo-Pacific region as some describe this vast area in support of higher headquarters' guidance. This paper provides a planner's view and perspective on the manner in which we complete our myriad requirements in working with our friends, partners and allies as a maritime power to assure international security within the maritime commons. The role of navies and coast guards within the region all have a vested interest to assure the free flow of goods and services in an uninterrupted manner and to avoid any interruption to such conditions as there is an economic interdependence on all nations to cooperate and work together multilaterally as may be needed to ensure the freedom of the seas to all Asia-Pacific Rim or Indo-Pacific nations. Moreover, we also need to ensure that peace and stability remain paramount to avoid the unintended consequences of kinetic confrontations that lead to unwanted results by all parties.

Our Maritime Security Cooperation Plan (MSCP) is developed in accordance with U.S. Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan and its Theater Campaign Order along with the National Security Strategy (NSS), The National Strategy for Maritime Security, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy along with the Navy's “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” and other applicable guidance provided by national authorities. The strategies that our outlined are developed in support of our U.S. national interests within the region and delineated lines of effort to guide our Pacific Fleet naval forces' contributions to achieving our nation's strategic objectives through 2020 from my perspective as the U.S. Pacific Fleet's Executive Director for Plans and Policy (N5).

The globalized world's security and prosperity are tied to a stable, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, and our navies and coast guards must work together to preclude any interruptions to the maritime domain. The region is a nexus of vital trade routes, incorporates the world's largest democracy and hosts over one-third of the world's population. Most signs indicate the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific will continue to grow; however, unfortunately there remain threats to security and stability within the maritime domain that may cause continued concern and must be overcome. Many of the challenges and opportunities within this dynamic region are political or diplomatic in nature, and are normally not military issues. They can best be addressed through diplomatic or political efforts to resolve tensions both between states and within them and military actions should be the last option, if possible.

In advancing U.S. interests in this region, the U.S. Navy and in particular U.S. Pacific Fleet plays a supporting role to these important and difficult diplomatic efforts. This does not relieve the U.S. or any other Navy of their duties and responsibilities, but rather provides a shared perspective to our unique naval role within the maritime environment. Engagement is necessary to further our interests, encourage regional stability, ensure a secure maritime domain, assure shared information is available to ameliorate transnational crime, and to deny the use of the sea by violent extremists or transnational criminal groups. The navies and coast guards within the Indo-Pacific, and Asia-Pacific Region in general must actively promote and advance these relationships among friends, allies and partners in an acceptable manner that benefits the region as a whole and satisfies each nation's goals and objectives as we all have mutual interests within the maritime domain.

Accordingly, we all must seek a secure, stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific Rim or Indo-Pacific region characterized by a secure maritime domain allowing the free flow of legal goods and services while denying the use of the sea by violent extremists or transnational criminal groups. Conflicts must be resolved, or be in the process of making substantial progress toward peaceful resolution, and strong formal and informal relationships and structures should reinforce regional stability and maritime security within the Indo-Pacific region as a common goal for all. The maritime forces should retain the strategic initiative to dissuade, deter, confront and when necessary, and defeat adversaries as may be directed unilaterally, or from a combined or coalition force structure.

Effective measures will deter the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and proliferators, whether state or non-state entities must be held accountable. Legal commerce will flow unimpeded as nations collectively work together within the global commons to assure safe access and freedom of movement to deliver the goods and services desired for economic purposes. Maritime security is essential to mitigating threats short of war (including terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities) and must be established and maintained through a cooperative, multilateral effort to ameliorate such events from occurring. Countering these threats protects all of our homelands, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. A viable maritime strategy seeks a cooperative and multilateral approach to maritime security while promoting the rule of law by partnering with other navies and coast guards throughout the Indo-Pacific to police and patrol the maritime commons while mitigating common threats that may confront our friends, allies and partners in the maritime domain.

The ideology of violent extremists will be discredited and its adherents will lack freedom of action, while governments and non-governmental controls and programs will be in place to inhibit their re-emergence. Allies, partners and friends must have the will, capabilities, and capacities to secure their maritime borders, assure freedom of maneuver in their territorial seas, and defeat adversaries at sea as may be required in a cooperative manner for the common good of like-minded nations.

Navies must be prepared to confront strategic surprises within the region — WMD acquisition, testing, or its use; regime changes or collapses; provocations at sea, etc. — that may induce fundamental changes in our relationships as we effect our end state objectives. To do so will require constant communications and understanding at all levels, and in particular with our mil-to-mil activities and advancement of our shared values, goals and objectives as we share information relative to the common operational picture within the maritime domain.

### **Cooperation Imperative**

To achieve such a desired end state, long-term cooperation through bilateral and in particular multilateral frameworks with allies, partners and friends, both within the region and external to it, must be established, and the employment of this strategy must furnish effective means of deterring and countering our adversaries whenever we or our allies, friends and partners are challenged. We, as well as all like-minded nations, must seek a secure, stable, and prosperous region to advance the national interests of all stakeholders to assure our common goals and objectives are not only achieved, but also sustained for those who reside within the Indo-Pacific.

The Asia-Pacific Rim and Indo-Pacific is a region of great diversity with a multitude of religions, cultures, ethnicities, and political systems. State-to-state relationships vary greatly, from near conflict to peaceful coexistence, and similar variance is evident in the unique internal security situation of each Indo-Pacific entity. Underlying the threats of interstate conflict and domestic insurgencies are deep-seated tensions, including economic, social, political, religious, and ethnic strife. These tensions vary from state to state. Inability to provide the most basic needs to include clean water, food, and shelter; lack of economic opportunity amplified by significant economic disparity; at times ineffective educational systems; social conventions which may inhibit opportunity and development of a just society; religious or tribal animosities; and an inability or unwillingness to address ethnic grievances all contribute to conditions that limit political and economic opportunity and, in turn, cultivate conditions for social and political unrest. Poor governance, signified by rifts among the leadership classes and those they govern, potential corruption of government officials and oppressive political systems, fosters alienation and radicalization if not corrected or identified in time. If such conditions are left unaddressed, these probable causes lead to the same ends: conflict, failing or failed states, and accompanying humanitarian disasters that are not easily overcome or managed sufficiently.

### **Regional Challenges**

In the broadest terms, the region is engaged in a struggle for political, social, and economic order. Tension and conflict will remain between nation-states and sub-state competitors, between modernizers and traditionalists, between secularists and fundamentalists, between militias and government militaries, between those with much and those with little, and between the ill-treated and their rulers. Our challenge is to apply Seapower in a manner that protects the Asia-Pacific / Indo-Pacific

interests while promoting greater collective security, stability, and trust among all stakeholders within the region, and to find multilateral solutions to issues that may arise with regional navies and coast guards in a supporting role to keep the maritime domain secure. That is a challenge that U.S. Pacific Fleet, as the Maritime Service Component for U.S. Pacific Command must and will embrace to assure we meet these myriad challenges.

There are a multitude of maritime challenges to varied national interests in the maritime domain, but there are numerous opportunities to advance shared interests. Challenges include territorial disputes, the potential for interstate conflict upon the seas (impacting regional and global relations, SLOCs, and the global economy), competition for resources in, or under the sea, threats to security of harbors, ports and cargo, safety of vessels and navigation, the illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing problems (IUU), and use of the sea for the benefit of violent extremist or criminal groups.

Large, ungoverned and under-governed areas along the littorals may be exploited by violent extremists and criminal groups for weapons smuggling, drug smuggling, piracy, and trafficking in persons. Weapons smuggling, if largely unchecked, provides violent extremist groups and criminal elements with easy access to an ample supply of arms, while drug smuggling often funds such activities. Trafficking in persons takes advantage of the most vulnerable; denying what little hope the suffering may have to improve their dire situation. Whether in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca, the problem of piracy has been an issue that presents a difficult problem throughout the Indo-Pacific as the piracy acts have moved east in recent years. Besides the economic costs of ransom payments and increased insurance premiums for international shippers, piracy also has a political impact in the form of public perceptions regarding a lack of regional order and stability that could be used to the advantage of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). In any of its forms, transnational crime is a constant challenge for the entire international community.

The Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific region is also subject to a disproportionate share of natural disasters and human suffering due to the enormity of such unfortunate events. The ability of many of the region's nations to handle large scale disaster relief is limited and there is a need for multilateral action all too often. While the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) provide the regional expertise and long-term rebuilding capability, the expeditionary character, capabilities and capacities of the regional navies and coast guards provide an immediate, short-term complementary role required to relieve human suffering in the initial aftermath of such disasters through humanitarian civic actions to promote humanitarian activities and disaster responses for needed relief efforts to overcome the human suffering. Our U.S. Pacific Fleet has played a major role in supporting such actions expeditiously and professionally in support of our Country Teams in nations that encounter such horrific natural disasters such as volcanoes, tsunamis, floods, earthquakes, typhoons/cyclones, droughts and radiation disasters that were encountered in Operation Tomodachi in Japan after their earthquake and tsunami events that occurred in 2011.

Another naturally occurring threat to the Indo-Pacific, and one that has quickly gained notoriety in recent years, is the potential for a pandemic disease outbreaks. The medical capacity of any nation subjected to a pandemic event would be quickly overwhelmed. Developing a common multilateral framework for cooperation will enable nations to best apply their combined resources to develop coordinated international programs to address the threats of a pandemic episode. To achieve the desired effects, the international effort should include close cooperation of civilian agencies and militaries of donor nations and those nations that are affected and/or are anticipated recipients of assistance. Efforts should be made to include all nations in a partnership of the willing that will agree to openly share information and coordinate their efforts with other nations and various organizations to work diligently to overcome the pandemic challenges. Multilateral solutions must be the bench mark for defeating such incidents. Hence, our Navy's Surgeon General, Vice Admiral Matt Nathan, has employed "medical diplomacy" on a global stage, and such an effort has been embraced within the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific. Moreover, our U.S. Pacific Fleet's "Pacific Partnership" humanitarian deployment events since 2006 have demonstrated a means to advance our regional relationships in SE Asia as well as in Oceania that meet mutual goals and objectives of the host nations as well as those many nations that support these humanitarian actions on a routine basis.

## Maritime Cooperation

Effective international cooperation is dependent on capable partners, friends and allies. The ability to build relationships and capable forces requires focus on capability development and capacity building. Navies should acknowledge that our partners, friends and allies often possess different capabilities, skills, and knowledge and that affords us all opportunities to learn from each other – this is particularly important as we all try and improve our professionalism as navies and coast guards. We should emphasize training, exercises, interoperability, and information sharing that account for each other's complementary capabilities to improve capacity building whenever possible. This is something that we accomplish as we participate in over 125 exercises per year, and conduct over 350 working port visits each year to promote confidence building measures among our friends, partners and allies. These events may seem routine, but they are critical to our achieving our goals and objectives within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Training opportunities exist in a variety of forums: within exercises; through visits by subject matter experts; at partner nation universities, naval academies, and war colleges; through personnel exchanges; and a variety of other avenues. Bi-lateral and multilateral exercises contribute to capability development and greater understanding. Such exercises and events prepare forces for effective integrated operations within the region among all navies and coast guards. Interoperability consists of an ability to effectively communicate, the establishment of common practices and procedures for working together, and is facilitated by personnel exchanges and common equipment to assure interoperability when needed. Information sharing brings situational awareness, and is best exemplified in establishing a shared Maritime Domain Awareness to understand what vessels are over, under and on the ocean in order to identify those involved in malevolent activity. In order to deter adversaries and defeat enemies, navies require capabilities that facilitate rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to our forces and partners. Active information sharing programs will enable us to counter threats to our populations, infrastructure and other interests. In this effort, we should establish or build upon existing information sharing relationships to assure a shared common operational picture for situational awareness purposes.

There is no substitute for direct, frequent, and personal engagement with regional partners at all levels – to build trust, strengthen personal relationships, and to communicate one's intentions effectively and unambiguously. In particular, frequent high-level interactions among senior Flag Officer and governmental leaders are essential. During a crisis, strong military-to-military relationships provide a stabilizing influence and support diplomatic efforts as well as security objectives. These events are mutually beneficial and are extraordinarily important to promote cooperation and understanding throughout the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific region.

Cultural knowledge will be required at every level in order to ensure an understanding of each state in the region, as well as the connections between them. Naval forces need to continue to develop cultural and historical understanding and pursue language training that nurtures effective interaction with diverse international partners and fosters goodwill.

Tailored and synchronized funding for training, education, and security assistance/equipment programs engenders good will and enhances partner capabilities to participate in multilateral exercises, enhance interoperability, and contribute to the combined ability to deter or counter regional threats. Hence, we work very closely with CNO's International Programs Office to ensure we have a good perspective on managing our friends, partners and allies needs to improve their capabilities and capacities in order to work effectively together within the maritime domain.

We should all seek cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain, and developing regional frameworks for improving maritime security and governance in accordance with international norms and standards. As such, U.S. Pacific Fleet supports initiatives that further maritime security cooperation among regional navies and coast guards. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the South Asia Regional Port Cooperative (SARPSCO) are excellent examples of multinational cooperative organizations that work to achieve a means for regional responses to regional issues and understanding. Furthermore, the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meetings Plus – Experts' Working Group events have developed multilateral events and exercises addressing humanitarian assistance, disaster response and maritime security activities that have been favorably received and supported multilaterally for a number of years.

Leading regional navies have an important role in combining extra-regional naval cooperation into regional efforts. These leading regional navies are important in facilitating the advancement of mutual objectives such as ensuring freedom of the seas and in leading regional multilateral maritime security efforts. The USN and other like-minded navies can assist regional navies having the capability, capacity, and will to operate outside their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to further regional naval cooperation and to assist with capability development with and through other regional naval partners. In building partner capacity, all partner navies need to remain sensitive to regional relationships.

Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific countries that operate outside of their EEZ on a routine basis include Australia, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Korea and the U.S. Over the next ten years, more countries may also operate in the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific region on a more routine basis. Bangladesh for example is planning on participating in RIMPAC 2016 as it did observe RIMPAC 2014, which is required prior to fully participating in this exercise. These nations provide a unique opportunity for engagement in that they are regionally indigenous and have the capability to assist other regional partners in development of their navies' capabilities and capacities and to assure greater understanding and interoperability among like-minded navies.

We need to develop a proper efficacy among navies that have a shared perspective and purpose. To execute this line of effort, I would submit that Indo-Pacific navies and extra-regional navies with interests in the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific region should:

- ♦ Support multi-national maritime security initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) that seek to enhance maritime cooperation among Indo-Pacific navies
- ♦ Increase the frequency and duration of senior Flag Officer contact among the leadership of the Indo-Pacific's leading navies
- ♦ Conduct military leadership development for regional military officers and senior enlisted personnel through training and education exchange programs
- ♦ Continue bilateral and multinational exercises which address conventional and irregular threats, and place regional military leadership in positions of command to foster skills necessary to lead a coalition
- ♦ Continue initiatives to develop interoperability for humanitarian missions, placing regional military leadership in positions of command

For our part the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Navy will:

- ♦ Monitor International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, particularly Professional Military Education (PME) programs, in order to cultivate a professional officer corps with the requisite skills required to meet our objectives
- ♦ Monitor the use of Foreign Military Financing and other congressionally authorized funding to build the capability and capacity of leading regional navies to train other regional maritime forces

A stable, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific benefits the global community and advances our efforts from a mil-to-mil perspective as well as from an economic interdependence viewpoint. Navies (and coast guards) should work towards a region free from littoral conflict, freedom of the seas for legal endeavors, and a maritime domain free from those who use it for malevolent purposes. By working along the below four lines of effort:

1. Strengthen and foster relationships among regional and extra-regional navies in order to build cooperative security partnerships
2. Develop and expand Indo-Pacific naval cooperation to advance mutual interests
3. Adapt theater force posture to the requirements of the region
4. Provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response

Navies can deter threats to the international community, maintain strategic access to and for the region, ensure the free flow of goods that the international community depends on, foster maritime security cooperation, and work to deny use of the sea by violent extremist or criminal groups. The result is a level playing field for nations in accordance with international law that facilitates peace and economic prosperity.

The question then that must be addressed in view of our vast responsibilities as the maritime component command for U.S. Pacific Command that also entails an assigned role as the Theater- Joint Force Maritime Component Commander is whether or not we are actually accomplishing those responsibilities, and are we doing so successfully. The Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet's Maritime Security Cooperation Plan (MSCP) is the vehicle that we use to further military-to-military engagement with friends, allies and partner navies in the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Asia-Pacific region that encompasses the U.S. PACOM AOR. As I mentioned earlier, our MSCP is derived from higher headquarters guidance to ensure alignment with national, combatant commander, and Navy strategic and operational objectives. This guidance is contained in the National Security Strategy, Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Navy Maritime Influence CONOP, the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), the Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower, and CNO's guidance for Executing the Maritime Strategy and there are others as well. The MSCP provides direction to conduct maritime security cooperation events with forward deployed naval forces, rotationally deployed forces, and forces deployed in response to emergent operations.

Security cooperation events span the entire range of military operations. The level of engagement with any particular country will depend on that Navy's capacity and capability to operate with the U.S. and other partners and the impact that country plays in U.S. strategic planning. To discriminate the level of effort, the MSCP established goals and objectives through the lens of five objective categories that represent fundamental access, presence, and influence needs required from each country to support existing plans and strategies within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region:

- ♦ Coalition – the capacity and capability to operate in a coalition with the United States Navy gauged across the full ROMO.
- ♦ Access – to ports and airfields for logistics, training, and operations support, as well as access to key leadership and information resident with a particular nation or partner.
- ♦ Choke Point Security – the capability and capacity of a partner to monitor and interdict threat activity in key choke points around the Indo-Asia-Pacific littoral.
- ♦ Policy Support – the alignment of a nation with the U.S. geo-political viewpoint.
- ♦ Maritime Security / Maritime Law Enforcement – the capacity and capability of the partner to monitor, assess, and interdict threats within their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones and further expansion of this capability to the maritime commons.

It is understood that not all five bin categories apply for every country and that there are different levels of requirements in each category depending on the country and its impact on achieving U.S. strategic and operational objectives. I might add that we have employed this method for over a decade and we continue to evaluate and refine its use to ensure we keep focused on what is important for us to achieve our goals and objectives through a viable evaluation process.

## **Evaluation**

Assessment is the continuous monitoring of a situation, evaluating progress towards attaining a goal or objective, and recommending or directing action for improvement. The Commander uses the assessment to adjust operations to remain focused on accomplishing the mission. With regard to military-to-military engagement this involves monitoring those operations, actions, and activities that directly involve our partners and allies or indirectly message other militaries; and observing the environment to determine what changes are occurring that can be related to U.S. deliberate actions. Furthermore, I am exceedingly fortunate to have Captain Kevin R. Johnson USN (Retired) who is in charge of my Maritime Assessment Group and he is our Maritime Domain Awareness Department Head within the Plans and Policy Directorate. His vast experiences in evaluating operations, activities and actions while a member of the U.S. Pacific Command level, as well as at our U.S. Pacific Fleet level for several years while he was on active duty benefits our N5 Directorate more than I am able to articulate. He is critical to our successes in this evaluation and assessment process.

A measure of performance (MOP) is that criterion used to assess friendly actions and is tied to task accomplishment. In the case of U.S. Pacific Fleet the MOPs encompass the operations, actions, and activities that Pacific Fleet and subordinate commands take to advance MSCP objectives and include:

senior leader engagements, port visits, exercises, security assistance programs, training, conferences and symposia, and real world operations.

In most military planning, operations are focused on achieving specific goals and objectives. In assessing the success of these planning efforts, the success of an operation (a measure of performance) is linked to an effect (a measure of effect) that in some way leads to attaining the ultimate objective. A valid military objective may be achieving air superiority over a given region; a necessary condition to achieve this objective could be disruption of the enemy's integrated air defense capability. A TLAM strike could be planned and executed to take out a key node in the electrical grid. The successful execution of the strike would be a measure of performance that would result in the desired effect of shutting down an air defense radar site that would contribute to the overall objective. In these types of operations there is a direct link between the measure of performance and the desired effect. Relating measure of performance to desired effects is not so strait forward when dealing with security cooperation plans and operations. Most effects associated with engagement or theater security cooperation activity can be influenced by more than just military-to-military activity. The economy, politics, culture, world events, and so on will play a role in establishing the environment in which the desired effect resides. At best the assessment of engagement efforts can look at the events executed that support the lines of effort to achieve desired effects and then sample the environment to determine if there has been movement either forward or backward towards any specific goal.

The MSCP effects are encompassed within the objective bin category definitions. The goal of the assessment is to determine where, within the objective bin hierarchy, the country currently stands so that meaningful recommendations can be made that will direct the most effective operations, actions, and activities that can advance the military-to-military relationship towards the objective. The first step in measuring the current status vis-à-vis the objective bin level is to define a set of indicators within each bin category. The measures of effect (MOE) for the coalition category would include the desire of the country in question to work with the United States in a coalition and their level of competence to operate at a level commensurate with U.S. forces. Access measures would include the frequency in which access for ship and aircraft visits are approved and for what types of operations; the responsiveness of the process used to review and grant diplomatic clearance; level of access afforded to both military and government leadership; and finally the degree to which information is shared in support of mutual objectives. Policy support measures are linked to the country's behavior as a responsible international actor and how they encourage or discourage like behavior in other countries; as well as measures of their support for U.S. policies as reflected in public statements, UN voting practices, and participation in programs associated with U.S. policy objectives. Choke point security and maritime security/maritime law enforcement measures are similar and would encompass their capacity and capability to conduct maritime operations; their physical presence and development of maritime domain awareness in maritime areas; and the effectiveness of their operations in countering maritime threats.

Information that is applied to these effects and indicators is derived from multiple sources that include: open source news reporting, after action reviews, IIRs and other intelligence reports, country team inputs, trip reports, and other subject matter expert reports. This information is reviewed against the derived MOE indicators and assessed with a coded score that is consistent with the objective bin category definitions. The results of this analysis can be displayed graphically. At Pacific Fleet we prefer to use a radar, or spider, graph where the current assessment and the desired objective level can be displayed for each MSCP bin category.

The final step in the assessment process for a given country is to convene the Maritime Assessment Group (MAG). The MAG includes the Department of State policy advisor (POLAD), the security assistance officer, the country desk officer, representatives from the intelligence, operations, and training directorates as well as other observers on a situational basis (COMSUBPAC, COMSEVENTH FLEET). A typical MAG meeting will start with the POLAD providing the overarching political-military context for the discussion. This is followed by an intelligence brief focused on military capabilities, current operations, and engagement activity. The security assistance officer briefs the latest information on applicable assistance programs to include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The operations, actions, and activities accomplished during the previous year are displayed and discussed regarding their applicability in supporting the MSCP objective bin categories. The country desk officer briefs each of the bin categories and highlights the predominant effects observed in each area. This is

an open discussion with all parties participating and exchanging views and reaching a consensus on the current state of effects embodied within the MSCP objective bin categories. Based on the discussion of the effects, a determination is made regarding execution of the MSCP for that country: either “on plan” or “off plan.” Recommendations are discussed and compiled that reflect the combined input from the operations, intelligence, and planning subject matter experts to advance the plan in those categories where the assessed status is short of the goal and to maintain status quo in those areas where the goal has been achieved. Recommendations take into account current resource limitations as well as political sensitivities and perceptions.

These results are briefed routinely to me and then I have further discussion among the staff to ensure we are moving in the correct direction to meet our goals and objectives. We also brief the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet on a routine basis to ensure he is aware of our assessments and to highlight where we may be having difficulties in meeting our end states. Hence, we have developed a process that ensures an evaluation effort that is thorough and pragmatic as we examine our operations, actions and activities to keep our MSCP engagement focus on track.

## **Conclusion**

A stable, secure, and prosperous Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific benefits the global community and advances our efforts from a mil-to-mil perspective as well as from an economic interdependence viewpoint. In partnership with our friends, partners and allies, all navies and coast guards must work towards this ideal by deterring threats to the international community, while maintaining strategic access to the region, ensuring the free flow of goods that the international community depends on, fostering maritime security cooperation with our friends, partners and allies, and working to deny use of the sea by violent extremist or criminal groups.

We will maintain strong and flexible U.S. Naval Forces, capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating threats to our interests and those of our friends, partners and allies. This maritime strategy is intended to defend America’s vital national interests, but recognizes that our success comes in large measure from maintaining strong alliances and partnerships with our friends and allies in the region as we work together for the common good of all maritime nations. We must continually assess whether or not we are actually achieving our goals and objectives in the completion of our operations, activities and actions – this is an extraordinarily difficult task, but we believe our Maritime Assessment Group has embraced this analytical challenge and provides us the inputs we need to continue to move forward and adjust our MSCP as may be required to support U.S. Pacific Command’s Theater Campaign Plan, its Theater Campaign Order and our own planning to develop and promulgate a viable engagement plan that is successful. I would also make a comment those events that occur within the Asia-Pacific Rim / Indo-Pacific region cause actions and attitudes to move or change “glacially” within the PACOM AOR and its theater of operations.

I am delighted that we have an N5 staff that reflects decades of experience to work these dynamic challenges and who understand what can be done and constantly strive to advance our relationships with our friends, partners and allies on a daily basis. In executing their duties they strive to meet the imperatives of our Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet that are as follows:

- ◆ Be ready to fight tonight
- ◆ Posture forward, ready to respond
- ◆ Demonstrate and reinforce commitment to international norms
- ◆ Foster cooperation to address regional challenges
- ◆ Assure the region of U.S. Pacific Fleet resilience
- ◆ Innovate to survive

Hence, in my view we are achieving successes and are doing so because of our constant maritime assessment group’s evaluation of what we do to ensure we remain in step with the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander’s Guidance, and our Higher Headquarters’ Guidance, our U.S. Governmental agencies at the Office of Secretary of Defense and Department of State, the Joint Staff and U.S. Pacific Command guidance as well as being compliant to our Chief of Naval Operations “Sailing Directions” that he provides to us to ensure we are aware of his guidance and focus for the maritime domain.

## PANEL 5: SECURITY COOPERATION

### Ambassadors and the Geographic Combatant Commands

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Shoon Murray

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Since the end of the Cold War, accelerating after 9/11, the Pentagon's geographic combatant commands have become increasingly involved in regional engagement strategies, efforts to build capacity in other countries, strategic information, and the disbursement of humanitarian, development, and security assistance. These non-combat roles have been labeled as "Military Diplomacy."<sup>1</sup> One question that arises is whether they cause friction with the "traditional" diplomatic role of the State Department.

Some observers have raised alarms. Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Dana Priest warned that "[O]n Clinton's watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate, came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world."<sup>2</sup> She observed "American generals and admirals...had long exercised independent influence abroad and competed with U.S. diplomats, corporations, and intelligence agencies to shape foreign policy. But during the 1990s, the sheer weight of their budgets and heft of political authority handed them by the White House and the Pentagon had tipped the balance of power in favor of the CINCs and their institutions."<sup>3</sup> Likewise Richard Kohn, a civil-military historian, agreed that "the regional commanders have come to assume such importance in their areas – particularly in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Central Asia – that they have effectively displaced American ambassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign policy."<sup>4</sup>

#### **Growth in Military Diplomacy, but Basic Ambassadorial Authority Remains Intact**

Has the growing diplomatic role of combatant commanders interfered with or diminished the role of ambassadors? To answer that question, Anthony Quainton and I asked about two dozen ambassadors, most recently retired, about their experiences with the combatant commanders and the COCOMs.<sup>5</sup>

We found basic ambassadorial authority intact. Ambassadors remain the President's personal representative, and, as such, the highest ranking U.S. official residing in the country, head of the Country Team composed of all agencies represented at post, with authority to decide whether a U.S. government employee can come into, or stay, in the country, including military personnel not directly deployed by the combatant commander. Judging from our interviews, a combatant commander typically might visit two or three times during an ambassador's three-year assignment, if at all. He would, in most cases, meet with the Minister of Defense and high-ranking military officials, but he might also meet with the President or Foreign Minister. In all such cases that we reviewed, the ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see Derek Reveron, 2008, "Military Diplomacy and the Engagement Activities of Combatant Commanders" in Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm, eds., *Inside Defense* (Palgrave MacMillan). See also, Derek Reveron, 2010, *Exporting Security: International Cooperation, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military* (Georgetown University Press).

<sup>2</sup> See Dana Priest, 2003, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (W.W. Norton and Company), p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> See Richard H. Kohn, 2002, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review* LV: No.3.

<sup>5</sup> Almost all of the ambassadors we interviewed were career State Department officials, not political appointees. Our pool of interviewees mostly served in countries in SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, and what is now AFRICOM. We have only a few representatives from PACOM or the big countries in EUCOM. Our analysis also draws upon findings from an investigation done by six of Senator Richard Lugar's Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members who interviewed 20 ambassadors in 2006 about their embassies' relationship with DOD. See Shoon Murray and Anthony Quainton, 2014, "Combatant Commanders, Ambassadorial Authority, and the Conduct of Diplomacy" in Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., *Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?* (Georgetown University Press). See also U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," December 15, 2006.

would accompany him on these high-level civilian meetings. In strategically important countries, the combatant commander might visit more frequently or start a separate track of discussions with a foreign leader through phone calls. Still, it was the ambassador who had the deeper day-to-day relationship with officials in the country. Significantly, not one of the ambassadors we spoke with felt marginalized or overshadowed by discussions between the combatant commander and the president or prime minister or king of the country where he or she served; almost all of the ambassadors spoke favorably about their respective geographic combatant commanders, describing them as cooperative, not as competitive or displacing.<sup>6</sup> We also found that when there were disputes between ambassadors and the COCOMs, the ambassadors' authority stood ground.

The exception was SOCOM. Many ambassadors we spoke with perceived Special Operations Forces as more free-wheeling and less deferential to ambassadorial authority, and some recounted stories from the early years after 9/11 when SOCOM sent in operatives, or had plans to do so, without notice to or clearance from the respective ambassadors.

### Some Diplomatic Complications

The interviews did reveal, however, that the disparity in resources between State and DoD, and the increase in security cooperation activities by COCOMs, can complicate the ambassadors' diplomatic responsibilities. Here are a few selected examples.

- ♦ The ambassador to Turkey spoke about the challenges of working with the Senior Defense Official (SDO) who represented the agenda of the combatant command and who took charge when a joint military or intelligence operation was at play. While the SDO was an adviser to the U.S. Ambassador concerning military affairs, he also had, in the ambassador's words, "direct reporting lines and sets of responsibilities to EUCOM." What made the relationship difficult, he explained, was the "blurred lines of reporting authority... because of the way things come back to Washington."<sup>7</sup>
- ♦ The ambassador to Jordan recalled an incident where CENTCOM initiated a discussion with Jordanian King Abdullah II about building a Special Operations Training Center. The Ambassador was initially wary of the idea: building one of the world's largest training centers to simulate urban warfare and train troops in counterinsurgency techniques would necessarily put a spotlight on the U.S.-Jordanian military collaboration. The Ambassador was "sensitive to fact that the Jordanian public was not nearly as happy with the military-to-military relationship as the leadership."<sup>8</sup>
- ♦ An ambassador to a former Soviet Republic revealed discomfort that the COCOM was initiating high-visibility humanitarian efforts in the country, where a U.S. military installation was now based, while the population was still wary of a U.S. presence. The Ambassador reasoned that it made more sense for U.S. military personnel to keep a low profile in this case: military-sponsored good works just attracted attention to their controversial presence in the country.<sup>9</sup>
- ♦ In some African countries, the influx of military resources and manpower after 9/11, often on temporary duty assignments, overwhelmed the embassy staff. In a few cases, ambassadors had to deny country clearance for military personnel to slow down the inundation.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Howard Belote also found that the ambassadors he interviewed held a favorable view of geographic combatant commanders and did not see them as usurping civilian control. See Howard D. Belote, 2004, "Proconsuls, Pretenders or Professionals? The Political Role of the Regional Combatant Commanders," Institute for National Security Studies, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=100788>

<sup>7</sup> Interview by Shoon Murray with Ambassador Ross Wilson, June 21, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Interview by Shoon Murray and Anthony Quainton with Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., April 9, 2012.

<sup>9</sup> This ambassador asked not to be identified.

<sup>10</sup> An ambassador in Niger "limited the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the country" and an ambassador in Chad reportedly "called for a 'strategic pause' in implementing TSCTP (Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership) activities, stating the need to reassess available embassy personnel to support DOD activities in country." See Government Accountability Office,

- ♦ One ambassador complained to Richard Lugar’s Senate staff team sent to interview embassy personnel in 2006 that “his effectiveness in representing the United States to foreign officials was beginning to wane, as more resources are directed to special operations forces and intelligence.” The Ambassador felt that “Foreign officials are ‘following the money’ in terms of determining which relationships to emphasize.”<sup>11</sup>

### **Concluding Thoughts**

Overall, we concluded the role of the combatant commander has not become so expansive that it fundamentally challenges the traditional role of the ambassador as the principal interlocutor between the U.S. Government and a foreign government. Ambassadors retain their authority as the highest representative assigned to a particular country. But the combatant commanders and the activities of the COCOMs do influence U.S. relations at the country level, pushing a focus on security issues, and the resource imbalance between the military and the civilian agencies does have implications for the conduct of U.S. diplomatic relations. A troubling gap is revealed: ambassadors retain formal authority within a country but combatant commanders increasingly wield more resources with a regional engagement agenda.<sup>12</sup> As the geographic combatant commands initiate and coordinate more and more security cooperation activities, the role of the State Department as the primary manager of diplomatic relations may erode.

The pronouncements a decade ago of DoD’s supremacy and State’s demise were clearly exaggerated, but the trend is in that direction. The sheer size and energy and purposefulness of and political support for the military establishment vis-a-vis the civilian agencies create legitimate concerns that, in the long run, such warnings could prove prescient.

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“Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership” (GAO-08-860), July 2008, p. 24.

<sup>11</sup>See U.S. Senate 2006, 12.

<sup>12</sup>See Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, 2014, “An Introduction to Mission Creep,” in Adams and Murray, eds., *Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?* See also, Nina Serafino, 2014, “Foreign Assistance in Camouflage?” in Adams and Murray, eds., *Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?*



## PANEL 6: NAVAL STRATEGISTS' PERSPECTIVES

# Naval Diplomacy and Competitive Strategy in the Bay of Bengal

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The arteries of the growing Asian economies are the sea lines of communication. They connect Asia to Middle Eastern and African natural resources and Asian exports to markets in Europe and beyond. The Strait of Malacca is the vital conduit common to them both. To its west lies the Bay of Bengal, a rising economic powerhouse in India, emerging economies such as Bangladesh and Thailand, and a recovering pariah state in Myanmar. To its east lies the South China Sea and its growing complexity as Vietnam, the Philippines, and China vie for rights among overlapping exclusive economic zones. Both China and India's rise unfold in this maritime context and represent both challenges and opportunities for a maturing United States policy in the region. This work examines the Bay of Bengal in the context of a rising China based upon two key assumptions. First, a rising China will continue to seek influence in the Bay of Bengal to protect and where necessary advance its interests. And second, that China's actions vis a vis these interests could cause friction with the interests of the United States, India, and other regional nations. This work's purpose is to understand how the United States and India through a competitive strategy based upon naval diplomacy in the Bay of Bengal could influence and shape China's behavior.

Naval Diplomacy, as described by Geoffrey Till in his work *Seapower- A Guide for the 21st Century*, is a use of seapower combining the soft power aspects of presence, cooperation, and collaboration along with the hard power aspects associated with deterrence. Presence, cooperation, and collaboration build a shared understanding of the maritime domain, encourage interoperability and tactical proficiency, and lay the foundation for commitment and responsibility to shared goals and interests. These aspects of naval diplomacy shape adversary behavior by setting shared standards. The deterrent effects of naval diplomacy build upon that foundation. Through the use, or threat of the use, of credible and capable combat power, adversary behavior is shaped by demonstrated resolve. Competitive Strategy, as described by Thomas Mahnken in his edited volume, *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century- Theory, History, and Practice*, focuses on the use of interactions between adversaries to achieve national interests. It is based upon understanding the nature of the competition between and amongst actors, the rational calculations made to determine cost and benefit, and the overall value of their individual interests as expressed through action. A Competitive Strategy takes aim at those resources necessary for potential adversaries to achieve their interests and creates an interactive environment where their potential denial or the imposition of costs force an opponent to make choices and trade-offs.

Naval Diplomacy and Competitive Strategy are good potential candidates to achieve US interests in the Bay of Bengal because of the limited aims of the United States, India, and China in the region. A regionally hegemonic China is a threat to United States' interests. Yet China's economic power stands to provide numerous opportunities for regional growth and prosperity. The United States must manage China's rise in a manner that takes advantage of this opportunity. But it must maintain a presence that communicates a sense of credible commitment to the region and builds durable partnerships in the face of declining fiscal resources. China must remain a benign presence within the region to assure it maintains access to natural resources and unencumbered sea lines of communication (SLOCs) necessary to fuel its export driven economy. If China pushes too hard and alienates the countries it does business within, it runs the risk of untenable internal political fallout as growth and investment stall. India must look for new opportunities to exert regional leadership in the face of a rising China and solidify its immediate sphere of influence while it sorts out internally how to evolve from its non-aligned roots, advance its standing in East Asia, and grow its navy. The cooperative and collaborative aspects of naval diplomacy lower the barriers to cooperation amongst nations within the Bay of Bengal and establish a commitment and sense of shared responsibility to good order at-sea, while setting the conditions for an evolved and strengthened role for Indian leadership in the region. The deterrent aspects of naval

diplomacy maintain the established good order at-sea through credible and capable US combat power in response to obtuse behavior. China will need to continue to lean forward in the Bay of Bengal in its search for markets, safe SLOCs, and places to invest its savings. Collaborative, cooperative, and deterrent measures establish an environment in the Bay of Bengal where China's obtuse behavior while acting to achieve these interests is readily apparent. And through their own recognition that to proceed in a similar manner would be too costly to their overall interests, China would rather regulate their behavior than proceed in a manner that holds their interests at-risk.

There are three immediate critiques to this work as they relate to the main actors in this strategy. First, in a resource constrained environment, the United States cannot afford the additional levels of commitment to the Bay of Bengal, let alone sustain it for the time necessary, for the strategy to realize its aims. Second, India lacks the capacity, capability, and political will necessary to increase its presence within the Bay of Bengal and commit toward deepening its strategic relationship with the United States. And, third, because of China's opacity in terms of its intentions and strategic imperatives, a situation develops where a competitive strategy creates a destabilizing security dilemma between China, India, and the United States. The United States can indeed afford to commit the additional resources to the Bay of Bengal through looking closely for efficiencies in the force generation process, continuing to examine forward basing requirements, and re-evaluating combatant commander requirements. The Bay of Bengal and China's presence therein will become a larger driver of India's immediate security concerns in the coming years. The United States is one of the few reliable strategic partners for India in managing this concern. This strategy affords India the opportunity to create a sphere of influence that has the potential to expand along with its desires to both look and act east and lead in a manner that plays to their soft-power strengths. But it does so with the United States providing the reliable deterrent muscle necessary while India builds its own capacity and capability. Finally, a valuable byproduct of this strategy is that it clears up opacity in Chinese intention and imperative. Naval diplomacy as part of a competitive strategy establishes limits, forces choices, and exposes poor intentions.

## PANEL 6: NAVAL STRATEGISTS' PERSPECTIVES

### The Dynamics of a Pacific Blockade Strategy

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The purpose of my research will be to further the discussion of a blockade strategy in the Pacific by testing the existing literature against updated geostrategic assumptions and a more detailed articulation of the operational conduct of such a blockade.

In a 2008 Naval War College Review essay, Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray posited that China was, “not fundamentally vulnerable to a maritime energy blockade...”<sup>1</sup> The basis of their conclusion was twofold. First, they argued that China could overcome the effects of a distant blockade in a variety of ways ranging from outright avoidance to clever bills of lading and forgery. Secondly, they argued the infeasibility of a close blockade based on the number of warships required and the extreme risk imposed on those ships by Chinese coastal defense in a wartime scenario.

In 2012 Dr. T.X. Hammes proposed a blockade strategy which he called “Offshore Control” for the achievement of limited objectives in a protracted conflict with China. The scope of this proposal is larger than the petroleum based energy embargo examined by Collins and Murray. Offshore Control prescribes a distant blockade in concert with a close maritime exclusion zone to limit China’s energy and raw material imports while also preventing their industrial exports. The assumed theory of victory is a Chinese bid for peace due to, “China’s economic exhaustion...”<sup>2</sup>

The following year Sean Mirski furthered the argument for a blockade strategy in what he termed an “extensive” conflict with China, which he defined as something short of unlimited war over vital American interests. Like Hammes, Mirski argued a blockade strategy would leverage China’s energy security and economic reliance on seaborne trade through the combination of a lethal inner-ring blockade and a non-lethal outer-ring blockade. It is notable that both Hammes and Mirski rely heavily on cooperative regional partnerships, while Collins and Murray give them only ancillary mention.

These arguments have formed the basis for much of the currently ongoing debate regarding a blockade strategy in the Pacific and my student research is aimed at furthering this discussion. The current literature, in its strategic treatment of a naval blockade, comes short of fully encapsulating the operational requirements of actually implementing and sustaining such a blockade. While our dialogue is oriented at the strategic level, it is important for decision makers to be armed with a more thorough understanding of the operational conduct and requirements of such a strategy. Each argument addressed blockade implementation in a broad scope, but those same arguments came short of fully developing and articulating how such a strategy would be executed operationally. The potential misunderstanding of blockade conduct at the operational level is strategically relevant when the strategy in question relies solely on an effective blockade. Thus, a more thorough understanding of force structure, manpower, and platform limitations will provide strategists a more accurate understanding of the means available to sustain a blockade.

In addition to those operational limitations, which likely contain strategic relevance, there have been significant recent geopolitical developments which challenge some of Mirski’s and Hammes’ assumptions, most notably the U.S. relationship with Russia. Both blockade proponents accept the assumption that at least a cordial U.S. relationship with Russia would be required to sustain an effective blockade of China. Furthermore, the development of what President Obama has termed a “long-term

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<sup>1</sup> Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2, p. 92.

<sup>2</sup> T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict” *National Defense University Strategic Forum*, June 2012, No. 278, p. 5.

campaign” regarding ISIS in Syria and Iraq<sup>3</sup> imposes an additional resource requirement in that region for the foreseeable future. Maintaining a force presence in an additional theater will likely affect the ability to prosecute a protracted blockade strategy in the Pacific.

On the other side of the argument, much has changed since Collins and Murray first argued the futility of a Chinese energy blockade strategy. China is now the largest net importer of oil in the world, with a demand that continues to outpace its production capability.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, much of this demand is being fed by China’s growing Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) fleet<sup>5</sup>; which could potentially benefit a blockade strategy. Does a larger and more consolidated Chinese oil demand lend credence to a blockade proposal? By updating the data used in Collins’ and Murray’s argument, my research will attempt to determine what, if any, effect the new data have on the current relevance of their conclusions.

The analysis of this effort will occur in testing the existing literature against a more explicit operational understanding. The goal of this analysis will be to assess the current operational feasibility of each argument; and to then apply those conclusions in a strategic context based on the updated assumptions. The conclusions will also consider whether the existing force structure is capable of supporting such a strategy and, if not, make future force recommendations.

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<sup>3</sup> Remarks by President Obama during an interview with CBS News, October 14, 2014, available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-says-fight-against-isis-will-be-a-long-term-campaign/>.

<sup>4</sup> EIA *Comparison of net petroleum and other liquids imports for China and the United States*, March 24, 2014, available at, <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531>.

<sup>5</sup> Dexter Yan. “China VLCC Rise to 28 Ships”, *IHS Maritime 360*, 31 December 2014, available at, <http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/15978/china-vlcc-s-fleet-rise-to-28-ships>.

## PANEL 6: NAVAL STRATEGISTS' PERSPECTIVES

### Means to Aims in the Asia-Pacific

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China's naval capacity in Asia rivals that of the United States' navy; However, the numeric advantage does not overcome America's 239 years of experience gained conducting global maritime operations. Nevertheless, the U.S. must be cautious of naval atrophy in critical warfare areas because China's ambition is to achieve parity at sea. Chinese and U.S. naval strength can be quantified in terms of capability, capacity, and readiness. Using these three factors parity between maritime forces can be estimated. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), analyzed under these terms, has achieved parity with some regional competitors in Asia. However, the PLAN is not a peer competitor with America. The PLAN lack experience employing a global maritime force and are hesitant to enter the arena as a responsible international partner.

On a national level, Chinese leadership experience and American leadership experience are not equal. China's leadership has not maintained a navy capable of supporting national aims outside territorial seas long enough to foresee challenges associated with long term modernization. Leaders in America, Britain, and Russia have learned maintaining a credible maritime force over decades challenges even the largest economies and most powerful nations. Chinese leaders, at some point, will be required to make tough decisions between maintaining capability, capacity, and readiness.

Today, Chinese leaders consider sustaining economic growth and military modernization vital to their national security strategy. The country spends approximately 21% of their national military budget on naval modernization to support this strategy. Their aims include, developing a regional blue water navy to enforce maritime claims and defending the sea lines of communication.<sup>1</sup> The purchase, modernization, and production of the aircraft carrier Liaoning and 70 modern surface combatants is evidence of this ambition. This capacity already surpasses that of America's Asia-Pacific forward deployed naval forces, and does not include an aging PLAN surface fleet. However, PLAN leaders have not proven this force capable of credible power projection for either deterrence or coercion.

On the other hand, the United States views China's pursuit of a global maritime strategy, absent a clear desire to become a responsible contributing partner on the world stage, to be in direct contest to U.S. goals in Asia. The *National Security Strategy, February 2015* (NSS 2015) says, "We reject illegal and aggressive claims to airspace and in the maritime domain and condemn deliberate attacks on commercial passenger traffic. On territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation."<sup>2</sup> However, despite these claims, American leaders have made tough decisions about their maritime force. The Chief of Naval Operations' *Navigation Plan 2015 – 2019* and the President's *NSS 2015* prioritize economic and political development above hard power. The CNO states, that aims will be accomplished with appropriate fleet capability, delivered at the capacity afforded by the budget. Clearly, showing America is not building ships to outpace Chinese production and acquisition capability. In fact, today's naval capacity, according to the CNO, is 50 ships operating in the Asian-Pacific. Of the available 50 ships, nine, approximately 18 percent, are forward deployed surface combatants either destroyers or cruisers.<sup>3</sup> If, the CNO's statement and percentages remain accurate and proportionate these numbers will increase to 65 and 12 by 2019. These projections do not exceed the capacity of the PLAN.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> JHS. 2015. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia*. February 10.

<sup>2</sup> The President of the United States. 2015. *National Security Strategy, February 2015*. Report, Washington, DC: The Office of the President of the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of Naval Operations. 2014. *Navigation Plan 2015 - 2019*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy.

<sup>4</sup> Chief of Naval Operations. 2014. *Navigation Plan 2015 - 2019*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy.

Operationally, America has been employing maritime forces in support of national, theater, and military objectives since 1775. This enables the U.S. Navy, without notice, to be called upon to perform multiple missions independently or as part of a coalition. This flexibility gives leaders options and requires them to make prioritize employment scarce maritime resources. This decision-making processes cannot be bought or learned overnight. It has taken success and failure in multiple wars and countless daily operations to gain the experience required to know which options are best in a given situation.

America's Navy has maintained peer advantage over China despite their efforts to purchase parity. However, China, given enough time and economic growth could potential be equal to the U.S in terms of capability, capacity and readiness. America's Navy, under current fiscal constraints, and years of uncontested sea control must be cautious of maritime atrophy. Two developments, which could be seen as evidence of atrophy: are the loss of a significant offensive long-range surface-to-surface capability and the move toward a single mission platform surface vessel like the Littoral Combat Ship.

Preventing atrophy should focus on developing a long-range surface-to-surface capability that incorporates third-party targeting leveraging joint military experience in stand-off strike operations to counter emerging A2AD capability. Second, the Littoral Combat Ship, despite significant programmatic challenges, holds the most potential for increased capacity. U.S. leaders have already identified this fact, but must commit to resolving the problem based on experience, not budget.

Today, American and Chinese naval forces routinely interact at sea while conducting a variety of maritime operations; this fact, demonstrates growing PLAN operational capability. These interactions range from friendly encounters to deliberate provocation between competitors. The U.S. needs to proceed with caution when dealing with an opportunists' China. Specifically because military developers have shown little respect for intellectual property. Subsequently, these developers, pursue technological advancement through procurement, theft, or data collection, whichever is easiest. They attempted this during RIMPAC 2014, and have reverse engineered multiple technologies to advance military capabilities in an effort to gain peer parity with America. These efforts combined with a proven ability to reverse engineer make China a dangerous and formidable growing power. America cannot afford complacency regarding PLAN modernization and goals of maritime parity in relation to China's national aims.

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

# America will be Forced to Lead

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Since 1945, the United States has employed military force about every four years. Some deployments were high-intensity conflicts like Korea in 1950-3 or Iraq in 1990-1. Other deployments were long-term efforts to counter insurgencies and build functioning states such as Vietnam from 1959 to 1975 and Afghanistan since 2001. As U.S. foreign policy looks beyond 2016, with likely reductions in defense spending, and a general distaste from recent bouts of state-building efforts, the United States will be more selective when it chooses to use force and where to intervene.

This does not mean that the world has become a safer place. As the 2015 National Security Strategy makes clear, “there is no shortage of challenges that demand continued American leadership.” Nevertheless, fiscal austerity is a reality in the United States that will affect the expeditionary capabilities and global American military presence. The failure of grand plans to reshape the Middle East and Central Asia have instilled an appreciation for the risks involved in large, transformational international-security projects. Witness the restraint in postconflict reconstruction in Libya to include closure of the embassy in Tripoli and the reluctance to choose a side in Syria's civil war. Even the return to Iraq to combat the Islamic State focuses on the delivery of pinpoint strikes, rather than on the full-scale rehabilitation of the Iraqi state.

### Impact of Technology

At the same time, technological innovation is striking at the heart of one of the key rationales for America's global engagement—U.S. dependence on securing international trade routes for energy, other raw materials and manufactured goods. The United States can afford to be more self-selective in determining how much of the burden of keeping the global commons open it wishes to accept. This is glimpsed in the president's latest national strategy, which captures the zeitgeist of foreign policy: the preservation and expansion of domestic prosperity.

America's own economic recovery, coupled with growing energy self-sufficiency, is benefiting domestic production and redefining the economic landscape. Through a combination of defense cuts and more economic self-reliance, the U.S. global security posture will shift while redefining the national interest. If this trend continues, along with efforts to seek resolutions of existing disputes (such as those between the United States and Iran over its nuclear program), some of the rationale for the extent to which the United States adopts a strategy of forward deployment of its military around the world will be reduced.

### National Strategy and International Partners

When analyzing the extent to which the National Security Strategy is a strategy, we think it should answer three basic questions. First, what do we wish to achieve? That is, what are the desired ends? Next, how do we get there? Finally, what resources are available? Because the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act included provisions requiring the president to publish a National Security Strategy on a regular basis, these debates have found their way into the strategic documents that are supposed to guide national-security policy. The 2015 iteration is very aware of the tension that now exists between a U.S. commitment to maintain the current international system and clear limits on American resources and attention. Thus, President Obama declares, “We embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interests, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global,” but also stresses that “. . . we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict . . .” An emphasis on building

partners' capacity is the American attempt to overcome the tragedy of the commons by sharing the defense burden through foreign military sales in Asia, joint training efforts in Europe and multinational military coalitions in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

As a result, the preference will be to reinforce capable partners, such as India, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, France and Saudi Arabia, who can take on stabilizing roles in their regions to deter the possible rise of challengers intent upon changing the existing global order, rather than have the United States take the lead in all cases. These partners, who can make definitive contributions to international security, have a shared sense of a world defined by secure lines of communication, free trade and collective security. To be sure, future U.S. grand strategy will be global and multilateral, but it will be much more selective than it is today.

Under this approach, the United States would focus on meeting its treaty commitments (but interpret them in a much stricter and restrictive fashion) and would also require its partners, if the threat emanated from their region of the world, to assume primary responsibility for action, including shouldering the costs. The challenge, moving forward, will be whether the United States makes it clear that it is not prepared to deploy a fiscal or military safety net to make up for a partner's shortfalls the next time its foreign policy exceeds its military capacity. In both northeast Asia and the Middle East, the United States expects its partners to do more.

In addition to enabling partners to take more action, a second challenge is coping with the rise of new powers that have benefitted from the existing system, but chafe at the imposition of rules and regulations they feel unfairly privilege the powers of the industrialized Global North and West. It is very true that the emerging powers of the Global South and East are resistant to the idea of a single rulebook for the world's nations that has been drawn up largely in Washington. Yet no other power or group of powers is positioned to create an alternate global system that can produce the same benefits. In particular, China remains suspicious of what it sees as American attempts to get Beijing to do things that lighten Washington's "hegemonic burden" without fundamentally changing the current distribution of power and influence in the international system. Yet, China's rise is inextricably linked to the Americanized international order. Modifying the status quo, rather than replacing it altogether, will remain the guiding principle.

It is likely, therefore, that rising powers will negotiate with the United States over accommodations rather than turn to outright conflict. (Even Russia, which is struggling to retain its position among the major states of the international order, is attempting by its actions in Ukraine to improve its bargaining position through its efforts to define a distinct sphere for itself.) In turn, the domestic politics of the United States, which are trending in favor of retrenchment, will lead Washington to be more prepared to seek power-sharing compromise arrangements reminiscent of the way it did after World War II when the Soviet Union and China were made permanent members of the UN Security Council. The first tentative efforts to define a new pattern of great-power relations between the United States and China, a hallmark of the recent summit between Obama and Xi Jinping, and the outreach to India, are signs of this transformation. Traditional allies in Europe and Asia who have grown accustomed to a United States that picks up the slack in regional security and offsets the threats posed by a rising China and a resurgent Russia may be troubled, but the United States increasingly will be more inclined to find compromises that preserve the overall structure of the current system.

The United States will become more selective in where and when it chooses to act, both because of budget cuts at home and the rising power of other states. Yet Washington is also eager to maintain the current system, which has depended on U.S. willingness to shoulder the lion's share of the burdens. This strategy seems to have been an attempt to signal that other partners need to step up more, but it may have the unintended consequence of casting doubts on Washington's reliability—at a time when clear statements, not purposeful ambiguity, are more critical than ever.

Thus, as the first two decades of the twenty-first century fade, the impetus to challenge the U.S.-led order will recede, with emphasis instead placed on gaining more influence within it. As this occurs, the new world order will end up looking a lot like the old one, where the United States incidentally leads.





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