

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PURSUIT OF MARITIME TRANSFORMATION

Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds. *China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 544pp. \$49.95

The third book in the Naval Institute Press's Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series is a collection of essays and case studies that is important not only for those working in naval studies and for sinologists, but also for scholars concerned with the idea of strategic culture and its application.

Following an introduction by Erickson and Goldstein, the book is organized into four parts: the premodern era (Persia, Sparta, Rome, and the Ottoman Empire); the modern era (France, Russia, imperial Germany, and Soviet Russia); Chinese maritime transformations (Ming and Qing dynasties, the Cold War); and China in comparative perspective, with essays on contemporary Chinese shipbuilding prowess, China's navy today as it looks toward blue water, and the Chinese study of the rise of great powers.

The contributors are such renowned scholars as Barry Strauss, Arthur Eckstein, James Pritchard, Holger Herwig, and Bruce Elleman. As stated in the book's introduction, a close reading of the case studies reveals distinct differences between China and other

powers that have pursued maritime transformation. Erickson and Goldstein note that Beijing has an impressive commercial maritime dynamism and is uncovering a robust historical maritime tradition. China understands that stable relationships with its continental neighbors are a prerequisite for the growth of maritime power. The issue of Taiwan and the strategic significance of China's maritime trade routes mean there is no real comparison with the Kremlin's pursuit of naval power.

The concluding chapter, by Carnes Lord on China and maritime transformation, is a key element in this meta-narrative of naval history—an approach that is valuable as a complement to the customary focus on the leading naval power but not as a substitute for it. Lord depicts a genuine maritime transformation, and the case studies provide a valuable historical perspective, although the chapter's connection to part 4 is limited.

The most useful chapters are those on China, because they contribute to the historical memory of Chinese policy makers. Elleman notes the extent to

which defeat helped lead China to modernize its navy; defeat in both opium wars forced China to bring new ideas to the forefront. Bernard Cole's assessment of the Cold War reveals a Chinese naval service viewed by its military and civilian masters as an organization whose primary mission was to support army forces. Defensive concerns gained priority, and a new engagement with naval power had to await the end of the Cold War.

Current Chinese developments underline the folly of the Western military posture, with its planning largely focused on Afghanistan and Iran. There is a serious risk that crucial long-term capability will be sacrificed to the exigencies of campaigning in Afghanistan. While the development of Chinese capability has led to responses by such regional powers as Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea, there has not been a sufficient move from awareness to action on the part of other powers. The Chinese naval challenge is apparent as an aspect of an increasingly far-flung Chinese defense system that has serious implications for Western interests in the Middle East and South Asia—implications that are not addressed by counter-insurgency capability.

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Hasik, James. *Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008. 224pp. \$35

For decades, analysts have understood the nonmarket conditions of defense development and procurement. First, government-as-buyer and ultimate legal authority are atypical market constraints and, second, military weapons systems often have no commercial equivalents and may also have several unique component or material requirements—for example a one-off electronic component architecture.

The recent trend of fewer systems required, or at least procured, in the roughly synchronous post-Cold War and precision-munitions eras has more often than not exaggerated the already anomalous defense-systems market. The Department of Defense (DoD) generally buys or intends to buy smaller numbers of more capable and complicated ships, manned aircraft, tanks, munitions, etc., than it has in the past. Advancing technological sophistication and relatively smaller unit buys, in turn, pressure defense-systems suppliers' business models, alliances and acquisitions, systems integration competencies, and subassembly, component, and material supply chains.

James Hasik is a defense industry analyst and former naval officer with degrees in history, physics, and business. His first book (coauthored with Michael Rip in 2002) was a well received, comprehensive examination of GPS and its implications in modern warfare. With this book, Hasik continues his insightful analysis of the DoD toolbox via a set of six case studies covering disparate defense-system development projects woven into a succinct but overarching analysis of the current international arms industry. The cases examined are air, land, sea, and space

systems, each a precision-guided weapon project and a mission-planning system.

The book's foremost merit is its sober analysis, grounded in business economics. Each case covers technological, economic, and operational trade-offs and frames each project within a relevant and timely international business context. For example, Hasik's space-system case emphasizes the competencies and alliances of the few firms competing in the satellite business. He explores the credible competition for the Space-Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS Low) satellite contract by the five-hundred-employee Spectrum Astro Corporation against the established and significantly larger firm TRW Inc. Hasik's land-vehicle case demonstrates how the DoD benefited from decades of prior research and development in South Africa on blast-resistant vehicle design, greatly accelerating the Army's and Marine Corps's adaptations for our current wars. As a bonus, Hasik adroitly presents the academically rigorous clearly, and for a reader accustomed to plowing through the arcane prose of technical reports and academic papers, this is no small gift.

The Department of Defense is constantly looking for innovative technologies through its service labs and several science and technology development programs. The enduring challenge is in managing the underlying risk and in the integration into a complex system-of-systems life cycle amid competing priorities, operational commitments, and assessments of the future strategic environment. Although this book could be more comprehensive, it need not be. Through his case-study selection and opening and closing synthesizing

chapters, Hasik provides a cogent and instructive assessment of innovative technology development and procurement approaches across defense system sectors. *Arms and Innovation* suggests opportunities for more nimble defense systems innovation in the future, opportunities that do not require comprehensive acquisition reforms or reiterations of revolutions in military affairs.

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Yoo, John. *Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush*. New York: Kaplan, 2009. 524pp. \$29.95

John Yoo's most recent book is far more than a defense of the George W. Bush administration, which he served, as some of his many critics may find it. In fact, *Crisis and Command* is a carefully documented study of the exercise of presidential power from George Washington to President Obama. This is the last book in a trilogy by Yoo, the first two being *The Powers of War and Peace* (2005), which explains the founders' original understanding of the foreign-affairs power within the Constitution, and *War by Other Means* (2006), which discusses the law and logic behind the Bush administration's counterterrorism policies. This study extends well beyond the Bush administration, focusing mainly on Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. In each of these respected leaders Yoo finds bold presidents who changed the existing political order and transformed it into

their own. They found distinction by leading the nation through crises, carefully shaping the direction of national security policy and recasting the boundaries of presidential authority. Through careful historical analysis, Yoo reminds us that the relationship between presidential greatness and the exercise of executive power is an inextricable link that has always taken advantage of the vague contours of Article II of the Constitution, which addresses executive authority. In his historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces the founders' work at the Constitutional Convention to accommodate the executive's energy and decisiveness within a workable constitutional framework.

In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and addressing the Indian uprisings of 1789–90, the first U.S. president believed that Congress having created a military, he had the authority to decide when and how to use it. In the latter case, Washington sought no authority from Congress when he directed an attack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians 150 miles within their territory. Similarly, in the *Prize Cases*, President Lincoln concluded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that after hostile acts are directed against this nation the president is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any legislative authority. President Roosevelt went even farther prior to the Second World War by taking action to assist Britain through the Lend-Lease program and to isolate Japan from critical resources without congressional approval or consultation, actions that clearly provoked Japan and drew the United States ever closer to war.

A later section in the book reflects the application of this lengthy historical analysis to the current administration and to the response of the Bush administration to 9/11. Yoo points out that President Bush looked to former presidents for support of his actions. He states succinctly that "Congress simply does not have the ability to make effective, long-term national security decisions because of the difficulty in organizing 535 legislators and the political incentives that drive them toward short-term, risk-averse thinking."

In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on President Obama's early determination to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA's special authority to question terrorists, and to suspend military commissions in the middle of the trials of al-Qa'ida leaders for war crimes. Describing the new president's law enforcement approach to terrorist violence, he asks whether this approach, although popular with his liberal supporters, can be successful. He finds hope in recent decisions by President Obama, however, in increasing troop levels in Afghanistan and in the increased use of Predator drones. He observes that the new president may be learning to "draw on the mainspring of Presidential power as deeply as his greatest predecessors."

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Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army*. New York: Crown, 2009. 330pp. \$28

Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe have attempted to provide a narrative of the U.S. Army from the end of the Vietnam War through the present wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by tracing the careers of four Army general officers. Using biographic sketches of Generals John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter Chiarelli, and David Petraeus, *The Fourth Star* seeks to show how the Army has changed doctrinally and developed its leaders. Cloud and Jaffe deliver a story that is engaging, although short on analysis, explaining how as an institution the Army adapted post-Vietnam. As a result of their approach, the story of the “epic struggle” for the Army’s future between fighting counterinsurgencies and conventional battles is anecdotal at best. The scholarly opinions that have shaped the debate over the future Army doctrine are missing.

Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Department of Social Sciences (“Sosh”) at West Point was instrumental in shaping the strategic thinking of these Army leaders as well as of the Army as an institution. The book attributes the unconventional thinking of Petraeus and Chiarelli to their experiences as Sosh instructors. Cloud and Jaffe explain how Petraeus collaborated with Andrew Krepinevich (author of *The Army and Vietnam*, 1988), to place the blame for the service’s failures in Vietnam directly on the Army. Throughout the text, the authors are careful to note Sosh alumni who serve with or under these generals. Yet the emphasis on the role of the Sosh faculty in this story is somewhat misleading—especially since both current and former Sosh faculty are the main sources for much of the narrative. One could have easily looked to West Point’s

Department of History to find similar connections and influence. The roles of Dr. Fred Kagan and Brigadier General H. R. McMaster in shaping the “surge” strategy of 2007 and 2008 represent an example.

However, Cloud and Jaffe do succeed in chronicling four generals whose careers began at the end of Vietnam and have culminated in the present. Petraeus is portrayed as the overly competitive Francophile infantryman, Abizaid as the international soldier-student of Arab culture, Casey as the hard-charging armor officer, and Chiarelli as the career tanker of Cold War Europe. While Reagan’s military readied itself for tank battles with the Soviet Union, these officers were going to graduate school and thinking seriously about the next war. In the post-Cold War years, all four men gained promising reputations during crises in Kurdish Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The chapters on Iraq are the most interesting. Abizaid, as commander of U.S. Central Command, seems to understand the challenges of a post-Saddam Iraq but is powerless to stop the rush toward de-Baathification. Petraeus, for his part, appears as the imperious commander, acting as a statesman and commander in creating a post-Saddam government in Mosul. Conversely, Casey seems overwhelmed, coming to terms with his errant assumption about defeating the insurgency through elections and politics by the end of 2006. By the end of the book, Abizaid and Casey have become the older, ineffectual model of the post-Vietnam Army, while Chiarelli and Petraeus are the newer, progressive model—the Army that emphasizes protecting the people over protecting the force.

The Fourth Star offers additional understanding to events already described by fellow journalists Bob Woodward, Tom Ricks, and Linda Robinson. However, the book about this epic struggle for the future of the Army doctrine is still yet to be written.

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Miller, Aaron David. *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*. New York: Bantam, 2008. 407pp. \$26

This interesting book aims at unraveling a significant mystery that has lain at the heart of international diplomacy for more than a generation: Why and how has America failed to bring lasting peace to the Middle East? Specifically, why, despite so much expended American money and political effort, does peace between the Jordan River valley and the Mediterranean look as far off today as in the last forty years? Answers to this question have never been lacking, yet few authors have tried to tackle it comprehensively and fairly.

There are few individuals better placed to answer this question than Aaron David Miller, a scholar-diplomat who was an eyewitness to much of the drama he recounts, having served as an adviser on the Middle East to six U.S. secretaries of state. Miller's prose is accessible and more, as he draws the reader into behind-the-scenes vignettes that make the most of a topic that is potentially mind-numbing, given its complexities and nuances. The author is refreshingly open about his biases as an American Jew whose emotions about the plight of

the Palestinians are sincere, as are his not-infrequent frustrations with the Israelis. His notion that both Israelis and Palestinians are caught in a macabre diplomatic dance that occasionally delves into comedies of the absurd would merit a smile, were it not for the countless lives—and, as Miller demonstrates, diplomatic careers—that have been wrecked while the band plays on.

Miller's vivid, usually empathetic descriptions of the cast of characters alone are worth the price of admission. This is diplomatic history at its most accessible and enjoyable. Miller's lively work is thoroughly researched, including interviews with almost all the dramatis personae, so this is much more than a you-are-there account. The author's analysis of the problems that he, like so many others, failed to unravel fully is candid and detailed, and it will be a reference source for future generations of scholars.

Moreover, *The Much Too Promised Land* deserves high praise for finding paths through all the major minefields, not least the vexing issue of the Israeli lobby, the alleged den of limitless Jewish money and aggressively neocon influence on U.S. foreign and defense policy. While not all readers will accept Miller's answers, the fair-minded will appreciate the care and tact with which he addresses them. In this sense, this work is a polite refutation of such recent academic writings as those of Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, who have perhaps indulged in an overdrawn analysis of Israeli influence in Washington, D.C.

In his conclusion, Miller offers some thoughtful guideposts to thinking about this never-ending problem and what it

means for regional and international security. Considering that the Arab-Israeli dispute looks as intractable as ever (and that the Jewish state is facing demographic crises that threaten to overwhelm it by the end of this century, if not before) the author's counsel, including a plea for humility, is refreshing and much needed. His concluding thought about America's role in the peace process, that "although we remain vital to peacemaking, we can't drive the train as much as I once believed," is a fitting one and captures the essence of the author—a thoughtful observer, seasoned analyst, veteran diplomatist, readable scholar, and all-around mensch.

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Law, Randall D. *Terrorism: A History*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2009. 342pp. \$24.95

Rarely is a book written to fulfill the author's own need for a scholarly work on a topic that he teaches at university. So when Associate Professor Randall Law determined that he must write a book on the history of terrorism, he sought to satisfy a need not only for himself but for other professors and researchers who deal with the subject. According to Law, "When I started teaching a course on the subject shortly after September 11, 2001, I could not find a book for my students that told this story in a clear chronological fashion, that provided sufficient analytical framework, that made use of the most recent scholarly work, and that was comprehensive but succinct." Law's book does exactly what he intended.

Dr. Law, a historian, immediately wrestles with his own working definition

of terrorism with two core assertions. The first is that individuals or groups act through rational and conscious decision making within political and cultural contexts. Therefore, according to Law, terrorism is not "a kind of madness." His second states that terrorism is a communicative act intended to influence the behavior of the audience. Consequently, the author emphasizes a correlation between terrorism and the media throughout the book.

An astute reader might ask on what basis the author chose certain groups and historical events. Actually, Law selected three viewpoints that would give the reader a broad understanding of the complexity of the subject. The first is what he calls the "terrorist toolbox," a set of tactics, behaviors, and methods normally associated with terrorism. The second is that terrorism is "violent theater" that leverages symbols and provocatively violent acts. The third viewpoint is that terrorism has become a cultural construct, while the word itself connotes illegitimacy or is used as a label to vilify enemies.

Although concise and of a nice, workable size for classroom use, the volume treats terrorism with a stunningly all-encompassing approach. Its sixteen chapters truly span the historical, cultural, and political underpinnings of terrorism.

As one who teaches graduate courses on terrorism to federal, state, local, and tribal law-enforcement professionals, as well as military leaders, I found this book to be a welcome addition to the multitude of scholarly materials on terrorism. Randall Law has written the quintessential work on the subject, one that is provocative and educational, and will stimulate a necessary dialogue for future decision makers.

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McCarthy, Andrew C. *Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad*. New York: Encounter Books, 2008. 250pp. \$25.95

For anyone who has followed, however peripherally, the disposition of those who have come to be called “detainees” of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Andrew McCarthy’s *Willful Blindness* is a mandatory read. McCarthy was the prosecuting U.S. attorney in the case of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman, for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. The book chronicles McCarthy’s prosecutorial clean sweep in that case, in which ten defendants were convicted and the remaining two pleaded guilty. McCarthy details with great insight and clarity the conspiracy to bomb the World Trade Center and the tortuous road of the prosecutorial effort after the attack—tortuous because the available law enforcement and prosecutorial tools were either antiquated or inadequate to cope with the enormity and complexity of the perpetrators’ efforts.

The United States has been grappling for years with how to treat and process those who have been captured and held during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Protocols of neither intelligence, justice, nor the treatment of prisoners have proved adequate to deal sensibly and reliably with a diffuse yet tight-knit group of adversaries.

The book begins with the chapter “Imagine the Liability!” referring to a concern of the FBI that an informant

placed in the inner circle of the conspirators might materially contribute to the success of the operation. Indeed, the informant in this case worked his way into the conspiracy only because of his bomb-making skills. His FBI handlers envisioned a very difficult legal battle if, despite the warning provided by their informant, the plot nevertheless succeeded. As a result, the informant was extracted and hidden before the actual target or timing of the effort had been discovered. Through the efforts of their informant, the FBI knew that something was afoot, but they did not know precisely when or where, having exfiltrated their undercover source before he could gain access to that critical information.

Although this work reads much like a novel, it offers clear examples of how laws and procedures established for a very different context can have severe and unanticipated side effects.

As a single example of many mentioned in the book, the process of discovery during the preparation for trial can cause to be divulged important information that should be protected. As is routine in such matters, in the course of the pretrial workup a list of unindicted coconspirators is developed. On such a list, in 1994, was the name Osama Bin Laden. Appropriately, under U.S. law, the list was made available to defense attorneys for the accused; it was subsequently leaked to Bin Laden, who was in Kenya at the time. As McCarthy writes, “Think, though, how valuable [the fact] that [he was on the list] would be for bin Laden to know. If you are he, you say: ‘Maybe the government has an informant in my inner circle. Maybe I should use a different phone.

Maybe I should stop having meetings in my usual places because they might be bugged.”

Finally, this book is helpful for connecting the dots after the fact, for reconsidering how such adversaries think and plan. For example, McCarthy points to statements made three weeks prior to the actual attack of the USS *Cole* in October 2000 by Sheikh Omar’s son, and also to the writings of Nidal Ayyad, one of those convicted in 1995 of the first attack on the World Trade Center: “We promise you that next time it will be very precise and the World Trade Center will continue to be one [of] our targets.”

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Casey, Steven. *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 476pp. \$55

The far left and the far right have something in common, especially when their enemies hold the White House. They each tend to think that the president can get away with anything, because he controls the media and the media controls the public, especially when it comes to issues of war. Professor Steven Casey of the London School of Economics actually *knows* something about this topic, usually the realm of strong opinions based on strong prejudice. In 2000 Casey wrote perhaps the most perceptive study ever published on presidential policy and public opinion during World War II. His *Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany* (2001) demonstrated

that FDR late in the war could not lead the public to change its opinion that the Nazi Party, not the German people, was the primary culprit of German aggression. The president did not make this distinction, but the country focused blame on Hitler and his inner circle, whom the Allies would remove from power. They would not sanction the plan of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to dismantle German industry or to smash the German nation into a bunch of separate principalities. Why punish the people for the sins of their deposed government?

Casey takes on President Harry S. Truman under different, later circumstances. Truman wanted to “de-escalate,” so to speak, public opinion lest it lead to World War III versus China and the Soviet Union. The president, in this effort, refused to call the Korean conflict a “war,” as opposed to “a police action,” his fateful phrase first uttered at a press conference on 29 June 1950. This signal to the American people did not work out as the White House planned, as Korea quickly turned out to be a war by everyone’s definition—except that of executive branch officials, who inadvertently freed the administration’s opponents from pressure to mute their criticism, which is what the minority usually does during a war lest it flirt with disloyalty. “The administration’s subdued public posture,” says Casey, “often afforded the Republican opposition the perfect *opportunity* to take the offensive.” Indeed, the public seemed mystified about government policy, as one State Department official pointed out: “Those who approved our resistance [to the communist invasion] in Korea now find the present situation completely confusing and baffling.”

A student of the Korean War can now understand why the administration had such difficulty containing Douglas MacArthur before firing him on 11 April 1951. Could the White House come up with a line to rival the general's riveting message: "There is no substitute for victory"? Perhaps, but it could not deliver one, since its credibility was largely shot by mid-1951, when Truman registered 23 percent public approval, the lowest in the history of the Gallup Poll. In a battle of sound bites, General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to rescue administration policy by testifying that MacArthur's proposal to attack China "was the wrong war, at the wrong place, against the wrong enemy."

One hears that Casey's next book will be about the U.S. Army and correspondents in World Wars I and II. This reader would have preferred that he pushed on into the next war—doing presidents, policy, the media, and public opinion during Vietnam. For those of us particularly interested in those topics, Casey would thus produce a trilogy on wartime policy worthy of the three volumes on military operations produced by Douglas Southall Freeman (*Lee's Lieutenants*, on the U.S. Civil War) and Rick Atkinson (*The Liberation Trilogy* on the U.S. Army in the European theater in World War II). Yes, Steven Casey is that good.

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Hendrix, Henry J. *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 288pp. \$34.95

Commander Henry J. Hendrix has written a neat monograph based on his doctoral work. He makes two related arguments: first, that one cannot understand the diplomatic style of President Theodore Roosevelt without first understanding his attitude toward the efficacy and use of naval power; and second, that the existing literature has not adequately integrated naval and military historical methods of analysis with existing diplomatic historical approaches. Consequently, previous interpretations of Roosevelt's foreign policy decisions, as they relate to incidents that involved the use of naval power, are incomplete, precisely because they do not fuse the diplomatic and political with the naval—especially the perspective reflected by the navalist attitudes of Theodore Roosevelt.

As for structure, the book begins with the now-common device of the narrative vignette—in this case the "sailing of the Great White Fleet," as a means of establishing the ambience of the moment of the great president and his great fleet. With the reader now interested in "the rest of the story," Hendrix proceeds in a workmanlike and professional manner, establishing in the first chapter the basis for the beginning of the "beautiful relationship" between TR and the object of his affection and desire, the U.S. Navy. Included here is the story of Roosevelt's famous action as Assistant Secretary of the Navy regarding the deployment of Admiral George Dewey's Far East Squadron to Manila Bay. This episode may be regarded as typical of Roosevelt's activist attitudes and actions regarding the Navy.

The remaining chapters focus topically. The closing chapter on the Great White Fleet is the only one that deals directly

with the linkage of the U.S. Navy to an “American Century.” The odd man out is the chapter on technology, although it is a welcome discussion, given both TR’s fascination with new technology and the inherently high-tech nature of navies in general. Additionally, this chapter provides ammunition for a much larger argument about modern Americans and their fascination with technology.

However, the bulk of the book deals with the diplomatic-naval arguments mentioned. Hendrix makes an excellent case for his thesis that previous historians have paid too little attention to the intersection of naval and diplomatic trends of analysis. He employs a multidisciplinary approach that examines naval signals, logbooks, war plans, and other archival Department of the Navy records to render less opaque some of TR’s diplomatic actions and motivations.

Although this work is not a biography, it adds value to existing ones, especially Edmund Morris’s *Theodore Rex*, which focuses exclusively on his presidency. Theodore Roosevelt had many different personae, and it has not escaped historians that he was not only a historian but also a naval historian, par excellence. Neither has it escaped them that, along with A. T. Mahan and Stephen Luce, he is the father of the modern U.S. Navy. However, Hendrix makes a strong argument that TR’s naval persona was critical to understanding his use of power, especially in foreign relations.

The book’s minor weakness is its narrow, monographic scope. The chapters proceed in a generally chronological manner but maintain no extended narrative thread—the unifier, instead, is

the topical theme. Hendrix may have missed an opportunity to make a larger statement about the relationship of the man to the institution and its importance to the United States under the entire Roosevelt “dynasty.” There is much peripheral evidence here about the institutional and organizational aspects of the Navy that made this reviewer long for more discussion. TR’s presidency was a time of profound change in the military establishment of the United States, a period that involved the Root reforms of the Army and the establishment of the General Board of the Navy, as a sort of proto-naval general staff. TR’s role in these critical early years of the General Board would have been worth exploring.

These are minor quibbles in an otherwise fine book that adds substantially to the understanding of an important aspect of the rise of the United States to great-power status and influence during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. I recommend this book for a broad audience, especially those interested in the development and execution of American foreign policy in the early twentieth century.

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Brooks, Max. *World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War*. New York: Crown, 2006. 352pp. \$14.95

“A breath of fresh air stormed into the Naval War College over the rotting flesh of the undead,” reads the first book-club selection of the President of the Naval War College. Without

vilifying another country or radicalizing any group, *World War Z*'s zombie pandemic and ensuing global chaos are the vehicle transporting the reader straight into the potential realities of what can happen when the functionality and safety of our cultural norms, personal values, societal ethics, and governmental structures are stressed, overwhelmed, and broken.

A quick title scan of current military and national security professional reading lists suggests that there is something different about the selection; most are exclusively works of nonfiction, and none of them have the word "zombie" in their titles. However, one does not have to be a zombie fan to enjoy this book. Another consideration is that if any book passes the zealous scrutiny of a cultlike following of "zombie-ophiles" and the similarly exacting standards of the President of the Naval War College, this should spark your curiosity—if not an automatic "add" click for your personal military and national security reading list.

World War Z is a work of apocalyptic fiction set in modern times and told in a journalistic style. Man is the main character; the zombie simply provides the literary mechanism facilitating a journey into "total war." The book opens and reads like, and brings about imagery combining, George Romero's 1968 classic *Night of the Living Dead*, Quentin Tarantino's often eclectic and avant-garde directing style, and Tom Clancy and Clive Cussler's flair for globe-trotting storytelling. Attention to historical detail, geopolitical issues, and nuances of social and applied sciences makes it intriguing for most nonfiction and historical-fiction purists. Three

years of research and the confirmation of all facts and assertions by a professional "fact-checker" enable readers to focus and to immerse themselves into the horrifying musings of what can happen when mankind faces annihilation.

The narrative travels beyond the brink of extinction and continues on a journey of choice, response, societal resilience, and recovery. These choices and actions allow one to go beyond contemplation and explore the potential preventive measures and solutions needed not only to survive but to win.

Are there any negatives about *World War Z*? There are, and readers can find their own likes and dislikes. One notable point is the physiological and biological improbabilities associated with the ability of zombies to exist and survive, but as with all science fiction, some bending of reality is to be expected. On occasion political biases creep into the writing where perhaps more neutral or nuanced references would have been more effective and less distracting. Those comments aside, *World War Z* is a great read.

The most telling local review of the book, here at the Naval War College, is the number of students and faculty who, as parents, have said they were going to share the book and read it again with their children as part of developing their understanding about the world, and people's responsibilities to themselves and one another. Applying this metric, *World War Z* is a worthy choice for any reader, be they practitioners of national security or not.

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