

James R. Holmes is a senior research associate at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs; editor of the Center's journal, The Monitor; and instructor in the university's honors program. He earned a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is the author of the forthcoming Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations, as well as numerous articles and shorter works.

WHY DOESN'T AMERICA HAVE A NELSON?

Does It Need One?

by James Holmes

Two thousand five marks the bicentennial of the Battle of Trafalgar. Off the southern Atlantic coast of Spain, at Cabo (Cape) Trafalgar, a British fleet commanded by Lord Horatio Nelson crushed a larger Franco-Spanish fleet. The encounter answered one of the central questions of the Napoleonic Wars—would Napoleon’s legions be able to invade the British Isles?—with a resounding No.¹ The British media today are abuzz with talk of Nelson’s exploits. The Royal Navy planned a full slate of events to honor the man the poet Lord George Byron dubbed “Britannia’s god of war.”² Towns and seaports have scheduled their own tributes. All evidence points to a surge of public enthusiasm for Horatio Nelson in particular, and for Great Britain’s maritime traditions in general.³ Naval history, in short, continues to shape public discourse.

Not so in America. Why? Like Great Britain, the United States is a maritime nation. Like Britain, the Republic has—from the day of John Paul Jones forward—owed much of its prosperity and security to the sea. America’s history is replete with heroic figures and feats of derring-do, from the single-ship actions of the War of 1812 to the epic struggle with the Japanese navy at Leyte Gulf.⁴ Yet in stark contrast to the hubbub surrounding Britain’s Trafalgar bicentenary, great naval endeavors are noticeably absent from our national discourse. At this writing the sixtieth anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima, one of the pivotal clashes of the Pacific War, has passed with scarcely a murmur from the media or the public. For the good of the U.S. Navy and the nation, American sailors, veterans, and naval historians need to put this kind of oversight to rights.⁵

BRITONS PAY TRIBUTE TO THE GREAT MAN

Why the disparity between such kindred societies? Despite the gap of two centuries and thousands of miles of ocean, it is possible to venture some informed speculation. First, as Byron and a legion of other admirers would attest, Horatio Nelson was a unique man. Granted, other naval heroes were his equal in certain respects. For example, Lord Collingwood showed that he was as skilled in combat when he took over from Nelson after Nelson was mortally wounded at Trafalgar and ably commanded the fleet, consummating the victory.⁶ Some historians would rate Collingwood as Nelson's equal as a warrior and seaman.⁷ Others possessed his force of character. Thomas Cochrane, one of the most accomplished frigate commanders of Nelson's day and "the master of small ship tactics and the *ruse de guerre*," served as the model for both Patrick O'Brian's Jack Aubrey and C. S. Forester's Horatio Hornblower—ample testament to his larger-than-life character.⁸ However, none could match Nelson in all of these respects.

Lord Nelson's boldness, strategic and tactical acumen, and sheer bravado endeared him to Britons, as did his high-profile triumphs at the Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Corsica (1796); the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797); the Battle of the Nile (1798); and, of course, Trafalgar (1805). At Trafalgar, rather than have his ships form up parallel with Napoleon's fleet and pound away—the usual mode of nautical combat in the Age of Sail—Nelson divided his fleet into two squadrons and ordered his captains to cut across the Franco-Spanish battle line, creating a melee that favored British gunners. He admonished his officers to close with and annihilate (one of his favorite words) the Franco-Spanish fleet.⁹ "No captain can do very wrong who lays his ship alongside that of the enemy," he proclaimed.¹⁰ Nelson exploited the edge in command and control conferred by the Royal Navy's freshly devised system of signal flags.¹¹ That he fell at Trafalgar only served to etch Nelson's greatest deed into the British public mind—much as Abraham Lincoln's death at his moment of greatest triumph made him a fixture atop many rankings of American presidents.¹²

In recent decades it has become fashionable to downplay the impact of individuals on history. Great, impersonal forces, we are told, carry us along to their own mysterious ends, indifferent to our efforts to influence events. Maybe, but great men still command the admiration of their countrymen.

Nelson's like is not to be found in American naval history. The momentary brilliance of Commodore Stephen Decatur braving the pasha of Tripoli's guns to burn the captured U.S. frigate *Philadelphia* (1804), of Admiral David Farragut forcing Mobile Bay (1864) despite "the torpedoes," or of Commodore George Dewey demolishing the Spanish flotilla at Manila Bay (1898) cannot measure up to the repeated victories of a Nelson. Nor does the sustained excellence of the U.S. Navy's World War II elite measure up.¹³ Admiral Chester Nimitz oversaw

the Pacific War from Pearl Harbor, and so was denied the laurels due a fighting admiral. The Japanese navy made a sucker of Admiral William Halsey at Leyte Gulf, luring him off with an unarmed fleet. The cerebral Admiral Raymond Spruance lacked the dash of a Nelson, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, perhaps the U.S. Navy's best candidate for the eminence of a Nelson, made his reputation not by masterminding an epic, Trafalgar-like fleet engagement, but as a destroyer squadron (23) commander—too obscure a post to inspire lasting public ardor.¹⁴

The U.S. Navy has yet to produce a commander who can equal Nelson's combination of war-fighting excellence, personal gallantry, and public prominence. Whether the Navy can do so today, absent a powerful rival on the high seas, is doubtful at best.

MORTAL THREATS CONCENTRATE MINDS

Great Britain's national survival was at stake, and the sea was where its fate would be decided. Gratitude for national salvation only intensified Nelson's countrymen's affection for him. Says Arthur Herman, author of the acclaimed new book *To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World*, "It was the Royal Navy, led by men like Horatio Nelson, that stopped [Napoleon] in his tracks, and preserved the liberty of Europe and the rest of the world."¹⁵ Naval supremacy not only fended off attack but allowed British trade—the foundation of national power—to thrive in the face of French commerce raiding. Alfred Thayer Mahan credited Britain's "watery bulwarks, traversed in every direction by her powerful navy," with securing the nation's "peaceful working as the great manufactory of Europe."¹⁶ Concluded Mahan, "Those far distant, storm-beaten ships upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world."¹⁷

Insulated from foreign enemies by two vast oceans, the United States has never faced the kind of mortal, seaborne threat that menaced Great Britain during its decades-long duel with France. Consequently, Americans are less likely to view their naval heroes as national saviors.¹⁸

GEOGRAPHY SHAPES ATTITUDES

Geography played a defining role in Britain's economic, political, and military life. Lord Halifax observed in 1694, "The first article of an Englishman's creed must be that he believeth in the sea."¹⁹ Writing in 1907, the British diplomat Eyre Crowe agreed, in less lyrical but more analytical terms. Britain's foreign policy, declared Crowe, was "determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State . . . whose existence and survival . . . are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea power."²⁰

Despite Americans' kinship with and lingering affinity for British society, their nation's geography and traditions have attenuated their attitudes toward the sea. Unlike Britain, America is a continental empire first and a seapower second. Settling the American West consumed the energies of Americans during the nineteenth century, molding habits that persist today.²¹ It is no coincidence that our best known military heroes are soldiers and Marines—less dependence on the sea, less affection for seafarers.

Beginning in the 1880s with Theodore Roosevelt's *Naval War of 1812*, an influential band of expansionists, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, urged Americans to emulate the British model of seapower, acquiring colonies, building naval and merchant shipping, and wresting a share of international commerce away from the European great powers.²² At first the expansionists made little headway with their blandishments. Roosevelt nearly despaired of being able to rally public support for expansion, bemoaning evidence that Mahan was more popular in Europe than at home.²³ "I am glad Mahan is having such influence with your people," wrote Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, "but I wish he had more influence with his own. It is very difficult to make this nation wake up. . . . I sometimes question whether anything but a great military disaster will ever make us feel our responsibilities and our possible dangers."²⁴

Lord James Bryce, a British historian, observed during his travels in North America in the late 1880s that "the general feeling of the nation [was] strongly against a forward policy" in Hawaii and the other islands that captivated the expansionists. After talking to a cross section of Americans, however, Bryce prophesied that the public "would not stand by and see any other nation establish a protectorate" over the Hawaiian Islands or tolerate European efforts to occupy Caribbean islands.²⁵ No amount of abstract seapower propaganda would galvanize U.S. public opinion, but a foreign war might.²⁶ The Spanish-American War jolted Americans out of their comfortable isolationism, showing how prescient Bryce had been.²⁷ Only then did the expansionists' vision of a maritime commercial empire upheld by a potent navy become attainable.

TECHNOLOGY WORKS AGAINST HEROISM

Technological change also discouraged Americans from venerating their naval heroes. Battleships were romantic weapons, conjuring up images of single combat between mounted champions. These majestic vessels had public appeal. By the late 1800s, when the United States built its first battle fleet, the days of chivalric battles on the high seas were on the wane—witness the Royal Navy's vain attempt to replicate Trafalgar during World War I. Unglamorous weapons such as submarines and torpedoes offset British dreadnoughts at Jutland, the war's lone fleet engagement.²⁸ The U.S. Navy's Great White Fleet never saw action and in

any event was rendered obsolete when Britain's turbine-powered, all-big-gun *Dreadnought* slid down the ways in 1906.²⁹

Aircraft carriers emerged as the U.S. Navy's capital ships during World War II, relegating battleships to the obscure, if indispensable, roles of providing air defense for the carriers and naval gunfire support to troops ashore. With the advent of naval airpower, naval aviators were more likely than "ship drivers" to excite the public fancy. Outfitting the *Iowa*-class battleships with "gee-whiz" armaments and sensors, notably Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles, restored some of the dreadnoughts' romantic appeal. Nonetheless, these warships played a secondary role in their main modern combat mission, evicting Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait in 1991, then speedily returned to mothballs.

It is tough to be a Nelson in modern naval warfare.

AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEIR OWN HISTORY

Without its own Nelson to focus attention on the sea, the United States risks allowing its naval power to atrophy. If it does, the nation's military means could eventually fall dangerously out of step with its global political objectives. Americans are famously indifferent to their own history—its maritime component included. Surveys and studies have repeatedly shown how little students know, even at elite colleges and universities, let alone rank-and-file citizens, about American history.³⁰ This forgetfulness seems intrinsic to our national character. Observed the Princeton scholar Bernard Lewis in another context, "In current American usage, the phrase 'that's history' is commonly used to dismiss something as unimportant, of no relevance to current concerns."³¹

Whatever its merits, Americans' relentless forward-looking nature often blinds us to the value of historical experience. Nathaniel Philbrick, author of *Sea of Glory: America's Voyage of Discovery*, recently told *Naval History* magazine that America suffered from "a kind of amnesia" with regard to its maritime heritage.³²

With the gold rush and the rise of the West, America became obsessed with its own boundaries as the defining wilderness, when it was the sea that was essential to development of the nation. Not having a nautical or maritime background or perspective, a lot of historians don't know what to do with naval history. . . . So it's been a blind spot, both in American and global history.³³

Moreover, the egalitarian ethos on which the United States was founded works against public awareness of and interest in the nation's maritime traditions. Americans are skeptical of aristocracies, and the U.S. Navy officer corps borders on being an aristocracy. It is a truism in naval circles that Navy captains are the world's last absolute monarchs, enjoying near-total authority once their vessels put to sea. The endeavors of naval officers, consequently, tend not to resonate

with ordinary citizens in the same way as the exploits of soldiers and Marines. The nature of naval history accentuates Americans' already pronounced tendency to put the past behind them.

WHAT NEXT?

Does it matter whether America has a Nelson, and, more generally, whether America renews its love affair with the sea? Yes. Philbrick's "historical amnesia," far from being a harmless national quirk, has real strategic repercussions. The sea is vital to what America is. The loss of its nautical heritage deprives the nation of a fund of wisdom. Absent a sense of how naval power contributes to national security and prosperity, the electorate—the final authority over U.S. policy and strategy—has no way to balance the claims of the U.S. Navy against other important national priorities. Losing its historical moorings is perilous for an America with global interests that demand a vibrant naval strategy and force structure.

Shifts in the global balance of power increasingly place the free flow of commerce at risk. A contemporary scholar—echoing Mahan's description of the world's waterways as a "wide common," a medium through which commerce and military power could flow freely—rightly observed that control of the commons was the basis for U.S. preeminence in world affairs.³⁴ Rising powers, notably China, were amassing the wherewithal to create "contested zones" in which imposing U.S. naval dominance would be difficult if not impossible.³⁵ Globalization is a predominantly maritime phenomenon, just as it was in the day of Mahan and Roosevelt. If spreading globalization is in the U.S. national interest, the United States must maintain a navy sufficient to assure free navigation, commerce, and, in the words used by a recent commentator, "connectivity."³⁶

Therefore, it behooves sailors, veterans, naval historians, and the array of institutions friendly to the mission of the U.S. Navy to work to build public awareness of how seapower underpins national security and prosperity, as well as of the nation's efforts to foster security and prosperity overseas. Can they manufacture an American Nelson to focus attention on the sea? That is doubtful—Nelson's feats were imprinted on the minds of his contemporaries, not artificially recreated decades or centuries hence. There is no mortal threat to the United States from the sea to concentrate the public mind on maritime pursuits, let alone naval history, and the United States cannot shed its culture as a continental empire in favor of a maritime culture akin to that of the island nation, Great Britain. Nor is technological change likely to restore the heroic flair of nautical warfare. Quite the opposite: The advent of standoff weaponry, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other technological wizardry will likely continue to drain war on the high seas of its public appeal, perhaps permanently.

Today's proponents of naval history, consequently, should work to instill a more generalized affinity for the Navy and the sea—invent a corporate “Nelson,” as it were, an amalgam of all the virtues and heroism in U.S. naval history.

This promises to be a laborious undertaking. Cultures and traditions are stubborn things. As we have seen, even the impassioned pleas of turn-of-the-century expansionists failed to stir up much enthusiasm for maritime pursuits among the populace. Mahan, Roosevelt, and their cohort of expansionists, however, wrote primarily for an elite, northeastern audience.³⁷ They failed to broaden their appeal and, thus, political support for seapower beyond this enclave. Today's enthusiasts for seapower should not repeat this mistake but should undertake a concerted outreach campaign that extends not only to Middle America, but to U.S. Navy personnel, Congress, administration officials, and across disciplinary lines within the academic community.³⁸ The starting points for this enterprise in “public history” are:

- Recognize that seapower is interdisciplinary. Though it might appear to be a cohesive discipline, seapower is in fact interdisciplinary to an extraordinary degree. Mahan's concept of seapower as a phenomenon fusing history, strategy, economics and trade, geography, and a host of other disciplines provides a useful reference point. Tying naval history to globalization—and the prosperity globalization confers—in the minds of the residents of landlocked areas could amplify the effectiveness of any outreach campaign. While outreach within the historical profession is essential, moreover, any campaign must address a far larger cross section of the academic community.
- Realize that knowledge is scant within the U.S. government. The paucity of congressmen and administration officials with military service has occasioned much discussion in recent years.³⁹ Any outreach effort must seek to build a corps of spokesmen for naval history within the halls of government. To bolster knowledge and pride within the ranks of the U.S. Navy, it would be worth examining the extravagant effort the U.S. Marine Corps puts into cultivating these virtues within new recruits and seasoned Marines alike.⁴⁰ The Navy might incorporate elements of the Marines' training regimen into boot camps and officer accession programs, as well as more advanced schools.
- Use every tool available. Contemporary advocates of seapower enjoy a significant advantage over their forebears from Mahan's day. There is an abundance of electronic media to go along with the print media exploited by nineteenth-century expansionists. Naval historians ought to submit opinion columns on the anniversaries of great events and as opportunities present themselves. They might also start online journals or “weblogs,”

frequently updating websites packed with digital photographs and nautical history. The Naval Historical Center could accelerate the digitization of its photograph collection, much as the Library of Congress has done with its holdings—and so forth.

Propagating historical knowledge among a large, diverse populace promises to be a long, painstaking endeavor. The sooner advocates of American naval history get started, the better.

NOTES

1. Arthur Herman, *To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), pp. 360–94.
2. George Gordon Byron, “Don Juan,” Canto I, in *Byron: Selected Poetry*, ed. A. S. B. Glover (London: Penguin, 1954), p. 194.
3. See, for instance, “The 200th Anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar,” Royal Navy website, 12 May 2004, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/rn/content.php3?page=1&article=792.
4. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (New York: Putnam, 1882; repr., Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987); Hanson W. Baldwin, “Leyte Gulf: Kinkaid vs. Kurita, Etc.” in *“Fire When Ready, Gridley!” Great Naval Stories from Manila Bay to Vietnam*, ed. William H. Honan (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), pp. 251–77.
5. On the importance of maritime history, see John B. Hattendorf, “The Uses of Maritime History in and for the Navy,” *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Spring/art1-sp3.htm.
6. Herman, *To Rule the Waves*, pp. 360–94; John Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), pp. 9–95; Charles R. Low, *Her Majesty’s Navy, Including Its Deeds and Battles* (London: Virtue, 1890), vol. 3., pp. 1–32.
7. Author’s e-mail correspondence with Dr. John Hattendorf, E. J. King Professor of Maritime History and Chairman, Maritime History Department, U.S. Naval War College, 22 February 2005.
8. Herman, *To Rule the Waves*, pp. 400–401.
9. Keegan, *Price of Admiralty*, pp. 9–95.
10. This famous exhortation came in a letter sent to every captain under his command at Trafalgar. One such letter, sent in 1803 to Captain Eliab Harvey of the HMS *Temeraire*, fetched sixty thousand pounds at auction in 2001—testifying to Britons’ enduring fascination with all things Nelsonian. “Nelson’s Letters for Sale,” BBC News, 9 November 2001, available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/england/1646747.stm
11. Herman, *To Rule the Waves*, p. 382.
12. See, for instance, “C-Span Survey of Presidential Leadership,” C-Span, 1999, available at www.americanpresidents.org/survey
13. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 3–29; Stephen Howarth, *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 208–209; George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 28–39.
14. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 138, 287–90, 437–68.
15. Herman, *To Rule the Waves*, p. xix.
16. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1894), vol. 2, p. 380.
17. Mahan, *French Revolution and Empire*, p. 118.
18. Indeed, the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington represented the first time that American soil had been

- attacked by a foreign enemy since the British assault on Washington during the War of 1812. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), esp. pp. 7–34. One of the classic accounts of America's sense of separateness from the Old World is Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 3–26.
19. See also George Savile, "The Rough Draft of a New Model of the Sea, 1694," in Paul M. Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Scribner's, 1976; repr., Fontana 1991), p. 4.
 20. Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, vol. 3, *The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6*, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), p. 402.
 21. Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004), esp. pp. 33–60. See also Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History, 1893," paper read at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago, 12 July 1893, first appeared in the *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, 14 December 1893, repr. Woodbridge, Conn.: Research 1975); Theodore Roosevelt, "The Spread of the English-Speaking Peoples," in *Memorial Edition: Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 10, *The Winning of the West*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Scribner's, 1926), pp. 1–26.
 22. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*. Mahan's best known work was *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890; repr. New York: Dover, 1987), which purported to derive lessons of permanent value from British naval history.
 23. Eyre Crowe, testifying to Mahan's influence, noted that "the tremendous influence of [maritime] preponderance has been described in the classical pages of Captain Mahan. No one disputes it." Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," p. 402. See also Holger H. Herwig's "The Influence of A. T. Mahan upon German Sea Power," in *The Influence of History on Mahan*, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 67–80; and James R. Holmes's "Mahan: 'A Place in the Sun'" and "Germany's Quest for Sea Power," *Comparative Strategy* 23, no. 1 (January–March 2004), pp. 27–61.
 24. Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, 17 January 1898, in *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Elting E. Morison et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951–54), vol. 1, pp. 763–64.
 25. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2d. ed. (London: Macmillan, 1891), vol. 2, pp. 414–16.
 26. Carl Schurz, editor of *Harper's Weekly*, assailed Roosevelt's bellicose maxim that "no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war." Schurz rebuked Roosevelt for failing, "in his combative ardor," to notice "the logical quandary into which he has reasoned himself. It is this: according to him a long peace has a tendency to make a people effeminate and unpatriotic, while war will invigorate a people and inspire patriotism. But he argues also that the building of a great fleet of war-ships will be a means not to bring on war, but to preserve peace. Ergo, the building of a great war fleet will effect that which promotes effeminacy and languishing patriotism." Carl Schurz, "Armed or Unarmed Peace," *Harper's Weekly Magazine*, 19 June 1897, p. 603.
 27. Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: America's Encounter with the World since 1776* (New York: Mariner's Books; repr. 1998), esp. pp. 101–21.
 28. Keegan, *Price of Admiralty*, pp. 97–155.
 29. Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (New York: Random House, 1991), esp. pp. 468–97.
 30. See, for instance, Anne D. Neal, Jerry Martin, and Mashad Moses, *Losing America's Memory: Historical Illiteracy in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Trustees and Alumni, February 2000), available at www.goacta.org/publications/Reports/acta_american_memory.pdf; Michael K. Block and Robert J. Franciosi with Melissa Geiger, *What Do College Graduates Know? A Survey of Arizona Universities* (Princeton,

- N.J.: National Association of Scholars, April 2002), available at www.nas.org/affiliates/arizona/az_survey_revised.pdf.
31. Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Modern Library, 2003), pp. xviii–xix.
 32. Nathaniel Philbrick, *Sea of Glory: America's Voyage of Discovery, the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842* (New York: Penguin, 2004).
 33. “An Interview with Nathaniel Philbrick: ‘What to Do with Naval History,’” *Naval History*, February 2005, available at www.usni.org/navalhistory/articles05/NHPhilbrickFeb.htm.
 34. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 25.
 35. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 25–46. On China’s strategic outlook and military power, see James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,” *Comparative Strategy* 24, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 53–71.
 36. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004), esp. pp. 247–94.
 37. Ferguson, *Colossus*, pp. 33–60.
 38. Hattendorf, “The Uses of Maritime History in and for the Navy.” Hattendorf documents how sparse knowledge of naval traditions is among active-duty personnel. This not only denies the service a fund of historical experience that could be of contemporary use but makes these personnel poor spokesmen for the U.S. Navy.
 39. A report commissioned in 2000 by Richard Danzig, then secretary of the Navy, concluded that the service had “failed to use the rich historical information available to it in order to manage or apply effectively these resources for internal or external purposes.” History Associates, Inc., *History and Heritage in the U.S. Navy* (Rockville, Md.: October 2000), p. 3.
 40. See, for instance, Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps* (New York: Scribner’s, 1997), esp. pp. 53–72.

