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POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF STRATEGY

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I am going to take the liberty of analyzing the topic with which I am dealing in a manner that may be a little more comprehensive than perhaps was originally intended. It will be necessary to give rather extended consideration to the term "political," since the word is ordinarily used in many different ways. Over the term "strategy" it is not necessary for me to tarry. I assume that we use the word as a convenient way of talking about a basic pattern for employing instruments of power. It is assumed that these power instruments are utilized for the purpose of maximizing the degree to which the fundamental values of the body politic are realized. Hence, any strategy includes objectives and courses of action under various contingencies. I suppose it is obvious that a strategy of sea power relates this instrument to all other instruments of total strategy; or, to express it another way, to total policy.

For many purposes it is convenient to classify the instruments of power according to the *distinctive* characteristics of the *means* employed. Let us begin by saying that strategy uses *arms, goods, deals,* and *words.* Perhaps you think these are undignified ways of talking about the four major divisions into which strategy is often separated: *military* strategy, *economic* strategy, *diplomatic* strategy, and *ideological* strategy.

It is also useful for some purposes to classify strategy according to the *distinctive effect* which a given instrument is capable of achieving in times of active crisis. From this perspective we may speak of *destruction* (or protection from destruction) as the distinctive effect of military strategy; of *scarcity* (or abundance) as the effect of economic strategy; of the *disunity of leaders* (or unity) as the distinctive result of diplomatic strategy; and of *disunity of masses* (or unity) as the distinguishing effect of ideological strategy.

Suppose we make a small table of these terms for ready reference purposes:

Strategy	Distinctive Means
Military	Arms
Economic	Goods
Diplomatic	Deals
Ideological	Words

Distinctive Effects

Destruction (protection)
Scarcity (abundance)
Disunity of leaders (unity)
Disunity of masses (unity)

There is no general agreement on the terms appearing in this table, although the categories are quite well-known. It is not important to insist upon the labels, if we understand one another.

I believe it is evident that the first two (arms and goods) are alike in putting the emphasis upon *capabilities*, and that the last two (the agreements made or negotiated among leaders, and the words addressed to large audiences) put the emphasis upon *intentions*. However, no instrument is limited to its distinctive effect. It invariably has effects of every kind, in varying degree; in war and in peace. Furthermore, all the organizations which are primarily specialized upon any one of the means must make use of all means in varying degree. Obvious as this may appear to be, it is nevertheless worth repeating, since it is of the utmost importance to catch hold of the *contextual principle*.

Another fundamental principle, besides wholeness (*contextuality*) is the *principle of maximization* of all values sought by total policy. This basic postulate of strategy is continually being revived in new words; and the revival, by renewal of emphasis, often accomplishes a useful purpose. To choose a recent example: The principle of maximization is often the point of the modern slogan, "psychological warfare." What is being stressed is the importance of achieving effects as economically as possible—by measures short of total war, for instance; and by the timing of all actions with the psychological state of the opponent always in mind. Hence, it turns out that the general principle of maximization—which is a fundamental principle of *all* strategy—is being reaffirmed in different terms. The slogan "political warfare" often performs precisely the same function by stressing what can be done to gain the ends of policy by diplomatic arrangement (with those in authority, or disaffected leaders, for example). Such considerations make a difference wherever strategy is conducted on behalf of goal values which do not include war itself as a positive value.

In the available time I propose to limit the scope of the present analysis by taking the "political" factor in the formulation of strategy to mean: first, considering the intentions of leaders and masses; second, considering the potential impact of any instrument of policy upon these intentions. In terms of our table, I'm concentrating upon disuniting (or uniting) leaders and masses; and I am considering the impact of each of the instruments of power, not only of diplomacy and ideology.

In fact, my discussion will be narrowed much further. Because of the fundamental importance of *relating the objectives of any special sphere of strategy to the goal values which are sought by the body politic* for whom the strategy is formulated, I shall devote most of my time to the problem of objectives.

The selection of objectives is enormously complicated in a democratic setup like ours by the ambiguity of the framework in which the strategist is compelled to operate. In this country there is always much ambiguity about long—and middle-range-policies. Strictly speaking, no one is authorized to tie the hands of future generations of Americans. This applies to successive Congresses or Presidents. In addition to our formalities, our pattern of thinking includes the expectation on the part of our policy makers that national goals may be differently interpreted through time. Hence, no one arrogates to himself the last word on the goal values of the American people—and gets away with it.

Where does this leave the strategist who is responsible for any aspect of total American strategy? To say that it "leaves him up in the air" doesn't help us very much. And even though this is true to some extent, the strategist need not be nearly as far up in the air as might appear from what I've just said. It is possible to obtain some guidance. First, there is a degree of consensus about the goal values of American life, and also about the translation of these values into institutional terms. And,

second, it is possible to estimate the way in which policy objectives will be interpreted under various future contingencies. Both these operations are essential in estimating basic political factors in strategy.

Let us consider for a moment the ideal values of the American tradition. Each of us would express these basic goals in somewhat different words. But most of us would recognize that the words that I'm going to use are about equivalent to his own vocabulary preferences. The ideal preferences of the American tradition are for the realization of human dignity in theory and in fact. These words mean that we favor the achievement of an American commonwealth in which values are shared on the basis of individual merit, rather than on the basis of the privileged status of a family group into which one happens to be born.

Let us spell this out more concretely in terms of a fundamental way of thinking about the social process. This notion of social process, by the way, is a handy intellectual gadget for examining a great many problems connected with strategy. A social process gets under way whenever human beings affect one another. Thus, we have a social process today on a global scale; we have it on a bipolar, regional, national, and local scale. Whatever the social process is that we are undertaking to explore, it is convenient to talk about it in some such general terms as these: "*People* pursuing *values* through *institutions* using *resources.*" This term "values" refers to what people want; and the word "institution" means the patterns by which values are shaped and shared in concrete circumstances.

Let us apply this by making use of eight words to talk about the values in any social process that we want to describe. I'm going to use eight words for values:

Power, or decision making, a value that is shaped and shared through the institutions called government, political parties, pressure groups, and the like.

The *wealth* value is shaped and shared through the institutions specialized to production and consumption; more specifically, the corporations, trade unions, and so on.

Another value is *respect* which includes such activities as the giving of honors or of stigma. It includes the discriminations and the distinctions in a community.

Well-being is the value of physical and psychological health. The institutions specialized to it provide medical care, seek to prevent accidents, and so on through a vast network of activity.

Enlightenment means access to facts and opinions upon the basis of which rational judgments can be made on important questions. The institutions are the agencies of civic instruction and public information.

A further value is *skill*, the maturing of latent talent into socially acceptable expression. Distinctive institutions are the organizations which concern themselves with levels of technical competence.

Another convenient value category is *affection.* Here we are talking about congenial personal relationships—family, friendship cliques, and so on.

Last in this list of eight is *rectitude.* We are talking about institutional patterns which specify standards of right and wrong and apply them.

Now let us look at the goal values of the American commonwealth in relationship to this statement about social process. Having the general ideal of realizing human dignity in theory and in fact, we are in favor of moving in the direction of a commonwealth in which all values are very generally participated in, as distinct from a community in which all values are concentrated in a relatively few hands. What this means is that in terms of power we endorse a decision-making process in which there

is democratic participation, as distinct from despotic dictation by a few.

In terms of wealth, we think of rising standards of living throughout the community, as distinct from situations in which the enjoyment of economic benefits is highly concentrated in very few hands.

In terms of human respect, we are against social castes.

In terms of well-being, we are in favor of high levels of physical and psychic health throughout the commonwealth.

So far as enlightenment is concerned, we are in favor of universal civic instruction and freedom of the press.

In terms of affection, we are in favor of human relationships in which there is opportunity for friendly and loyal human relationships to be maintained.

Then, in terms of rectitude, we want to attain a universal sense of individual responsibility for contributing to human dignity.

This is an over-simplified way of characterizing the sort of social process toward which we want to move, according to our ideal objectives.

Well, let's stand back from this. What are some of the implications for the development of strategies? One point is that our decision makers are multiple-valued, rather than single-valued; and, especially, they are not centered on power. If you compare the decision makers in top official and unofficial positions in the United States with those in Nazi Germany in its heyday, or within the Soviet Union at present, you'll be struck by the difference. Nazis and communists are intensely focussed on power.

For example: Very often American decision makers are emotionally upset when they listen to a situation being analyzed in strictly "power" terms. (I'm even referring to some specialists in the Armed Forces, as well as to decision makers who represent top civilian groups in the United States). There are frequent evidences of moral shock when an analysis is stringently carried through in power terms. The same attitude is reflected in a different way in a crop of embittered "baby Machiavellis" when people are trying to transform themselves into individuals who are hard-boiled about power.

You notice also a strange zigzag, in which persons who at one moment are insistent upon the consideration of many values besides power, engage at the next moment in most ruthless power politics. This type of zigzag reaction expresses lack of ease in dealing with the power value, a lack of ease which comes from our "multi-valued" and "open" society.

This reaction also gives the United States a singular reputation for hypocrisy, thanks to the difficulties that arise in squaring many of our moralistic formulations with many of our power necessities. Now this reputation for hypocrisy was also a reputation which Victorian England enjoyed. To some extent, of course, it is the prerogative of all powerful units in the world to be regarded as hypocritical by those who are weaker, and in this sense we inherit England's position. The United States may have to get accustomed to being regarded as a nation of hypocrites.

A second implication of goal values for the choice of strategical objectives is this: we aim at national security by international law and organization rather than by world conquest or world empire.

A third point: We're not politically organized to plan and execute a so-called "preventive war." This is partly because the idea is repugnant, and partly a result of our unwillingness to concentrate sufficient authority and control.

A fourth point: We desire to change the enemy's effective intentions by persuasion, if possible, rather by destroying his or our capabilities. This comes from our strong reliance on methods of

bargaining and persuasion—bargaining in the sense of deals with leaders; persuasion in the handling of propaganda, advertising, and other mass-directed forms of communication.

Fifth in this particular list: we have little confidence in force as an instrument of policy save as a means of nullifying hostile force and of keeping the channels open for persuasion and for peaceful internal evolution.

Next, our fundamental goal values are of consequence when we undertake to formulate in advance the end results of the present crisis (end results to be obtained, be it remembered, by measures short of total or limited war, if possible).

What are the minimum objectives of basic American policy in the present crisis? I think we can be fairly definite about the minimum objectives. We want to bring into the effective control of the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) policy makers who accept inspection and control by the United Nations of arms, and agree to arms reduction and limitation.

What are our maximum objectives? Well, one hypothesis about our maximum objectives—not to be taken seriously, for I think it is highly improbable—is this: to impose detailed United States institutions on the Soviet world. That is to say, to reproduce as many of our specialized institutions concerned with each value as possible.

It is of the greatest consequence for strategic thinking to arrive at workable estimates lying somewhere between the minimum I have specified (which is pretty clear) and the ceiling I have mentioned.

Next, in this list of implications, we prefer a minimum use of coercion against Allies and neutrals.

Next, I think there are as yet unrealized implications for the *positive* objectives to be sought during the next several years. It is notorious, isn't it, at least among analysts of American policy, that so far our policy formulations have been primarily negative. We have relied in public (and frequently in private) on formulating basic objectives in terms of hostility to somebody else—somebody's leadership, somebody's institutional details. Problem: do we have any positive objectives which can be made potentially clarifying and stimulating to our own people and to the world as a whole? I think the answer is "yes," and I would forecast, without stopping to develop the point, that in the years ahead we are likely to discover that we are the ones who are the most impatient with a nonindustrialized world, and that we are the ones who most want to take the initiative and leadership in working closely with the leaders and peoples of all countries in order to develop worldwide industrialization; and that we propose to foster worldwide industrialization with a maximum of freedom and a minimum of sacrifice of the values connected with human dignity. To phrase it one way, we are for "industry and democracy" *versus* "industry and despotism." Our aim is to cooperate in realizing a commonwealth of free men in an industrial world. The purpose is to use modern science and technology in order to maximize the scope of human choice. I refer to this in passing to indicate the problems and solutions that appear when you explore the fundamental strategic objectives of this nation.

Note that in formulating strategy for a despotism the strategists are also in a quandry. People who suffer the ambiguities of popular government frequently forget the ambiguities of a dictatorial regime. This is not only because the dictators change their "line," if not their "spots," but because the dictators change their key personnel, so that you get a considerable readjustment by selective attrition. So at any given moment the official has the serious problem of deciding just how long a given perspective will be safe to play with. Hence, officials of despotisms

become rather adroit in devising techniques for the evasion of responsibility, thus developing a kind of creeping paralysis in the formulation of middle- and long-range programs.

Of course, in thinking about our objectives, political factors must be calculated that go beyond the influences at work in this country. We must take into account the power factors moulding the policies of present and potential allies.

There are special problems connected with the liberation and restoration of allies who are overrun.

There are thorny questions to be disposed of in adjusting our immediate and long-range objectives to programs of cooperation with regimes having little popular support. Here we meet the danger with which we have become well acquainted in recent times, of weakening the internal unity of the United States by close cooperation with regimes that have no basis of popular support. Also, there is the danger of weakening our appeal in the intermediate areas—and, ultimately, to peoples of the Soviet orbit—by upholding a ruling group with whom we can make excellent deals, but whose masses may be alienated in time of crisis by these arrangements.

Again, we must evaluate the helpfulness of regimes with a great deal of popular support but neutralist in orientation. Perhaps their neutralism comes from fear of internal disunity if their policies are more positive, perhaps through fear of being the theater of active warfare. In any case, the strategic problem is to estimate the policies open to us for increasing our mutual identification with common objectives. And, of course, we must evaluate the likelihood that the United States public will show patience and consideration toward other powers.

Turning now to another political problem involved in the formulation of strategy: *the scale and timing of preparations.* Let's assume that the strategist has arrived at an estimate of the magnitude of the enemy threat, and of the efforts needed to meet the threat. Assume further that a high level of continued mobilization presents novel problems that must be taken into account in strategy formulation. One must estimate the degree to which it is possible to maintain the conviction that the threat is as large as the strategist thinks it is. Unless such convictions are generally shared by leaders, all sorts of other attitudes will reassert themselves. One traditional attitude in this country is the suspicion that everybody is likely to exaggerate what he is interested in. After all, this is an advertising culture. It is a culture of Yankee traders. It is assumed that whenever any professional man tells you his services are needed, he is exaggerating, and making a self-serving declaration.

If the level of popular conviction is not high, it is necessary to avoid subjecting the standard of living to sharp reduction. Otherwise it will be impossible to maintain full cooperation through long periods. It will be necessary to count on achieving our objectives, not by cutting civilian requirements, but by diverting the annual increase of productivity into the defense program.

If support is not intense, we must also make sure that all important elements recognize that they have high and tangible stakes in the production program. This applies to big and little business, investors, managerial groups, technical groups, farmers, and so on.

Then it is obvious that we must estimate the possibility of keeping inflation under control (particularly by tax measures) in order to diminish the likelihood of alienating the fixed and low income brackets.

We also have to estimate the degree to which it is possible to prevent black market operations, and the spread of administrative corruption. Obviously, we must consider the degree to which it

is possible to mobilize an effective demand for efficient law enforcement.

Further, we must consider the likelihood that political police measures can be held to a minimum in the crisis. The traditional American attitude towards political police—toward the investigation of individual loyalty—is one of great hostility. The problem is to estimate whether these attitudes can be modified realistically without alienating the unity of the country.

Further, we have to consider to what extent it is possible to build up and sustain common unity of outlook, not only throughout the nation as a whole, but especially among young people and their families.

Strategy also calls for weighing the political factors affecting the scale of preparation by allies. I shall go no further with this phase of the analysis.

Rather, I shall mention another major element: *calculating the significance of political factors affecting the possible scale and timing of losses in active warfare.* This, I shall not have time to deal with.

The formulation of strategy calls for the evaluation of political factors in connection with the *choice of instruments of warfare and the mode of their application.* I shall mention only a few ramifications of this extraordinarily important matter. Plainly, one has the task of estimating the role of specific bases under various conditions of political reliability. One has the problem of weapon balance. Weapon choice is not only a matter of engineering comparisons, but of weighing the chances of continued political support for various weapons. In some cases this means making concessions to the ease with which the support of certain industrial and territorial groups can be mobilized, and, as I heard some one remark, attention to the popular vogue of various weapons, even if this presents the problem of keeping up-to-date with popular education in the comic strips.

Connected with weapon choice and application is estimating the effect of appearing to play the role of the aggressor (and also of appearing to play a passive role).

Again, there is the problem of calculating the effect of introducing new and "inhuman" weapons, or of following suit. It is worth considering the possibility of developing and introducing new and humane weapons in order to avoid negative political effects. Some years ago the "paralysis weapon" was suggested as the ideal weapon for humanitarians. The idea was to treat large masses of the population the same way as the individual patient in the hospital when you put him under an anaesthetic.

We also have the task of estimating the usefulness of a weapon as a deterrent and as a builder of confidence. Historically, of course, this has been one of the many role played by naval demonstrations.

Further, target selection for strategic operations calls for the consideration of political elements.

I turn now to another set of strategic calculations in which political factors cut an important figure: *the orientations and capabilities of the enemy.* I shall first mention the problem of estimating the weight assigned to political factors in the enemy's strategic thinking. What elements of his own population does he regard as liable or unreliable for various activities? What elements of other populations does he believe to be helpful under various circumstances? What are his expectations about our policy and that of other nations? (We note in this connection the chronic underestimation of the fighting potential of the United States by despotisms).

There is also the problem of the political responsiveness of the enemy to measures short of war, and to war itself. Here the greatest question is whether significant elements in the ruling elite

can be brought to recognize, by procedures short of total war, that they have more to gain by cooperation than by noncooperation with the rest of the world.

It is also necessary to assess the effect of internal cleavages, if they develop, upon the policy of an opponent. Will the development of antagonisms among the peoples of the Soviet world lead to even greater consolidation of garrison police states, or will it bring about a steady drift toward peaceful cooperation on the part of the top elite? We have in mind actual and potential cleavages separating Soviet cultures and nationalites, urban and rural populations, and the like.

Let me bring this analysis to a close. Political factors, I have said, enter into the formulation of partial or total strategy. Political considerations relate especially to the intentions of ourselves and others, and also to the impact of every instrument of power upon intentions. The aim of strategy is to maximize the realization of the goal values of the body politic in a democratic commonwealth, and of the ruling few in a despotism. Political factors enter at least into the formulation of strategy in (1) the choice of objectives on the basis of our goal values and those of our present and potential allies; (2) the estimation of the possible scale and timing of preparations at home and on the part of allies; (3) the scale and timing of possible losses by our own forces and our allies; (4) the choice of war instruments and their mode of application; (5) the estimation of the political considerations that figure in the strategical thinking of the enemy; and (6) the weighing of the political responsiveness of the enemy to measures short of war and to war itself.

Ψ