
contends (p. 82). Those documents, moreover, had real consequences for people in the backcountry. They signaled the desire of American leaders to move toward a formal relationship with all foreign nations and away from the fluid negotiations that marked previous dealings with Indians.

But many people did not share this desire. Adams, Jefferson, and Madison wanted not only to enter the international system but also to reshape it on their own terms. European leaders, though, rejected this type of New World thinking in part because they were leery of the weakness of the federal relationship of American states and their capacity to deal with Indian peoples. Sadosky argues that diplomatic impotency on the frontier and in Europe was a key factor to make the union more perfect in 1787. The Constitution did not end the clashes between state officials, federal agents, and Native Americans over who had the authority to negotiate for land. Federalists and Republicans dissented over "who is in charge" (p. 171). That question fractured American responses to both Indian policy and the wars of the French Revolution. Finally, with the War of 1812, the United States moved formally into the international states system, not just with peace but also with the adoption of what Sadosky calls the "Jackson Doctrine," the isolation of all Indian peoples from engaging with any outside connection. With the "Jackson Doctrine" the United States exhibited its emergence as a modern nation-state because it had the power to "forcibly relocate an ethnic/racial minority against its will" (p. 215).

This is a thought-provoking book. Its turning points are surprising and fresh, and the narrative is well-crafted. It is an excellent choice for undergraduate classrooms. More importantly, it should be essential reading for cultural specialists who might have carelessly cast diplomatic history aside. For them, the question of how America came to be is especially germane. Sadosky's excellent answer to that question—though it comes from the realm of treaty conferences—should not be ignored.





George Washington's Great Gamble and the Sea Battle that Won the American Revolution • James L. Nelson • New York: McGraw Hill, 2010 • xxiv, 376 pp. • \$26.95

Reviewed by Lt. Col. Paul Krajeski, Ph.D., military professor in the strategy and policy department at the United States Naval War College. He is the author of *In the Shadow of Nelson: The Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton*, 1753–1812 (2000).


Compelling works of history breathe new life into our understanding of old events and leave the reader wanting to know more about what happened and why. By this definition, James Nelson has given us a compelling history of the American Revolution that emphasizes the role of naval power in the decisive battle of Yorktown. In no uncertain terms, Nelson makes clear that the war would have ended differently without French naval power coming to bear at the right time and right place in North American waters. This conclusion of itself is not new—Alfred Thayer Mahan and many others have long recognized the centrality of the French navy to American independence. What makes the author's book stand alone is the way it explains the tactical and strategic conditions as George Washington must have understood them on 14 August 1781, the day he decided to shift the main effort of the combined French and American armies from New York to Virginia. By then, Washington was convinced that the combined armies could not achieve a decisive victory without the French navy.

What is surprising is the extent to which Washington's "great gamble" was influenced by General Rochambeau, commander of the French expeditionary force in Newport, Rhode Island. Based on previous French naval experience near New York City and the extent to which the British had fortified it, Rochambeau recognized the futility of an attack on the city even if French naval and land forces acted in conjunction with Washington's army. Rochambeau sensed lower hanging fruit in the Chesapeake. Washington did not see it that way, having his eye on New York City ever since losing it to the British in 1776. The author depicts Rochambeau as a patient tutor of the American general, a Frenchman who never forgot his subordinate role, but who nonetheless was insubordinate for the greater good—one wonders what Washington would have done in 1781 without him. One also wonders how Washington would have fared without Admiral de Grasse in the Chesapeake. Nelson's account of the interaction between Washington, Rochambeau, and de Grasse demonstrates how seemingly countless obstacles to coalition success can be overcome by leaders who are united in purpose. A good bit of luck helps, too.

The battle of the Capes could have been a British victory, Cornwallis could have escaped from Yorktown, and the war for American independence could have lasted for an indeterminate number of years if the British had had more capable leadership in its army, navy, and government. Using an impressive array of primary and secondary sources, Nelson skillfully portrays the friction and frustration between Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, Admiral Arbuthnot, Lord George Germain, and a cast of other British characters as they struggled to develop and execute a coherent strategy to defeat the Americans. This book also could be subtitled "And How the British Lost the American Revolution."

I agree with Patrick O'Brian's comment that "James Nelson is a master both of his period and of the English language." Nelson best demonstrates this while writing about war at sea during the age of sail, translating the arcane language of that era into terms that can be appreciated by the landsman of the information age. If there was a way to enhance this story, the author could have included a brief primer on the relative rise of French naval power and decline of the Royal Navy in the period between the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution. In conclusion, *George Washington's Great Gamble* is full of colorful detail that creates a sense of personal connection to the book's key players without exaggerating or understating the importance of French naval power to the birth of the United States.





The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804 • Douglas Bradburn • Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009 • xiv, 418 pp. • \$35.00

Reviewed by Melvin Yazawa, professor of history at the University of New Mexico. He is the author of "Dionysian Rhetoric and Apollonian Solutions: The Politics of Union and Disunion in the Age of Federalism," in *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World* (2005).

In 1776, Revolutionary Americans repudiated their allegiance to George III, thus precipitating a fundamental transformation in their civic identity from subjects of a king to citizens of a republic. But what did republican citizenship entail? Who might be a citizen? And who would determine what privileges and immunities were associated with that newly adopted status? In *The Citizenship Revolution*, Douglas Bradburn addresses these questions and offers a "grand revision . . . of much of the received wisdom about the pace and meaning of the American Revolution" (p. 14).

Bradburn's "analytical narrative" is structured around two interrelated arguments: first, that the "traditional chronological boundaries" of most Revolutionary histories are totally inadequate for comprehending the significance of the American Revolution because they end in 1783 or 1788; and second, that the political conflicts of the 1790s were extensions of the "Founding moment" and essential in effecting a consensus on the matter of American citizenship (pp. 15–16, 67). Neither of these points would seem to amount to a "grand revision," and indeed, much of the scholarly terrain Bradburn covers will be familiar to readers acquainted with the literature on the Federalist era. Nevertheless, Bradburn expertly synthesizes much of this liter-