

BOOK REVIEWS

HOW INSIGHTFUL CAN THIS BE?

Campbell, Kurt M., and Michèle Flournoy et al. *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2001. 416pp. \$18.95

As death and taxes are inevitable to citizens of the United States, so also are the contemporary strategic blueprints written *after* a crisis has occurred. In November 2001 the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank that focuses on national security, published *To Prevail*, offering a comprehensive strategy to guide the Bush administration's "global war on terror." From inception to press, the book took less than two months to complete. How insightful can such an "instant" piece of strategic reasoning really be? The answer is "surprisingly so."

To Prevail is a decidedly mixed bag of facts, analysis, insight, and recommendations. For example, the chapter on the Taliban appears quaint in light of very recent history (since November 2001). Other chapters, especially those dealing with military and economic issues, come across as shallow and too general for real utility. However, the overall conception of the book and its on-the-mark chapters dealing with intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and foreign assistance make this an invaluable guide to the post-"9/11" national security world.

Reflecting the mixed nature of the book are findings and recommendations in the closing chapter that call for applause but lead to more questions. Meriting applause, the book's recommendations reassert the need for engagement and an active, focused diplomacy with the rest of the world. Readers are reminded that the United States must win this war with the cooperation of a "coalition of coalitions"; that the United States must win the information wars, not only in cyberspace but in the international public forum of debate (the press, television, and the Internet); and that it must pay attention to coordinating its aid efforts to focus such assistance so as to reinforce the public message that the country wishes and needs to send.

Also, *To Prevail* summarizes the intelligence needs for this conflict in ways that are only now being discussed among executive and congressional decision makers. The authors point out the dangerous parochialism within U.S. intelligence agencies and the overwhelming need for more and better human intelligence. This is coupled with the authors' argument for expanded international engagement, for

in the short term, other nations can provide the human intelligence capabilities that the United States currently lacks. Finally, the authors recognize that local and state officials rather than members of the federal government are on the front lines in one major theater of operations—the homeland. Consequently, the book recommends ways of allowing decentralized coordination among federal, state, and local authorities that maintain a balance between the civil rights of the citizenry and the necessity of prosecuting a vigorous campaign.

However, one must ask why—in light of their insightful recognition for the need for an integrated command, control, and coordination of an incredibly diverse repertoire of efforts to fight the war against terrorism—the authors refused to consider any real command and control organization, process, system, or doctrine. In place of such a useful, even vital capability, *To Prevail* merely calls for more commissions, more coordination, and more openness, and information sharing among existing agencies. The authors are Washington veterans who must know how naïve their recommendations on this matter sound. They recommend *against* forming a powerful department of homeland security that would be capable of integrating the diverse and often contradictory and self-defeating efforts of a variety of federal agencies. One never really fully understands who or what the authors are suggesting will conduct the overall campaign planning and oversight of the global war on terror. The fact is that at this writing, it is still not clear which federal entity is conducting the command and control functions of much of the global campaign. This

country learned quickly in World War II that crises alone, even sneak attacks, do not overcome bureaucratic turf wars; the nation is relearning that lesson now. The authors must know this, and they should propose an organizational framework to implement the wide array of global and domestic measures advocated in their strategy.

To Prevail is for the serious strategic thinker and decision maker. It is a commendable effort to bring together in one place a comprehensive strategy that can bring success in what promises to be a long and unusual war. My only quibble is the shortage of relevant citations, which is probably due to the quickness of editing and publication. Such is the price of currency.

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Baylis, John, et al., eds. *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002. 356pp. \$27.95

Although not recognized as an equal academic discipline by mainstream academics, the study of strategy has a long and honorable history—the result of numerous authors who, over the centuries, have developed their ideas and placed their own imprints on the discipline. Since the beginning of the Cold War, when the threat of nuclear destruction concentrated the minds of scholars, the field shifted from traditional military concerns to the study of nuclear deterrence. But now, more than a decade beyond the end of the Cold War, strategic studies return to their

origins, though in a time rife with novel challenges. *Strategy in the Contemporary World* marks a good first step for the discipline.

The editors, strategists all, have assembled a remarkable introduction to strategic studies. Not only is it the first textbook on the subject rather than a collection of edited readings, but it is singularly helpful to the novice. The book addresses a broad array of subjects and may refresh experienced strategists on subjects outside their expertise.

The book's fourteen chapters by seventeen authors have been organized into four sections: "Enduring Issues," "Evolution of Joint Warfare," "Twentieth-Century Theories," and "Contemporary Issues." The subject of each chapter varies tremendously—an introduction to strategic studies; the causes of war; great strategists of the past; land, air, and naval power; terrorism and irregular warfare; international law; deterrence; weapons of mass destruction; technology and warfare; humanitarian intervention; nontraditional security concerns (environmental degradation, etc.); and others.

Each chapter, despite the analytical bias of its author (or authors), explores the fundamentals of its subject fairly well. For example, in "Sea Power: Theory and Practice," Captain Sam Tangredi, USN, traces the historical and theoretical lineage for sea power versus land power. He defines sea power broadly to include maritime trade and ocean resources, and he analyzes the importance of sea lines of communication. Tangredi evaluates the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Soviet admiral Sergei Gorshkov as they relate to the debate over naval strategy during the Cold War. He follows this by discussing

naval theory for the post-Cold War era of smaller navies, wider threats, and only one truly global naval power. That is to say, he covers the subject broadly, but with finesse.

The typical problems with multi-authored works are absent in this book. A strong editorial hand has blended the various chapters to read as if the same author had penned them. In addition, the book contains clear introductions and conclusions; key points are summarized in each section; questions are included at the end of each chapter; and further reading references are listed. Students and instructors could make good use of this book.

Only one minor inconsistency mars this otherwise good work. Strategy and strategic studies have long recognized the relationship between politics and war. Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war is a continuation of political discourse by other means. Truth be told, to understand strategy—the art of marrying military means to political ends—one must look constantly to its political origins. The worth of this idea can be seen in the want of it in some of these chapters. For example, in "Arms Control and Disarmament," John Baylis entirely divorces the subject from the politics of nations. Thus when he reports on the charges and countercharges of arms violations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s, without reference to politics and policies, the states' behaviors appear morally equivalent. In contrast, James D. Kiras emphasizes the political objectives of war in his chapter, "Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," helping the reader to make sense of how unconventional tactics may or may not accomplish certain goals.

This is a minor problem, however. It does not significantly mar an excellent work that will serve anyone desiring grounding in strategic studies or a refresher on strategy.

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Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 448pp. \$27.95

This monumental and ambitious work sets out to provide the definitive account of the “offensive realism” school of international relations theory. Offensive realism represents a kind of synthesis of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau and the structural or “defensive” realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Morgenthau it assumes that states (or major states) seek to accumulate as much power as possible for themselves, but it accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they do so lies in the structure of the international system rather than in the human lust for power. Mearsheimer must therefore show that Waltz and his many followers have been overly optimistic in analyzing the implications for state behavior of the anarchic character of the international system. According to Mearsheimer, they have wrongly assumed that a cautious or defensive approach to safeguarding a state’s security is the only rational approach and hence the norm for most states. Rather, he insists, aggressive or expansionist behavior is both more common in the recent history of the great powers than this would allow and more rational in the sense that it is not infrequently very successful.

Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated, from the history of the great powers from the wars of the French Revolution through the end of the Cold War. It also looks out into the future to test the theory against the common if vaguely articulated belief that great-power war has become obsolete. For these reasons, and because it is written in a clear and jargon-free style, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* holds much interest even for those with limited patience for the theological disputes of international relations theorists. At the same time, it is a formidable challenge to mainstream realism. It scores many points off an approach that somehow never comes to grips with what one is tempted to call the sheer bloody-mindedness of international politics. Particularly novel and persuasive is Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck passing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fundamental alternative to balancing against another power.

Yet the book has its limitations, which are largely the limitations of the realist school as such. Mearsheimer never quite convinces when he argues that the domestic regimes and leadership of, for example, Britain, the United States, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan had no fundamental impact on their international behavior. But perhaps the weakest part of the book is its disregard of the ideological context of nineteenth-century European diplomacy. The anti-revolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,” were arguably at least as important in maintaining the long great-power peace through much of this period as were the abstract structural characteristics of the European state system. For that matter, the fact that many of the wars that did occur were connected in some way with

the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that wars can be caused as much by the weakness as by the strength of a key actor. Both these points have suggestive applications as we look to the twenty-first century. The war against terrorism might well be the occasion for the formation of a global “concert” of the great powers. The greatest threat to such a concert could well be the continuing weakness of Russia—not, as Mearsheimer holds, the rising strength of China.

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Kagan, Donald, and Fredrick W. Kagan. *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today*. New York: St. Martin's, 2000. 483pp. \$32.50

Did the leadership of the United States throw away a priceless opportunity to bring stability, prosperity, and peace to the world in the decade following the end of the Cold War, as surely as the leadership of Great Britain failed to grasp a similar opportunity following the end of the First World War? For Donald and Fredrick Kagan, the answer is a resounding yes. *While America Sleeps* is their attempt not only to show how opportunities were squandered but also to highlight the similarities of both situations. The Kagans argue that both states dangerously reduced the size of their military forces, falsely believed in the saving power of technology, failed to exercise strategic leadership, and embarked on a pattern of “pseudo-engagement.” The importance of the central question and the

authors' credentials make this a book to be taken seriously.

The Kagans, both historians of note, make a potent father-and-son team. Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor of History and Classics at Yale University, has produced an impressive body of work, including the best-selling *A History of Warfare*. Fredrick W. Kagan, currently a professor of military history at West Point, is perhaps less well known to the general public but has impressive credentials in his own right.

While America Sleeps is divided into three sections. The first, “Britain between the Wars,” chronicles that state's transition from a globally dominant power in 1918 to one of near-fatal weakness by the mid-1930s. It pays special attention to the Chanak crisis of 1922, the Corfu affair of 1923, the Locarno Treaty of 1925, the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1934–35, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. The second, “The United States after the Cold War,” follows a generally similar approach, addressing particularly the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1991 to 1993, the occupation of Haiti in 1994, the Clinton administration's attempts to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program, that same administration's efforts to curtail Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction, and American responses to conflict in the Balkans. The true third section, although actually included in the second section of the book, is the concluding chapter, in which the authors clearly state their belief that the United States is at risk of “suffering a fate similar to that which befell Britain in the 1930s.” They present an argument supporting this conclusion and

offer the chilling suggestion that it may already be too late to prevent such an outcome.

While America Sleeps is rich in background material. Defense strategies, budgets, building programs, and much more are fully and clearly discussed. For example, the section on how both the United States and the United Kingdom turned to technology as compensation for diminished force structure is fascinating. Readers will find compelling the portraits of both countries, depicted as states weary of conflict, desirous of maintaining dominance at the lowest possible cost, and eventually relying too heavily on inadequately led and maintained diplomatic services.

Some areas of *While America Sleeps* are open to criticism. One potential failing is that explaining how events between 1919 and the mid-1930s led to war is a very different thing from explaining how different events would have led to peace. Also, the authors do not address in detail the severe domestic political opposition that choosing a different strategy might have encountered; such difficulties are mentioned only to remark they could have been overcome. There are also discrepancies. The authors imply, for example, that President Bill Clinton was never able to bring himself to order an invasion of Haiti, that U.S. forces were only “prepared” to invade. In reality the forces described were actually in the process of invasion when the military regime of General Raoul Cedras yielded to U.S. negotiators.

Some of the authors’ subjective interpretations are also open to debate. The Kagans are critical of British leaders in 1936 for being overly fearful of the Italian navy should British opposition to Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia lead to

conflict. Yet it is hard to see how Britain could *not* have been concerned with Italian naval power. The Italian ships were new and well handled, and they would have had air support for any operation near the Italian Peninsula. In a more modern example, the decision not to force the landing of the USS *Harlan County* (LST 1196) at Port-au-Prince during the confrontation with Haiti is strongly criticized. There is no doubt that the image of a U.S. Navy warship backing away from a government-directed mob did not reflect credit upon the United States or its military forces. However, the authors might have more fully explored the potential consequences of a forcible landing. The ship was there on a noncombatant mission, with the ostensible permission of the Cedras regime. If a landing had been carried out, potentially killing many Haitians, significant domestic and international repercussions could have been expected to result. Additionally, it is unlikely that the original mission could then have been carried out at all.

One last criticism deserves mention. As Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have long reminded us, all analogies are suspect. The power of analogies is so great that arguments by analogy almost inevitably result in flawed decision making. This is in large part because all too often historical analogies invoked as decision aids are shallow circumstantially and far more different from the situation at hand than they are similar. Yet once the analogy has been invoked the damage often has been done, and the course of action suggested will be followed to its unsatisfactory end. To their credit the Kagans remind the reader that “the United States at the end of the millennium is not England between the wars.”

They point out that comparisons of present policies to those of the British at Munich are premature and that it is not their intention to draw precise parallels between the British and U.S. experiences. However, these admissions come only in the very last chapter, after the reader has had every opportunity to make just such comparisons.

Despite these critical comments, *While America Sleeps* is very much worth reading. The Kagans are asking the right questions. Their warnings about the fate of states that reduce military capabilities to dangerously low levels, lack consistent strategic visions, and replace sound strategy with wishful thinking are more germane than ever.

So too are the questions their work points to but does not ask. Can democracies avoid reducing military capabilities without the impetus of a visible external threat? Does state behavior motivated by self-interest weaken all alliances over time? Can a democracy survive taking on the mantle of world policeman? Can wars be prevented through consistent displays of strength and purpose? These are questions that reading this book evokes, questions that should be considered and discussed far more than they are.

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Detter, Ingrid. *The Law of War*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. (2d ed.) 516pp. \$39.95

This is the second edition of Ingrid Detter's sweeping survey of the law relating to the "modern state of war." The first edition, published in 1987, was then

reviewed by, among others, Professors Howard Levie (*American Journal of International Law*, vol. 83 [1989], p. 194) and Leslie Green (*Canadian Yearbook of International Law* [1988], p. 473), two distinguished former holders of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College. Both reviewers identified numerous inaccuracies and misreadings of source documents. The second edition is intended to explore the changing legal context of modern warfare since 1987. A reader interested in this edition should first read the earlier reviews. Regrettably, the representative deficiencies pointed out by Levie and Green still persist, and a fully balanced discussion of particularly important legal issues is lacking.

Typical errors left unchanged include Detter's erroneous position regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. She states that the 1949 "Geneva Convention III on Prisoners of War specifies [in Article 4] that there need be no fighting for the Convention to apply; it is sufficient for persons to be captured." There is no such provision in the convention. Detter also continues to assert that the convention provides that prisoners of war must not be subjected to interrogation, because Article 17 obliges prisoners to provide only their name, rank, date of birth, and serial number. Article 17, however, then continues, proscribing physical or mental torture, or any other form of coercion, to secure information from prisoners of war. Interrogation short of such prohibited actions is not prohibited by the convention. While a prisoner of war is required to give the identifying information, international law does not prohibit a prisoner from giving more than this, nor a captor from seeking more—so long as torture is not used.

Astonishingly, Detter continues to insist that the actions taken during the Korean War never had authorization from the United Nations. She states that the military operations were only “a collective security action of certain States, as there was no actual UN authorization for the action.” She asserts further that “the troops operating under the aegis of the United Nations in Korea may not have been forces of the United Nations as the decision to take action had been taken without the vote of the former Soviet Union, a permanent member of the UN Security Council.” Detter continues, “The units were probably troops of the collective operation of the Western powers, but as such, detached from their respective home States and placed under a collective command which, at least on an ad hoc basis, functioned as an international organization.”

As noted by Levie in his review, the legally significant actions taken by the Security Council were in Resolution 1511 of 27 June 1950, calling on all members to offer assistance to the Republic of Korea, and Resolution 1588 of 7 July 1950, requesting that members offering assistance do so through a unified command under the United States and authorizing it to use the United Nations flag. That the Soviet Union chose to boycott Security Council meetings was significant politically but not legally with respect to the actions taken by the Security Council in authorizing action under Article 42 in Korea.

It is bewildering that Detter in the second edition did not make the proper corrections about both the Prisoner of War Convention and the legal basis of the Korean conflict, given the prominence and qualifications of the earlier critical reviewers.

The last passage above also illustrates Detter’s distracting tendency to mix personal opinions with legal analysis, which does little to present a balanced view of the state of the law. In discussing the basis for intervention by Nato in Kosovo, Detter describes Kosovo as “a province of Yugoslavia which . . . sought, and deserved” autonomy from Serbia. She argues that nonstate “groups” should be allowed to adhere to treaties on the law of war, reasoning that “it is important to abolish the unequal idiosyncrasy that States are bound by obligations under the Law of War by treaties but groups, because of their inequality, are not.” Moreover, she states that “much has been written about the ambit of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter [which prohibits the threat or use of force by members in their relations with each other]; there is above all an area of doubt as to whether the article covers economic force.” The issue whether economic force is included in the Article 2(4) prohibition (it is not) was settled long ago—it is not at all an area of doubt.

Claiming that the second edition is intended to incorporate changes since 1987, Detter provides disappointingly little discussion on information operations. In less than two pages, she notes that information technology has introduced a new form of warfare and that collateral damage to nonmilitary targets is a risk of information operations. Much more could have been presented about when information operations constitute a use of force under Article 2(4), when a state may consider an information attack an armed attack and respond in self-defense under Article 51 of the charter, or how the law regulating the use of force applies to information

operations. While little was written in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the international legal issues associated with information operations, a cottage industry on the topic has grown over the latter part of the decade, and Detter's book suffers without a fuller discussion of this topic.

Detter's treatment of the law of naval warfare is similarly incomplete. She fails to include discussion of modern maritime interception operations beyond a cursory mention of the coalition operations conducted in the Arabian Gulf since 1991, and she only briefly covers the UN-authorized operations in Haiti and the Balkans. Although Nato's operations in Kosovo are discussed at great length in other parts of the book, Detter does not address the vigorous debate that ensued among Nato members about the propriety of interdicting delivery of refined oil intended for Yugoslavia. Some Nato members believed that the authority to do so was based on the belligerent right of visit and search, while others claimed that Nato was not involved in an international armed conflict, a predicate for the belligerent right.

With respect to maritime war zones, Detter states that "defensive" war zones are allowed if they do not extend for more than twelve miles offshore and are effectively supervised, while "offensive" zones, in which merchant ships are sunk, are illegal even if warnings are provided. Both these statements are patently wrong. Customary international law provides that within the immediate area of naval operations, a belligerent may establish special restrictions on the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. The "immediate area" or vicinity of naval operations is

that area within which hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. Such an area could exceed twelve miles and could also be in some location other than near the shore of one belligerent. Additionally, while merchant shipping generally enjoys greater protection from targeting than enemy warships, it is not an absolute protection. Under particularly defined exceptions, merchant shipping is liable to being targeted by a belligerent.

Detter also concludes, concerning the torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* by the submarine HMS *Conqueror* when both were outside the British total-exclusion zone during the Falklands War, that it was "highly questionable whether the sinking was compatible with international law, especially as the [warship] was heading for its home base and posed no threat to the British armed forces." This too is a misstatement of the law. Generally, enemy warships are subject to attack, destruction, or capture anywhere beyond neutral territory. Thus the sinking of *Belgrano*, even beyond the declared British total exclusion zone, was a legitimate act of war.

Conspicuously absent from Detter's assessment of the law of naval warfare is any citation or reference to the International Institute on Humanitarian Law's *Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea* (the *San Remo Manual*). The *San Remo Manual*, issued in 1994 and published in 1995, is a contemporary restatement of the law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. It was compiled by a panel of international law experts from various countries as an attempt to restate the customary and treaty law of naval warfare. It is not binding authority on states, but it is nonetheless

persuasive evidence of the current law. The United States does not agree with every provision in the manual, nor does any other state. Still, it is a fundamental source document that must be considered in any discussion of the law of naval warfare. As such, it is inexcusable of Detter not to cite it. Failing to do so detracts greatly from the text. Using the manual would have provided balance, and familiarity with it should have helped to avoid the errors described.

In Leslie Green's review of Detter's first edition, he concluded that "regrettably, it can hardly be said that Dr. Detter De Lupis' *Law of War* provides the reader with any real practical account of 'the body of rules which regulates relationships in war.'" Levie, after devastatingly recounting the representative errors and inaccuracies in the first edition, left to the reader to judge "whether [these errors] are important or unimportant, could a political leader or a military commander accept and rely on advice based upon this volume as authority?" Unfortunately, the passage of more than ten years and the addition of new information do not warrant improving these two assessments of Detter's *The Law of War*. Like the first edition, the second is not a very useful book if one is looking for a basic understanding of the law of war, nor is it helpful in advancing the development of that law.

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Podvig, Pavel, ed. *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 692pp. \$45

This comprehensive encyclopedia of all Russian (and Soviet) nuclear weapons systems deserves attention not only because all earlier versions were confiscated by the Russian Security Service (FSB) but because it is a complete and authoritative chronology of the weapons, warheads, and delivery systems that enabled the Soviet Union to achieve "superpower" status. Authored by Russian physicists and mathematicians using only unclassified data bases, the book tells the "official" story of how Soviet and Russian bureaucracies built the world's most fearsome nuclear arsenal from World War II until the mid-1990s.

Organized by function and military services, the story is easy to follow for a reader reasonably conversant with the systems and willing to plow through tables and specifications. The book's objective, clinical, and dispassionate treatment is both its strongest and weakest point. It presents all the facts. The data presented in the tables and notes probably could not have been fabricated at this level of detail. However, the book makes no judgments or any effort to place its contents in political context.

The chapter on the Soviet navy details how technology shaped strategy. The development of the R-29 sea-launched ballistic missile (Nato's SS-N-8) and the Project 667B (Nato's Delta I) submarine put the Soviet ballistic submarine force within range of its American targets while remaining in the "bastions" of the ice-covered regions of the Arctic, thus obviating the need for the "Yankee patrols" (by Yankee-type submarines carrying SS-N-6 missiles). With only one-third of the range of the SS-N-8, the SS-N-6 missile was a threat only when it was brought near the U.S. coast, where the submarine could be constantly

targeted by antisubmarine warfare forces. American naval strategists of this era can take satisfaction in having correctly postulated that the central purpose of the entire Soviet navy was to support the submerged missile forces, particularly the Deltas and their successors near the Soviet coasts.

The authors dispassionately and authoritatively document the eventual decay of the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why the FSB has declared the book a work of espionage. In fact, one of its authors, Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on charges related to his research for the book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an American reader to note the degeneration of the Russian early-warning satellite system or the pollution hazard caused by the way in which the nuclear submarine fleet was deactivated.

The table on nuclear testing provides a keen insight into the mindset of the Soviet decision-making elite, as well as the efficacy of focused, centralized planning. The sheer size of the program and its reckless disregard for the environment persuasively show the political power of the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex. The hundred pages devoted to this program make clear its importance. Of particular note, the Soviets conducted 135 nuclear explosions for industrial or other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough earth to form a dam.

The authors offer no apologies for the huge building programs or for the Soviet Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in the Cold War arms race. While the book is not overtly political, one senses that the authors believe the governmental pronouncements justifying the building or destruction of each weapon. They

make numerous allusions to the Soviet desire to adhere to international agreements, and to American perfidy as forcing the Soviets to build all of this weaponry. There is sadness in the discussion of the demise of the Russian strategic program, brought about by the dire economic situation facing Russia and the loss of Soviet republics as newly independent states, and with them the Soviet test ranges.

Nonetheless, this book should not be read for its political message. It is a well referenced storehouse of knowledge on Soviet strategic systems, useful to researchers and historians alike. Against its own standards, it is a remarkable accomplishment.

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Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999. 264pp. \$28.95

Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in writing this book was to fulfill the need for an introductory text for students of intelligence. He is well qualified to do so, having devoted more than twenty years in the executive and legislative branches of government as an intelligence official and as an adjunct professor in graduate programs at Columbia and George Washington Universities. (He is now the vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation.) The resulting work is much more than an introductory textbook; it is a trove of valuable information and insights ranging from the basic concepts and definitions of intelligence to a thorough examination of the intelligence process.

Thus not only is this an excellent textbook on the basics of intelligence and ideal for a course in Intelligence 101, but it is also an interesting and informative examination of intelligence and national security disciplines, one that would be of interest and value to national security “old-timers.”

This book addresses the fundamental issue of what “intelligence” is and what it is not, and it offers a detailed examination of the processes involved in the practice of intelligence—collection disciplines, analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, the role of the policy maker, oversight and accountability, and the ethical and moral issues generated by intelligence practice. Lowenthal provides an abbreviated but enlightening history of the development of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as a summary of significant historical intelligence developments since the creation of the Coordinator of Information and the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. There is not only a helpful examination of the structure of the U.S. intelligence community (with the obligatory wiring diagrams) but also an interesting description of the relationships between and among the players in the community, including the important stakeholders in the budgetary process.

Throughout the book, Lowenthal has inserted sidebars containing brief descriptions and vignettes summarizing the more detailed material in the text; these add a certain panache to the work. He also discusses historical examples of intelligence successes and failures, to illustrate the various concepts and insights he has mentioned. At the end of each chapter Lowenthal lists “key terms” unique to the profession, as well as additional readings. He has also included the

key provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and the Senate resolution that established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; all these are helpful for ready reference.

Lowenthal provides an interesting and valuable examination of the “syndromes” that sometimes affect the analyst, resulting in a faulty analysis and product. Most interesting is the “mirror-imaging” syndrome, in which the analyst erroneously presumes that other states will act in the same way as the United States would—Pearl Harbor is a classic example. Throughout the book, Lowenthal emphasizes the importance of the role of the policy maker and the fact that the purpose of intelligence is to support the policy makers who run the government. He also notes the converse responsibility of policy makers to provide clear and unambiguous requirements to the intelligence community.

In his chapter on covert action, Lowenthal characterizes these activities as “something between the states of peace and war.” That may not be entirely accurate, since covert action may consist entirely of nonforcible measures. Nevertheless, his description of the covert-action process and his examination of the ethical issues that are raised in connection with it are right on the mark. However, one would have liked a bit more discussion on what *does not* constitute covert action. For example, section 503(e)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 exempts “traditional military activities” from the definition of covert action, while in the *Senate Report on the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act*, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence went to some length to describe those activities, including “almost every use of uniformed military forces . . . whether or

not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged publicly.” More along these lines would perhaps reveal that policy makers have quite a bit more flexibility in responding to overseas events and that covert action is not the only option between inaction and the overt use of force. But this is a mere quibble.

In sum, Lowenthal has written an outstanding primer on intelligence, the intelligence process, and the intelligence community.

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Lerner, Mitchell B., *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 320pp. \$34.95

Finally, an author has done a hard-hitting analysis of the USS *Pueblo* incident of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner, an assistant professor of history at Ohio State University, does not exonerate the commanding officer of the *Pueblo*, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up the ship and crew, and the intelligence it had gathered. However, of all those who may have been culpable, Commander Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer the scapegoat his superiors made him out to be. Exhaustive research, including access to new information released from the Lyndon Johnson White House files, leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the shoulders of the Navy chain of command, the intelligence community, and Johnson’s foreign policy advisors, due to their misunderstanding and underestimation of

the North Korean–Soviet Union relationship.

Lerner asserts that the intelligence collection effort, code-named Operation CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the National Security Agency and that it had been patterned after the efforts of the Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United States. Deciding that the Navy should be the operational commander for this strategic tasking, the National Security Agency turned the program over to it. Converting tired, old, and slow cargo ships into intelligence collection platforms with insufficient money, inadequate self-defense, little more than fresh coats of paint, minimal training, and inadequate safeguards for the sensitive intelligence equipment on board, the Navy mismanaged the effort from the outset. The maladies that befell the USS *Liberty* in 1967 off the coast of Israel were repeated in the preparation and tasking of *Pueblo* just seven months later off the Korean Peninsula.

The USS *Pueblo* had been tasked to collect signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan using the “cover” of conducting hydrographic research. The operation had been deemed to be of minimal risk, based on the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner contends that whenever an AGI violated territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would turn it around with an admonishment and no more. Would not the North Koreans do the same? Herein rested the Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Koreans were not the puppets of the Soviet Union or its foreign policy executors. Lerner goes to great lengths to take the reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung and his vision of communism and the greater glory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Shortly after the operation got under way, the North Korean navy reacted with surprise and precision. Commander Bucher, armed only with a few .50-caliber machine guns aboard his slow vessel, surrendered the *Pueblo* after stalling his pursuers for only sixty-five minutes. Inadequate destruction equipment and too much unnecessary classified material on board led to an intelligence coup for North Korea. One U. S. sailor lost his life during the short resistance. The defensive cover that was to have been provided by the Navy and the Air Force in response to calls from the *Pueblo* never came. The Navy and the Johnson administration missed all the indications and warnings that such a fate could befall the *Pueblo*, even after recognizing that the Pyongyang regime had violated the demilitarized zone more than fifty times, ambushed U.S. and allied ground forces, attempted to assassinate the president of the Republic of Korea (with a secondary target to be the American embassy), and in the preceding nine months seized twenty South Korean fishing vessels for “entering North Korean territorial waters.”

Lerner then brings the reader briefly into the brutal interrogation rooms of the communist regime and the eleven-month negotiations that finally resulted in the release of the crew in December 1968. Kim Il Sung used the captured vessel and its crew to further his domestic agenda and drive for greater nationalism. His negotiators remained steadfast in their demands that the United States admit that the *Pueblo* had violated North Korea’s territorial waters—it had not—and that the American government apologize to the citizens of North Korea and assure Kim Il Sung that the violations would never happen again.

Meanwhile, President Johnson could not negotiate the return of the crew without considering a host of broader international considerations, most notably the war in Vietnam. Lerner concisely weaves together the competing national foreign policy objectives to ensure that South Korea remained an active ally in South Vietnam while simultaneously keeping the United States out of another conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

While negotiations dragged on, there was little interest from the American public: the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War, the struggle for civil rights, the campaign for the equal rights for women, two political assassinations, and the decision of the incumbent president to forgo a second term all diverted the attention of the American public and relegated the *Pueblo* negotiations to the back pages of the newspapers and in most cases erased them altogether.

Lerner presents such a thorough explanation of the entire incident that it is unnecessary to belabor here the findings of the Navy’s court of inquiry. This important historical analysis provides the reader with a better understanding of the impact of seemingly harmless operations on the conduct of foreign policy. More importantly, the book demonstrates the critical importance of intelligence collection, analysis of indications and warnings, and the effects that ignoring such crucial information may have on not only fighting forces but the nation’s interests.

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Freeman, Gregory A. *Sailors to the End: The Deadly Fire on the USS Forrestal and the Heroes Who Fought It*. New York: William Morrow, 2002. 293pp. \$25.95

Since its release in 1973, the training film *Trial by Fire* has been seen by hundreds of thousands of officers and sailors during mandatory shipboard firefighting training—training improved in no small part by the lessons learned from the *Forrestal* tragedy. Undoubtedly many (this reviewer among them) have wondered what it must have been like to have been on the *Forrestal* that hot July day in 1967 when the crew fought to save their ship. Through interviews with survivors, relatives of victims, and the meticulous mining of official U.S. Navy files, Gregory Freeman, former Associated Press reporter turned freelance journalist, seeks to capture the human emotions of the day and explore the question of why this tragedy happened. Weaving a thoroughly engaging, often riveting tale as seen through the eyes of selected *Forrestal* sailors, Freeman fully meets his remit while describing the role that chance played that day in selecting who would live and who would die. He concludes, justly, that this was a tragedy that need not have happened, and in doing so he focuses on a causal factor—World War II-era thousand-pound bombs—that has been less fully recognized until now.

The book is divided into three major sections. The first six chapters introduce the *Forrestal* crewmen who play key roles in Freeman's story. For the civilian reader, this section will serve as a primer to life in the U.S. Navy in general, and to duty onboard an aircraft carrier specifically. It is also in this section that the

few flaws in the book are found. Perhaps invisible to the layman, errors—such as calling a commander a “high-ranking enlisted man” or stating that “landing without killing anybody or causing damage usually got you an OK grade” (generations of aviators wish it were so)—will jump out at the informed reader. While small, the errors do distract from an otherwise meticulously researched book.

The next eight chapters form the heart of the book. Here Freeman accelerates the pace, using literary snapshots taken through the eyes of the crew members to build an appreciation of the tension and fear felt on board the carrier that day. At 1051 on 29 July 1967, a Zuni air-to-ground rocket fired from an F-4 Phantom near the aft end of the flight deck, knocking off a fuel tank hung beneath an A-4 Skyhawk among Air Wing 17 aircraft preparing for a major strike in Vietnam. While certainly unexpected, the initial response to the Zuni launch and the resultant fire was by the book—a situation that changed dramatically with the explosion (just ninety-four seconds later) of the first thousand-pound bomb. In stark and realistic terms Freeman describes the efforts over the next twenty hours of Captain John Beling and his well-meaning but inexperienced crew to ensure that their ship would survive. These 150 pages are exceptionally engaging and so successful in capturing the stress and emotion of the crisis that they grab readers and leave them emotionally exhausted. In particular, the description of the death of sailor James Blaskis in a remote and inaccessible part of the ship cannot leave a reader unmoved. One hundred thirty-three other *Forrestal* crew members and air wing personnel were killed; many died heroically.

The final three-chapter section deals with the aftermath. The cause of the fire must be investigated, answers found, survivors treated, the dead buried, and the ship re-find its soul. Freeman describes well the aftermath of the tragedy and the difficulty finding the truth when some of the men had become primarily concerned with themselves.

In the end the official causes were determined. Independently, two shipboard groups had each bypassed one of two in-place safety features, confident that the other would suffice. Additionally, obsolete and less fire-resistant bombs had been transferred to *Forrestal* and loaded on the attack aircraft that morning—a point not fully explored previously. While no specific personal blame was assigned, without the negative synergy created by the convergence of these three decisions this would most likely have been just another unremarkable and short-lived flight-deck fire.

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Weir, Gary E. *An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2001. 403pp. \$44.95

Gary Weir has scored another hit. Using the approach he fashioned in *Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940–1961*, the head of the Contemporary Branch of the Naval Historical Center has turned his keen analytical mind and sharp sense of political realism to the linked topics of the U.S. Navy and the practical science of oceanography.

The book is divided into three chronological segments: from World War I to 1940, the Second World War, and the Cold War up to the administration of President John F. Kennedy. In each of these eras the submarine exerted a transforming impact on naval strategy and operations. The revolution began in 1914, when the U-boat explosively demonstrated the magnitude of its threat to the security of transatlantic shipping and to the political survival of Great Britain. The German undersea offensive and the resultant Anglo-American antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forcibly introduced an unwelcome third dimension into combat at sea, the comprehension of which exceeded the professional and technological competence of even the best-educated American naval officers. The massive, opaque, and largely uncharted subsurface domain could be mastered as a theater for warfare only if the Navy enlisted the expertise of oceanographers, who themselves represented little more than a loosely organized multidisciplinary specialty operating on the fringe of institutional academic respectability. If the Navy needed their expertise in order to fight underwater, the oceanographers needed the Navy's funding in order to prosper in academe.

Weir begins his analysis of the submarine as the *deus ex machina* of twentieth century, oceanographically determined maritime warfare with a New York meeting on antisubmarine warfare chaired by the inventor Thomas Alva Edison in March 1917. The specialists at the gathering, Weir writes, “concluded that underwater sound and echo ranging offered the most promising avenue of exploration for ASW scientists in the war effort. Physics and physical oceanography thus immediately became vital to

the national war effort.” As a result, the characteristics of sound transmission beneath the surface of the oceans, especially the effects exerted by thermal layers, became the focus of scientific research sponsored by the Navy. By 1918 the resulting underwater sound-sensing and transmission systems had “helped keep the U-boats at bay.”

World War I ended less than two years after the United States entered, and for a few years thereafter it seemed as if the wartime spirit of cooperation in the naval-scientific inquiry into oceanography’s utility to naval warfare would continue. However, the Republican era was a time of American isolationism and naval retrenchment, and by 1924 the budgetary axe had decapitated the fledgling naval-scientific hybrid. A revival of the joint effort by scientists and the Navy did not come until 1940, but not until the attack on Pearl Harbor did the fiscal floodgates of defense spending on such topics truly swing open.

In the Second World War the final form of American naval oceanography began to emerge. Just as the submarine is the weapons system around which Weir weaves his story, his concept of a cultural clash between naval officers and scientists constitutes his institutional or political theme. Still, as Weir points out, “Effective submariners and ASW officers soon realized that applied oceanography improved a ship’s chance of survival and increased the likelihood that crewmembers would again see their families after a difficult North Atlantic convoy or a submarine patrol near the Japanese home islands.” Besides patriotic motivation, the scientists hoped that memory of “the profitable wartime application of oceanography and the lives spared in combat would induce the Navy to

become the generous patron” of postwar oceanography.

That was how it turned out, but only because the unanticipated Soviet submarine threat provided an irresistible impetus for many shrewd oceanographers and some astute naval officers who served as the “translators” between their respective cultures. The two groups cooperated for mutual and national benefit in the Cold War, but the cultures of the warrior and the scientist remained as separate as oil in water. Their testimonials were parallel, not unified—the invincibility of U.S. fast-attack and fleet ballistic missile submarines for the Navy, and the intellectual fecundity of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography for science.

This book is not light reading, but it is invaluable to every serious student of naval strategy, weapons systems, and the marine environment that shapes and limits modern warfare at sea.

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Krug, Hans-Joachim, et al. *Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 456pp. \$38.95

With the exception of Carl Boyd, John Chapman, Gerhard Krebbs, and Bernd Martin, historians have largely ignored German-Japanese relations in general and naval relations in particular. (A further exception would be Werner Rahn; see his “Japan and Germany, 1941–1943: No Common Objective, No Common Plans, No Basis of Trust,” in

the Summer 1993 issue of this journal.) That gap in the literature has now been filled by this collection of essays by four eminent German and Japanese naval officers and historians: Hans-Joachim Krug, Yōichi Hirama, Berthold J. Sander-Nagashima, and Axel Niestlé. Each contributes from his research specialty, and the product is a welcome re-examination of a “missed opportunity” based on sources in British, German, Japanese, and U.S. archives.

Part I consists of a historical overview and analysis of German-Japanese naval cooperation by Captain Krug, German Navy, and Admiral Hirama, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Their message is straightforward—there never existed real cooperation between Berlin and Tokyo, as each side was intent merely to use the other to further its own power-political agenda. This is as true for the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 as it is for the follow-up Agreement for Cultural Cooperation of November 1939. Various technical, joint, and military affairs committees were eventually formed, mainly for “propaganda purposes”; they never met before Pearl Harbor and thereafter only “for protocol and courtesy.” The result was a “reluctant” alliance. In August 1939 Adolph Hitler did not tell the Japanese of Germany’s nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union until two days before its signing. In April 1941 Hitler refused to inform the visiting Japanese foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, of his decision to invade the Soviet Union. Matsuoka, in turn, did not inform the Germans that on his way home he would sign a neutrality pact with the Soviets. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came as a complete surprise to the Germans. Hastily arranged joint warfare

agreements among the three Axis powers on 11 December 1941 and 18 January 1942 brought few concrete measures.

Much of the book rests on the detailed radio transmissions of the German naval attachés in Tokyo, Admiral Paul Wenneker and Captain Joachim Lietzmann. These show that even in the area of possible joint operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, there was mutual mistrust and jealousy. This stemmed from lack of prior cooperation, racial arrogance (by both sides), linguistic difficulties, and especially the fact that German auxiliary merchant cruisers and submarines had to diesel more than thirteen thousand miles across a hundred degrees of longitude en route to the Far East. Admiral Karl Dönitz reduced the cargo capacity of U-boats by insisting that they carry full loads of torpedoes; he refused to share German weapons and equipment technology with the Japanese until August 1944, and then only at Hitler’s insistence. In the Indian Ocean, the one place where German and Japanese naval forces might have been able to coordinate operations, nothing of the sort eventuated.

Part II, by Sander-Nagashima, a German naval officer and historian, fleshes out much of the above. Sander-Nagashima first analyzes the command structure of both navies and then examines technical and personnel matters (“Cooperation with Caution”). He is especially critical of German duplicity in continuing to supply Chiang Kai-shek with military material in large quantities and in building submarines for China, stating that they were for Germany—in the process “purposefully fooling the befriended Japanese.” Perhaps in return, the Japanese refused to give direct help to German warships in the Far East; supplies,

until 22 June 1941, had to be shipped via the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the final analysis, Sander-Nagashima concludes, naval cooperation between the two allies was restricted to “the limitation of the operational zones through 70 degrees east longitude.”

Part III, written by Niestlé, a businessman and author of numerous works on German U-boats, details the meager logistical exchanges between Berlin and Tokyo. In terms of passengers traveling by transport ship, a mere twenty-one people went from Europe to Japan, and not quite nine hundred from the Far East to Europe; by submarine, the totals are ninety-six and eighty-nine, respectively. In terms of material exchanges, in 1941–42 Japan shipped 104,233 tons to Germany, of which 19,200 were lost; in 1942–43 half the 104,700 tons shipped was lost. Of the goods shipped in both directions by submarines, only between 20 and 40 percent ever arrived. While the Germans were anxious for deliveries of rubber and precious metals, the Japanese requested industrial products, technical equipment, and chemical goods. Part IV consists of a conclusion by Sander-Nagashima.

My criticisms of this superb work are but two. First, the fact that it has four authors writing separate sections has resulted in a good deal of overlap, retelling various aspects of the story. Second, the title does not do the book justice; it was hardly a “reluctant” alliance but rather a hollow, empty, or wasted one.

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Herwig, Holger H., and David J. Bercuson. *The Destruction of the Bismarck*. Overlook, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2001. 314pp. \$35

Rhys-Jones, Graham. *The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 272pp. \$32.95

During the early evening hours of 22 May 1941, the German battleship *Bismarck* departed Bergen, Norway, to face the might of the Royal Navy with only the heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen* in company. It was to be the battleship’s first and only operational deployment. Five days later, the ship went down with over a thousand of its crew.

Considered then to be the world’s most powerful battleship, *Bismarck* entered the Atlantic when Britain was stretched almost to the breaking point. With the critical Battle of the Atlantic hanging in the balance, the pursuit and sinking of *Bismarck* was one of the war’s most dramatic episodes; many books and a movie were dedicated to it. Those early works, written mostly within twenty years after the war, focused almost entirely on the operation itself. None devoted attention to the strategies, political aspects, or operational and politico-strategic backgrounds that shaped the battleship’s deployment and the Allied responses to it.

That void has now been filled by the two books under review, *The Destruction of the Bismarck*, by Holger Herwig and David Bercuson, and *The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster*, by Graham Rhys-Jones. Both books bring new information and fresh perspectives to the tale, putting *Bismarck*’s operation in its strategic context. In doing so, the authors highlight the strategic impact of the potential outcomes of Operation RHINE, the code name for *Bismarck*’s

sortie. Perhaps more importantly, these books expose the domestic political, the operational, and the military-strategic considerations that drove much of the protagonists' decision making. The books, however, differ in their approaches.

Holger H. Herwig and David J. Bercuson are prominent, widely published historians who coauthored an earlier book on an Atlantic Ocean engagement in World War II. Prior to their recent collaborations, they had specialized in German naval history and Canadian military history, respectively. Both live and teach in Canada, and for the most part they write from a western Atlantic perspective; as a result they have incorporated U.S. planning and activities related to *Bismarck's* deployment and how U.S. naval operations affected the planning of the German navy's commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder—a heretofore unexplored topic. They also provide detailed, comprehensive treatment of the domestic political considerations behind Raeder's thinking and the staff's response to his direction and requirements, recounting the German naval staff's extensive objections to Operation RHINE, its timing, and the results of their predeployment gaming of the operation. The book then shifts to a lively but traditional narrative of the battleship's deployment and loss.

The Loss of the Bismarck takes a more Euro-centric view of the battleship's deployment, focusing on the overall Anglo-German strategic picture, with special emphasis on Russia and the Mediterranean. Moreover, it presents the pursuit and engagement of *Bismarck* from a naval command perspective, highlighting the operational picture, available to the commanders on both sides. The contending naval doctrines and missions are explained and provide context to the

decisions made and executed at the time. The book reflects the background of its author, Graham Rhys-Jones, a retired Royal Navy officer whose career spanned from ship's operations to strategic naval planning. He is not without academic credentials, however, for he both attended and taught at the U.S. Naval War College. (See Graham Rhys-Jones's "The Loss of the *Bismarck*: Who Was to Blame?" in the Winter 1992 issue of this journal.) His combined academic, planning, and operational background enables him to provide an operational context for the battleship's destruction. More importantly, he demonstrates how Germany's and Britain's lessons learned in previous twentieth-century naval operations shaped their actions in and responses to Operation RHINE.

The Loss of the Bismarck contends that Admiral Raeder was a man totally wedded to the idea of major surface combatants operating as "raiders," attacking an enemy's ocean commerce. Raeder's naval vision called for "surface raiding groups" operating on the high seas, powerful enough to overwhelm most convoy escorts but fast enough to escape fleet engagements. The two-ship *Bismarck* class was to be Germany's initial post-World War I class of battleships; the *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* were designed with the raiding mission in mind. These ships were fast and powerful and had a long cruising range but were of a design that essentially represented an update of late World War I practices. The never-built follow-on H class was to have been the primary class of German battleships, optimized for raiding operations against the full range of modern naval threats. Unfortunately for Admiral Raeder, the war started too soon for his dream battleships to be

built, and the war's early operations found the much cheaper U-boats enjoying far more success at commerce raiding than his surface ships. He saw the prospects for his "surface raiding groups" retreating into the background. This feeling was reinforced in 1941 by the need to transfer nearly half of his carefully husbanded fuel reserves to the German army for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece and the planned invasion of the Soviet Union, as well as the sudden requirement to supply fuel to the oil-starved Italian navy. His hopes were revived, however, in late March 1941 when Vice Admiral Gunther Lütjens returned from Operation BERLIN, a surface-raiding sortie involving the two battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* that destroyed over 115,000 tons of British shipping. Emboldened by Lütjens's success and believing that the future of his surface ships was at stake, Raeder ordered an almost immediate *Bismarck* deployment, despite his staff's and Lütjens's objections and the lack of supporting forces. From that point, Rhys-Jones depicts the operational picture available to the respective commanders, from Britain's Commander in Chief Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey, and Admiral Raeder down their chains of command to the commanders at the scene. What follows is a chess game in which the reader sees what the commanders saw, and (unlike in previously published books) understands why those commanders acted as they did and how those actions affected the overall operation. It is a revealing and fascinating look into the fog of naval war.

Thus the reasons for the decisions of Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland aboard HMS *Hood* become more apparent, as

do the tactical and operational impacts of those decisions on the other players, such as Admiral William Wake-Walker aboard the cruiser HMS *Norfolk*, trailing the *Bismarck* and *Prinz Eugen*. Britain's naval operations and heavy losses around Crete, the German invasion of which was under way concurrently with Operation RHINE, were weighing heavily on British commanders. They could not afford a mistake in either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. German decision making was hampered by inconsistent and unintegrated intelligence support, and it was inhibited by a complex naval command structure in which Vice Admiral Lütjens worked for no less than three admirals in seven days—Admiral Raeder and Admiral Saalwächter, who coordinated operations in the Atlantic, and Admiral Carls, who was responsible for naval operations in the North and Norwegian Seas. Neither country's navy executed its respective intentions perfectly, but postoperational analysis indicates that the British had at least learned their World War I lessons better. They also then applied the lessons of Operation RHINE more effectively to their post-1941 operations.

Both books provide an insightful, balanced, and fascinatingly fresh treatment of a well reported naval event, and they complement each other well. In addition to the revelations discussed above, both expose design and equipment problems that reduced *Bismarck's* readiness and combat effectiveness, but *Loss of the Bismarck* does better with the faults of British ship designs. Both show how ULTRA contributed indirectly to *Bismarck's* destruction, but once again Rhys-Jones applies the naval context better; more importantly, he presents the German intelligence picture, highlighting the

impact of Germany's failure to integrate its intelligence. However, Rhys-Jones all but ignores America's involvement and fails to include much of the German materials that detail the political factors driving Admiral Raeder and explain the naval staff's objections to executing Operation RHINE in May 1941. Neither book tells the story completely; but if one must choose, *The Loss of the Bismarck* provides a better naval story, while *The Destruction of the Bismarck* provides the better strategic treatment.

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Strachan, Hew. *The First World War: To Arms*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. 1,127pp. \$39.95

What began as a single-volume replacement of Oxford University Press's long-running World War I survey (*A History of the Great War*, by C. R. M. F. Cruttwell [1934]) has, in Hew Strachan's hands, burgeoned into three mammoth volumes, of which this is the first. The second, we are told, will cover the years 1915 and 1916 and will be called *No Quarter*. The third and final volume, entitled *Fall Out* (reader be warned that the first volume has been in the making since 1989), will pick up in the winter of 1916 and push through to the end of the war.

Since this first volume alone runs to 1,127 pages, readers will want to know how this book differs from an already crowded field. The answer is that it looks at topics—origins, war planning, tactics, munitions crises, morale—in a broad

comparative context. No blundering great power is unfairly singled out.

As is obvious from the subtitle, the book is about the origins of the war, mobilization, and opening campaigns. To rephrase what has already been written many times over by battalions of historians is no easy task, but Strachan rises to the challenge. Better yet, he works through all the latest literature in English, French, and German to provide the most up-to-date interpretation of the war's outbreak. In common with most historians, Strachan points to the shakiness of the German Empire and its nervous quest for status and security as the main causes of the war. A chief abettor was Austria-Hungary, whose own military had become so enfeebled by the continuous Vienna-Budapest budget skirmishes that war in 1914 appeared the only way to rally the monarchy behind a much-needed program of rearmament. Similar calculations prevailed in Russia, where the tsar hoped that mobilization in defense of Serbia would heal political wounds and stop a politico-economic strike wave that had escalated from 222 strikes in 1910 to 3,534 in the first half of 1914. France and Great Britain appear more benign; Strachan concludes from the most recent French scholarship that there was no real war fever in France—*révanche* was a slogan of certain pressure groups. Britain was hamstrung between its fleet and "continentalists" clustered around General Henry Wilson.

Strachan's analysis of the competing war plans is excellent. Regarding the Schlieffen Plan, he describes Moltke the Younger's growing unease with the seven-to-one ratio set by Albert von Schlieffen to overweight the "right hook" through Belgium and Holland

that would envelop a French thrust into Lorraine. Although Wilhelm Groener and B. H. Liddell Hart later blasted Moltke for his timidity—he reduced the ratio of troops on the right wing to those on the left to three to one—Strachan points out that “an army would [not] behave as a united mass, gaining impetus on its right specifically from the weakness of its left,” for an army “is a combination of individuals and not a weight obeying the laws of physics.” That is precisely the point: the Schlieffen Plan was undone not by its relative weighting but by inadequate transport and insoluble problems of supply. Each German corps required twenty-four kilometers of road space, and there was just not enough of that on the right wing once the Belgians tore up their railways and Holland was foreclosed as a corridor. Add to this the fact that no fewer than 60 percent of German trucks had broken down by late August 1914, and it is easier to explain the German floundering at the Marne. There was also the small problem of French resistance. Having begun the war with tactics that were notoriously “perplexed by the problems of firepower,” the German army faced French forces, commanded by Field Marshal J. J. C. Joffre, that hacked five entire German corps to pieces in the last week of August and the first week of September 1914. Strachan’s larger analysis of this Battle of the Marne is interesting. The German high command’s initial response to the defeat—Moltke and thirty-two other generals were dismissed—was to blame individuals, “to make the debate about operational ideas, not about grand strategy.” In fact, the Marne was a strategic failing that *should* have discredited the kaiser and his army, which “had failed to succeed in its prime role.” Yet there was no

healthy introspection or self-assessment; the imperial army would simply hammer away for another four years.

In contrast to the western front, hammering seemed to work in the East, where the Germans shattered the Russians at Tannenberg and the Austro-Hungarians achieved some early successes in Galicia. However, there too the war stagnated for logistical reasons; with Germany committed on the western front and Russia’s strength divided by French demands for an attack on East Prussia, it was difficult to mass troops and artillery *anywhere* on the eastern front, and yet more difficult to move them, given the poverty of communications.

Although the production of this three-volume history of World War I will take far longer than the Great War itself took to fight, readers willing to enter the trenches with this first volume will be rewarded with a kaleidoscopic and elegantly written presentation of the great issues and problems raised by the war’s origins, campaigns, and home fronts.

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Uhrowczik, Peter. *The Burning of Monterey: The 1818 Attack on California by the Privateer Bouchard*. Los Gatos, Calif.: Cyril Books, 2001. 170pp. \$12.95

I am a resident of Monterey. Everyone here knows about the Carmel Mission and Father Junipero Serra. Colton Hall, where the California Constitutional Convention was held, still stands, as a preserved historic landmark. Cannery Row likewise remains, though John

Steinbeck would barely recognize it. Then there is the hidden history of Monterey.

Recently the biography of Thomas ap Catesby Jones revealed an episode in which the city was seized in the name of the United States. A quick withdrawal after a festive party was required upon the revelation that the war with Mexico had not begun (*Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*, by Gene A. Smith, Naval Institute Press, 2000, reviewed in the *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2001). More recently, *The Burning of Monterey* has appeared to reveal another fascinating episode in the town's history.

In November 1818 the capital of Alta California fell into the hands of rebels from Buenos Aires, the principal city of the newly independent Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata, today's Argentina. The privateering commander was Hipolito Bouchard. Born in France, he had sailed from Argentina around the world seeking to attack Spain's assets from South America to Madagascar to Manila, through the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, and on to Monterey. Bouchard started the journey on *La Argentina* and picked up the Philadelphia-built Argentinean vessel *Santa Rosa* in Hawaii. The crew of the *Santa Rosa* had earlier mutinied off the coast of Chile and found their way to the Sandwich Islands, where they sold the ship to King Kamehameha I. Bouchard obtained the *Santa Rosa*, placed it under the command of Peter Corney, an Englishman, and replenished the crew with whatever ragtag collection of Europeans and Polynesians he could find. Then Bouchard and his crew sailed on to the California coast, where they captured

and burned the town of Monterey, saving the Presidio church (today San Carlos Cathedral) and the mission at Carmel.

Until now, we knew of Bouchard only from cursory paragraphs in local history brochures. Peter Uhrowczik has delved into archives in Californian and Argentine libraries. From original sources, he has given us the most comprehensive work available about Bouchard's 1818 attack on Monterey. This study places the events in the context of its times. One learns nuggets of facts that could not have been easily discovered by studying other histories of the period. For example, the end of the War of 1812 created a slump in Baltimore's privateering industry, which, at least indirectly, made these ships and crews available to the insurgents in the Spanish-American revolutions. The business of privateering was not for the faint of heart. Bouchard encountered the slave trade, scurvy, mutineers, and pirate attacks in his journey around the world. As a consequence of Bouchard's raid, the Anglo-Saxon population of Alta California increased from three to five persons; one of the newcomers was an officer taken prisoner in Monterey, and the other was a Scottish drummer who had deserted. The author has been thorough in providing maps and illustrations so that the reader can visualize the geography of California as it was during the Spanish occupation.

This history is fascinating and entertaining. The contrast in reputations of Bouchard in Buenos Aires and in Monterey is striking. In Argentina, Bouchard's monument sits in the middle of a small plaza honoring him as a brave patriot. In California, those acquainted with Hipolito Bouchard tend to regard

him as a pirate, not a privateer. The distinction between a pirate and a privateer is a fine one separated by a thin letter of marque (as provided for in the U.S. Constitution). *The Burning of Monterey* gives us an understanding of an interesting man who lived in

turbulent times, from the perspectives of both those who admire and those who detest him.

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