

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF PARIS

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It involved no fleet action, and only verbal salvos were exchanged, but the “naval battle of Paris” was a high-stakes diplomatic contest that threatened to poison the good relations between erstwhile allies Britain and the United States and that at one point disrupted the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The common goal of defeating imperial Germany ensured Anglo-American cooperation while the war lasted, but as soon as an armistice appeared imminent, both powers began to maneuver to secure their postwar interests. Previously obscured by the common crusade against a common foe, the reality of conflicting war aims and interests now threatened the peace.

By 1918 President Woodrow Wilson had emerged as the most articulate proponent of a new era of international relations based upon law and international cooperation. Enshrined as it would be in the “Fourteen Points,” a Wilsonian peace promised to end the kind of great-power rivalry that had led to the Great War. The most revolutionary part of Wilson’s program was the establishment of a League of Nations—not only a forum for arbitration but a vehicle for collective security.

Despite Wilson’s liberal internationalism and support for disarmament, however, during the conference he threatened a naval arms race with Great Brit-

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ain. The challenge to British naval supremacy alarmed the British and nearly alienated the European partner most sympathetic to Wilson’s vision of the peace. The United States and Britain, both great trading powers, had much to gain from cooperation and much to lose if attempts at collective security failed to halt a slide

into renewed great-power rivalry. The failure to set aside their naval and commercial competition at Paris ultimately helped undermine Anglo-American hopes that together the two nations could forge a system of international cooperation to keep the peace and promote global trade. Wilson's conduct of the negotiations was most unwise. While the threat of a naval race gave Wilson leverage at the conference, coercion came at the cost of damaged relations with a vital ally.

Originally, as the Great War raged in Europe, Wilson had been determined to keep America out of the war while protecting its trading rights as a neutral power. In a situation not very different from the Napoleonic Wars, both Britain and Germany were violating the American notion of neutral rights in their attempts to deny U.S. trade to the other.¹ Germany's U-boat campaign was more brutal than Britain's blockade, and unrestricted submarine warfare was widely viewed as an atrocity against noncombatants and contrary to international law. Ultimately, of course, unrestricted submarine warfare would force Wilson to declare war on Germany and join the Entente powers. Nevertheless, Wilson fumed that the United States could not resist British restrictions on U.S. trade because of the supremacy of the Royal Navy. In September 1916 Wilson remarked to his closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, "Let us build a bigger navy than hers and do what we please!"² Wilson was beginning to see the U.S. Navy not only in its traditional role of providing security but as an instrument of diplomacy.³ The result of Wilson's new appreciation of naval power and public enthusiasm for it was the unprecedented three-year naval building program of 1916.

The bill called for \$300 million in appropriations—more than double those for the preceding year and six times the naval funding for the Spanish-American War.⁴ Had American entry into the First World War not intervened, the program would have given the United States twenty-seven battleships, six battle cruisers, and over 350 smaller warships—approaching parity with the Royal Navy by 1921. In terms of modern capital ships, the U.S. Navy would have been superior. In the event, the danger that U-boat depredations might defeat Britain in the spring and summer of 1917 forced the reluctant Wilson administration to postpone dreadnought construction and concentrate on escort craft to defeat the U-boats. Wilson remained committed, however, to continuing the dreadnought program as soon as conditions permitted.⁵

If the United States was concerned in 1918 with neutral rights and the strength of the fleet, the British were worried that the end of the war might see naval and mercantile supremacy pass to the Americans. As vexing as the 1916 building program had been to the British, the dramatic growth of the U.S. merchant marine during the war was equally troubling. Would the United States capture markets Britain had formerly held? On 2 August 1918, as Allied armies

were beginning the series of offensives on the western front that would lead to the end of the war, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet. He complained that while Britain had been maintaining a huge war fleet, the United States had produced very few warships for convoy escort duties, eleven a month, while building great numbers of merchantmen. He warned that Britain's position as the world's shipper and premier shipbuilding country was imperiled: "Are we to go on losing ships in our Allies' interest, and repairing ships for them while they overtake us in their Mercantile Marine?" The building of U.S. battleships was also resuming. Geddes insisted that the United States be induced to shift its priorities to destroyers so British yards could focus on merchantmen, to make up for Britain's great shipping losses during the war.⁶ It soon became clear to the Admiralty, however, that it could not count on the use of any U.S. destroyers until 1919; Geddes now referred to the United States as "a naval liability" and a "tax on the alliance."⁷

During mid-October 1918, as Germany sought an armistice based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Navy Department and Admiralty were already contemplating how the naval section of the armistice terms might affect their relative positions.⁸ The British pressed for harsh naval terms, including the surrender and destruction of the German surface fleet, leaving Germany with only a coastal defense force. Wilson and the Navy Department, in contrast, wanted lenient naval terms, because the destruction of the German fleet would leave Britain without a significant European rival, in which case the Royal Navy could "do with our new merchant marine as she saw fit."⁹ The Admiralty, for its part, now began considering the implications of the second of Wilson's Fourteen Points: "freedom of the seas." That aspiration enshrined the traditional U.S. position on neutral rights in wartime—the very issue that had provoked American entry into the war. The Admiralty took alarm at the thought of placing restrictions on Britain's ability to conduct effective blockades. Was not the purpose of sea power to deny overseas communication to an enemy? The blockade was clearly an important factor in the approaching German defeat. The British Empire could not in future wars afford to trust its security to an untested international organization (Wilson's League) or surrender the bulwark of sea supremacy, which had never failed it.¹⁰

In its battle against freedom of the seas, the Admiralty had the unshakable support of Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Lloyd George insisted that Britain could not abandon its principal strategic weapon. In response, Wilson, resorting to "brinkmanship," instructed House to tell the Allies that they could either accept freedom of the seas or the United States would build "the strongest navy that our resources permit and as our people have so long desired." House amplified the president's message by pointing out the United States had more

resources and money than they—that if it came to a contest, Britain would lose. Lloyd George held his ground, retorting that Great Britain would “spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power.”¹¹ However, anxious to avoid an open break over freedom of the seas yet determined not to surrender on the issue, Lloyd George offered to defer the matter to the peace conference; Wilson accepted that olive branch.

In any case, as would become clear, Wilson’s broadening concept of the League of Nations made freedom of the seas moot—in a world without neutrals there would be no wars except between the League and outlaw states. Wilson ultimately abandoned his support for freedom of the seas, later explaining that it had been a “practical joke” on himself, since Point Fourteen (“a general association of nations”) eliminated the need for Point Two.¹²

There remained the issue of the U.S. naval building program, which assumed even larger dimensions. In late October 1918 the Wilson administration raised the ante and asked Congress for a second three-year naval building program, a repeat of the 1916 program plus ten additional battleships and six battle cruisers. Wilson now had a bigger club, or bargaining chip, to use at the peace conference, as well as clear evidence for the American people that failure to endorse the League would mean expensive defense policies.¹³ In his annual message to Congress on 2 December 1918, Wilson declared that he took it for granted Congress would continue the naval building program begun in 1916. He implied that the new program was simply a continuation of the long-term development of the Navy and insisted that the building program should continue: “It would clearly be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our programs to a future world policy as yet undetermined.”¹⁴

Two days later Wilson boarded the transport ship *George Washington*, escorted by the battleship *Pennsylvania*, for Brest, in France, and the peace conference. Once in France Wilson became increasingly bitter about the motives of the Allied statesmen. At a dinner with a few Americans on 10 January, he opened his mind. He seethed with indignation that the French wanted rent for the use of their trenches and that the British were demanding payment for each American soldier transported in British ships to fight in their cause. He made a distinction between the people of Europe, who wanted a just peace, and the ruling classes, who cared only for their national rivalries.¹⁵

While the president was in France, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was energetically promoting the naval building program to the American public. In a lengthy press release Daniels explained the administration’s motives and why it was imperative to support the program. Arguing in moralistic terms, Daniels said the country had no designs on the territory or trade of other nations but was “pledged to the protection of the weak wherever they may suffer

threats.” The nation would have to be “strong in defense against aggressors and in offense against evil doers.” Should the peace conference fail to create a “world police force” to keep peace in the new order, the United States would have to create “incomparably the greatest Navy in the world.” Here indeed was not just justification for naval expansion but an expansive vision of the Wilson administration’s internationalist agenda.¹⁶ Clearly thinking of his negotiating position in the peace conference, Wilson sent a message to Secretary Daniels encouraging him to continue pushing for the new building program, which was “essential to our purpose here.” He revealed that he was willing to accept a proviso in the pending naval legislation that if the peace conference adopted some agreement to reduce armaments (the fourth of the Fourteen Points, “national armaments would be reduced”), he could postpone building contracts pending consultation with Congress.¹⁷

In late January the American, British, and French naval leaders established a committee in Paris to consider the naval terms of the treaty. The American representative, Admiral William Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations and Wilson’s technical adviser on naval affairs during the conference, soon clashed with the British First Sea Lord, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, and the French Chief of Naval Staff, Ferdinand de Bon. The thorniest issue was the final disposition of the interned German fleet. Benson favored sinking the German ships, so they would not affect the postwar balance of naval power. Admiral de Bon wanted them distributed, so France could have compensation for its lack of naval construction during the war. Wemyss entertained destruction of the German ships, but only as part of an Anglo-American agreement on new naval construction. Benson’s position found support in a lengthy memorandum by the U.S. Naval Advisory Staff in Paris.¹⁸ Ignoring the inconsistency of calling for reduction of armaments while embarking on a major building program, the Advisory Staff argued that destruction of the German ships would “be a practical demonstration of the sincerity of the High Contracting Parties of the determination to reduce armaments.” If distribution happened, the United States should abstain: “America is proud to claim that she came into this war with clean hands and will come out with empty hands.” After evoking the specter of an Anglo-Japanese combination aimed at the United States, the document called for naval parity with Britain, concluding, “World interests demand that no single power may rule the sea against all comers.”¹⁹

By early March the committee of naval leaders was deadlocked. Moreover, Admiral Benson’s insistence on naval parity with Britain was increasingly at odds with the administration’s diplomacy. Benson’s biographer Mary Klachko writes, “House shared the president’s conception of the building program as primarily a diplomatic bargaining chip, whereas Benson wanted to construct the

ships.”²⁰ Meanwhile, the Admiralty was considering how best to respond to the American naval challenge. In a shrewd and insightful memorandum to the War Cabinet the Admiralty advised tact, caution, and restraint. The Admiralty noted the deep political divisions already apparent in the United States, where the Republican Party, hostile to the building program, controlled Congress. The Admiralty recognized that many in the United States would support equality with Britain but argued that any program to gain supremacy was certainly a bluff; most Americans, it believed, were not anti-British but jealous of American dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The paper warned that “any ill-judged action on our part might be fanned to produce among them such a wave of spread-eagleism as to force the government to carry through the biggest naval programme, even if the President does not really mean or wish to do so.” Finally, the memorandum recognized the deep distrust between the two countries but dismissed the threat of war as “unthinkable.”²¹

In late March Wilson returned to Paris after a month in the United States. Daniels too arrived in Paris, and it was shortly after Daniels’s arrival that the most heated confrontation of the “naval battle of Paris” took place. The First Sea Lord, Wemyss, called on Daniels at his hotel, and the secretary sent word to Benson to join the discussions. Benson, when he arrived, was shocked to find his British counterpart pressing Daniels about the U.S. naval building program. Benson later reported that Wemyss demanded to know why the Wilson administration had undertaken its naval increase and to what extent the administration planned to carry it out. Indignant, Benson shook his finger at Wemyss, retorting, “By what authority do you presume to come over here and ask such a question from our Secretary?”²² There is no complete account of what followed, but Daniels wrote in his memoirs that while the two admirals did not descend to cursing one another, they came close, and he had to intervene between them.²³

The next day, 27 March, Daniels and Benson met with the First Lord of the Admiralty (the First Sea Lord’s civilian senior), Walter Long. Wemyss was not at the meeting, presumably to avoid an altercation with Benson. Long told the Americans that Great Britain simply could not abide coming out of the war a second-rate naval and commercial power. After Long’s explanation of Britain’s need to maintain sea supremacy, Benson demanded to know whether Britain, simply because it had always been supreme, would try to remain supreme at all hazards. After reflection, Long replied, “Well, Admiral, that is about the size of it.” Benson responded that if the British government continued policy along those lines it would mean “war between Great Britain and the United States.” Daniels affirmed that Admiral Benson had not stated the case too strongly. Long responded, “In that case you had better talk to your President, and I will talk to my Prime Minister.”²⁴

From this point, political leaders intervened to resolve the impasse at Paris. When Daniels reported the naval discussions to Wilson, the president considered the reality that British support for the League of Nations depended on resolving the naval dispute. Wilson instructed Daniels, “Do not leave this matter in the hands of naval officers. Take it up with Lloyd George. You are both civilians and will understand the situation better than men who belong to the profession of arms.”²⁵ If Wilson now considered Benson poorly suited to a role in the negotiations, he could have turned to other naval advisers who were on good terms with the British. For instance, William S. Sims, the administration’s liaison with the Admiralty during the war, had established an excellent working relationship with the British and would have been a fine diplomat and able negotiator. Wilson, however, mistrusted Sims, probably because Sims had been the naval aide to his Republican rival in the 1912 election, Theodore Roosevelt.

On 1 April Daniels had a breakfast meeting with Lloyd George and Long. The prime minister suggested, “You ought to stop work on your cruisers and dreadnoughts if you really believe in the League of Nations.” Daniels responded that limits to the U.S. program could not be invoked before the League was a reality. When the prime minister insisted the defense of the empire required naval supremacy, Daniels countered that the imperatives of the Monroe Doctrine demanded even greater U.S. naval forces, since American interests included not just the Western Hemisphere but Pacific possessions as well. Lloyd George exploded: “Do you mean to say that your country dominates Mexico, Central America, and all South America?” Lloyd George and Daniels were now at an impasse as intractable as the admirals’ had been. With British support for the League dependent on U.S. acceptance of a subordinate position in naval strength, the negotiations were deadlocked. On 6 April, Wilson, in a dramatic step, prepared to leave the conference for the United States.²⁶ One gets the impression he was using the old salesman’s trick of threatening to leave the negotiations simply to apply pressure.

If so, the ploy seems to have worked, for over the next few days Colonel House and Lord Robert Cecil, who was responsible for British negotiations on a League of Nations, worked to broker a compromise to save the conference and the League. Cecil had been an early advocate of the League and understood that Anglo-American cooperation would be critical to its success.²⁷ Happily, both men also understood that their respective nations would have to make concessions in their mutual interests. In his diary for 3 April, House recounted a visit from Benson that morning urging him to uphold the naval building program: “Benson is a little obsessed with this idea.” House explained to the admiral that “if the League was to have a chance of life, it would not do to start its existence by increasing armaments instead of diminishing them.”²⁸ House believed it was

sufficient to complete the 1916 program, but Benson and Daniels continued to press for naval parity with Britain. Wilson should have intervened to settle the dispute among his representatives. His failure to do so is likely explained by the fact he was by then consumed with his clash with Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau over French demands to detach the Rhineland from Germany.²⁹ Daniels would later disparage House for failing to gain both freedom of the seas and naval parity at the peace conference: "We never lowered our flag of equality."³⁰ At the same time, the Naval Advisory Staff in Paris produced another memorandum for Benson reinforcing the Navy Department's position. The staff argued that the crucial test for the League would be its ability to restrain its strongest member, Great Britain. The success of the League, then, would depend on naval equality between the United States and Britain. The paper warned darkly: "Every great commercial rival of the British Empire has eventually found itself at war with Great Britain and has been defeated."³¹

Meanwhile, Cecil was urging the prime minister to moderate his position. The crisis of the moment was Lloyd George's refusal to support a Monroe Doctrine amendment to the League covenant without an Anglo-American naval agreement. Cecil pressed Lloyd George to accept the amendment and thereby keep the question of the League separate from the thorny naval question. In Cecil's words, however, "the little man was obdurate." Finding him immovable, Cecil appealed directly to House. He reminded House that "to inaugurate the League of Nations by a competition in armaments between its two chief supporters would doom it to complete sterility or worse." He admitted that the position was being complicated by Britain's deep-seated popular sentiment about sea power but pointed out that Britain was more vulnerable to a naval blockade than any other power, while the United States could "laugh at any blockade." Cecil confided to House that were he the naval minister and saw Britain's sea security threatened, even by the United States, he would "have to recommend to my fellow countrymen to spend their last shilling in bringing our fleet up to the point which I was advised was necessary for safety." Cecil then suggested a compromise solution: Could the United States abandon or modify its new naval building program as soon as the treaty with the League covenant was signed? Cecil was confident his government would give corresponding assurances. The two nations might consult one another from year to year about their naval programs.³² Here was a formula that "saved face" for both naval powers.

After gaining the president's approval, House responded on the next day. The United States could not alter the 1916 naval program but would readily abandon the 1918 program, which was not yet authorized. House conveyed Wilson's assurance that he understood Britain's "peculiar position as an Island Empire." This was not enough for Lloyd George, who still hoped for a formal naval

agreement that limited U.S. building, but further assurances on 10 April finally won over the prime minister. Wilson pledged the United States had no intention of entering a naval competition with Britain. Furthermore, ships from the 1916 program that had not yet been laid down would be postponed, pending an Anglo-American naval agreement.

The “naval battle of Paris” had at last ended.³³

Josephus Daniels pronounced it a draw, as have most historians since. While Lloyd George failed to gain formal American recognition of British sea supremacy, he did avoid the enshrining of the American principle of freedom of the seas in the peace treaty. Belligerent rights in wartime remained intact. Moreover, the door was left open for further negotiations that would eventually lead to the Washington Conference of 1921. The Wilson administration secured British support for Wilson’s peace program without acknowledging British sea supremacy, and Congress could in the future still authorize “a navy second to none.”³⁴ But had the threat of a naval arms race been necessary to achieve Wilson’s program? Seth Tillman sees no evidence that the threat of U.S. naval competition modified the fundamental British position.³⁵ In any case, Wilson’s threat to Britain’s naval supremacy, however artificial it may have been, proved counterproductive. Britain had manifested greater enthusiasm than any other European power for Wilson’s ideals. The only significant disagreement was over freedom of the seas, which Wilson abandoned early in the game. Wilson could have taken British support for most of his program for granted had it not been for the naval competition he sponsored.

The “naval battle of Paris” demonstrates three lessons very well. One is that a cooperative approach in the negotiations, enlarging mutual interests and developing collaboration, would have been more productive in the end. Negotiation theorists have developed a number of principles that this historical case seems to support. Woodrow Wilson’s and David Lloyd George’s “hardball” negotiating styles, on the one hand, and House’s and Cecil’s search for mutually beneficial solutions, on the other, represent the two major paradigms of negotiation theory—bargaining and problem solving. While bargaining characterizes most negotiations, it implies a zero-sum dynamic. For example, diplomacy between Cold War rivals naturally took this form. Nevertheless, in an era of globalization where mutual dependence characterizes the system, problem solving may be the better approach. P. Terrence Hopmann insists that most research reveals that problem solving produces “more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable agreements than bargaining does.”³⁶ Most negotiations, however, are neither purely competitive nor collaborative but what negotiation theorists call “mixed motive” scenarios, involving both mutual dependence and conflict. In his classic theoretical work on negotiation, Thomas Schelling notes that

mutual dependence demands collaboration and mutual accommodation, although one party can exploit dependence for unilateral gain as Wilson attempted in 1919. Schelling also recognizes that threats (hard bargaining) can be used to coerce an ally as well as deter an enemy. The difference is one of degree: the degree of the threat must match the objective and be credible.³⁷ By this measure, Wilson's naval challenge to Britain was out of all proportion to his objectives at Paris. Furthermore, once it became apparent the Senate would not approve Wilson's 1918 naval construction program, the threat would be no longer credible. Although the 1916 program remained to cause the British anxiety, the immediate threat to British naval supremacy had passed.

Another element the "naval battle of Paris" illustrates is axiomatic: the character and personality of the negotiator matters a great deal, especially in an era of presidential diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson, more than any prior president and all but a few presidents since, personally directed diplomacy. Wilson became estranged from his only trusted emissary, House, as soon as he showed initiative beyond Wilson's skittish tolerance. His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, had had the temerity to disagree with his chief and was no longer a member of Wilson's councils. Historians have noted Wilson's arrogance and his inclination to surround himself with sycophants.³⁸ Margaret MacMillan, who has written the definitive account of the Paris Peace Conference, quotes the French ambassador to the United States as reporting that Wilson "does not have the slightest conception that he can ever be wrong."³⁹ Of course, other leaders have had these faults yet managed to govern well. But Wilson's arrogance made him unyielding, and that unsuited him for the give-and-take of diplomacy. Seth Tillman concludes that although the United States and Britain shared many common interests and objectives at the peace conference, the "alienation of temperaments" between Wilson and Lloyd George precluded close cooperation. He implies that Wilson was the more at fault, because of his limited capacity for concession and accommodation.⁴⁰ Perhaps Lloyd George summed up Wilson's qualities best, when he remembered Wilson as having embodied an "extraordinary mixture of real greatness thwarted by much littleness."⁴¹

Finally, the "naval battle of Paris" is instructive in that it took place in the context of failed attempts to establish a system of collective security and to restore global trade and prosperity. Two authors writing in this journal on the U.S. sea services' 2007 maritime strategy, Geoffrey Till and Robert Rubel, cite historian Niall Ferguson's thesis that the world was globalizing until the catastrophic Great War destroyed the international order.⁴² The parallels with our own time are obvious—an international system is developing that makes multiple great powers mutually dependent on global trade. As in the era of the First World War, globalization today is fragile. Great-power rivalry and the growing power of

nonstate actors pose critical risks to the postmodern era of globalization. The risks to the system demand cooperative multilateralism. In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Richard Haass predicts, “There will be a premium on consultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of inevitable disagreements.”⁴³

National security strategy documents already signal a shift toward greater multilateralism. In language that harks back to Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* promises to strengthen international partnerships, advance global trade, and abide by the “principles of freedom of the seas.”⁴⁴ Likewise, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* stresses the need to promote collective security and the rule of law.⁴⁵ While these documents recognize the need to maintain naval strength and war-fighting capability, they also assert that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”⁴⁶ This implies a marriage of sea power and effective diplomacy. Furthermore, these strategies recognize that no single nation, not even the United States, has the resources to protect all the world’s seas. With the global economy slowing and revealing its weaknesses, the truth of this maxim is all the more apparent. Interestingly, this same truth dawned on Great Britain in 1918–19, when the British recognized that their economy could no longer sustain the ruinous expenditures required by global naval superiority.

Woodrow Wilson’s vision is perhaps more relevant than ever. Whether or not a single international organization is the right vehicle, as Wilson assumed it was, greater multilateral cooperation is imperative. Wilson’s peace program failed to prevent a second Great War not because his vision of collective security was unreliable but because his diplomacy was flawed. National chauvinism was incompatible with Wilson’s internationalist peace program. The Wilson administration created what Michael Simpson has called “an artificial naval rivalry” that continued for another decade and prevented close cooperation between the two great sea powers at a critical moment in history.⁴⁷ We are likely living in a similar epoch, and cooperation between sea powers could mean the difference between peace and stability or the collapse of globalization.

NOTES

1. Of course, there were other neutral powers whose trade suffered, such as Norway and the Netherlands, but the United States was by far the largest neutral shipper.

2. Michael Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations* (London: Naval Records Society, 1991), p. 486.

3. Mary Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918–1922" (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), p. 54.
4. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*, 1966 ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 390–91.
5. Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 479–82.
6. Eric Geddes, memorandum to War Council, 2 August 1918, ADM 116/1809, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, p. 504.
7. Director of Plans, memorandum, September 1918, ADM 137/2710; and Notes for Conference with Navy Department, October 1918, ADM 116/1809; both in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, p. 525.
8. Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, which aspired to establish the end of the war (still ten months away) on a moral basis, were announced in a speech to Congress on 8 January 1918. For the text see World War I Document Archive, on the Brigham Young University Library website, at wwi.lib.byu.edu/.
9. Rear Adm. Sir S. Fremantle, memorandum, and comments by U.S. Naval Planning Section, October 1918, NSF/TX, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 545–46.
10. Rosslyn Wemyss, memorandum, 17 October 1918, ADM 116/1810, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 548–51. See also David Trask, *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918* (Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1972), p. 320.
11. Klachko, "Naval Competition," p. 77.
12. Seth Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 289.
13. Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, p. 488.
14. Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union Message, 2 December 1918, in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Arthur Link (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966–94) [hereafter *Wilson Papers*], vol. 53, p. 282.
15. Edith Benham, diary, 10 January 1919, in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 53, p. 707.
16. Josephus Daniels, press statement, 4 January 1919, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 585–86.
17. Gilbert Fairchild Close [Wilson's secretary] to William Benson, 27 January 1919, in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 54, p. 303.
18. The Naval Advisory Staff supported Benson in his role as Wilson's chief technical adviser on naval affairs at Paris. The staff's memorandums were directed to Benson and sometimes forwarded to Daniels and Wilson.
19. U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, "Disposition of German and Austrian Vessels of War," memorandum, 13 March 1919, in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 55, pp. 515–21.
20. Mary Klachko, *Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations*, with David Trask (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 144.
21. Adm. Sir William Lowther Grant, "British Policy as Regards the American Naval Programme," memorandum for War Cabinet, 25 February 1919, ADM 116/1773, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 590–94.
22. William Benson, memorandum on Anglo-American talks on naval building at the Paris Peace Conference, March 1919, 16 May 1921, Benson Papers, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 597–99.
23. Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917–1923* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 396.
24. Benson memorandum, 16 May 1921.
25. Daniels, *Wilson Era*, p. 375.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 377–79; Josephus Daniels, diary, 1 April 1919, in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 56, pp. 518–19; and Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, p. 91.
27. "Robert Cecil: The Nobel Peace Prize 1937—Biography," Nobelprize.org.
28. Edward House, diary, 3 April 1919, in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 56, pp. 558–59.
29. The disagreement over the fate of the Rhineland also imperiled the conference and was, along with the naval question, one of the great stumbling blocks of the conference. See Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months*

- That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 198–203.
30. Daniels, *Wilson Era*, pp. 381–88.
31. U.S. Naval Advisory Staff, memorandum, 7 April 1919, NSF/TX, in Simpson, *Anglo-American Naval Relations*, pp. 601–605.
32. Robert Cecil, diary, 8–10 April 1919; and Robert Cecil to Edward House, 8 April 1919; both in *Wilson Papers*, vol. 57, pp. 142–43.
33. Edward House to Robert Cecil, 9 April 1919; and Robert Cecil, memorandum to Edward House, 10 April 1919; both in *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House: The Ending of the War*, ed. Charles Seymour (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 420–23. As it turned out, Wilson would soon be out of office, and it would be a Republican administration that negotiated an agreement at the Washington Conference of 1921.
34. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy between the Wars: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism* (New York: Walker, 1976), p. 100.
35. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, p. 294.
36. P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 542 (November 1995), pp. 24–27.
37. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 11, 83–89.
38. See John Morton Blum, *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956); and Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, pp. 405–406.
39. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, pp. 5, 149.
40. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations*, pp. 405–406.
41. David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 154–55.
42. Geoffrey Till, “New Directions in Maritime Strategy? Implications for the U.S. Navy,” *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 39–40; and Robert Rubel, “The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story,” *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 74–75.
43. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” *Foreign Affairs* 87 (May/June 2008), pp. 51–56.
44. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 20 September 2005), available at www.whitehouse.gov/.
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