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Maritime Terrorism “A Nautical Quandry”

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As humans visibly prosper on land, it is easy to overlook the fact that our world is an ocean world, and the sea remains its defining characteristic. The maritime domain has consistently contributed to and supported the growth of civilizations and the magnitude of its role and relevance in our daily lives has significantly increased. About 95 per cent of global commerce traverses by the sea, and about 70 percent of the world population lives in the littorals. Given the real world economic labyrinth, and its near total dependence on the seas, the maritime domain affects life ashore, directly or indirectly. With this heavy dependency also comes an acute sense of vulnerability, necessitating the requirements of security and good order; yet the vast ocean remains free.

Maritime forces as guarantors of security have more often found themselves protecting trade and maintaining order at sea rather than fighting battles. This remains their singular continual occupation, interrupted occasionally by hard-core combat. Contemporary challenges that pose a

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threat to maritime order are terrorism, piracy, and smuggling (humans, material, weapons, drugs, explosives, and so on). Crime on land is restrained as it is defined and dealt with by a host of law enforcement agencies ashore. On the other hand, crime at sea has room to thrive unchallenged. Seafarers have lived with piracy and smuggling since the sail-age, which was never considered catastrophic. In the past, classical acts of piracy and smuggling were generally regarded as selfish criminal acts, equated to robbery and bootlegging. With the emergence of transnational terrorism at sea and its envelopment of other crimes like smuggling and piracy, the current security challenges have become more convoluted.

In today's maritime domain, "What hurts one may hurt all." Piracy, as it reared its head off the Gulf of Aden, led to an adaptive approach towards maritime security. It brought a host of regional and extra regional maritime forces together under a common cause. However, maritime terrorism, which remains a larger issue, still needs a tangible and concerted effort. At times, its complexity and amorphous nature tends to dilute its clarity, credibility, and presence. Congruent to the ongoing anti-piracy efforts, the Navies and Coast Guards of the world are well suited to play a pivotal role in countering terrorism at sea together; however, they remain disjointed and legally constrained to act effectively. This paper examines the issue of terrorism and its confluence with other criminal activities at sea. Next, the paper will discuss the need of a multilateral approach in the ambit of constabulary role of a modern maritime force. In closing, the paper will highlight a proposal towards an internationally acceptable, multilateral military initiative and its beneficial attributes and suggest a way ahead.

Past as Prologue

The 9/11 attacks on twin towers of the World Trade Center drew global attention to the monstrous design of transnational terrorism. Terrorism as a security threat has been in existence for a long time; however, this unprecedented attack in 2001 forced a serious reflection on security and the vulnerability of life and property. Terrorism is a relatively recent problem to the maritime domain, which hasn't yet been as rampant or spectacular to draw global concern. The existing maritime system and infrastructure remain susceptible to targeting as well as exploitation as means of furthering terrorist agendas. The perpetrator could be anyone from anywhere. None of the apparently localized terror groups active in a particular region can be absolved from an incident beyond their territory. This is especially true and particularly relevant to the maritime domain.

Maritime terrorism frequently appears to be an anarchic movement of like-minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and resources. For instance, the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam* (LTTE) owned a sizable fleet of freighters and cargo carriers registered in Panama, Liberia, and Honduras. It operated the ships for legitimate revenue, shipment of arms and ammunition to their own war zone, and for the purpose of supplying other groups not linked to their cause such as *Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin* of Pakistan which is reportedly linked to *Al-Qaeda*.¹ Given this symbiotic association among unrelated terrorist groups, maritime terrorism scenarios increasingly require consideration of a broad spectrum of targets and an equally broad base of perpetrators. As for the sea, it could be used for transporting terror without causing a ripple, or it could be targeted to cause a catastrophe.

Maritime Medium

The enormities of maritime transportation networks, the complexities of ownership, registrations, manning, and services spanning the globe provide room for exploiting the sea as a vehicle of terror. Global shipping is an industry on a behemoth scale and of labyrinthine complexity. It is not only vast, but it remains lightly regulated, frequently beyond the reach of law, and is often secretive in its operations, especially in concealing the real owners of the ships.² Seaborne trade is carried by a merchant fleet which is slightly over 50,000; the numbers of seafarers include 624,000 officers and 747,000 ratings.³ The world fleet is registered in over 150 nations and is manned by virtually every nationality. They crisscross approximately 8293 listed ports in almost 222 countries. Additionally, millions of standard steel containers that carry 90 per cent of the general cargo pose another unique security challenge. Once loaded and sealed, inspection is a problem. Contents can be misrepresented or undeclared items (including humans) concealed with relative ease. Even if sealed, containers can be surreptitiously opened and resealed without difficulty to remove or add contents. This is a made-to-order method of transport for terrorist assets—just as it is for drugs and other contraband smugglers.⁴ Worldwide less than 1 per cent of the shipped cargo is screened for explosives, radioactive substances, or other dangerous material.⁵

Many terror factions have realized the convenience of using the sea transport, as opposed to other arenas which remain relatively well policed. The group that executed simultaneous blasts in the port city of Mumbai in 1993 used explosives transported over sea from a foreign location. The explosives were brought close to the coast and smuggled ashore using small boats at a remote location south of the city.⁶ In 1998, one of *Al Qaeda's* vessels delivered explosives in Africa to bomb the US Embassy in Kenya.⁷

These gambits, however, are not limited to inanimate material alone; barely a month after the 9/11 attacks, an unusually well equipped and neatly dressed stowaway was discovered in a container at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro. The individual was an Egyptian national with a Canadian passport, and he was well-dressed, clean shaven, and well-rested in a furnished container. In addition to his passport, he also possessed a return ticket from Montreal to Egypt, mobile phones, cameras, a satellite phone, a laptop, airport security passes, and an airline mechanics certificate valid for four major US airports. The container was loaded at Port Said, Egypt and destined for Canada. The individual was accidentally discovered while he was getting fresh air.⁸ What is disturbing is there could have been many more who managed to cruise in the luxury of customized containers undetected.

The maritime medium also offers a potentially rewarding investment for the future. Days before he was arrested Khaled Sheikh Mohammad had a meeting in Karachi with Uzair Parcha, the son of a clothing import company owner from New York. Apparently *Al Qaeda's* representative offered to invest approximately \$200,000 USD in the firm, International Merchandise Group (IMG),⁹ in exchange for access to IMGs shipping containers bound for port Newark in New York-New Jersey harbor complex.¹⁰

Al-Qaeda and the LTTE were also known to have owned and operated merchant fleets, often escaping detection and capture. Ships tagged to suspicious owners could be easily lost by intelligence agencies as they were repainted, given fictitious names, or reregistered using invented business names. Many ships successfully hide their ownership under layers of corporate subterfuge.

Even a sizeable percentage of seamen carry fake documents and use false names, making intelligence tracking an onerous task.¹¹ The interesting case of *Baltic Sky*, a normal looking cargo ship, which had changed its names, flags, and ownerships for 37 years, is only the tip of the iceberg. The ship seized in June 2003 by Greek authorities was apparently on a voyage from Tunisia to a nonexistent post office box in Khartoum with a consignment of 680 MT ammonium nitrate and 8000 detonators.¹² Another utility of maritime medium for transnational terrorism is for garnering funds through criminal piracy and illicit activities. Narco-trafficking has often been linked as a funding source for terrorist organizations and so has been the use of other contraband smuggling.

Maritime Targets

Targeting the maritime network and infrastructure also remains a lucrative option for a terrorist organization. The network and infrastructure are not just appealing because of their vulnerability but also because an incident at sea would resonate onshore. Three uniquely vulnerable aspects of maritime system are port city hubs, choke points, and the potential use of ships as weapons against life and property.

Port City Hubs

Globalization has resulted in an explosive expansion of world trade. The industrial community remains intricately intertwined, interconnected, and interdependent. Raw material could come from Africa with sub-components manufactured in Asia; however, the product would be finished in Europe only to be shipped to Australia. The ever growing dependence of international trade on shipping implies that the port cities play a crucial role in its sustenance. Port hubs that form a network of crucial nodes for the interdependent global trading web dominate container and transit shipping. For example, overlooking the crossroads of busy trade routes, the Port of Singapore receives an average of 140 thousand vessels per year carrying about 30 million containers, 500 million tons of cargo, and a million cruise passengers.¹³ The sheer scale and volume of shipping activity makes it delicately vulnerable to a disruptive act: even a phony threat could have far reaching consequences.

The attack on *MT Limburg* in October 2002 nearly paralyzed the port of Aden. Security fears led to drying up of ship traffic, tripling of insurance costs to prohibitively high levels, and diversion of essential trade to other hubs in vicinity. As a secondary effect, the PSA Corporation, Singapore, which owned majority stake in the container operations, was virtually forced to write off its stake in the port operations. Such an eventuality also has a potential to escalate into a humanitarian crisis if essential supplies like food, energy, and critical shipments remain interrupted for a substantial duration. The Bali bombings of 2002 revealed another offshoot of how a terrorist attack without even a maritime connection can rattle the hypersensitive club of marine insurers. Seaports across the Indonesian archipelago were declared unsafe and added to “exclusion zones” by Lloyds marine underwriters association, which meant that a ship’s insurance was cancelled if calling at any Indonesian Port,¹⁴ leaving it segregated.

Choke Points

Smooth operation of the global economy also depends on the free flow of shipping through international straits, waterways, and canals. Seventy-five percent of global maritime trade passes

through a handful of relatively narrow shipping lanes, and half the world's daily consumption oil passes through six geographic "choke points." A growing proportion of global trade in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), a key energy source for some nations, also passes through some of the same narrow waterways.¹⁵ These strategic spaces remain open access areas. An interruption of at one of these could choke the global trade, at least temporarily, and cause ripple effects in terms of altering shipping routes, escalating transportation and insurance costs etc., affecting business and livelihood.

Ships as Weapons

Analogous to the commercial airliner, which proved to be an effective weapon, an innocent vessel could also be vulnerable to such exploits. Ships carrying hazardous cargo such as LNG, LPG, ammunition, and ammonium nitrate could potentially create a catastrophe. While there have been no recent incidents or recorded attempts of such a maritime misadventure, using a ship as a bomb is possible. The potential effect of using a ship as a weapon to attack ports can be gleaned from the following examples. On 16 April 1947, a French cargo carrier, *Grandcamp*, loaded with 2300 tons of ammonium nitrate, exploded in a Texas port. The damage included a huge loss of life and property inside the port. Additionally, chunks of *Grandcamp*, weighing several tons, were hurled over several miles, causing damage, while two light planes flying in the vicinity were knocked out of the sky. The explosion also initiated multiple secondary fires and consequent interruption of essential services. The misery was further aggravated when a second ship *High Flyer*, holding sulphur and 1000 tons of ammonium nitrate, exploded the subsequent day killing all the rescue workers and onlookers. Investigations revealed a discarded cigarette to be the cause that wiped out nearly a third of the city.¹⁶

A similar catastrophe was caused in December 1917 when a French munitions ship blew up in Halifax after colliding with a Norwegian freighter. The blast destroyed 1630 buildings and damaged another 12,000 with approximately 1900 fatalities.¹⁷ Both incidents were attributable to safety issues, which were addressed and led to higher safety standards. However, what remains relevant is that if a discarded cigarette or accidental collision could wreak such devastation, the repercussions of a deliberate act could be worse. It is not just a large volume of hazardous cargo that can cause mayhem: the addition of a dirty bomb could lead to even more catastrophic results. For terrorists, passenger ferries and cruise liners can also be potent and politically useful instruments. The sinking of *Superferry 14* by the Philippine based *Abu Sayyaf Group* (ASG) in 2004,¹⁸ and hijack of *Achille Lauro*¹⁹ are instances that substantiate the efficacy of using passenger ferries and ships.

Today, a ship-as-weapon attack remains a distinct possibility. A well-funded organization could undertake a high profile ship-as-weapon attack using its own asset, while an organization that cannot afford to sacrifice a ship could use its personnel as crew to control the ship of opportunity. Fake Certificates and registration are not difficult to obtain in the maritime bureaucracy. The International Transport Forum (ITF) procured a First Officer's certificate for its General Secretary, David Cockcroft (a landlubber) from the world's largest ship register Panama.²⁰ Buying a few tickets to a cruise liner would not even need that effort.

The Unholy Nexus

The vast and open maritime domain is used for various types of criminal activities. Unlike on the land or in the air where hijacking, hostage taking, and indiscriminate mass murders indicate terrorist acts with perceptible clarity, crime at sea plays out in the grey area. The debates on purpose, method, and jurisdiction further muddy the waters. There is a struggle for distinguishing between piracy and terrorism. Further, the approach to discriminating between the two hinges on motive. A widely accepted factor that distinguishes piracy from terrorism is that while the former is supposedly perpetrated towards private ends the latter is undertaken to realize political ends. As the two acts merge, these definitions are losing their relevance. Both employ similar methods like illegal access and unauthorized force, causing intentional damage to life and property for a purpose, which may not be apparent. In either case, the maritime community remains equally terrorized. An attempt to distinguish between the two may turn into an exercise in futility. Considering its scope and potential, maritime terrorism can be viewed as a cogent problem with piracy as its second-string, which can be tapped for funding, material, weapons, knowledge, hostages, vessels, stolen documentation, and nautically skilled manpower. Discussed below are certain examples that highlight how the two remain entwined.

The case of *M/V Ocean Silver* a Honduran Flagged vessel, which was hijacked by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in August 2001, remains a puzzle.²¹ The ship was hijacked and the crew was taken hostage. When the ransom was paid, the hostages were released; however, the vessel disappeared, never to be found. The act had aims beyond financial gains as the money was reportedly used to fund the insurgency on land.²² In the case of *M/V Sintel Marine 88*, a Singaporean registered vessel which was attacked by local pirates in June 2002, the hostages were passed on to ASG through a contact for political usage,²³ a telling case of local piracy flowing into mainstream terrorism. Recent evidence indicates that the Somali pirates hand over a part of their millions in ransom to *Al Shabaab*, which is linked to *Al Qaeda*.²⁴

The Mumbai attack of 2008 is another example that highlights an unprecedented evolution of maritime terrorism and serves to confirm the much speculated but often discarded fear of an amphibious assault.²⁵ The attack used technological innovations like GPS devices, BlackBerry cells, and satellite phones in combination with simple assets like a mid-size ocean tender, an opportune fishing trawler, and a disposable rubber dinghy to wage an assault. The attack involved hijacking a vessel, murder of its crew members on the high seas, smuggling arsenal into a foreign country, an amphibious landing, siege and massacre ashore, thus spanning the criminal spectrum for an insidious cause.

In The Now

The current security situation can best be characterized as a state of volatile peace. The contemporary threat is more likely from an unknown terrorist rather than a known belligerent, making the issue of terrorism in the maritime arena relatively subdued. Attacks on maritime assets have been limited in scope to singular ship attacks by suicide crafts, attacks on passenger ferries, piratical gambits, and transporting terror by sea. Noticeable incidents have often spanned over a large time period. Owing to prolonged inactivity and relative lack of limelight, it might appear that maritime terrorism is not a cause of major concern. However, the few events/incidents from a large set available that were discussed above indicate that maritime terrorism remains an extant threat. It

capitalizes on latitude of maritime freedom and is potentially more catastrophic than the spotlighted issue of piracy. It is not intended to sideline the immediate issue of piracy, but the intention is to expand the scope of maritime security to include a potent threat, dormant in nature but larger in its scope and reach. Unlike piracy, it is an amorphous challenge which has managed to outpace us while we grapple with issues of definition and jurisdiction. With virtually unlimited number of potential targets and attack scenarios, it remains a pressing problem, spanning the oceans and possessing the potential to paralyze oceanic lifelines of the world.

A large scale terrorist incident at sea anywhere in the world would send ripples across the entire maritime community. No state is immune to its ill effects, not even the ones that may use it as a covert state policy. Thus, it presents a compelling cause common to the world community, opening avenues for collective consolidation. A viable approach to meet this challenge at a global scale is through multilateralism. While treaties and agreements exist, overall, multilateralism remains inadequate. Bilateral or trilateral treaties are limited in their scope and influence. Others like TF-151 or the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)²⁶ are seen as being too politically prejudiced to enjoy universal acceptance. The ones widely accepted like International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)²⁷ and Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)²⁸ deal only with parts of the problem. A comprehensive convention on international terrorism from the United Nations is needed. Further, most of these treaties do not discuss the use of maritime forces to counter or contain this threat.

Modern Maritime Force

As the possibility of full-fledged wars and high end conflicts recede, ancillary challenges continue to swell. Unlike the law enforcement enterprise on land, which is noticeably distinct and functionally demarcated from the forces that guard territorial sovereignty, the situation in the maritime domain is different. In contrast to territorial sensitivity, the maritime vulnerability of a state extends beyond the region where it exercises sovereign control. Every state is equally vulnerable on the high seas where reach is limited and jurisdiction doubtful. Militaries have traditionally been proactive towards war and reactive to supplementary issues. Resident expertise remains concentrated around the art of war as a result of the long, continuing investment. However, modern navies are often engaged in roles that do not necessarily conform to their traditional responsibilities. Various navies' additional roles include diplomatic, constabulary, and benign functions. A majority of world navies find themselves increasingly engaged in one of these on a daily basis. While the diplomatic role is an orchestrated activity, the benign function is spontaneous, unpredictable, and occasional. The constabulary hat, however, remains shaky. Maintenance of good order at sea may be at the non-glamorous end of the naval operations, but it is increasingly seen as a crucial enabler of global peace and security and therefore, something that should command attention of naval planners everywhere.²⁹ Maritime terrorism is an issue that does not necessarily flow in the mainstream of military thought. The problem remains amorphous and ill-structured which has successfully evaded a clear definition in the international congress; it straddles the seam between peace and war complicating diagnosis and therefore the treatment. However, as Geoffrey Till observed, it is fairly clear that most issues that need to be managed at sea fall in the lap of a maritime force.³⁰ There are no specialized counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics squads that run on high seas. All that needs to be sunk, salvaged, or apprehended is largely achieved by a maritime force consisting of either Navy, Coast Guard, or both. It therefore remains an apt instrument to act and react against terrorism at sea.

Considering the ongoing anti-piracy praxis, it can be inferred that most maritime states are increasingly inclined towards multilateral maritime co-operation. The problem of piracy has been universally and unequivocally acknowledged as a common maritime threat. Emergence of bold, indiscriminate piratical acts and their consequences has resulted in an adaptive multilateral response. The legal definition of piracy has evolved through United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 (Article 101) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB) initiative during its 74th meeting of Maritime Safety Committee which cleared confusion and addressed its loopholes,³¹ the 2002 amendments to SOLAS conventions and aspects of the revised of SUA protocol of 2005 have further provided a better framework to deal with piracy.

The universal right to board a foreign flagged vessel involved in piracy (Article 110 of the UNCLOS) provides a robust reach to deter and contain this menace. As rampant piracy emerged off the Somali coast, maritime forces of the world congregated around the Horn of Africa to protect common maritime interests. The compelling cause of combating piracy has not only seen cooperation from traditional maritime partners like NATO but also from certain states that otherwise may not share the same umbrella. India, China, and Japan joining hands and vowing to cooperate and coordinate antipiracy initiatives is undoubtedly an encouraging sign of maritime cooperation.³²

For the Future

Piracy is only a part of the problem that plagues the maritime commons. A greater threat is posed by the emergence of maritime terrorism, which provides a convincing cause for synergizing multilateral efforts. For a goal of countering transnational maritime terrorism, the institutional form is best suited to succeed. A two pronged approach with Multilateral Maritime Military Initiative (MMMI), which would provide coherent capability and reach, along with a Maritime Counterterrorism Convention (MCC) to provide legitimacy and guidance; under the patronage of an international body like the IMO or the UN is proposed. An MMMI model that promises unbiased commitment of military resources to react against a maritime terrorist threat, intelligence exchange, a system of forewarning, co-operative patrols, and catastrophe containment mechanism like joint hostage rescue, assistance against a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical threat under IMO/UN, will find better universal acceptance. An MCC which isolates the maritime adjunct of terrorism providing definition, jurisdictional guidance, protocol, rules of conduct and legitimacy and other nuggets to help counter and deter maritime terrorism would serve to further boost the effort. Discussed below are certain attributes and suggestions in support of the MMMI and MCC.

Reach

The global expanse of this problem and extra-territorial vulnerability of all states need to be tackled with a system of forewarning and reach. A maritime military force is the most effective tool that governments have to physically reach deep into the ocean. The reach that any state can singularly possess, however, remains limited as it is physically impossible and economically unwise. One way to expand effective reach is through resource pooling in a multilateral institution. Multilateral commitment to contribute assets towards counter terrorism initiatives at sea would expand every participant's reach. Enhanced reach, complemented by intelligence sharing, would offer an effective (proactive and reactive) response to a developing situation. The ability of a state

(large or small) to call an asset on scene anywhere in the world would help deter many bold plans that initiate over the horizon. An MMMI will also serve as a pedestal for bettering interstate relations, interoperability, and understanding amongst maritime forces that often bump into each other on the high seas.

Response

The resource pool of military assets if available would still find itself constrained in its ability to respond with legitimacy. Towards this end, two critical issues that need attention are definition and jurisdiction. Under the MCC, a definition needs to be codified and the jurisdiction needs to be modified.

Definition

For the definitional clarity, maritime terrorism needs to be insulated from terrestrial politics, and a definition should be crafted around the act, not its purpose. As the maritime domain largely remains everybody's property free from color, culture, and ethnicity, political insulation of the maritime space seems feasible under the principle of common use for peaceful purpose. Following is a proposed definition:

An act of violence against a vessel, fixed platform, any person on a vessel or threat to life and property or disruption of navigational freedom of a vessel in the maritime medium and preparation towards execution of such acts at sea or ashore would be deemed an act of maritime terrorism.

While this definition may seem incomplete with deliberate omission of purpose or motive for classifying the act, the motive is considered inconsequential when viewed in the light of increasing collusion of different crimes at sea for unclear purposes. At sea, it could be safer to anticipate a terror act and downgrade to burglary than follow the reverse.

Jurisdiction

A jurisdictional tweak is also considered necessary to capitalize on the effectiveness of reach and clarity. One can never pretend that a ship pulling into a port comes from the home port painted on its stern. There are ships hailing from LaPaz in landlocked Bolivia and from the Mongolian deserts. The registries are financially oriented and often based outside the country that they represent.³³ A flag state like Panama or Liberia that enjoys jurisdiction over a large chunk of floating vessels has no wherewithal to effectively exercise it. Given this, many ships sail the sea with virtually no jurisdiction. This remains one of the largest flaws of maritime order, which provides latitude for crime and restricts a state's ability to act decisively.

As for jurisdiction, it is proposed that the jurisdictional ambit be amended from high seas no jurisdiction to end points jurisdiction. End point jurisdiction means that a ship sailing from one port to another should fall under the jurisdiction of its destination port as it leaves the jurisdictional waters of the departure port. It will not only bring a sense of regulation at sea but also provide the destination state an opportunity to act/react in sufficient time if a suspicion should arise. Such a measure will also enhance the effectiveness of a multilateral institution by complementing resource

pooled reach with a legal shot in the arm. These proposals, however, are only starting points; nuances of their implementation and complications need detailed consideration.

Concluding Remarks

Maritime terrorism as an adjunct of organized terrorism has emerged as one of the daunting challenges of the 21st century. Maritime order, which contributes significantly to growth and prosperity of the world community, seems increasingly vulnerable to the emerging nautical disturbances. At the moment, the problem does not appear pressing and immediate; however, a gradual tack of terrorist organizations towards the sea would eventually turn it into a leviathan. The praxis of counter-piracy around the Horn of Africa is a contemporary example that emphasizes the fact that distant and widespread challenges need to be responded to through a universally acceptable multilateral effort. Unlike piracy, the issue of maritime terrorism would remain concealed under convenient layers and oceanic entropy only to strike on some fateful day, like the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. There is a need to adopt a multilateral effort against the potential for maritime terrorism to prevent losing advantage to myriad terrorist groups which operate in unregulated waters, furthering their convoluted agendas by resorting to violence and subterfuge. The MMMI and the MCC could be a feasible start.

¹ Peter Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A preliminary Analysis," Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication, Winter 1999, <http://www.csis-scrc.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm77-eng.asp> (accessed 25 Apr 2012).

² Michael Richardson, *Time Bomb for Global Trade*, (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asia Studies, 2004), p5

³ BIMCO/ISF, *Manpower 2010 Update*, The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and International Shipping Federation (ISF), <http://www.marisec.org/Manpower%20Study.pdf> (accessed 30 Apr 2012).

⁴ Richardson, 6

⁵ Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Report on Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact*, July 2003, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/61/18521672.pdf, (accessed 26 Apr 2012)

⁶ "Mumbai Blast Judgement", South Asia Terrorism Portal.

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india.../mumbai_blasts_judgement.htm (accessed 26 Apr 2012)

⁷ William Langewiesche, "Anarchy at Sea", Atlantic Monthly, Sep 2003.

<http://www.wesjones.com/anarchy.htm> (accessed 27 Apr 2012)

⁸ OECD, 8 ; Richard Owen and Daniel McGrory, "Terrorist in a Box", Times (UK), 25 Oct 2001

⁹ IMG is an export-import company that ships clothing in containers to the US for clients, including K-mart.

¹⁰ Phil Hirschhorn, "Pakistani in US Aided Al- Qaeda" CNN, 9 Aug 2003 accessed 28 Apr 2012.

¹¹ Richardson, 14

¹² "New Explosives Cargo Mystery", BBC News, 26 June 2003.

¹³ 'Port Details-Port of Singapore', World Port Source,

www.worldportsource.com/ports/SGP_Port_of_Singapore_244.php (accessed 29 Apr 2012)

¹⁴ "All Indonesian Ports Put Under Marine Insurance Exclusion Zones" , Business Times, 26 October 2002

¹⁵ Richardson, 3

¹⁶ Texas State Historical Association. "Texas City Disaster", **Handbook of Texas Online**

<http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/lyt01> (accessed 30 April 2012)

¹⁷ Langewiesche

¹⁸ "Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines Islamist Separatists)", (<http://www.cfr.org/philippines/abu-sayyaf-group-philippines-islamist-separatists/p9235>) accessed April 30, 2012. Backgrounder published by Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009.

¹⁹ Achille Lauro a cruise liner was hijacked near Egypt on 7 October 1985, by Palestinian terrorists. The terrorists threatened to kill all passengers unless fifty Palestinians were released from Israeli custody.

²⁰ Richardson,35

²¹ GAM is an insurgent group established in mid 1970; based in Aceh province on the Northern tip of Indonesian region of Sumatra. The group is known to use maritime domain, in its pursuit of a political agenda of Free Aceh.

²² John S. Burnett.*Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas.*(Plume, 2003)

²³ Rupert Herbert-Burns and Lauren Zucker, “*Drawing the Line Between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism*”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 01 September 2004. Accessed 29 Mar 2012. Janes

²⁴ Douglas R. Burgees Jr., “*Piracy is Terrorism*” Op-Ed, New York Times ,5 December 2008.

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~dewar20e/international%20security%20Research/burgees.pdf> (accessed 01 May 2012)

²⁵ Mumbai Attacks - On 26 Nov 2008, ten highly trained terrorists executed a sophisticated attack on the city of Mumbai (India), which involved indiscriminate firing of assault rifles in public places, luxury hotels and a Jewish Chabad house and resulted in loss of 166 innocent lives with scores injured/maimed . The attackers were linked to banned Pakistani terrorist group Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) apparently supported and trained by the state run ISI. The group boarded a vessel at Karachi, hijacked a trawler en-route for a concealed transit, killed its crew, landed ashore at an ill lit spot on a rubber dinghy at night and wreaked havoc in the city for 72 hrs.

²⁶ PSI is a US led initiative towards arresting proliferation of WMD through interdiction on a cooperative framework. It however is not an international treaty and hasn’t been ratified through the UN

²⁷ ISPS- International Ship and Port Facility Security Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea(SOLAS) convention which spells the minimum security arrangements for ships, ports and government agencies. It came into force in 2004.

²⁸ SUA - Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation is an international treaty agreed in 1988 and amended in 2005 to codify certain maritime crimes. The treaty basically hinges around ensuring maritime navigational safety.

²⁹ Geoffrey Till, “*Seapower-A Guide to twenty-First Century*” , Second Edition. p10

³⁰ Ibid,.

³¹ International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report* , Annual Report 2007

³² Nitin Gokhale, “India, China and the Pirates”, The Diplomat, 06 March 2012; “China,Japan,India Cooperating Well On Anti Piracy Activities”, The Economic Times, 29 March2012.

³³ Langewiesche.