



Easing Of Tensions In The South China Sea - The Need For A Multilateral Approach And Cooperative Strategy

Captain Praveen Nair
Indian Navy

The South China Sea has repeatedly been in the news over the last year. Chinese military and law enforcement vessels have come under the scanner for complaints related to harassment of fishing and the oil exploration vessels of neighboring nations. Incidents of interfering with the innocent passage of other countries military vessels in international waters of the South China Sea have also been reported. Additionally, China has often been accused of forceful incursion of uninhabited islands and islets in the region. China even declared a unilateral ban on fishing in the South China Sea in mid-2011. Such scenarios show no signs of abating and are, in fact, on the rise.

The existing security scenario in the South China Sea is complicated, with varied hues. It is critical for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to work in concert with the United States of America to get China, the most powerful and dominant nation in the region, to play a more responsible role to prevent the South China Sea from spiraling into a zone of conflict.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within /luce.nt/ are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or any other branch or agency of the U.S. Government.

Background

The South China Sea as shown in Figure 1, lies surrounded by China, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Singapore. It contains the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar through which more than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes and a third of all maritime traffic. The majority of the energy supplies of China, Japan and South Korea pass through the South China Sea.



Figure 1: South China Sea.¹

The competing claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea by the littoral states—namely, China, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam—have heightened the tensions in the region. “Due to the number of claimants, the complexity of the claims and the wide range of interests, the South China Sea has been called the ‘mother of all territorial disputes.’ Confrontations rather than cooperation mark its history and the disputes act as a major irritant in bilateral and multilateral relations in the region”.² The issue has become more complicated with the rigid stand and actions taken thereof, by the largest and the most dominant claimant—China. This, in turn, has led to the other claimants aggressively asserting their respective claims leading to needless tensions in the region.

Core of the Disputes

Within the South China Sea are thousands of small islands, islets, coral reefs, and atolls spread over a wide area of about 1,800 km from north to south and more than 900 km from east to west. Within these, two archipelagos, the Spratlys Islands in the south and the Paracel Islands in the northwest, are of competing economic and political interests. The core of the sovereignty disputes essentially boils down to one fundamental objective: the pursuit of energy resources. The South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels and almost 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.³ “In the Spratlys Islands, 60 of the 750 islands and rock features are occupied with China controlling 14, Vietnam 22, Philippines 11, Malaysia 10 and one by Taiwan. The Paracels are a smaller set of islets and

sandbanks spread over 15,000 sq kms and claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China presently controls the whole of Parcel archipelago, having annexed it after a military clash with Vietnam in 1974.”⁴

It is interesting to note that all claimants to the two archipelagos have adopted legislations related to their claim. “Moreover, all (except Brunei) have established local sovereignty claim markers including the grant of petroleum and natural gas concessions to foreign companies, in disputed areas and maintain a military presence on one or more of the features that appear above water at high tide. China has also established various electronic support systems both in Spratlys and Paracels, which are second in importance only to Hainan Island bases on the South China Coast.”⁵



Figure 2: A Chinese flag and a satellite dish on a structure built by China in one of the islands in the Spratlys.⁶

China’s exponential growth in the last two decades has led to an ever-increasing demand for oil. From self-sufficiency in the 1990s, it is now dependent on imports for more than 60 percent of its consumption. The other South East Asia countries too are in increasing need of energy resources to meet their demands at home. The Philippines has imported over 10 million tons of gas in the past five years with the needs expected to double in the next decade.⁷ Vietnam’s average domestic energy consumption increased by 10.3%, and it is expected to turn from a pure-export nation into a pure-import one after 2013.⁸ This has renewed the interest of the littoral states for the rich resources in the South China Sea. Moreover, in the wake of the global energy crisis, the critical need to garner energy resources has become one of the core national interests for every nation in the region, especially for China. This has been instrumental in the Chinese assertiveness in pressing its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.⁹

China - Its Claim and Motives

To stake its claims, China had been using a historic map (shown in Figure 3) dating from the 1940s, when Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists drew a dotted line in the shape of a cow’s tongue extending

south of China, embracing most of the sea and two disputed island chains, the Paracels and the Spratlys.¹⁰ For China, the South China Sea has long been crucial as a supply route for oil and other raw materials to fuel its economy.¹¹



Figure 3: Map Depicting China's Historical Claim.¹²

The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia and Taiwan also have similar and overlapping claims over the South China Sea. Therefore, they do not subscribe to the jurisdictional claims made by China. In May 2009, China protested submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf by officially submitting a map of China's historical claims.¹³

"In International affairs, behind all questions of morality lie questions of power."¹⁴ Having staked its claim, China began to demonstrate that it has legal jurisdiction over the South China Sea.¹⁵ The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the other Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies have been regularly harassing the Philippines and Vietnamese fishing and survey vessels in these waters. On more than one occasion, China has objected to the US Naval presence in the said waters. A serious incident March 8, 2009 caused a major diplomatic row between the US and China, wherein five Chinese vessels blocked and surrounded USS Impeccable, a US Naval surveillance ship, 75 nautical miles from China's Hainan Island.¹⁶

In March 2011, Chinese patrol vessels harassed a Philippines survey ship in the Reed Bank. In May 2011, the Philippines objected to Chinese surveillance ship and two marine vessels putting up steel posts, building materials and buoys on one of the Spratly islands well within Philippines's EEZ.¹⁷ In June 2011, Chinese naval vessels cut a cable trailing from a Vietnamese oil exploration ship 120 kilometers off the Vietnam's southeastern coast.¹⁸ China refuted the complaint claiming Vietnamese survey ship had been operating illegally in Chinese-administered waters.¹⁹ In Sep 2011, China opposed the announcement of an India-Vietnam joint offshore exploration venture, describing it as an infringement of her sovereignty.²⁰

The expansion of the PLA Navy and the increasing presence of its naval assets in the contested waters strengthen the perception of China's motives of regional dominance. China has long been

professing its overall policy as a 'peaceful rise' with its military build-up being purely defensive in nature. However, its actions lately have been to the contrary.

The Current Security Scenario

The efforts to resolve disputes between the littoral nations have seen ups and downs and have not led to any concrete conclusions or a way ahead. At the turn of this century, the scenario in the region was more conducive with China and the other South East Asian countries pursuing economic development as their main agenda. It could be attributed to the Asia financial crisis in 1997-1998 wherein the economic problems of the troubled Asian economies adversely affected the larger economic powers such as the United States, Japan, China, and others.²¹ China pursued a policy of strengthening economic bonds with the South East Asian countries resulting in no incidents of significance between the claimant states. However, this has given way to the present demonstration of more overt overtures, actions, and provocative skirmishes to assert their claims and influence in the region by the competing and claimant nations.

Experts looking at the strategic trends attribute the changes in Chinese behavior to a combination of militant nationalism promoted by the Communist Party and the PLA's increased profile in making foreign policy.²² The down turn of the global economy, the economic crisis in Europe, and the increasing US debt have affected the Chinese growth (being largely export oriented). China has an additional challenge of disparity in wealth distribution. The civil unrest against escalating state corruption and income disparity is posing an ever-present challenge to political stability.²³ Therefore, China's political elite is increasingly nourishing nationalistic sentiments as a means to cement domestic cohesion. The aforementioned, together with the growing role of the Chinese military in shaping foreign policy, has resulted in China taking a more assertive line internationally, particularly as far as the Asia-Pacific neighborhood is concerned'.²⁴ This has also led China to include the South China Sea as a core national interest, traditionally applied to territories such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan that China considers as integral parts of its territory and non-negotiable.

This new set of dynamics and power politics combined with the increasing demand for resources has resulted in complicating the existing equations between China and the other claimant nations. It has been the Chinese incremental show of might and non-transparent perusal of its interests, which has garnered increased attention towards the region. Thucydides the Greek historian had said, "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."²⁵ This may be true with respect to a strong China but does not hold much water with the other supposedly weak littoral nations. The military expansion by China, and its demonstrated capability and intent, has led to an arms race in the region. As per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2000 and 2009, arms imports to Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia rose by 84%, 146% and 722%, respectively. "Vietnam recently spent \$2 billion on six state-of-the-art Kilo-class Russian submarines and \$1 billion on Russian fighter jets. Malaysia too has opened a submarine base in Borneo. Singapore became the first Southeast Asian country to make SIPRI's list of the top 10 arms importers since the end of the Vietnam War."²⁶

Daniel Yergin, an energy expert and author of "The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World" explains, "When you have energy resources on land, you know where things stand. When they're offshore, things can get murkier."²⁷ As the dispute becomes murkier in the South China Sea, there is bound to be more involvement of the other non-regional dominant players such as Japan, South Korea, and the US. Japan and South Korea, both heavily dependent on oil imports, have voiced concerns, as the South China Sea is their main energy transit route.

Every regional state desires a good equation with the economic powerhouse China. However, China's increased influence is seen as a threat, thus making them seek a balance of power in the region: "They look towards China for economic development and to the US for security".²⁸ China's rapid military modernization and transformation from a coastal to a blue water navy has created security dilemma for the regional states.²⁹ Many South East nations welcome the US military's presence in the region.³⁰ It is not without reason that apart from offering its naval facilities to the US Navy, Singapore has permitted the basing of the latest US littoral ships in Changi Naval Base.³¹ The Philippines, too, have renewed their alignments with the U.S. for military support apart from other initiatives such as procuring ex-US Coast Guard Cutters. On 23 June 2011, Philippines officials announced that the United States is obligated by a 1951 treaty to help defend Philippine interests if her ships came under attack in the South China Sea.³²

The Way Ahead – China and ASEAN – A Multilateral Approach

There is no discounting the influence that China wields in the region. Every regional and non-regional actor acknowledges China as a strong and dominant player in the present world. It is time for China to acknowledge the same and conduct herself on the geo-political stage with all fairness and more importantly utmost openness. It is essential that China take the lead to initiate discussions to reach a common ground mutually beneficial to all the competing countries.

If China desires to pursue her core interests, it should, at the outset, drop its unreasonable historic claims over the South China Sea. China should stop the coercive actions against the claimant states and flexing its muscles in the region, which essentially are the main triggers for the tensions in the region. It is essential that China lead by example. Instead of propounding a historical map and domestic laws to claim jurisdiction over almost the entire South China Sea, China, a United Nations Conventions of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signatory, should submit her maritime claim in line with UNCLOS. Abiding by the accepted international norms of navigational rights in international waters would allow China to avoid an aggressive outlook in the region. A strong military is any country's aspirations, and China is no different. However, to use the military might to intimidate the weaker littoral nations and demonstrate its intentions in pursuit of its interest does not augur well for a nation which aspires and thrives to be a major world power. Rationally, the options for a peaceful negotiation and settlement of the disputes look good, but the main challenge is in how to make China see reason and act upon it.

It is in China's interest to change her current policy with regard to the South China Sea. A stable and friendly regional environment would allow China to focus on the domestic challenges ahead. This is relevant in the backdrop of slower growth predictions and a potential for populace unrest fuelled by the slowing down of the economy and growing wealth disparity. China should look back at its policies of the late 90s to the beginning of the 21st Century wherein her positive efforts towards regional cooperation, economic trade and engagement with ASEAN gave her adequate mileage in pursuing her economic growth. However, all the goodwill that China garnered amongst the neighboring littoral nations is gradually withering away with her current policy of might is right than reason in light of its assertive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

China has consistently resisted dealing with other nations on contentious issues in multilateral forums and propounded bilateral negotiations. The claimant nations have been reluctant to have bilateral talks with China being wary of its economic and political clout. They seek to resolve the territorial disputes with China on a multilateral basis under the auspices of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). To unknot the issue in hand, China will have to embrace a multilateral and

pragmatic approach mutually beneficial to all the claimants. A healthy equation with the ASEAN would be in its interest.

ASEAN, which includes 10 South East Asian nations (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam and Laos), is the most significant group in the region and has taken initiatives to bring about some meaningful solution to the issue. China established a strategic partnership with ASEAN in October 2003 by acceding to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; since July 2004, at China's suggestion they have enhanced strategic relations.³³

In November 2002, China and the ASEAN states signed an agreement called the Document for Code of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea.³⁴ However, ASEAN initiated DOC was finally ratified only on 23 July 2011 during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bali after an agreement was reached with China on the guidelines for its implementation.³⁵ The Chinese reluctance and delay to ratify the guidelines were due to its stated approach of not dealing with a group of nations. The DOC guidelines consist of eight brief points and a preamble which dictates it as a milestone document signed between ASEAN member states and China.³⁶ It provides guidelines for the implementation of joint cooperative activities, measures and projects as provided in the DOC.³⁷ The Guidelines preamble also states that the effective implementation of the DOC will contribute to the deepening of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.³⁸

China's acceptance of the Code of Conduct (DOC) guidelines proposed by ASEAN marks a significant shift in approach and reinforces the accepted views that China values its relationship with ASEAN.³⁹ The significant trade and economic ties between China and ASEAN have undoubtedly been one of the contributing factors with ASEAN states accounting for more than one tenth of China's total bilateral trade post implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).⁴⁰ Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in his keynote speech at the Eighth China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit in Nanning on 21 October 2011 stated, "Cementing partnership for peace and prosperity and promoting all-dimensional and mutually beneficial cooperation with ASEAN remains China's unswerving policy".⁴¹ "It also allows China to demonstrate its capacity to be a responsible power."⁴²

The sovereignty issues and the disputes for resources across the maritime border are not unique to the South China Sea. The joint venture agreement in 1976 between the United Kingdom and Norway in the North Sea for cross-border oil and gas development brought lasting peace between competing nations.⁴³ It is a good example of how marine resources can be developed to the benefit of all parties.⁴⁴ The two countries signed another agreement in October 2011 to co-operate further on energy security issues, and the use of technology such as carbon capture and storage to manage emissions.⁴⁵ It provides a valuable model for resolution of the South China Sea dispute as the joint development can generate mutual trust, expand consensus, and help to reinforce the regional security framework for the South China Sea.⁴⁶

There have been a few initiatives proposed by some of the claimant nations in order to resolve disputes. The Philippines has called for a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation" that would have countries clearly define their claims in the sea and then cooperate in and share areas where they have no overlapping claims, leaving a reckoning on the disputed areas until later.⁴⁷ However, the proposal did not meet much support during the ASEAN and East Asia Summit meetings.⁴⁸ The lack of response has more to do with few of the nations, mainly the non-claimants within the ASEAN not wanting to displease China and maintain their economic interests. In Oct 2011, Philippines and Vietnam signed a bilateral agreement for military-to-military cooperation. Japan and the Philippines have held bilateral meetings to find a way ahead to keep the South China Sea safe from provocative interactions.

The only agreement of significance has been the one between China and Vietnam on 11 October 2011 on “Basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime disputes.” The six-point agreement states that the two countries should remain committed to friendly consultations in order to handle maritime issues and make the South China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.⁴⁹

ASEAN should pursue this momentum and the change in China’s pragmatic stance to pursue a more lasting solution. As sovereignty is the core issue, with no nation willing to compromise its stand or the claim, ASEAN should push for a workable solution within the legal framework of UNCLOS tribunals, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or the International Court of Justice.⁵⁰ “International law provides the safeguards for the weaker states against the stronger states. The regional states should realize that by pursuing the legal route they elevate law above self-interest and principle over power.”⁵¹ There are a few groups working under the auspices of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and South China Sea issues.⁵² The most effective is the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), which is working on a more binding Code of Conduct. The inclusion of the South China Sea Security issue in the agenda of the ASEAN Summits has kept the issue alive.

Way Ahead – The US and ASEAN with a Cooperative Strategy

Since 2010, the US has openly raised objections to the Chinese actions in the South China Sea starting with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s statement in Hanoi in 2010 that the United States would join Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries in resisting Beijing’s efforts to dominate the sea.⁵³ South East Asian nations are openly warming up to the U.S. for a security umbrella. The U.S. has been trying to establish itself as a de-facto party in the facilitation of a peaceful settlement of disputes by calling on all the claimants to back their claims with legal evidence ensuring conformity with the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁵⁴ “The firm stand that the US has taken is a necessary condition for any peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. It also assists the traditional ASEAN preference for an inclusive approach in dealing with the problems and helps prevent ASEAN from being isolated in its dealings with China”.⁵⁵

The United States, a central player with strategic interests in the region, spelled out its renewed focus towards the Asia-Pacific in its new Defense Strategic Guidance for the 21st Century released early January 2012.⁵⁶ This is being seen as a new counter to the emergence of China as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific Region.⁵⁷ Considering the US economic situation with impending defense budget cuts, it is a matter of conjecture as to what additional military assets the U.S. would be willing to deploy in the region. The plan appears to be more focused on joint exercises, rotations, and logistics support arrangements that will help avoid establishment of costly bases.⁵⁸ An agreement with Singapore and Australia is the model for the new US posture in the region.⁵⁹ These proposals by the US and its implementation would likely deteriorate the security scenario and unnecessarily invigorate the already existing arms race in the region.

Thus, given the US position in world geo-politics, in concert with the ASEAN, it should pursue its diplomatic and economic instruments of power to bring China on to the discussion table. Given the Chinese reluctance to discuss the issue with the U.S. or any other non-claimant regional player, ASEAN (although it includes only four of the claimants) appears to be the most viable alternative. US participation (for the first time) in the last East Asia Summit held in Indonesia in November 2011 was a step in the right direction towards engaging with South East Asian nations. Its benefits are multifold. Apart from enhancing the value, weight, and influence of ASEAN in the region, the US engagement also balances China’s increased assertiveness in regional affairs. Further, it provides the U.S. a more acceptable position (as far as China is concerned) in its quest to have a say in matters of international

common good than the unilateral approach it has taken in the past. “Long years of US disengagement with ASEAN, particularly during the Bush administration, allowed China to take a leading role in ASEAN-led regional platforms which coincided with the rise of China, both economically and militarily.”⁶⁰ The U.S.’s renewed focus towards the Asia-Pacific Region does offset the traditional imbalance. As China continues to strive for her economic growth, the nascent regional security architecture with US as a central figure is not to China’s liking. This may in all likelihood compel China to revert to her earlier reconciliatory approach with the neighboring littorals towards her stated goal of peaceful rise.

Peace and stability in the South China Sea is in the interest of not only the littoral states but also the other non-regional states. The existing security scenario is unwarranted as any minor skirmish between the contenting claimants has the potential to deteriorate the situation further. However, a quick fix solution does not exist. It is essential that ASEAN takes the lead and pursue the most amicable solution relentlessly. The ratification of the Document for Code of Conduct in the South China Sea by all the contesting states is a small but positive step. ASEAN should encourage the various bilateral agreements that China is willing to work out with the claimant nations. ASEAN should then endeavor to find a lasting solution. ASEAN should also persuade the other two major claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines, to build a consensus on the contested issues with possible solutions prior to pursuing the issue with China. China, for its part, must make all efforts to rein in her maritime law enforcement agencies to lower the tensions in the South China Sea and provide an atmosphere favorable for dialogue and reconciliation. The U.S. has done well so far with its sensible approach and should continue to engage with ASEAN. The U.S. should use its smart power, rather than flexing its military might to make China see reason in settling the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea.

¹ South China Sea Picture, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia>, (accessed 02 January 2011).

² Erik Beukel, China and the South China Sea: Two Faces of Power in the Rising China’s Neighborhood Policy, DIIS Working Paper 2010:07.

³ Robert D Kaplan, ‘South China Sea is the Conflict of the Future’, Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2011; <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15> (accessed 15 December 2011).

⁴ Erik Beukel, China and the South China Sea: Two Faces of Power in the Rising China’s Neighborhood Policy, DIIS Working Paper 2010:07.

⁵ Erik Beukel, Ibid.

⁶ Photo by Reuters in ‘Philippines Seeks Answers About Latest South China Sea Incident’ by Simone Orendain, 01 June 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Philippines-Seeks-Answers-About-Latest-South-China-Sea-Incident-122936653.html>, (accessed 02 April 2011).

⁷ Deng Yingying, Liu Feng, ‘Disputing Nations should side with China for Joint Development of oil and gas in South China Sea’, 22 September 2011, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/slider/disputing-nations-should-side-with-china-for-joint-development-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-china-sea/>, (Accessed 01 April 2012).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Carlyle A Thayer, ‘China’s New wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, International Journal of China Studies, Vol 2, No 3, December 2011, pp 555.

¹⁰ Mark Landler, Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/south-china-sea-claims3.gif>.

¹³ Carlyle A Thayer, Ibid, pp 556.

¹⁴ Robert D Kaplan, ‘South China Sea is the Conflict of the Future’, Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2011; <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15> (accessed 15 December 2011).

-
- ¹⁵ Carlyle A Thayer, China's New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea, IJCS Vol 2, No 3, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/58487022/Thayer-China-s-New-Wave-of-Aggressive-Assertiveness-in-the-South-China-Sea> (accessed April 4, 2012)
- ¹⁶ Mark McDonald, 'U.S. Navy provoked South China Sea incident, China says', NY Times, 10 March 2009; <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10iht-navy.4.20740316.html> (accessed 01 April 2012).
- ¹⁷ Simone Orendain, 'Philippines Seeks Answers About Latest South China Sea Incident' 01 June 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Philippines-Seeks-Answers-About-Latest-South-China-Sea-Incident-122936653.html>, (accessed 02 April 2011).
- ¹⁸ Philippines Seeks Answers About Latest South China Sea ..., <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Philippines-Seeks-Answers-About-Latest-South-China-Sea-Incident-122936653.html> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ 'China warns India against oil exploration in South China Sea', India Today, 25 March 2012; <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-india-oil-exploration-south-china-sea/1/179274.html> (accessed 01 April 2012).
- ²¹ Dick K. Nanto, CRS Report for Congress on the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-98, 06 February 1998, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-asia2.htm> (accessed 02 April 2012).
- ²² STRATEGIC TRENDS 2012, Key Developments in Global Affairs, Center for Security Studies Publication, p 14, <http://www.sta.ethz.ch/Strategic-Trends-2012/China-s-uncertain-peaceful-rise> (accessed 01 April 2012).
- ²³ STRATEGIC TRENDS 2012, Key Developments in Global Affairs, Center for Security Studies Publication, p 14, <http://www.sta.ethz.ch/Strategic-Trends-2012/China-s-uncertain-peaceful-rise> (accessed 01 April 2012).
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Robert B Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides-A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War, p352/5.89.
- ²⁶ Andrew Marshall, 'Military Maneuvers', Sept. 27, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2019534,00.html>, (accessed 07 January 2011).
- ²⁷ Mark Landler, 'A New Era of Gunboat Diplomacy', New York Times Sunday Review, 12 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/sunday-review/a-new-era-of-gunboat-diplomacy.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed 12 January 2011).
- ²⁸ Mr. Gordon England. Ex-US Secretary of Defense, during his address in the Naval War College on 05 Jan 2011.
- ²⁹ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea', P3, <http://www.maritimesecurity.asia> (accessed 10 January 2011).
- ³⁰ Jacob Zenn, 'US Presence Evolves in South East Asia', 04 April 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ND04Ae01.html, (accessed 04 April 2012).
- ³¹ Global Security, 'Military', <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-china-sea.htm> (accessed 06 Jan 2012).
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea', P9, <http://www.maritimesecurity.asia> (accessed 10 January 2011).
- ³⁴ Asian Security Outlook, <http://www.asiansecurityoutlook.com/> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ³⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea', p 20, <http://www.maritimesecurity.asia> (accessed 10 January 2011).

-
- ³⁶ ASEAN, South China Sea Dispute, and U.S. Policy on East Asia, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/asean-south-china-sea-dispute-and-us-policy-on-east-asia> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Carlyle A. Thayer, Ibid, p20.
- ³⁹ South China Sea Dispute: Why China Takes Pragmatic Stance .., <http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-asia/south-china-sea-dispute-why-china-takes-pragmatic-stance-%E2%80%93-analysis/> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ⁴⁰ Yang Fang, 'South China Sea Dispute: Why China takes a Pragmatic Stance', www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/26 (accessed 23 January 2011).
- ⁴¹ 'Chinese Premier calls for deepened China-ASEAN co-op amid global financial crisis', www.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/21/c-131204563, (accessed on 22 January 2011).
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Deng Yingying and Liu Feng, 'Disputing Nations should side with China for Joint Development of oil and gas in South China Sea', 22 September 2011, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/slider/disputing-nations-should-side-with-china-for-joint-development-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-china-sea/> (accessed 01 April 2012).
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ UK Department of Energy and Climate Change Press notice: 11/088, 'UK and Norway sign historic energy agreement', 25 October 2011, http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn11_088/pn11_088.aspx (accessed 03 April 2011).
- ⁴⁶ Deng Yingying and Liu Feng, Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Eric Bellman, 'Philippines Press for Action on South China Sea Claims', The Wall Street Journal, 20 November 2011, <http://www.online.wsj.com> (accessed 03 January 2011).
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.
- ⁴⁹ Xinhuanet News, 'China, Vietnam sign accord on resolving maritime issues', 12 October 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/12/c_131185606.htm (accessed 02 April 2012).
- ⁵⁰ John Hemmings, 'The South China Sea: a Legal Solution Needed', www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/07, (accessed 23 January 2011).
- ⁵¹ 'Nations Adrift in the South China Sea', MaritimeSecurity.Asia, <http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/south-china-sea-2/nations-adrift-in-the-south-china-sea/> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ⁵² Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea', p22, <http://www.maritimesecurity.asia> (accessed 10 January 2011).
- ⁵³ A National South Asian Newspaper, CanAsian Times » The new .., <http://canasiantimes.com/?p=9459> (accessed April 4, 2012).
- ⁵⁴ Daljit Singh, South China Sea developments at the ASEAN Regional Forum, www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/03 (accessed 23 January 2011).
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2012).
- ⁵⁷ BBC News, 'Obama unveils new strategy for 'leaner' US Military', <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16430405> (Accessed 09 Jan 2012).
- ⁵⁸ Jacob Zenn, 'US Presence Evolves in South East Asia', 04 April 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ND04Ae01.html, (accessed 04 April 2012)
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 'How the US plays into the East Asia Summit for ASEAN', 17 August 2010, www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/17, (accessed 23 January 2011).