



# Evaluating the Core Competencies of the United States Navy

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“United States (U.S.) naval doctrine is the foundation upon which our tactics, techniques, and procedures are built. It articulates operational concepts governing the employment of naval forces at all levels . . . in broad terms, it defines who we are, what we do, and how we fight.”<sup>1</sup> Those words, co-signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard subsequently articulate the importance and utility of service doctrine. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1 (NDP-1), signed March 2010, is the U.S. Navy’s cornerstone document containing its service-wide doctrine. Within this publication, the Navy recognizes and describes its six core capabilities for the overall service. The inclusion of Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) as a core capability and the exclusion of amphibious operations as a specific core capability represents a flaw within Naval doctrine and demonstrates incorrect prioritization of missions for the U.S. naval service.

## Relevancy of Service Doctrine

Doctrine aligns the United States Navy’s efforts to man, train, equip, and fight. Milan Vego describes the essence of service doctrine: “A service doctrine commits the entire service to the same rules, principles, and standards for the conduct of war. It describes how a particular service should plan, prepare, and execute major operations; independently and in cooperation with other services or multinational forces . . . a sound doctrine should explain the employment of service forces across the spectrum of warfare and in any physical environment.”<sup>2</sup> By articulating the core capabilities for the U.S.

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Navy, the CNO stated the Navy's six areas to plan, prepare, and execute for in the future. Ensuring the validity in these six capabilities is vitally important to the future of the individual service and its overall place in the military.

Before one develops service doctrine and outlines its basic capabilities, one must understand a service's strategy. In 1987, then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, testified to Congress about the upcoming fiscal priorities. Within his testimony, he outlined the importance of naval strategy and its use in shaping a force. "Strategy is not a formula for fighting each ship and deploying each tank in the battles that may take place around the world . . . beyond the central concept of global, forward deployed, and superior naval forces, strategy's role is to give coherence and direction to the process of allocating money among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare parts, missile systems, defense planning, and the training of forces."<sup>3</sup> Proper naval strategy shapes proper naval doctrine.

In writing strategy for the U.S. Navy, leadership must predict the future landscape the U.S. may face in the maritime environment. By including HA/DR and excluding amphibious operations from the strategy, leadership has incorrectly accepted a post-modern view for the future.

### **U.S. Naval Strategy – A Counter-Argument**

In Geoffrey Till's book *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, he explains at great lengths both the roles of the post-modern and modern nations and their resulting navies.

The post-modern states are content to open their economies to others and, if necessary, to see the relocation elsewhere of their manufacturing industries . . . . Their governments adopt classis laissez-faire attitudes to the defence of national economies . . . . Post-modern states of this sort adopt defence policies that are likely to produce navies whose focus is on the maintenance of the international order rather than national security . . . . emphasis is given to the maintenance of general maritime security through the protection of good order at sea . . . . Such navies expect to participate in coalition operations rather than attempt to act on their own.<sup>4</sup>

The post-modern state is starting to look past traditional, sovereign defense. Given both the expense of a blue water navy and the size of the global sea lines of communication, post-modern states come to rely on coalitions and consensus rather than individual naval capability to keep global trade secure.

His description of a modern state, on the other hand, is a more realist view of the world: "They make contingency preparations against the possibility that should globalization either collapse or enter a period of terminal decline, they would face a bleaker, harder, much less communal world of increased levels of competition in which coercive military force and power politics resume their dominance on the strategic horizon."<sup>5</sup> The modern state still maintains the need to use individual force if the situation warrants. In many ways, the modern state encapsulates the individual self-interest and power politics of realist foreign policy. Although Till concedes the line between a modern and post-modern state is flexible, the two types of navies these different states develop translate into very different core missions.

In Till's mind, a post-modern navy has four core missions: sea control, expeditionary operations, good order at sea, and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. Of note, Till believes his understanding of sea control as a common, international defence along with his thoughts on good order at sea are a "significant element" of the *Cooperative Strategy*. In terms of a navy's core capabilities, his views on expeditionary operations and maritime consensus highlight the areas of amphibious operations and HA/DR.

For expeditionary operations, Till concedes he is not describing the need for beach assaults; however, his description of expeditionary operations does fall under the classic idea of a non-opposed amphibious operation.<sup>6</sup> For Till, amphibious capability is crucial to a post-modern navy to influence events ashore. In fact, expeditionary operations allow for navies to conduct the HA/DR mission.

Till's thoughts on maritime consensus, at first look, tend to strengthen the need for a core HA/DR capability. In his description on maritime consensus, he extolls how the mission of HA/DR helps to win the hearts and minds of foreign populations. He then cites the deployments of the U.S. Navy's hospital ships USNS MERCY and USNS COMFORT along with the Asian Tsunami relief in 2004 as a fundamental alignment of effort towards maritime consensus.<sup>7</sup> His HA/DR examples, however, can be misinterpreted as the core mission for true maritime consensus.

The intent of maritime consensus is the ability to have navies in "loose coalition of the willing that got together, at very short notice, outside the fixed agreements, with no one 'in charge.'"<sup>8</sup> The point of maritime consensus is for nations to work together towards a mutual and ideally global objective. This objective is not always humanitarian assistance (although from a political standpoint, humanitarian efforts tend to be easier in gaining global support), but simply the act of reaching across the deck and working together to accomplish a mission. This idea is in line with Till's thoughts on a post-modern state that seeks coalitions over using sovereign force for national interests. In a peaceful, post-modern world, maritime consensus is important and beneficial to the United States; however, the means to obtain mutual trust and cooperation is through continuous coalition interactions. For decades, the U.S. Navy demonstrated this spirit of cooperation in its core "forward presence" mission. It is through forward presence that a nation's navy can promote mutual consensus with exercises, port calls, officer exchanges, or even humanitarian assistance efforts. The Combined Maritime Force's anti-piracy coalition near Somalia is a prime example of maritime consensus through coalition naval capabilities. HA/DR is not the core mission of mutual consensus; HA/DR is one of the many ways, while being forward deployed, a navy can build mutual consensus.

The core missions of the modern navy are also worth noting. He cites nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense, sea control, narrower concepts of maritime power projection, good order at sea, and maritime consensus (which for the modern navy are more limited to a "realist persuasion" of "bilateral arrangements on specific issues").<sup>9</sup> In viewing these core missions, and given the current global situation, in many ways the U.S. Navy finds itself sailing more through modern waters vice post-modern waters. A fleet developed to operate in the modern world can thus transition into the post-modern world; however, a post-modern navy, given its reliance on peaceful engagements and international consensus, will not have the capability to transition back to modern seas. This comparison is a critically important distinction the U.S. Navy and policymakers must understand when developing the future force.

The U.S. Navy is trying to define its place as either a modern or post-modern navy. The priorities of HA/DR and amphibious operations are a litmus test on that struggle. In order to better evaluate the future strategy of the navy and its ensuing doctrine, one must examine past and present doctrine and strategy along with how other services see the future military landscape.

### **U.S. Naval Strategy – Present**

To evaluate current naval strategy and understanding where the core capabilities originated, one must look at two cornerstone documents: *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, co-signed by the service chiefs of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in October 2007 and *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in February 2011. These two documents effectively establish the foundation for the current U.S. naval strategy. Specifically, the *Cooperative Strategy* describes the six core capabilities in an effort to “achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat operations capabilities,” and to state the “core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships.”<sup>10</sup>

In relation to HA/DR, the *Cooperative Strategy* provides the following: “Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises. Human suffering moves the U.S. to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation (NEO) operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety is in jeopardy.”<sup>11</sup> These two sentences are telling in the Navy’s emphasis on HA/DR.

The *Cooperative Strategy* states that through the Navy’s expeditionary character HA/DR becomes possible. More to the point, HA/DR is the ends provided by the means of an expeditionary character. It specifically uses the example of non-combatant evacuation as the primary example for the HA/DR mission. When compared to Marine Corps doctrine, however, NEOs are considered an amphibious withdrawal, not an HA/DR mission.<sup>12</sup> In relating HA/DR to both the Navy’s expeditionary character and NEOs, the *Cooperative Strategy* is not describing a core mission; it is describing a niche mission within an inherent core capability. The core capability which allows for HA/DR derive from a well-maintained, well-practiced, core expeditionary capability: amphibious operations. A naval service’s ability to conduct amphibious operations allows for a successful HA/DR mission; however, a navy built on the HA/DR mission does not necessarily allow for the full spectrum of amphibious operations. Interestingly, amphibious operations are not specifically stated anywhere within the U.S. Navy’s six core capabilities.

In describing the Navy as the vanguard of HA/DR, one must examine the *National Military Strategy* to evaluate whether assigning the Navy as the lead actor for interagency and multinational efforts is truly the intent of the U.S. national strategy. The *National Military Strategy* intentionally is not so narrow as to outline capabilities of each service; however, it does broadly describe the world environment and the U.S. military’s role and contribution.

In regards to HA/DR, the *National Military Strategy* directly addresses the mission; however, it is limited in its application. After describing some benefits HA/DR provides, it states, “We must be prepared to support and facilitate the response of the United States Agency of International

Development (USAID) and other U.S. government agencies to humanitarian crises.”<sup>13</sup> In this twenty-one page document, three sentences are dedicated to HA/DR, and the CJCS clearly place the Joint Force in the role of “support and facilitate” at the discretion of the USAID. For the Navy’s strategy to characterize HA/DR as its service core-capability based on the CJCS’s intent to keep the military in a support-only role appears misguided. HA/DR is, understandably, an important mission, but in reading the CJCS’s intent, one wonders if it should be the foundation for which to build a fleet.

In relation to amphibious operations, the *National Military Strategy* is more emphatic. Although it refers to amphibious operations as “joint forcible entry,” the intent and importance is made clear. “The core task of our Armed Forces remains to defend our Nation and win its wars . . . defeating adversary aggression will require the Joint Force to support National approaches to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies . . . these core military competencies include complementary, multi-domain power projection, joint forcible entry, the ability to maintain joint assured access to global commons and cyberspace should they become contested, and the ability to fight and win against adversaries.”<sup>14</sup> Given the U.S. Navy’s maritime role, joint forcible entry, or an amphibious operation, must be a fundamental role of the Navy in conjunction with the Marine Corps; yet, it is not included in the most current naval strategy. Before going further, one should evaluate previous core capabilities articulated by the U.S. Navy in past strategy.

### **U.S. Naval Strategy – Past**

Prior to 1992, the Navy’s strategy was guided within the overall national strategy of Cold War containment. It is worth noting; however, that stated naval strategy in 1987 did not mention the Soviet threat, but rather reflected the universal importance of keeping sea-lanes secure both in peace and war. Secretary Lehman’s testimony to Congress is telling: “Briefly stated, our strategic objectives are the following: to prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies; to ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward-deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners; to be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail.”<sup>15</sup> From the birth of the U.S. Navy through Cold War containment to present day, these objectives have not changed.

With the end of the Cold War, the Navy struggled to outline an official strategy and did not strictly articulate core capabilities; however, two white papers were published which gave some insight to the direction of the Naval service. In 1992, “...From the Sea” and in 1995 “Forward...From the Sea” attempted to forge a new strategy for the U.S. Navy. “...From the Sea” defined eight operational capabilities: Forward Deployment; Crisis Response; Strategic Deterrence; Command, Control and Surveillance; Battlespace Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment.<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, the paper does not elaborate on the first four operational capabilities; however, its description of Battlespace Dominance and Power Projection are noteworthy. Battlespace Dominance “means ensuring effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of potential missions ... Power projection from the sea means bombs, missiles, shells, bullets, and bayonets.”<sup>17</sup> Both these descriptions are in line with the fundamental objective of an amphibious operation.

The goal of “Forward...From the Sea” was to refocus the direction “...From the Sea” provided with emphasis on “peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts.”<sup>18</sup> The

resulting paper generally spoke to how the Navy can be specially tailored to react to crisis response and regional conflict along joint and combined operations. In general, it did not provide any further insight into the Navy's core capabilities and mission.

Given the lack of U.S. Navy strategic cornerstone papers since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has not had a fundamental service-wide strategy until the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* was signed. Although the efforts of the Service Chiefs in 2007 are noteworthy, and the need for a strategy is identified, the HA/DR core capability it describes, and which NDP-1 codifies, is not found in any previous naval strategy or doctrine. Alternatively, amphibious operations are fundamentally described in two of the operational capabilities described in "...From the Sea" and mentioned in Sec Lehman's testimony to "support combat ashore," yet it is omitted from the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy*.

The drastic changing of prioritization between the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* and previous U.S. Navy's strategic documents is also seen in the disconnect between the Navy's 1994 and 2010 doctrine publications.

### **Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, 1994**

The first Naval Doctrinal Publication was published in 1994 and signed by both the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps. CNO Admiral F. B. Kelso ordered its production in the "...From the Sea" white paper as an immediate task in order to examine the Navy's functions and capabilities.<sup>19</sup> The 1994 NDP-1 is an interesting document and not organized like other service doctrines. It does not describe core capabilities but rather breaks down the "Employment of Naval Forces" into three phases: peacetime, operations other than war, and war.

During peacetime, the Navy's two fundamental roles are deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, and forward presence. If total war occurs, the 1994 NDP-1 is adamant that "control of the sea is fundamental to accomplishing our naval roles."<sup>20</sup> NDP-1 then elaborates from either total or limited sea control, one can conduct war from the sea and war at sea. In its description of war from the sea, it states: "Amphibious assault capability is an integral component of our overall naval forces. Maritime forces provide not only sea lines of communication to bring men and materiel to the area of concern, but also mobile bases from which to conduct military operations."<sup>21</sup> In operations other than war, the roles of the Navy become very broad.

The 1994 NDP-1 provides two missions for operations other than war: forward presence and crisis response. Under crisis response, the 1994 doctrine outlines eleven different areas the Navy can "implement this international right . . . (of) individual or collective self-defense."<sup>22</sup> Among the eleven areas, HA/DR is listed along with coordinating public health operations. It is unclear whether doctrine is inferring that HA/DR is a form of collective self-defense or an example of a core capability. Overall, although one can reasonably assume HA/DR is a mission of the Navy, it is difficult to conclude the 1994 doctrine was making it a core, fundamental mission. Following the 1994 NDP-1, the next revision was not until March 2010.

### **Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, 2010**

NDP 1 *Naval Warfare* was signed in 2010 within a year of both the U.S. Army's ADP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* and the U.S. Marine Corps MCDP 1-0 *Marine Corps Operations*. All three of these documents describe the fundamental character and missions of their respective service. Although some

of the terms are different, they all define their role and core capabilities. In looking at all three doctrines, one can evaluate how both the Army and Marines clearly state their purpose, core missions, and their ability to act decisively; whereas, the Navy sees itself working in concert with other nations and organizations to achieve success.

ADP 3-0 succinctly describes the role of the U.S. Army as “bonded together in a profession of Arms – organized, trained, and equipped to be the most decisive land force in the world. We are a clear symbol of national resolve and commitment. From start to finish, in the lead or in support, we remain ready to shape, influence, engage, deter, and prevail.”<sup>23</sup> Within its core competencies, it describes two fundamental missions: combined arms maneuver and wide area security.<sup>24</sup> The remaining doctrine describes in detail about how to apply those two core competencies. In reading the Army’s doctrine, there is little question about its role, missions, and core capabilities. From training the newest soldier to buying the next generation of weapon, one can reference this document to evaluate whether one’s actions is in line with the U.S. Army’s line of effort in being the most decisive land force in the world through combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

The Marine Corps’ is described as an “Expeditionary Force in Readiness.” MCDP 1-0, within the first page, describes the role of the Marine Corps. “The Marine Corps has long provided the Nation with a force adept at rapidly and effectively solving complex, multifaceted, and seemingly intractable security challenges – so much so that “Send in the Marines” connotes both a demand for action and a presumption of success ... the Marines stand ready to get there fast and do whatever needs to be done.”<sup>25</sup> MCDP 1-0 then outlines the five “Key Marine Corps Tasks”: conduct military engagement, respond rapidly to crisis, project power, conduct littoral maneuver, and counter irregular threats.<sup>26</sup> As with the Army, at any level of the Marine Corps, one can judge his or her actions either being within or outside the line of effort for a fast, expeditionary force conducting five fundamental tasks.

NDP-1 does not implicitly state the role of the United States Navy in the same way as ADP 3-0 and MCDP 1-0. NDP-1’s introduction discusses the change in the world environment, but reassures the reader “the Naval Service’s fundamental roles and missions remain.”<sup>27</sup> Later, the document discusses six “strategic imperatives” which include limited regional conflict with forward-deployed forces, decisive naval power; deter major-power war, win our nation’s wars; contribute to homeland security defense in-depth; foster and sustain cooperative relationships with international partners; and prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.<sup>28</sup> These six imperatives are taken from the *Cooperative Strategy* document and are the imperatives which forge the need for the Navy’s core capabilities.

In describing the Navy’s core capabilities, NDP-1 again frames the context in a global, coalition dependent world. “The six core capabilities compose the foundation of U.S. naval power and reflect an emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships. The Naval Service, in conjunction with joint and multinational forces and interagency efforts when required, collectively must execute these core capabilities through a blend of routine, recurring military activities such as peacetime engagements, deterrence actions, and when directed, major operations.”<sup>29</sup> By emphasizing those activities which prevent war and build partnerships, the U.S. Navy described itself and its roles in post-modern terms. It is important to note; however, that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have not. This difference between a modern and post-modern paradigm is best illustrated in comparing NDP-1 to MCDP-1 in reference to HA/DR and amphibious operations.

The Marine Corps does not include HA/DR as a key task. Within its description of the Marine Corps Key Tasks, it has a “note” explaining that the Marine Corps tasks are nested within the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy*, but it describes humanitarian assistance and disaster response simply as a way for “naval power to mitigate suffering.”<sup>30</sup> This note highlights how HA/DR is important; however, it is not a core mission. It is a mission which naval power can perform if requested, but for the Marine Corps, it is not a mission to build its service around. Within the Navy, there is also some documentation supporting this conclusion.

OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, 21OCT2010, is the policy for baseline composition and basic mission capability for the major naval groups. Signed by the CNO, this document outlines how the fleet is to be formed and the basic missions it should conduct. It describes the make-up of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), Surface Action Group (SAG), and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). In the six pages describing mission-capability, there is one mention of HA/DR under the ARG/MEU’s ten missions related to crisis response.<sup>30</sup> It is not a mission conducted across the spectrum of the U.S Navy and is one of the multiple missions conducted by the ARG/MEU. Of note, six of the ten missions described for the ARG/MEU are prevalent in another mission set: amphibious operations.

OPNAVINST 3501 describes the ARG/MEU as able to perform “amphibious demonstrations, amphibious raids, amphibious assaults, amphibious withdrawals, non-combat evacuation operations ... enabling operations for follow-on forces, and function as a sea base.”<sup>31</sup> The CSG also contributes to the ship-to-shore capability by being the U.S. Navy’s component best equipped for “sustained maritime power projection.”<sup>32</sup> These capabilities fit well within Marine Corps’ key task of “conduct littoral maneuver” along with MCDP-1’s eight pages on amphibious operations.<sup>33</sup> NDP-1’s core capabilities; however, does not specifically state amphibious operations as a capability except for one reference under “Power Projection.”

## **Conclusion / Recommendations**

The future strategy and doctrine of the U.S Navy needs to precisely describe service-wide missions and core capabilities to maintain its line of effort internally and properly explain its roles externally. In describing HA/DR as a fundamental core capability the Navy has lost focus on its core war fighting capability. It is relying too heavily on a post-modern world in which partnership and coalition will win the fight and has detoured sharply from previous naval strategy and doctrine. Jointly, HA/DR is not a core mission shared by either the Marine Corps or the Army, and per the CJCS’s strategy, HA/DR is characterized as a supporting mission for the joint service.

Amphibious Operations have been a fundamental part of the Navy from World War II, through the Cold War, and into the new millennium. The ability to put U.S. forces ashore is an incredibly powerful form of influence which can be used at all levels of both diplomacy and war. This belief is outlined in every major naval strategy document until 2007 and shared within the doctrinal policy of the U.S. Marine Corps.

NDP-1 needs to be re-written within the confines of a new naval strategy. It should emphasize HA/DR as an important mission. It is a mission which fosters international goodwill and possibly opens diplomatic doors; however, its benefits alone do not make HA/DR a core capability. For leadership to

align the Navy's efforts with a HA/DR core mission, they may find themselves limited if facing a modern threat requiring an expeditionary solution.

Conversely, a re-written NDP-1 must be built for the modern world and in line with the current global outlook of the Navy's sister services. Amphibious operations should be succinctly stated as one of its core capabilities allowing for both the HA/DR mission along with the full spectrum of expeditionary contingencies.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Navy, *Naval Warfare*. 2010 Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, i.

<sup>2</sup> Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, XII-7.

<sup>3</sup> John Lehman, "Posture Statement by the Secretary of the Navy" in *Department of the Navy, Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 1987*, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Geoffery Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 13-14.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-16.

<sup>10</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 12.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, 2-24 - 2-25.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*, 15.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-9.

<sup>15</sup> Lehman, 8.

<sup>16</sup> "...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," 8-10.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-10.

<sup>18</sup> J.M. Boorda, John Dalton, and Carl Mundy, "Forward ... From the Sea," 1.

<sup>19</sup> "...From the Sea." 14.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Navy, *Naval Warfare*. 1994 Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP)-1, 26.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>23</sup> U. S. Army, *Unified Land Operations*. ADP 3-0, 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations*. MCDP 1-0, 1-1.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-16 – 1-17.

<sup>27</sup> *Naval Warfare 2010*, v-vi.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 27-28.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>30</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, "OPNAVINST 3501.316B: Policy For Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups," 5.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, 2-23 – 2-30.