



# Logistics Lessons for Operational Art in Counterinsurgency

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**G**eneral George S. Patton once said, “The officer who doesn’t know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless.”<sup>1</sup> Patton’s lesson is simple: a commander must appreciate logistics when determining his operational approach; otherwise, his ingenious plan might fall apart due to some unappreciated logistical issue. Despite the protracted and static nature of counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns, logistics is no less important for operational art in COIN than it was for Patton in World War II. An operational commander must understand the historical impacts of logistics in COIN in order to employ operational art effectively.

This research addresses two related questions: What are the operational effects that logistics activities have in COIN campaigns throughout history, and how does a commander integrate those lessons into his operational design? In COIN, logistics directly supports military operations against insurgents, but also provides extensive capabilities for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and economic development, activities that help to undermine the insurgency by targeting the population.<sup>2</sup>

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There are tradeoffs in risks and rewards in the conduct of these activities, which are vital to the long-term success of the campaign.<sup>3</sup> As an example of this dilemma, massive combat power requires substantial logistics, which may solve one problem for operational protection while creating a new one for heavily trafficked lines of communication. This paper summarizes the role of logistics in COIN theory, applying a conceptual framework from theory to derive three critical logistical lessons learned from history that support operational art, and concludes with an analysis of how the commander must think about logistics when developing his operational design in a COIN campaign.

### **Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine for Logistics**

Put simply, winning in COIN could be defined as defeating one's enemies without making more of them.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the COIN campaign must simultaneously dismantle the insurgent organization and remove the conditions that cause the population to support or join the insurgency. Although FM 3-24 covers tactical logistics considerations for COIN, U.S. Joint Doctrinal Publication 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations* does not highlight the importance of logistics on the operational and strategic levels of COIN planning. This section begins to close that gap.

General Akbar Khan, a veteran of World War I, II, and British COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, summarizes COIN into three simultaneous activities: 1) separating insurgents from the population, 2) defeating insurgent forces militarily, and 3) reestablishing government authority and social order by addressing legitimate grievances.<sup>5</sup> Although critics of the effort in Vietnam often blame leaders for a "strategy of tactics,"<sup>6</sup> COIN warfare is largely about developing a strategy out of tactical continuing actions. According to Geoff Demarest of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, "One successful form of master strategy is to recognize the aggregate importance of little battles, and so seek to make the result of as many as possible decisively favorable."<sup>7</sup> This aggregate nature of small tactical actions in COIN helps to illustrate how logistics policies, which describe how forces perform many important but routine actions, can have an operational impact. Current U.S. COIN doctrine seeks to recognize this idea through logical lines of operation and operational approaches.<sup>8</sup>

The most frequent examples of operational approach to COIN are the "clear, hold, build" concept, the "combined action" concept, and the "limited support" concept.<sup>9</sup> One might consider this like the difference between a patient on life support, in stable condition, and an outpatient. For example, the U.S. COIN campaign in Iraq began with the first approach in the aftermath of major combat operations, transitioned to the second approach as the indigenous forces became more capable of combined operations, and is currently providing limited support now that all combat forces have withdrawn. U.S. Joint doctrine refers to this as the transition from the direct approach to the indirect approach.<sup>10</sup> In all the approaches, support to the population and government features prominently with varying levels of combat involvement from U.S. forces. The idea is that simultaneous operations to defeat the insurgents and build up the host nation government will eventually enable the host nation to handle COIN on its own. There are numerous possible logical lines of operation that support these approaches, but the ones in which logistics play a primary role are "conduct combat operations/civil security operations; train and employ [host nation] security forces; establish or restore essential services; support development of better governance; [and] support economic development."<sup>11</sup> This research summarizes these four lines of operation as this simple framework: support to combat operations and support to the population.

## **Historical Lessons Learned about Logistics in Counterinsurgency**

Applying this framework for logistics in COIN to several cases from the Crusades to modern times, three important lessons emerge. The first is that light, mobile, self-sufficient forces are ideal for conducting combat and security operations in COIN because they extend the culminating point in time and space. The second is that reconstruction and economic development directly help to address the grievances of the population; however, they can have unintended consequences that aid the insurgency. The last lesson is about contracting and relates to supporting both combat operations and the population. Extensive use of contractors enables expeditionary operations and provides the means to conduct a myriad of support and development projects but the impacts can be both positive and negative. The upcoming sections explain each of these three ideas coupled with historical analyses that each illustrates an important aspect for a commander to consider.

### ***Light, Mobile, and Self Sufficient Forces Extend Culmination in Time and Space***

In his 1970 book, *Guerrilla Warfare: Its Past, Present, and Future*, General Akbar Khan wrote that it is “important to carry sufficient provisions, on the other hand, the team must be light in order to be mobile.”<sup>12</sup> He saw the failure to appreciate this lesson as a major flaw of U.S. operations in Vietnam at the time. Khan argues that modern technology should have actually enabled a principle that Muslim generals followed in antiquity. On the contrary, the technologically advanced U.S. troops were dependent on frequent resupply while the Viet Cong trained their troops to survive in the jungle for at least three days.<sup>13</sup> Reconciling this apparent contradiction between being light and self-sufficient is part of operational art. A light force has a reduced overall logistical requirement, meaning it can more easily be self-sufficient in order to press its advance on insurgents longer and further, in other words, more mobile. This extends the culminating point of the COIN unit in time and space. In all forms of irregular warfare, including insurgency and COIN, the goal is to drive the opposing force to culmination. The aggregate effect of hundreds of small engagements can amount to operational or strategic culmination for either side in the conflict.<sup>14</sup> Self-sufficient COIN forces that can be more persistent than insurgent forces have a chance of winning this interaction. Although lighter forces may assume more tactical risk, the aggregate risk to the COIN mission could be less.

History is replete with cases the wise commander should heed. French occupation of Muslim lands during the First Crusade and the conquest of Algeria provide evidence of this first lesson from before the modern era. Late in the First Crusade, the Franks’ early advantage in heavy cavalry and superior weapons technology could not stand up to Muslim forces’ ability to harass them with light cavalry and cut off their lines of communication with guerrilla warfare. Thirst and heat exhausted the Franks’ heavily armored troops before the decisive battle of the First Crusade at Hittin even began.<sup>15</sup> In this case, irregular warfare caused a formidable military power that was too heavy to sustain itself in a hostile environment to culminate before the decisive battle even took place. The French had a similar experience invading Algeria in 1830. Heavy forces conquered the major coastal cities easily, but it took over a decade to pacify the ensuing insurgency. After several years of poor performance, a veteran of Napoleon’s campaign against guerillas in the Iberian Peninsula, General Thomas Bugeaud, transformed the cumbersome French army from a slow, artillery dependent force into a light and mobile force that was able to live off the land. Using these forces, Bugeaud was ultimately able to cut off insurgent supply lines and forced their leader to flee into Morocco.<sup>16</sup>

From the turn of the twentieth century onward, the U.S. has continued to learn and relearn this lesson in numerous small wars. During the Philippine insurgency, U.S. forces were successful by focusing on a decentralized campaign of small mobile units aided by Filipinos hunting insurgents in the wild parts

of the islands. This technique enabled a more persistent presence, sustaining pressure on the enemy while other elements of the COIN strategy further isolated the rebels. The Marines used this approach through the Banana Wars in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and later in the Combined Action Program in Vietnam by integrating Marines with local forces.<sup>17</sup> One of the many advantages of combined action is an increased ability of forces to subsist with minimal external support and maintain consistent pressure on the enemy. Although the level of success of the overall strategy in each of the wars is certainly debatable, one aspect that was effective against the enemy was light forces capable of either hunting insurgents or maintaining persistent presence in widely dispersed locations.

The Marines applied this lesson in Afghanistan. Part of their population centric strategy in Helmand Province during the surge in summer 2009 was to live light and hard. Major General Michael Flynn, senior intelligence officer in theater at the time reported that, "The men of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines who fanned out across the district that hot July morning had to operate with no more supplies than they could carry on their backs. For weeks, they had no hardened bases, little electricity, and only radios for communication."<sup>18</sup> This approach enabled the Marines to begin to deny the insurgents' access to both the population and their own lines of communication while not heavily relying on their own sources of supply, which were frequent targets of enemy improvised explosive devices.

The Colombian government also has come to understand the dynamic of competing culminating points in its long fight with communist rebels. The insurgents used mules as pack animals, which enabled them to move more quickly through rugged terrain while still carrying heavy weapons giving them a force and mobility advantage over pursuing forces. The emplacement of landmines forced pursuing patrols to move more slowly using bomb dogs. Casualty evacuations slowed them even more. Demarest describes the mules as a "use of animals that could change [the] advantage in operational art."<sup>19</sup> This case illustrates two points. The interaction between insurgent and counterinsurgent is about developing tactics that force the opponent to culminate, and light, mobile and self-sufficient forces help to win this interaction. Demarest recommends commanders consider technologies, or perhaps animals, which help change the balance in movement, time, distance and weight as well as stealth.<sup>20</sup>

### ***Security and Unity of Effort are Vital for Reconstruction and Development***

Although insurgencies are complex phenomenon that are difficult to distill down to one or two issues, it is still fair to say that grievances among the population always detract from the legitimacy of the state and can help to support an insurgency's agenda. Logistical activities and capabilities can have a significant impact on a COIN campaign through reconstruction and development targeted to address or prevent grievances among the people. Security sets the conditions for development, while development helps to engage the population in constructive activities other than insurgency. Development is essential for the COIN force to avoid making new enemies, however, lack of unity of effort, the wrong project or poor security can work against that objective. This section uses two historical cases to illustrate this point: the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. According to Dr. Sean Maloney at the Royal Canadian Military College, "Security and development go hand in hand. You can't have one without the other."<sup>21</sup>

During the U.S. war in Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) Program proved to be one of the most successful aspects of the war effort. Created in 1967 to coordinate support to the South Vietnamese government and people, the program's objective was to meet the population's needs in basic infrastructure, governance, and security. These efforts undermined the communist message and assisted the government in gathering intelligence and attacking the enemy's political structure. Statistics from the period showed that the CORDS program increased the

number of relatively secure villages to 93 percent by early 1970.<sup>22</sup> The major flaw of the CORDS program is that unity of command with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was not established until 1968, which prevented unity of effort.<sup>23</sup> The lesson here is that true coordination between security and development came three years after the first major U.S. conventional ground forces deployed to Vietnam. CORDS began to be effective only when it achieved unity of effort with combat and security operations.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the long conflict in Afghanistan presents many lessons about development and reconstruction. One of them is that local power and social structures link closely with basic resources such as food and water. In one case, Swedish troops found that building a well in one area could diminish the aquifer in an adjacent area, thereby creating conflict between neighboring tribes.<sup>24</sup> In another case, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) built a well in a village where the women were accustomed to walking a long distance to draw from a nearby river. The well was destroyed, not by insurgents, but by the women, who loved the social opportunity hiking to the river represented.<sup>25</sup> Another lesson is that failed projects can benefit the insurgency. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had succeeded in building a school in Khakriz, but insurgents moved in while it was still under construction.<sup>26</sup> In this case, the project failed due to lack of security. In another case, geologic surveys identified extensive coal resources throughout Afghanistan, a potential boon for the economy, but it was mostly in remote locations that would require new roads. A military historian who spoke to the geologists in 2005 summed up the essential dilemma nicely: “No security, no roads. No roads, no coal.”<sup>27</sup>

These cases illustrate some of the potential benefits, possible unintended consequences, and important considerations for development and reconstruction projects in COIN. In general, reconstruction and development are important parts of stabilizing a fragile society and getting people to focus on building their lives rather than resisting what they perceive as an illegitimate government or occupation force. As some of the cases illustrate, an ill-conceived or badly executed project can upset local societies, present new opportunities for insurgents to discredit an already weak regime, or sow divisions in a society that can lead to long-term instability. Finally, all the cases point to the fundamental dilemma of COIN. Security begets development but development begets security. In other words, they have to come as a package deal, and that requires real unity of effort in the COIN campaign.<sup>28</sup>

### ***Contracting Enables Support and Development but not Without Drawbacks***

The final historical lesson is also the most recent. Although civilians have always accompanied forces in combat, the modern explosion in civilian contractors on the battlefield presents some unique challenges and opportunities. According to retired Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, the number of contractors “has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.”<sup>29</sup> Contracting supports the force as well as economic development, reconstruction, and a host of other activities related to a COIN campaign.

According to Dr. Daniel Goure, logistics analyst at the Lexington Institute, “The U.S. cannot go to war without private contractors.”<sup>30</sup> The raw numbers indicate that without contractor personnel, the U.S. would have needed double the number of troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. The biggest benefit of contracting in COIN is the ability to surge capacity in supporting roles or specialized missions without the cost of maintaining military equipment and force structure in peacetime. It also enables the U.S. military to sustain a protracted conflict without a full-scale national mobilization helping to blunt an insurgency’s perceived advantage in time. This gives both strategic and operational

level leaders increased options for balancing limited military resources against a myriad of reconstruction and support tasks. Finally, contracting can support development in the host nation by providing a direct way for the military commander to inject money and employment into the local economy.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the options that contractors give the commander, there are many potential drawbacks. In an example from Iraq, an Army division in Tal Afar contracted a local transportation company to help sustain many positions in the area. The contract was very successful until the division turned over with a much smaller force that was not able to provide the same level of security. Insurgents took advantage of the reduced security posture to kill the contractor, sending a stern message to other Iraqis who might consider supporting the U.S.-led coalition.<sup>32</sup> This case illustrates how using local contractors can support the force and develop the economy, but also puts locals at grave risk. The killing of local contractors can sustain an insurgency's reign of terror if the COIN force cannot adequately protect them.

Contractors can also compete with the local economy, change local pricing and wage structures, and can shift power bases. According to Colonel Hammes, in Afghanistan, educated professionals took jobs as drivers or clerks with contractors since they paid more than the Afghan government. Armed contractors create another set of unintended consequences. It is difficult for a COIN force to ensure that a contractor, especially one providing its own security, performs professionally or is dealing with the local population with respect. The Blackwater killings in Baghdad in 2007 are a prime example. Another example from Afghanistan was the proliferation of large private contractor security forces that competed directly with the Afghan government for influence. These aggregate effects can create a negative perception of contractors on the battlefield by the host population and foster a climate of corruption, which directly challenges the legitimacy of the COIN force.<sup>33</sup>

These few examples of contractor use on the modern battlefield illustrate the dilemma that a commander must face. While contracting on the battlefield has become a necessity, a commander should not take its use lightly. Just like building the wrong well might upset local politics, hiring the wrong local contractor can upset the delicate balance of power between rival groups.<sup>34</sup> For operational art, this lesson illustrates how important it is that a commander considers his contracting policies when he develops his COIN campaign in order to ensure unintended effects do not detract from support to the force or the population.

### ***Lesson Summary***

These three lessons serve to illustrate how important it is for the commander to consider how the ways and means used to support the force and population can influence the campaign. Self-sufficient forces that can maintain persistent presence or pursuit of insurgents maximize the pressure that combat or security operations can put on the insurgency while reducing the inherent vulnerabilities that relying on frequent resupply can have. Reconstruction and development are essential but they require integration with security operations, and it is important to pick projects that do no harm. Finally, contractors support both operations and development efforts, but not without a host of potential drawbacks for commanders at all levels to consider.

### **Applying Logistics Lessons to Operational Art in Counterinsurgency**

Now that some of the most important historical lessons about logistics in COIN are established, this section applies them to the theory of operational art to answer the second research question. Specifically, how should an operational commander think about logistical tradeoffs as he develops his operational design? The historical lessons point to the fact that the manner in which a COIN force

executes its lines of operation is important. As the commander balances the factors of time, space, and force and integrates operational functions such as protection or command organization, he must carefully consider the way in which the COIN force supports its operations and the people.

One of the first things a commander considers in operational art is how to balance advantages and disadvantages in the factors of time, space, and force.<sup>35</sup> In a COIN campaign, time and space are often initially on the insurgents' side since the insurgency can operate where the government is weak and only has to maintain itself in existence until the government collapses from sheer exhaustion or the force balance tips in the insurgents' favor.<sup>36</sup> This is why insurgencies are usually protracted wars. The COIN forces' main advantage is in aggregate force and resources.

A COIN commander can offset insurgents' advantages in time and space by ceding less important space to the insurgents, such as inhospitable jungle or mountain areas, in order to buy time to conduct security and reconstruction in higher priority areas. Logistical support to operations and the population is simpler, allowing the commander to maximize resources to conduct security and development. Eventually, security and development can move outward from the secured locations demonstrating the "oil spot principle."<sup>37</sup> To defeat the insurgents' advantage in time, the COIN force must be able to put pressure on the insurgents in their sanctuaries and along their lines of communication without making more enemies. Light, mobile, distributed and highly self-sufficient forces are ideally suited to this task. Development programs can help by defeating the insurgents' message and access to the population, as long the programs do not inadvertently support the insurgency. Poorly conceived or executed programs can detract from government legitimacy, give credibility to the insurgents' propaganda, create local conflicts, or in some cases, funnel resources directly to the insurgents.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the establishment of lines of communication and infrastructure, such as roads, landing zones, power grids, and outposts can help to extend government influence in space and can facilitate the sustainment and support of widely distributed light forces. This additional infrastructure can have the added bonus of addressing the needs of society.

In summary, the COIN force counters enemy advantages in space with development and security and in time by going after insurgents themselves. The commander must take care that superior force does not lead to foolish expenditures that might hurt the campaign. For example, a heavy force with considerable sustainment requirements over time can result in reliance on support contractors or frequent resupply, which can, as shown, have drawbacks. The commander must determine which security and development missions are appropriate for which forces, where to use contractors appropriately, and how to balance risk to friendly forces against risk of mission failure.

After considering time, space and force, support to the population and to combat operations must be also be synchronized with the operational functions, defined by Dr. Vego of the Naval War College as protection, fires, logistics, intelligence, command organization, and command and control warfare.<sup>39</sup> The lessons apply to each function, but the ones dealt with in detail are protection, logistics, and command organization.

In the protection function, there are many considerations. The commander must recognize that forces requiring frequent resupply will require greater force applied to protecting lines of communication, as these are prime insurgent targets. As the number of development projects increases, the requirement for security increases and subsequently support requirements increase. Lighter, more self-sufficient forces can offset this, but at some point, host nation and contractor support will be required. Protecting this contractor support presents dilemmas for the commander as well. If the contractors protect themselves, there can be unintended consequences. If military forces must protect

the contractors, it is likely that large portions of combat forces are engaged in project, line of communication, and contractor security and not pursuing insurgents to culmination. An approach to simplifying the requirements of protection in COIN is to minimize the amount of logistical support that the COIN force requires, and to synchronize development security with protection of lines of communication and contractors.<sup>40</sup>

In logistics, the commander must understand how he intends to win the interaction between each side's cumulative culminating points.<sup>41</sup> Ultimately, development projects and combat operations are logistically intensive and expensive activities. The commander must constantly keep in mind that the insurgents' strategy is to protract the conflict until the government or COIN force can no longer sustain its operations whether through lack of will or resource. Anything done to minimize requirements from lighter forces to judicious development project selection and supervision can help extend culmination in time and space.

In the command organization function, the commander must ensure that he has unity of effort between security and development since one cannot exist without the other. The example from CORDS in Vietnam is instructive. Achieving synergy between security and development can enable the COIN force to economize forces used for protection, potentially freeing resources to pursue insurgents. It is also important to ensure that development projects do not fall victim to the insurgency and that supporting contractors do quality work. Unity of effort also ensures that scarce logistics resources such as engineering units, supplies, and funding remain balanced across multiple lines of operation.

The remaining operational functions are also important. In the fires function, the commander must come to appreciate development as information operations or a form of non-lethal fires and the targeting process must support picking the right projects.<sup>42</sup> In the intelligence function, the commander must appreciate the physical, economic, cultural, and social domain of the battlefield in order to understand which development projects will have the biggest impact on undermining the insurgency and which ones are doomed from the start. Lastly, command and control warfare in COIN consists largely in winning the war of perceptions. Judicious use of force, contractors, and targeted development can defeat the insurgents' message while improper use could result in defeat.

### **Potential Counterarguments Rebutted**

No one could argue that an operational commander should not integrate logistics into his operational idea. However, a commander could certainly challenge the importance of development or consider it as someone else's responsibility. In his book, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, Demarest describes pursuit of insurgents to sanctuaries and the cutting off of their lines of communication as the ultimate ingredient for success, but he does not rule out development. Instead, he argues that economic development is not helpful in defeating insurgency in every case. His point is that nobody can really determine how much development might break the cycle of popular support for insurgents.<sup>43</sup> While this argument holds merit, a commander who sees his role purely as insurgent hunting or providing security is sure to fall into one of the many mistakes highlighted by the lessons learned. A commander's concern for development will shape the kind of combat operations he will conduct and therefore the resulting popular perception. Tanks may be lethal against insurgents, but wrecking streets and knocking down walls in a small village might convince the people that the insurgents are right.

Another potential counterargument is that a commander has a duty to protect his troops. Lighter, distributed forces inherently assume more risk. Fortified bases, armored vehicles, air, and fire

support assets can mitigate this risk. While all these things are potentially elements of good COIN strategy, the commander must consider how each of those items reflects in light of the lessons learned. More traffic on lines of communication means more targets for the insurgency. More support assets means more support contractors potentially causing more friction in the local society possibly making more enemies. While a commander does have a duty to his troops, it is vitally important to keep the objective, which is to defeat the enemy without making more, at the forefront at all times.<sup>44</sup>

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The first goal of this research was to understand the operational impact of logistics in COIN. The historical cases highlighted three lessons. The first is that lighter, mobile, and distributed forces are better able to maintain pressure on an insurgency and are less vulnerable to culmination. The second lesson highlights the importance of development and its dependence on security and unity of effort. It also shows how the wrong projects can do more harm than good. The third lesson highlights the proliferation of contractors on the modern battlefield and shows how they can have undesirable effects on the COIN campaign. The second goal was to understand how the commander could account for these lessons in his operational design. By looking at the operational factors and functions in light of COIN theory and the lessons learned, it becomes clear that a wise commander should consider his logistics policies in his operational design since success does not lie in merely selecting the right lines of operation but in setting the right policy for how they will be executed and supported.

Several other recommendations come out of this research in addition to the historical lessons:

-Joint COIN doctrine needs to discuss logistics substantively including the lessons presented in this research. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, has a detailed chapter on logistics and hints at some of these ideas. Conversely, JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, discusses logistics as an element in some areas of COIN, but does not address it as a distinct function whose policies can have an impact on the overall campaign.

-Military and national leadership need to consider the consequences of extensive reliance on contractors in combat zones. While contractors are critical enablers to modern combat operations, the unintended consequences are difficult to assess.

-Combat development programs need to consider capabilities that enable ground forces to be light, mobile, and self-sustaining for COIN and stability operations.

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<sup>1</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), I-4. Dr. Milan Vego uses a famous quote from General Patton to introduce his section on operational logistics.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 8-4. FM 3-24 describes typical logical lines of operation in COIN, which include these activities.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics* (Ft. Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), ix.

<sup>5</sup> Mohammed Akbar Khan, *Guerrilla Warfare: Its Past, Present, and Future* (Karachi: Rangrut, 1970), 295.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 164.

<sup>7</sup> Demarest, Geoff. *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 402.

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- <sup>8</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps. "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency* 5-6.
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps. "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 5-6.
- <sup>10</sup> U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-24." *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 5, 2009) xiv-xv.
- <sup>11</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps. "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 8-4.
- <sup>12</sup> Mohammed Akbar Khan, *Guerrilla Warfare: Its Past, Present, and Future*, 311.
- <sup>13</sup> Mohammed Akbar Khan, *Guerrilla Warfare: Its Past, Present, and Future*, 311.
- <sup>14</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 402.
- <sup>15</sup> Mohammed Akbar Khan, *Guerrilla Warfare: Its Past, Present, and Future*, 130-135.
- <sup>16</sup> Barnett Singer and John Langdon, *Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 47-90.
- <sup>17</sup> Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars" (*Parameters*, U.S. Army War College Quarterly Summer, 2004), 76-82. The author covers lessons learned from U.S. small wars and COIN efforts in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. Combined action is essentially a program where U.S. small units are blended with host nation units that operate together.
- <sup>18</sup> Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), 13.
- <sup>19</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 198-199.
- <sup>20</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 198-199.
- <sup>21</sup> Sean M. Maloney, *Confronting the Chaos: A Rogue Military Historian Returns to Afghanistan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 242. Dr. Maloney, the historical advisor to the Canadian Chief of the Land Staff, concludes his book about several trips to Afghanistan with this quote.
- <sup>22</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 2-13.
- <sup>23</sup> Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," 79.
- <sup>24</sup> Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 20.
- <sup>25</sup> Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, 20.
- <sup>26</sup> Sean M. Maloney, *Confronting the Chaos: A Rogue Military Historian Returns to Afghanistan*, 159.
- <sup>27</sup> Sean M. Maloney, *Confronting the Chaos: A Rogue Military Historian Returns to Afghanistan*, 232.
- <sup>28</sup> John Waghelstein, and Donald Chisolm, *Analyzing Insurgency* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2006), 5. According to the authors, the historical record shows that COIN campaigns that wait to establish security before development projects begin typically fail.
- <sup>29</sup> T. X. Hammes, "Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact" (*National Defense University Strategic Forum November*, 2010), 1.
- <sup>30</sup> Daniel Goure, Ph.D., *Logistics Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq*. (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, June 2010), 1.
- <sup>31</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 8-17.
- <sup>32</sup> U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, "FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5" *Counterinsurgency*, 8-18.
- <sup>33</sup> T. X. Hammes, "Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact", 5-10.
- <sup>34</sup> Although this conclusion is evident from the cases presented, the author, serving as a contracting officer's representative, personally witnessed cases in Iraq in early 2008 where friction between foreign

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contractors and local sub-contractors had the potential to alienate tribal leadership in Al Anbar province at a critical time in the COIN campaign.

<sup>35</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, III-3 – III-65. This chapter of Dr. Vego's book describes the theoretical operational factors of time, space and force, which a commander must balance in operational art.

<sup>36</sup> James D. Kiras, "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency", (*Baylis, Wirtz & Gray: Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Oxford University Press. 2012), 189-193. This section of the chapter discusses the way insurgents can leverage advantages in time and space.

<sup>37</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, 173.

<sup>38</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 133-134.

<sup>39</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, VIII-3 – VIII-95. This chapter of Dr. Vego's book covers theoretical operational level warfare functions.

<sup>40</sup> David C. Gompert, et al., *Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), xvii-xviii.

<sup>41</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 474. "Because you can design a strategy in such a way that the aggregate of your units' culminating points is advantageous."

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-24." *Counterinsurgency Operations*. (U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, X-14)

<sup>43</sup> Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, 126-132.

<sup>44</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, APP-100. According to Dr. Vego, "Not all principles of war can be fully observed. However, the principle of the objectives should be fully observed at all times. It is the most important principle of all."